Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

2:25-cv-18734Njd14.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GUILHERME HENRIQUE DE SOUZA,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 25-18734 (JXN)
LUIS SOTO, et al.,
Respondents.
OPINION
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court is Petitioner Guilherme Henrique De Souza’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued
detention. (Habeas Pet., ECF No. 1.) Respondents opposed (Resps.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 5), and
Petitioner replied (Pet.’s Reply, ECF No. 7). Having considered the parties’ submissions in support
of and opposition to the Petition, the Court decides the motions without oral argument under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth
below, Petitioner’s Petition is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner, a citizen of Brazil, entered the United States on August 13, 2021 pursuant to a
B-2 nonimmigrant tourist visa, with authorization to remain for a temporary period not to exceed
February 12, 2022. (Habeas Pet. at 4; Resps.’ Opp’n at 1.) Petitioner overstayed his authorized
period of admission and remained in the United States without lawful status. (Habeas Pet. at 4.)
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On December 8, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested
Petitioner. (Id.; Resps.’ Opp’n at 1.) Following his arrest, Petitioner filed an I-589 Application for
Asylum and for Withholding of Removal on December 15, 2025. (See Resps.’ Ex. D, ECF No. 6-
4 at *25–34.) On the same day, Petitioner filed a motion for bond redetermination under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) with the immigration court. (See Resps.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 6-3.) On December 17, 2025,
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and found Petitioner a
flight risk and denied him bond. (See Resps.’ Ex. E, ECF No. 6-5.)
On December 24, 2025, a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) was filed with the immigration court,
charging Petitioner with being removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), based on his remaining in the United States for a time
longer than permitted by his B-2 nonimmigrant tourist visa. (See Resps.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 6-1.)
Petitioner is scheduled for an individualized merits hearing on January 20, 2025. (Pet.’s Letter at
1, ECF No. 8.)
On December 17, 2025, the same day he received a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
before the IJ, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, arguing that his “detention is unlawful because
ICE lacks statutory authority to continuing detaining him . . . [and he] is not subject to mandatory
detention under INA § 236(a) and does not have a final order of removal such that INA § 241
would apply.” (Habeas Pet. at 2.) Petitioner argues that his continued detention without an
individualized custody determination violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
(Id. at 2, 13–14.) Petitioner argues that INA § 236(a) authorizes discretionary detention only
following an individualized custody determination. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner seeks release from
custody. (Id. at 15.)
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Respondents filed a response, submitting that Petitioner is removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B), is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)’s discretionary authority, and has received
an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a). (See Resps.’ Opp’n.) Petitioner replied, seeking
release based on “his unconstitutional confinement as well as the pervasive practice of Immigration
Judges denying bond requests irrespective of their merits.” (Pet.’s Reply.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when he “is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition if the petitioner is “in custody”
and the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). A district court’s
authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The burden is on petitioner to show that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston,
312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Whether Petitioner’s Detention Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment
Petitioner does not dispute that he overstayed his B-2 visa and is currently detained under
§ 1226(a)’s discretionary authority. (See generally Habeas Pet.; Pet.’s Reply.) In his Petition,
Petitioner argues that, as he is not subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c), he is entitled
to an individualized bond hearing. (Habeas Pet. at 10.) Petitioner claims detention without an
individualized assessment violates his due process rights. (Id. at 11.) Petitioner seeks immediate
release from custody. (Id. at 15.)
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Respondents letter answer submits that Petitioner received an individualized bond hearing,
where the IJ found him a flight risk and denied him bond under § 1226(a). (Resps.’ Ex. A.)
Respondents argue that because Petitioner was afforded a bond hearing, he is not entitled to habeas
relief. (Id. at 1-2.)
A noncitizen present in the United States may still be removed if he or she falls “within
one or more . . . classes of deportable aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). Section 1227(a)(1)(B) provides
for the removal of noncitizens who have overstayed their authorized period of nonimmigration
admission. Section 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining noncitizens
already present in the country who are deportable under Section 1227 pending their removal.
Jennings v. Rodriquez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018). “Section 1226(a) sets out the default rule: The
Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of [a noncitizen] ‘pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a)). The detention authority under §1226(a) is discretionary and the Attorney General “may
release” an alien detained under § 1226(a) “on . . .bond” or “conditional parole.” Id.
Here, the parties agree Petitioner has been detained under the discretionary authority of §
1226(a). Federal Regulations “provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings
at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 538 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)). Bond is
available if the noncitizen “demonstrate[s] . . . such release would not pose a danger to property or
persons, and that [he] is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) “[T]he
immigration judge is authorized to exercise the authority . . . to detain the [noncitizen] in custody,
release the [noncitizen], and determine the amount of bond.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1).
As Respondents contend, Petitioner already received an individualized bond hearing, as
required under the federal regulations and § 1226(a). In his Petition, Petitioner sought his
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immediate release, arguing the lack of an individualized assessment violated his constitutional
rights. However, the federal regulations authorize bond hearings for noncitizens detained under §
1226(a), not automatic release from custody. See 8 C.F.R. § 236(d)(1). As Petitioner received an
individualized bond hearing, the Court finds he has received the relief he was entitled to under §
1226(a).
B. Whether Petitioner’s Bond Hearing Violated his Due Process Rights
In his reply brief, Petitioner argues his bond hearing “lacked due process, and was further
fundamentally unfair, because an individualized determination of [Petitioner’s] interests never
occurred. (Pet.’s Reply at 4.) Petitioner claims that the record reflects overwhelming evidence
rebutting the IJ’s finding that Petitioner is a flight risk. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner argues that Judge
Rastegar summarily deemed Petitioner a flight risk based on the “following asserted grounds: (1)
that he allegedly lacks a fixed address; (2) that he claims gainful employment but purportedly
failed to prove it; (3) that he has no meaningful ties to the United States; and (4) that his Form I-
589 asylum application is allegedly week and only recently filed.” (Id. at 4.)
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review any discretionary determinations underlying the
immigration judge’s bond decision, but it can review whether the bond hearing was fundamentally
unfair in violation of this Court’s order. See Ghanem v. Warden Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No.
21-1908, 2022 WL 574624, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022). In a fundamentally fair bond hearing,
due process has three essential elements. The noncitizen “(1) is entitled to factfinding based on a
record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must be allowed to
make arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an individualized determination
of his [or her] interests.” Id. (alteration in original).
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The Court has reviewed the bond hearing transcript and finds the IJ did not “summarily”
deem Petitioner a flight risk. As noted above, Petitioner appeared before an IJ on December 17,
2025. The IJ concluded that Petitioner was a flight risk and denied Petitioner bond. (Pet.’s Reply
at 9–13.) Petitioner submitted documents to the immigration court, including letters from his
supporters. (See Resps.’ Ex. C.) The IJ reviewed the documents and Petitioner’s counsel was able
to address the IJ. (See generally Pet.’s Reply at 9–13.) The IJ particularly reviewed the letter from
Petitioner’s “sponsor,” noting the sponsor was married to Petitioner’s aunt and was willing to
provide financial support to Petitioner and offer him housing. (Id. at 9.)
Petitioner claimed to be gainfully employed, however, his attorney acknowledged that
Petitioner was unable to obtain a letter from the restaurant that Petitioner had been working at. (Id.
at 11.) The IJ noted that Petitioner failed to provide any evidence of his employment, including
pay stubs or tax returns. (Id. at 13.) The IJ asked if Petitioner had any evidence regarding a fixed
address, and counsel acknowledged that the only evidence was the address listed on Petitioner’s I-
589 asylum application. (Id. at 11–12.) In finding Petitioner a flight risk, the IJ noted the lack of
evidence of a fixed address. (Id. at 13.) The IJ also noted that the only relative listed by Petitioner
lived in Massachusetts and Petitioner admitted that he had not lived in Massachusetts in the past
four years. (Id. at 12.) Additionally, the IJ noted that Petitioner overstayed his visa by four years,
waited until two days before the bond hearing to apply for asylum, and provided no explanation
why he did not apply for asylum at any point in the past four years. (Id. at 13.)
Petitioner’s arguments that the IJ “summarily” deemed Petitioner a flight risk is a challenge
to the judge’s credibility determination and weighing of the evidence, which are discretionary
determinations beyond this Court’s review. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e); see also Ghanem, 2022 WL
574624, at *2 (“A motion to enforce a judgment is not the proper avenue to relitigate the merits of
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a bond order.”) This Court does not express any opinion on whether the IJ came to the correct
conclusion, but the record compels a finding that Petitioner received the individualized bond
hearing as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) that he was entitled to.
Any challenge to the IJ’s denial of bond must be presented to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition (ECF No. 1) is DENIED. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Opinion.
DATED: 1/14/2026
________________________
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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