Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

2:25-cv-18608Njd07.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
NAHUM SOTELO SALVATIERRA, 	:
: 	Civil Action No. 25-18608 (BRM)
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
:
PAM BONDI, et al., 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
:
THIS 	MATTER 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	Petitioner 	Nahum 	Sotelo 	Salvatierra’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenging his detention by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing (ECF
No. 1) and Respondents’ letter response (ECF No. 4).
Petitioner, a citizen of Bolivia, has been living in the United States and entered the United
States without inspection. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) On November 29, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. (Id.) Petitioner has been in ICE detention
since his arrest. (Id.) Following Petitioner’s arrest and detention by ICE, he has not been afforded
an individualized bond hearing because he is being held in mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). (Id. at 2.)
On December 16, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. (ECF No. 2.)
Respondents filed a letter response on December 26, 2025. (ECF No. 4.)
The Petition contends Petitioner is unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without
a bond hearing. (See ECF No. 1.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is lawfully detained under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) mandatory detention provision. (ECF No. 4.) Respondents provide a brief
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argument that Petitioner was either “released or paroled” into the United States following a
credible-fear screener interview for an asylum claim. (Id. at 1–2.) Respondents claim the fact that
Petitioner was “released or paroled” after his credible-fear screener interview and was later re-
detained does not change his detention from §1225(b)(1) to § 1226(a). (Id. at 2.) Respondents
claim 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	now 	mandatory 	pending 	removal 	proceedings 	under
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which states that, with a positive credible fear determination, the alien “shall
be detained” throughout the removal proceedings. (Id.)
Respondents have failed to provide support for their position. There is no evidence of
record that Petitioner was in fact “paroled” into the United States following his initial credible-
fear interview pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Rather, Respondents submit that Petitioner
was “released or paroled.” (Id. (emphasis added).) This is not a showing that Petitioner was
initially paroled into the United States. Respondents have only provided the Court with a copy of
Petitioner’s Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien I-213 Form that was created the day of
Petitioner arrest on November 29, 2025. (ECF No. 4-1.) The I-213 Form indicates only that
Petitioner was provided with a Notice to Appear following her credible-fear interview. (Id. at 2.)
There is no indication on the I-213 Form that Petitioner was paroled into the United States.
Respondents have not shown that Petitioner was paroled into the country.
Courts in this District, including this Court in the recent matter Sandhu v. Tsoukaris, No.
25-14607 (BRM), have considered whether noncitizens who are detained after having already been
in this country are unlawfully held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b) and need to be treated
as being held the discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In Sandhu, Respondents argued
DHS has implemented a new policy interpreting INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), to require
mandatory detention of noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or inspection
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and to render them ineligible for release on bond, a position that the Board of Immigration Appeals
recently adopted in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In Sandhu, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Sandhu,
No. 25-14607 (ECF Nos. 7, 8). The Court held that Sandhu was unlawfully held in mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) and need to be treated as being held the discretionary authority of 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a).
In Sandhu, this Court explained the following:
The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or §
1226(a) is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the
country. “The line historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that
section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the
country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already
in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238,
at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see
also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not
Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this
country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States
when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival
at the border.”).
. . .
For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either
seeking entry to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and
§ 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the interior of the United
States. The Supreme Court in Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction,
describing § 1225 as the detention statute for noncitizens affirmatively
“seeking admission” into the United States, and § 1226 as the detention
statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.” [Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)]. And although the Jennings Court
characterizes 	§ 	1225(b)(2) 	as 	the 	“catchall” 	detention 	provision 	for
noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it identifies § 1226(a) as the
“default rule” for the arrest, detention, and release of non-criminal aliens
who are already present in the United States. Id. at 303.
The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have rejected
Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado,
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as contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.[1] See, e.g., Soto [v. Soto, et al.,
No. 25-cv-16200, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)] (finding
that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e.,
affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners
who have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-
cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947 at * 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the
government’s proposed interpretation of § 1225(b) [is] at odds with the
context and structure of the provisions governing detention of noncitizens
who are arriving at the border and those who are already present in the
country”); Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496 at * 3 (noting that “up until July 8 the
predominant form of detention authority for petitioner and other noncitizens
arrested in the interior of the United States was § 1226(a)”); Salazar v.
Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe
v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept.
23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-4048, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D.
Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL
2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408,
2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–
cv–01542, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); [collecting
additional cases].
Sandhu, No. 25-14607 (ECF No. 7 at 7–11).
Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Sandhu, No. 25-14607, the Court finds the
facts asserted in the Petition establish Petitioner was detained after being present in the United
States and his detention is authorized only by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b).
Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS on this 7th day of January 2026,
ORDERED the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and
it is further
1 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the
meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to
ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412
(2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)).
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ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this
Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and it is further
ORDERED within 3 business days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a written
notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally
ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying
Opinion upon the parties electronically.
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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