BRYANT v. MYERS et al

2:25-cv-16688Njd27.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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IV. CONCLUSION
Having determined that (1) the CCB's judgment in Bryant v. Myers, 25-CCB-397 and
(2) Defendant's joint ownership of the "For Lila" film bars Plaintiff from asserting any cause of
action based upon Defendant's public display of the "For Lila" film,
IT IS, on this 27th of February 2026
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, D.E. 23, is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint, D.E. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is
further
ORDERED that Defendant's request for subpoenas is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's other pending motions, D.Es. 29, 34, 35, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45,
50, and 53 are DENIED as MOOT; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Memorandum Order to
Plaintiff via regular mail; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case.
Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.
investigation into retaliatory conduct, witness intimidation, and fraudulent filings), it is the
executive branch that "has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case." Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)). The Court would therefore have no role in
supporting such an investigation.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KAITRON BRYANT,
Plaintiff,
No. 25cv16688 (EP) (AME)
V.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
MALIK MYERS,
Defendant.
PADIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Kaitron Bryant proceeds pro se and seeks to sue Defendant Malik Myers, who
also proceeds pro se, for direct copyright infringement, contributory and vicarious infringement,
false representation and misattribution, and willful and continuing infringement. D.E. 1
(“Complaint”) at 1-2. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs claims on grounds that Plaintiff
brought these same claims before another tribunal and already lost. See D.E. 23 (“Motion to
Dismiss” or “Mot.”). In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant also seeks subpoenas to investigate
Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion to Dismiss and Defendant did not reply. See Dkt.

Because the Copyright Claims Board already dismissed Plaintiffs claims on merits-based
grounds and because amendment would be futile, this Court will GRANT the Motion to Dismiss
in part and DENY it in part. Specifically, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiff's claims with
prejudice and DENY Defendant’s request for subpoenas.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Copyright Claims Board Action
Plaintiff brought an action before the Copyright Claims Board (“CCB”), alleging that

Defendant “had publicly displayed a film titled ‘For Lila’” without Plaintiff's authorization. See

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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Bryant v. Myers, 25-CCB-397 (“CCB Action”), D.E. 6 at 1 (Sept. 30, 2025). The CCB
acknowledged that Defendant was the “film’s director, editor, and casting director,” and that
despite Plaintiffs claim that Defendant had no ownership interest in the film, the parties’ contract
clearly indicated that Plaintiff gave Defendant “a 10% ownership interest in the ‘For Lila’ film
footage.” Id. Because it is “a matter of basic copyright law, [that] co-owners of a copyright cannot
be liable to one another for infringement of that copyright,” the CCB found that, as a matter of
law, Defendant could not infringe Plaintiff's copyright. Jd The CCB accordingly dismissed
Plaintiffs claims and closed his case. Jd. Plaintiff did not seek review of that judgment.

B. This Action

Here too, Plaintiff brings an action against Defendant for Defendant’s public screening of
the “For Lila” film. Complaint at 1; see also

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a proposed amended complaint, D.E. 3, bringing the same
causes of action, as well as tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, against
Myers and other proposed defendants. D.E. 34-1 (“Proposed Amended Complaint”) at 3. Plaintiff
repeats his claims that Defendant had no authority to use or exhibit the “For Lila” film. Complaint
at 1; see also Proposed Complaint at 3 (alleging Plaintiff is “the sole author and copyright owner
of the screenplay and motion picture For Lila”).

Plaintiff had until January 14, 2026 to provide proof of service of the Complaint on
Defendant. See D.E. 22. He has not. Despite Plaintiff's failure to serve, Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss and a motion seeking to subpoena records to document Plaintiff's harassment of him.
See generally Mot. In response, Plaintiff has filed a flurry of improper motions, unduly burdening
the Court with meritless or procedurally improper requests. See, e.g., D.E. 22,27. The Court will

not recount Plaintiffs motions in detail but the motions currently pending include: (1) Plaintiff's

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emergent motion for alternate service to serve Defendant via email, D.E. 29;! (2) Plaintiffs motion
to file an amended complaint to add IMDb.com and Amazon.com as defendants, D.E. 34;
(3) Plaintiff's second emergent motion for alternate service to serve Defendant via email, D.E. 35;
(4) Plaintiffs third emergent motion for alternate service to serve Defendant via email, D.E. 36;
(5) Plaintiff's motions for striking Defendant’s prior filings, precluding Defendant from further
filing, and resetting pleading deadlines, D.Es. 41 & 42; and (6) Plaintiff's motion to judicially
estop Defendant from advancing any argument that he is a co-owner of the “For Lila” screenplay,
D.E. 44.
II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Claim Preclusion

Claim preclusion prevents parties from bringing a second suit against “the same adversary
based on the same cause of action as the first suit.” Salerno v. Corzine, 449 F. App’x 118, 122 (3d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Duhaney v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010)). Claim
preclusion applies when there has been: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving;
(2) the same parties or their privies; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action.”
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir. 2010).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The

plaintiff’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

'Tt appears that Plaintiff has made repeated attempts to personally serve Defendant by showing up
to his home. See D.E. 6; see also D.E. 40.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court holds the Complaint to a less
stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Nevertheless, the Court need not “credit a pro se plaintiff's ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Wl. ANALYSIS

The Court will DISMISS Plaintiff's claims with prejudice based on (1) the CCB’s
dismissal, on the merits, in the CCB Action; and (2) Plaintiffs inability to sue a joint owner for
copyright infringement. For the reasons provided below, the Court will GRANT in part and
DENY in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

A. The CCB’s Judgment Bars Plaintiff’s Action

In the CCB Action, Plaintiff challenged Defendant’s public display of “For Lila” and
alleged that Defendant’s actions infringed Plaintiff's copyright. The CCB dismissed Plaintiff's
claim after reviewing the parties’ agreement and finding that because Plaintiff had granted
Defendant an ownership interest in the copyright of the “For Lila” film, Plaintiff could not bring
an action against Defendant for infringement of that copyright. Plaintiff has therefore received a
final judgment on the merits. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947) (“[T]he merits of
a claim are disposed of when they are refused enforcement.”’).

Plaintiff also brings his action against the same party and challenges the same conduct:
Defendant’s purportedly unauthorized public dissemination of “For Lila.” Defendant is therefore
entitled to the benefit of the CCB’s judgment in the CCB Action. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d
333, 342 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Astoria Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107

(1991) (“We have long favored application of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as

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to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of administrative bodies that have
attained finality.”).

B. Joint Ownership Bars Plaintiff’s Action

Notwithstanding the prior action, Defendant’s joint ownership of the “For Lila” film
necessarily dooms any claim Plaintiff brings against him of copyright infringement. See
Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 68-69 (3d Cir. 2014). Plaintiff attempts to circumvent that
outcome by alleging that he is the sole copyright owner of the underlying screenplay, but he does
not allege that Defendant has publicly displayed or distributed the underlying written work. It is
therefore immaterial who owns the copyright over the underlying screenplay because Plaintiff’s
claims are based upon the display of the “For Lila” film, an audiovisual work that Plaintiff agreed
to work with Defendant on and which both parties hold a joint copyright over. Because amendment
would therefore be futile,” this Court will DISMISS Plaintiff’s action with prejudice.

C. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Other Motions and Defendant’s Requests for
Subpoenas

It appears that Defendant seeks to subpoena records in support of seeking sanctions against
Plaintiff. Because the Court will CLOSE this case and DISMISS Plaintiff's action with prejudice,
the Court will DENY Defendant’s request as MOOT.’ The Court will also DENY as MOOT

Plaintiffs various other pending motions at D.Es. 29, 34, 35, 36, 41, 42, 44, 45, 50, and 53.

> “[A] court may dismiss a claim with prejudice based on “bad faith or dilatory motives, truly
undue or unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously
allowed, or futility of amendment.” Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir.1993); see
also 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.15 (3d ed. 2021) (“An amendment
is futile if it merely restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms, reasserts a
claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a
motion to dismiss.’’).

> To the extent Defendant seeks records to support some potential investigation into Plaintiff's
harassment of him, see D.E. 14 (Defendant requesting referral to the U.S. Attorney for an

5

IV. CONCLUSION
Having determined that (1) the CCB's judgment in Bryant v. Myers, 25-CCB-397 and
(2) Defendant's joint ownership of the "For Lila" film bars Plaintiff from asserting any cause of
action based upon Defendant's public display of the "For Lila" film,
IT IS, on this 27th of February 2026
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, D.E. 23, is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint, D.E. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is
further
ORDERED that Defendant's request for subpoenas is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's other pending motions, D.Es. 29, 34, 35, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45,
50, and 53 are DENIED as MOOT; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this Memorandum Order to
Plaintiff via regular mail; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case.
Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.
investigation into retaliatory conduct, witness intimidation, and fraudulent filings), it is the
executive branch that "has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case." Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)). The Court would therefore have no role in
supporting such an investigation.
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