ELMILLIGY v. ELMILLIGY

2:25-cv-13434Njd04.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MAHMOUD ELMILLIGY,
Plaintiff,
No. 25cv13434 (EP) (JBC)
V.
OPINION
MONA ELMILLIGY,
Defendant.
PADIN, District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Mahmoud Elmilligy filed a complaint alleging that his sister, Defendant
Mona Elmilligy, had acted in coordination with “Plaintiff's estranged spouse and/or state agents”
and “knowingly spread[] falsehoods about Plaintiffs mental health.” D.E. 1 (“Complaint” or
“Compl.”) at 1-2. Plaintiff also sought to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). D.E. 7 (“IFP
Application”). On October 30, 2025, the Court screened the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed it for failure to state a claim, and allowed Plaintiff 30 days to file a
proposed amended complaint. D.Es. 11 (“Opinion Dismissing Complaint”) & 12 (“Order
Dismissing Complaint”). The Court did, however, grant Plaintiff's IFP Application. See id.

On November 2, 2025, Plaintiff then filed a proposed amended complaint. D.E. 13
(“Amended Complaint” or “Am. Compl.”). The Court now screens the Amended Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will DISMISS the Amended Complaint without
prejudice for failure to state a claim and allow Plaintiff 30 days to file a proposed second amended

complaint.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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1 LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this Court may excuse a litigant from prepayment of fees when
the litigant “establish[es] that he is unable to pay the costs of his suit.” Walker v. People Express
Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989).

When granting leave to proceed IFP, courts must examine whether the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, or asserts a claim against a defendant immune from monetary relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)—(Giii). A complaint is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it “lacks an
arguable basis either in law or fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and is legally
baseless if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995).

Complaints may also be dismissed where they fail to state a claim, a standard identical to
the one utilized for motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to
dismissal for failure to state claim under section 1915(e)(2)(B)).! To survive dismissal, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plaintiffs factual allegations “must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citation omitted).

' The Court’s preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not determine whether the
allegations in the Amended Complaint would survive a properly supported motion to dismiss filed
by Defendant after service. See Richardson v. Cascade Skating Rink, No. 19-8935, 2020 WL
7383188, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2020) (“[T]his Court recognizes [a] § 1915(e) screening
determination is a preliminary and interlocutory holding, subject to revision at any time prior to
entry of final judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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A pro se plaintiff's complaint must be liberally construed. See Shorter v. United States,
12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021). When construing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court will
“apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Vogt v. Weizel,
8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021). However, pro se litigants “cannot flout procedural rules—they
must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Jd.
Il. ANALYSIS

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings three claims against Defendant: (1) violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation “of his substantive due process rights to parent his children
and to access his property” (Count I), (2) tortious interference with parental rights under “New
Jersey Common Law” (Count II), and (3) defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (Count HI). Am. Comp. at 2. Though Plaintiff only explicitly brings Count I under §
1983, due to Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will—as it did when reviewing the Complaint—
construe Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as attempting to bring Counts II and II (for tortious
interference, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress) under both § 1983 and
state law. The Court construes these § 1983 claims as being based on the theory that Defendant—
whom Plaintiff has not alleged is a state actor—coordinated with state actors to deprive Plaintiff
of his constitutional rights (1) to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution by defaming him and preventing access to his property and (2) to
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment for interfering in his interest in the care,

custody, and control of his children.”

* The Court does not disturb its finding in its Opinion Dismissing Complaint that Plaintiffs
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim cannot be brought under § 1983 and will therefore
not consider it in determining whether Plaintiff has stated a claim over which this Court has federal
question jurisdiction. See Opinion Dismissing Complaint at 3 n.2 (citing Barkauskie v. Indian
River Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 519, 538-39 (D. Del. 1996)).

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Consistent with his Complaint, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not allege that this
Court has diversity jurisdiction over the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Am. Compl. Instead,
Plaintiff contends that this “Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, as the
Defendant’s actions deprived Plaintiff of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and 42
U.S.C. § 1983, through coordination with public actors in child custody and property deprivation
matters.” Jd. at 1. Because—for the reasons stated below—the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim under § 1983 and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's state law claims, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without
prejudice.

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a § 1983 Claim

Plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail because he has not alleged a violation of a constitutional right
caused by a person acting under color of state law.

§ 1983 provides a private right of action against every “person” who, under the color of
state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitutions and laws” of the United States. Therefore, to state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color
of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563
(3d Cir. 2011).

Although Plaintiff has added a few allegations to his Complaint regarding the involvement
of state actors in the alleged deprivation of his rights, the Court nevertheless finds that Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim under § 1983 in his Amended Complaint because he has not adequately

alleged that any alleged violation of his constitutional rights was committed or caused by a person

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acting under color of state law. See West, 487 U.S. at 48. The only Defendant, Plaintiffs sister,
is not alleged to be a state actor. The Amended Complaint does, however, allege that Defendant
“acted in concert with state officials,” including “persons affiliated with the Mount Olive Police
Department and DCPP,” by “sharing private and defamatory statements concerning Plaintiff's
mental health, parenting ability, and legal status” and “relaying misleading information to law
enforcement and preventing retrieval of personal and professional items critical to his livelihood.”
Am. Compl. at 1-2. While it is true that “citizens who conspire with a state actor are also acting
under color of law for the purposes of § 1983,” Rittenhouse Ent., Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 861
F. Supp. 2d 470, 481 (M.D. Pa. 2012), to “properly plead an unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff
must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred,” Yoast v. Pottstown
Borough, 437 F. Supp. 3d 403, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010)), aff'd, No. 22-1960, 2023 WL 4418213 (3d
Cir. July 10, 2023). In other words, a “plaintiff must make ‘factual allegations of combination,
agreement, or understanding among all or between any of the [co-conspirators] to plot, plan, or
conspire to carry out the alleged chain of events.’” Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F. Supp. 1011, 1020
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (quoting Hammond yv. Creative Fin. Plan. Org., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1244, 1249
(E.D. Pa. 1992)).

Here, Plaintiff has not asserted any facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be
inferred. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations that Defendant acted “in concert with state officials”
and “coordinat[ed] with Plaintiff's estranged spouse and individuals acting under color of law
created a joint participation sufficient to attribute state action under § 1983” do not constitute facts
from which an actual agreement between any state official and Defendant can be inferred. See

Am. Comp. at 1-2; Yoast, 437 F. Supp. 3d at 421 (“[Plaintiff’s] conclusory allegations that the

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defendants were ‘acting in concert’ or ‘acted in collusion’ cannot support his claim.”). Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint does not include any facts suggesting that Defendant and any state actor came
to a meeting of the minds to violate Plaintiff's rights. See Spencer, 968 F. Supp. at 1020. Instead,
beyond his conclusory allegations, he only asserts that Defendant communicated with state
officials and “relay[ed] misleading information” to those officials and that he was then deprived
of his rights. See Am. Compl. at 1-2. But “it is not enough that the end result of the [alleged co-
conspirators’ | independent conduct caused plaintiff harm or even that the alleged perpetrators of

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the harm acted in conscious parallelism;” a plaintiff must allege that “the private actor wrongfully
influenced the state actor’s decision through a conspiracy.” Spencer, 968 F. Supp. at 1020
(emphasis added) (quoting Davis v. Union Nat’l Bank, 46 F.3d 24, 26 (7th Cir. 1994)) (citation
modified). Plaintiff has simply offered no allegations regarding actions taken by any state official
that might suggest that those state officials agreed to conspire with Defendant to violate Plaintiff's
rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that any deprivation of his rights are
attributable to any state actor. See Diulus v. Churchill Valley Country Club, 601 F. Supp. 677, 679
(W.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to plead state action because “mere conclusory
allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically
present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action”).

Because Plaintiff has not set forth allegations from which the Court could plausibly infer
that any deprivation of his rights was caused by a person acting under color of state law, Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim under § 1983. The Court will accordingly DISMISS Plaintiffs § 1983
claims without prejudice. And because—even liberally construing Plaintiff's claims—the

Amended Complaint raises no other federal causes of action, the Court does not have original

jurisdiction over this matter.

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B. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
State Law Claims

Having found that Plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim, the only claims that remain
are Plaintiffs state law tort claims (Counts II (tortious interference with parental rights) and II
(defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress)). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1367, a
district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law claim] if. . . the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction... .” Here, as it did
in its Opinion Dismissing Complaint, the Court will exercise its discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. See, e.g., Grossberger v. Cormack, No.
24-8182, 2025 WL 1193994, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2025) (similarly declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over pro se plaintiffs state law claims after dismissing federal claims
upon screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS
Plaintiffs state law claims without prejudice.
Il. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DISMISS the Amended Complaint without
prejudice. Plaintiff may file a proposed second amended complaint within 30 days of the Order
accompanying this Opinion that cures the deficiencies identified herein. An appropriate Order

accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: February 4, 2026 $4 f To p-

Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

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