DE SANTIAGO KEENE et al v. CHEEKS, et al

2:25-cv-07375Njd26.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Gareth David de Santiago Keene
211 Graphic Boulevard
New Milford, NJ 07646
Pro se Plaintiff
Michael L. Berry
Ballard Spahr LLP
1735 Market Street
51 st Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Defendant Paramount Global
LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Re: 	Gareth David de Santiago Keene, et al. v. George Cheeks, et al., Civ. No. 25-7375
(SDW) (LDW)
Counsel:
Before this Court is Defendant Paramount Global’s1 (“Paramount Global”) Motion to
Dismiss (D.E. 7 (“Motion”)) 2 Plaintiff Gareth David de Santiago Keene’s (“Keene”) Amended
Complaint (D.E. 4 (“AC”)) and Keene’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (D.E. 6 (“TRO
Motion”)) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) and 65 and Local Civil
Rule (“Local Rule”) 65.1. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Venue is proper
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78.
1 All Defendants other than Paramount Global have not appeared or answered the original or Amended
Complaint. However, because the rationale articulated in the Motion applies to all Defendants, this Court
may decide if the Amended Complaint should be dismissed against all Defendants. See Casser v. Twp. of
Knowlton, 803 Fed. App’x 602, 605 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that a motion to dismiss the entire case is
appropriate if the same rationale applies to all defendants).
2 Citations to “D.E.” refer to the docket entries for the parties’ motion papers, including briefs and the
documents attached to and referenced therein.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHAMBERS OF
SUSAN D. WIGENTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
January 26, 2026
MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE
50 WALNUT ST.
NEWARK, NJ 07101
973-645-5903
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For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s TRO Motion
is DENIED.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action arises from an alleged extensive conspiracy orchestrated by Defendant
Paramount Global to prevent Keene, a New Jersey attorney, from marrying Maria Jose Fernandez-
Cote de Pablo3 (“Fernandez”), who Keene claims is secretly engaged to him. 	(AC at 10, 14.)
Fernandez is an actress who portrays the fictional character “Special Agent Ziva David” on the
CBS television show “NCIS.”4 In the show, Special Agent Ziva is the mother of “Tali.” Keene
names Tali as co-Plaintiff in this case and claims to be her anticipated stepfather, even though Tali
is a fictional character. (Id. at 1.) Keene brings this lawsuit on behalf of Fernandez and Tali and
does so based on a “General Durable Power of Attorney.” (D.E. 4-2.) This document, notarized
by a California public notary whose name and commission number does not exist in public records,
grants Keene vast control over Fernandez and Tali’s affairs, allowing him to make medical
decisions on their behalf and represent them in legal matters involving CBS and NCIS, among
other things.5 (Id. at 2–4.)
Keene alleges that to prevent him from marrying Fernandez, Defendants have: 	(1)
kidnapped Fernandez and Tali, held them hostage, and stolen their phones and belongings; (2)
confiscated Fernandez’s passport, subjected her to interrogations and a bodily search, and falsely
reported her to the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”); and (3) assaulted Tali. (AC ¶¶
14–15, 24–25.) 	Keene further contends that Defendants have breached their contracts with
Fernandez, pointing to an alleged 2008 contract between CBS and Fernandez for 50 billion dollars
and a 2021 contract for 500 million dollars. (Id. at 2–3.) Keene states that George Cheeks, the
former President and Chief Executive Officer of CBS, has admitted liability for the breaches of
contract and agreed to pay Keene 7 billion dollars and to recognize his impending marriage to
Fernandez. (Id. ¶ 9.) Based on these claims, Keene seeks 500 billion dollars, life imprisonment
sentences for Defendants, an order terminating all of Defendants’ “special privileges” or “movie
3 Fernandez’s professional name is “Cote de Pablo.” 	See Cote de Pablo: Biography, IMDB.com,
https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1580243/bio/?ref_=nm_ov_bio_sm.
4 This Court may take judicial notice of the nature of the television show “NCIS” and the fictional characters
therein because those facts are not subject to reasonable dispute. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also NCIS:
Tony & Ziva, IMDB.com, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt31512256/.
5 A legal representative of a third-party may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for constitutional standing
“so long as the power of attorney grant was valid.” J by Sorotzkin v. Abaline Paper Prods., Inc., No. 20-
08234, 2021 WL 2177547, at *3 (D.N.J. May 27, 2021) (holding that multiple defects in a power of attorney
deemed it noncompliant and could not serve as a basis for standing for the legal representative). Under
New Jersey law, a power of attorney must be in writing, signed, and acknowledged by an authorized official
such as a public notary. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 46:2B-8.9; 46:14-2.1, -6.1. Here, Keene’s “General Durable
Power of Attorney” is invalid as it appears to contain a falsified notary seal and thus he cannot appear on
behalf of Fernandez or “Tali.” See D.E. 4-2 at 6.
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industry licenses” and a writ of habeas corpus for Defendants to release Fernandez and Tali, among
other relief. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 46, 58, 61.)
On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first Complaint against Defendants George Cheeks,
CBS Television, NCIS, Tony & Ziva, Paramount Global, Sky Dance, National Amusements, Inc.,
Donald Bellisario, Bellisario Productions, Michael P. Bellisario, Maizee Almas, Valerie Weiss,
John Does 1, 2, 3, and Business Entities X, Y, Z (collectively, “Defendants”.) (See D.E. 1.) Two
months later, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, alleging, among other things, violations of
the Fifth Amendment, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and the
“Federal Kidnapping Act” under 18 U.S.C. § 1201. (See generally AC.) Shortly after filing his
Amended Complaint, Keene filed his TRO Motion, wherein he repeats the same allegations in his
Amended Complaint and seeks the same relief. (See D.E. 6 ¶¶ 2–37.) Timely briefing ensued.
(See generally D.E. 7, 10, 11.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id.
Determining whether allegations are plausible is “a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, federal courts “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff,” and determine “whether
[the] plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v.
Belichik, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). However, courts are not required to “credit ‘bald
assertions or legal conclusions’ improperly alleged in the complaint,” nor are they required to
credit allegations that are “sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it.” Debiasa v.
Donnelly, No. 16-552, 2016 WL 4620370, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2016) (quoting In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429 (3d Cir. 1997)); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendant Paramount Global seeks to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety. (See
generally D.E. 7-1.) Plaintiff impermissibly brings his claims on behalf of Fernandez and Tali,
arguing that Defendants have orchestrated an extensive corporate conspiracy to prevent Fernandez
from marrying him. (See generally AC.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants will stop at nothing to
achieve this goal—they have kidnapped and falsely imprisoned Fernandez and Tali, stolen their
phones, passports and luggage, falsely reported them to the DEA and conducted unlawful body
searches, and hacked into Plaintiff’s phone, among many other crimes. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 24, 25, 49.)
Plaintiff further contends that Defendants entered multiple contracts worth billions of dollars with
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Fernandez for her acting work, and requests that those payments be remitted to himself. (Id. at 2–
4.) Paramount Global asserts that: (1) Keene has not established federal subject matter jurisdiction
because his pleadings are facially insufficient; (2) the Amended Complaint should be dismissed
because the allegations are not based in reality; (3) leave to amend should be denied because Keene
has based his claims on fabricated evidence and has failed to demonstrate that an amendment
would not be futile; and (4) the TRO Motion should be denied because Keene’s claims are factually
baseless. (See D.E. 7-1 at 6, 11–17.)
A. Motion to Dismiss
On a motion to dismiss, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and determine if any reasonable reading of the complaint entitles the plaintiff to some
relief. 	Mayer, 605 F.3d at 229. 	Even against such a generous standard, courts need not credit
“allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696.
Here, Keene’s Amended Complaint is based solely on fantastic scenarios that are facially
impossible or entirely divorced from reality. 	Keene’s allegations stem from his alleged
engagement to Fernandez and an extensive corporate conspiracy by Defendants to prevent him
from marrying her. Keene contends that Defendants have kidnapped Fernandez and are keeping
her hostage, committing numerous crimes in the process, including making false reports to federal
law enforcement, rerouting planes, and digital hacking. 	Despite these drastic measures, Keene
fails to explain why Defendants are so opposed to Keene’s marriage to his alleged fiancée.
According to Keene, Defendants have nevertheless agreed to pay Keene 7 billion dollars for a
contract between Fernandez and CBS. 	Lastly, Keene claims a factual impossibility: 	that he is
Tali’s anticipated stepfather, a fictional character on NCIS and not a real child. Because Keene’s
claims are all based on factual impossibilities and fantastic premises and are precisely of the kind
courts are not required to credit, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Leave to amend should be freely granted in the absence of inequity and futility. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (holding that leave to amend should be
granted in the absence of “undue delay, bad faith . . . futility of amendment”). 	Here, however,
granting leave would be both inequitable and futile. 	Keene’s allegations are largely based on
fabricated evidence such as fictitious communications with Defendant Cheeks, forged notaries, or
delusional premises that indicate bad faith. Moreover, given the clear implausibility and lack of
factual basis for Keene’s claims, any amendment would be futile. 	As such, leave to amend is
denied and the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction is the
same. Mirashi v. Doe, No. 25-1805, 2025 WL 893003, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2025) (citing Reilly
v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017)). 	“A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)). When considering whether
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to grant a preliminary injunction, courts must decide whether the movant has shown: 	“(1) a
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is
denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) the
public interest favors such relief.” Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010)). A motion for temporary
restraining order is denied as moot when the complaint is dismissed on the merits, because the
underlying case is gone. See Cammarata v. Donnelly, No. 24-1000, 2025 WL 96446, at *5 (D.N.J.
Jan. 15, 2025) (dismissing a complaint and thereby concluding the motion for a temporary
restraining order was moot).
Here, because Keene’s Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, his TRO Motion is moot. Even if it was not moot, his TRO Motion
is baseless because his allegations lack factual basis and are largely divorced from reality. 	As
such, Keene’s TRO Motion is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED WITH
PREJUDICE. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED. An appropriate
order follows.
/s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Orig: 	Clerk
cc: 	Parties
Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.
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