MANDIGORA v. ZEVLIKARIS et al

2:25-cv-01306Njd17.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GRANT MANDIGORA,
Plaintiff,
v.
AFSTRATIOS 	ZEVLIKARIS, 	KIM
MINATEE, 	SHARON 	WALLI, 	SARAH
TURK, 	THERESA 	PITTMAN, 	JUDGE
RICHARD 	WISCHUSEN, 	and 	JOHN
DOES 1-10, and all persons or entities acting
in concert with any Defendant,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 25-1306 (ES) (SDA)
OPINION
SALAS , DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Grant Mandigora’s (“Plaintiff”) Second Amended
Complaint, (D.E. No. 18 (“SAC”)), Notice of Motion for Preliminary Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief, (D.E. 17 (“PI Motion”)), and Emergency Motion for Constitutional Protective Relief,
(D.E. No. 23 (“Emergency Motion”)). Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s submissions and
other relevant portions of the record without oral argument (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R.
78.1(b)); and it appearing that:
1. 	Plaintiff commenced this matter on February 18, 2025, asserting claims against
Defendants Afstrati Zevlikaris, Kim Minatee, Sharon Walli, and Sarah Turk. (See generally D.E.
No. 1). Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on the same date.
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(D.E. No. 1-3). The next day, Plaintiff filed both an Amended Complaint, (D.E. No. 2),1 and a
motion for injunctive relief. (D.E. No. 3).
2. 	By Order dated March 31, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP application and
dismissed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in its entirety, without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to
file a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies the Court had noted therein. (D.E. No. 9
at 8–9). The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief. (Id.).
3. 	On June 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed both the SAC and PI Motion. In his SAC, Plaintiff
once again asserts claims against Defendants Zevlikaris, Turk, Pittman, and Minatee, and also adds
New Jersey Superior Court Judge Richard Wischusen as a defendant. (SAC ¶¶ 6–11). Plaintiff
alleges violations based on a series of events involving (i) his August 17, 2024 arrest in Fairfax,
Virginia, (SAC ¶¶ 24–27), (ii) the State of New Jersey’s ongoing criminal prosecution against
Plaintiff, (id. ¶¶ 30–48), and (iii) “Fairfax County CPS’s” removal of Plaintiff’s minor child from
Plaintiff’s custody, at the alleged behest of non-party Department of Child Protection and
Permanency 	(“DCCP”) 	(and, 	specifically, 	Defendants 	Minatee 	and 	Pittman 	as 	DCCP
caseworkers), (id. ¶¶ 28–29).
4. 	Based on those events, Plaintiff has asserted six claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that Defendants violated several of his constitutional rights. First, Plaintiff contends that
Defendants Zevlikaris, Turk, Pittman, and Minatee violated his Fourth Amendments rights in
connection with his allegedly unlawful arrest in Virginia. 	(Id. at Count I 2 ¶¶ 1–6 (“Count I”)).
Second, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants violated his procedural due process rights under the
1 	In that pleading, Plaintiff asserted claims against Zevlikaris, Minatee, Turk, and Theresa Pittman, but
removed Sharon Walli as a named defendant. (Id.).
2 	As Plaintiff begins each Count of his SAC with paragraph “1” (i.e., rather than using continuous paragraph
numbering throughout the pleading), the Court specifies the Count at issue for the sake of clarity.
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Fourteenth Amendment both when removing Plaintiff’s minor child from his custody and, later, in
connection with Plaintiff’s ongoing criminal prosecution. (Id. at Count II ¶¶ 1–7 (“Count II”)).
Third, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Zevlikaris, Turk, Pittman, and Minatee violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights through their roles in removing Plaintiff’s minor child from
Plaintiff’s custody. (Id. at Count III ¶¶ 1–5 (“Count III”)). Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants
Zevlikaris and Turk violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him access to “critical
exculpatory evidence” in the context of his ongoing criminal prosecution. (Id. at Count IV ¶¶ 1–
4 (“Count IV”)). Fifth, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Turk unlawfully retaliated against him for
exercising his First Amendment rights (i.e., litigating the ongoing criminal matter) by “improperly
objecting to discovery, making unsubstantiated allegations in court, and communicating ex parte
hearsay from other to actors to prejudice judicial proceedings.” (Id. at Count V ¶¶ 1–4 (“Count
V”)). 	Finally, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Defendants Turk, Zevlikaris, and Judge
Wischusen to prevent “ongoing constitutional violations” in connection with his criminal
prosecution. 	(Id. at Count VI ¶¶ 1–5). 	The Court notes that Plaintiff explicitly seeks only
declaratory and injunctive relief, rather than monetary damages. (Id. at 13–14).
5. 	Because the Court previously granted Plaintiff’s IFP application and dismissed his
Amended Complaint, without prejudice, upon screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
the Court must now screen the SAC for sufficiency before permitting service of process. 	See
Burrell v. Loungo, 750 F. App’x 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2018). Specifically, the Court must sua sponte
dismiss any claim that (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). “When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failure
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to state a claim pursuant § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the District Court uses the same standard it employs
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Vaughn v. Markey, 813 F. App’x 832, 833 (3d Cir. 2020).
6. 	To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and a claim
is facially plausible when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Zuber v. Boscov’s,
871 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2017) (first quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128
(3d Cir. 2010); and then quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 	“[T]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements” are all
disregarded. City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 878 (3d
Cir. 2018) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012)).
7. 	Moreover, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the SAC
liberally and holds his filing to a less stringent standard than submissions filed by attorneys.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 	The Court, however, need not “credit a pro se
plaintiff’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282
(D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).
8. 	As the Court has noted, Plaintiff’s claims fall into three “buckets”: (i) those related
to his August 2024 arrest; (ii) those related to his ongoing criminal proceedings; and (iii) those
related to the custody of his minor child. The court will address each in turn.
9. 	The Court begins with Plaintiff’s false arrest claims against Defendants Zevlikaris,
Turk, Pittman, and Minatee. (SAC at Count I). Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to establish
a false arrest claim against any of these defendants. “‘The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim
based on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but
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whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the
offense.’” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Dowling v.
City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)); accord Islam v. City of Bridgeton, 804 F. Supp.
2d 190, 197 (D.N.J. 2011) (“To prove a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must prove two elements:
(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.”). 	Of the
four defendants named in Count I, only Defendants Zevlikaris and Turk appear to have allegedly
participated in Plaintiff’s August 17, 2024 arrest. (SAC ¶¶ 7 & 24). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that officers of the Fairfax Police Department arrested him “acting in conjunction with and at the
direction of” those defendants. (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff also alleges, however, that “[t]he arrest was
purportedly based on a New Jersey family court bench warrant allegedly issued by Judge Gavin
Handwerker.” (Id.). While Plaintiff alleges that he has never seen a copy of that warrant, (id.), his
limited factual allegations, taken as true, still do not state a plausible false arrest claim against
Defendants Zevlikaris or Turk. See Zuber, 871 F.3d at 255.
10. 	Plaintiff’s false arrest claims are also facially deficient as to Defendants Pittman
and Minatee. Those claims, it appears, are based on Plaintiff’s allegation that Pittman and Minatee
provided unsworn and incorrect information (i.e., that Plaintiff’s minor son was “missing and
endangered”) that ultimately provided the basis for Judge Handwerker’s issuance of a warrant and,
in turn, Plaintiff’s arrest. (SAC ¶¶ 9–10 & 25–27). Neither Pittman nor Minatee arrested Plaintiff,
however. The Court acknowledges that “a plaintiff may succeed in a § 1983 action for false arrest
made pursuant to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that [a]
police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false
statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant;’ and (2) that ‘such
statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’” Wilson v.
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Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d
Cir.1997)). 	Assuming, without deciding, that Pittman and Minatee might be subject to this
standard, despite their roles as caseworkers rather than police officers, and the fact that neither is
alleged to have taken part in Plaintiff’s arrest, Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient for the court to
reasonably infer that either defendant made false statements “knowingly and deliberately, or with
a reckless disregard for the truth[,]” let alone that they knew their statements would be used in a
warrant application. Id. Rather, Plaintiff suggests that Pittman and Minatee’s alleged statements
that Plaintiff’s son was “missing and endangered” were false because Plaintiff had previously
advised “the court” (i.e., not Pittman or Minatee), of his travel plans. The Court cannot reasonably
infer liability based on these meager facts.
11. 	As Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for false arrest against any
defendant, the Court will dismiss Count I of his SAC without prejudice, and will afford him a final
opportunity to replead his false arrest claim.
12. 	The Court next finds that the abstention doctrine that the United States Supreme
Court articulated in Younger v. Harris bars Plaintiff from pursuing claims falling into the second
and third “buckets” in federal court. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine reflects
“a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings
absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,
457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Discussing the scope of Younger abstention, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged that “abstention is not the presumptive course, but
rather an exception to the general rule that federal courts must hear and decide cases within their
jurisdiction.” 	Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir.
2014) (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013)). Indeed, the Third Circuit
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noted that Younger abstention applies “in only three ‘exceptional’ classes of cases: (1) ‘state
criminal prosecutions,’ (2) ‘civil enforcement proceedings,’ and (3) ‘civil proceedings involving
certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial
functions.’” Id. (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 571 U.S. at 73). Moreover, abstention is only
appropriate when (i) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (ii) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (iii) the state proceedings afford an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims. See Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United Methodist
Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App’x 232, 236 (3d Cir. 2009). For both the second and third
“buckets” of claims, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case meet all of the requirements
for Younger abstention.
13. 	The Court will begin with Plaintiff’s claims related to the ongoing criminal
prosecution against him, as they make up the bulk of the remaining claims in the SAC. Plaintiff
alleges a panoply of grievances concerning that proceeding, including that: 	(i) Defendant Turk
informed a judge that Plaintiff had violated pretrial conditions, without providing supporting
evidence, and the judge refused to let Plaintiff respond, (SAC ¶¶ 31–32 & 46); (ii) Defendants
either failed to produce documents in response to Plaintiff’s requests (e.g., Defendant Zevlikaris
allegedly did not respond to a subpoena) or interfered with such requests (e.g., Defendant Turk
objected to Plaintiff’s requests), (id. ¶¶ 33–37); and (iii) Judge Wischusen denied Plaintiff’s motion
to dismiss the indictment and Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant Zevlikaris to respond to
Plaintiff’s subpoena, declined to provide written findings when denying Plaintiff’s prior motions,
and refused to provide “clarification” regarding the nature and scope of proceedings, thus
subjecting Plaintiff to unfair surprise, (id. ¶¶ 38–44). 	Based on those allegations, Plaintiff has
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asserted claims for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See generally id. at
Counts II, IV, V & VI).
14. 	Each of these claims involves Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the conduct and
results—thus far–of the State of New Jersey’s ongoing criminal prosecution against him. Plaintiff
asks this Court to address those grievances with injunctive relief that would, in effect, wrest control
of that prosecution from the Superior Court. 	For instance, Plaintiff asks the Court to overturn
certain of the Superior Court’s discovery decisions (e.g., declining to compel certain parties to
provide information), to usurp the Superior Court’s authority to make others (e.g., “[a]n injunction
enjoining Defendants from interfering with validly issued subpoenas or discouraging witnesses
from complying”), to proactively direct what the Superior Court may and may not consider in that
litigation (e.g., an injunction requiring Judge Wischusen to “[c]ease reliance on secret or extra-
record materials in any ongoing criminal prosecution”), and to tell the Superior Court how and
when to issue its decisions (e.g., an injunction requiring Judge Wischusen to “[i]ssue timely,
written rulings on all dispositive motions implicating Plaintiff’s rights”). (See SAC at 14).
15. 	To the extent Plaintiff’s claims challenge his ongoing criminal prosecution in state
court, Younger abstention is appropriate. 	First, that prosecution is, without question, judicial in
nature. Second, state criminal prosecutions obviously involve important state interests. See, e.g.,
Solid Rock Baptist Church v. Murphy, 555 F. Supp. 3d 53, 62 (D.N.J. 2021), aff'd sub nom. Clark
v. Governor of New Jersey, 53 F.4th 769 (3d Cir. 2022) (“In this instance, it is clear that the ongoing
state criminal prosecutions fall within the confines of Younger abstention and should be resolved
in the jurisdiction in which they emanated—the state courts.”); Duran v. Weeks, No. 10-0293, 2010
WL 1544391, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2010), aff'd, 399 F. App'x 756 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A]s Younger
itself demonstrates, when a state acts to ensure compliance with its own criminal statutes or state
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constitution . . . important state interests are implicated.”). As to the third requirement, Plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing that “state procedural law barred presentation of [his] claims” in
the ongoing state court proceeding. Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670–71 (3d Cir. 2010).
The Court finds that he has not carried that burden. Plaintiff argues that he “has been denied any
meaningful opportunity to raise constitutional claims in state court. 	His motions have been
ignored, no findings have been issued, and state procedures have failed to provide an adequate
forum.” (PI Motion at 8). Plaintiff also represents that the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, has declined to take action on an interlocutory appeal. (D.E. No. 23 at 2). Even taking
those conclusory statements as true, Plaintiff has not established that he would be unable to raise
his constitutional challenges (or the lower court’s refusal to consider them) on appeal in the
ordinary course (i.e., on a non-interlocutory basis). 	See, e.g., Gonzalez, 755 F.3d at 184 (“The
Supreme Court has, on multiple occasions, affirmed decisions to abstain notwithstanding the state
agency's 	refusal 	or 	inability 	to 	consider 	federal 	challenges 	in 	the 	initial 	administrative
proceeding—at least where those challenges may be presented on appeal to the state court.”). In
short, Plaintiff has not “offer[ed] any legitimate reason why he could not raise his claims in the
New Jersey state court system, and therefore this requirement is satisfied.” 	Frederick of Fam.
Gonora v. Off. of Child Support Servs., 783 F. App’x 250, 252 (3d Cir. 2019).
16. 	The Third Circuit has recognized that, even if all three requirements are met,
“Younger abstention is not appropriate if the federal plaintiff can establish that (1) the state court
proceedings are being ‘undertaken in bad faith or for the purposes of harassment’ or (2) some other
extraordinary circumstance exists.” 	Id. (quoting Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 670). 	While Plaintiff
contends that both bad faith and extraordinary circumstances are present here, he merely restates
the factual bases for his claims (i.e., an allegedly unconstitutional arrest, wrongful reliance on
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family court records, and denial of due process). (PI Motion at 8). Based on its careful review of
the record before it, the Court finds no suggestion of harassment or bad faith, let alone the presence
of any extraordinary circumstances that might make abstention inappropriate.
17. 	In sum, the Court finds that it must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claims concerning his ongoing criminal prosecution. The Court will therefore dismiss
those claims, without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to pursue them in state court.
18. 	The Court will now turn to Plaintiff’s custody-related claims. In Counts II and III,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with
their respective roles in removing Plaintiff’s minor child, A.M., from Plaintiff’s custody. 	(See
generally SAC Counts II & III; see also id. ¶¶ 28–29). Plaintiff contends that “[n]o lawful custody
determination or parental fitness preceded the removal, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights to familial
integrity and due process under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 	(Id. ¶ 29). 	Having
examined Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, it does not appear that he seeks
any relief regarding the custody issue. (See generally id. at 13–14). In any event, this Court has
already determined that Younger requires the Court to abstain from interfering in what appears to
be ongoing state court custody proceedings concerning A.M.
19. 	In Mandigora v. New Jersey Division of Children Protection and Permanency, et
al., Civil Action Number 25-8593 (“Civil Action No. 25-8593”), Plaintiff challenged the very same
August 17, 2024 removal, and sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants
in that case had violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by virtue of their roles in A.M.’s
removal and/or seeking or acting in accordance with court orders concerning A.M.’s custody. (See
D.E. No. 2-1 in Civil Action No. 25-8593 at Count I). Plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgment
regarding the legality of those custody issues, (id. at Count III), as well as injunctive relief
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prohibiting Defendants from acting in accordance with the Superior Court of New Jersey’s various
orders related to A.M.’s placement (id. at Counts IV and V). By Order dated June 24, 2025, this
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims in Civil Action No. 25-8593 pursuant to the Younger abstention
doctrine. (See generally D.E. No. 5 in Civil Action No. 25-8593 (“June 24, 2025 Order”)).
20. 	In its June 24, 2025 Order, the Court made specific findings that: (i) “the ongoing
child custody proceedings that Plaintiff challenges herein are judicial in nature[,]” (id. at 7); (ii)
“the state court proceedings implicate important state interests involving child custody and
parental rights[,]” (id. (first citing Wattie-Bey v. Att’y Gen.’s Off., 424 F. App’x 95, 97 (3d Cir.
2011) (finding, in the context of a Younger abstention analysis concerning state court child custody
proceedings, that “‘family relations are a traditional area of state concern.”); and then quoting
Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 671 (“when the other elements of the Younger test are met, neither injunctive
nor declaratory relief will be available ‘in cases in which the federal relief would render the state
court’s orders or judgments nugatory’ . . . ‘This is a particularly appropriate admonition in the field
of domestic relations, over which federal courts have no general jurisdiction . . . and in which the
state courts have a special expertise and experience.’”) (citations omitted)); (3) Plaintiff failed to
carry his burden of establishing that “state procedural law barred presentation of [his] claims” in
the ongoing state court proceeding[,]” (id. at 8 (quoting Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 670–71)); and (4)
nothing in the record suggested that the custody proceedings had been undertaken in bad faith or
for the purposes of harassment, or that some other extraordinary circumstance militating against
abstention existed[,] (id. at 8–9 (citations omitted)). As Plaintiff appears to be challenging the
same custody proceedings herein, each of the aforementioned findings applies with equal force in
this case. The Court must, therefore, abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s custody-
related claims in accordance with Younger.
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21. 	Based on the foregoing, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC in its entirety,
without prejudice. Within regard to Count I, the Court will provide Plaintiff a final opportunity to
re-plead his false arrest claim, addressing the shortcomings the Court has identified herein. With
respect to the balance of Plaintiff’s claims, all of which are subject to Younger abstention, those
claims are dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to pursue them in state court.
22. 	As the Court has dismissed the SAC, it will not consider the relative merits of
Plaintiff’s PI Motion and Emergency Motion.
An appropriate Order follows this Opinion.
s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
Date: February 17, 2026
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