WEBB v. HILLSIDE MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

2:25-cv-01026Njd13.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT 	COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MALCOLM WEBB,
Plaintiff,
v.
HILLSIDE 	MUNICIPAL 	POLICE
DEPARTMENT 	et 	al.,
Defendants.
No. 	25-cv-01026 (MEF) (SDA)
OPINION and ORDER
* 	* 	*
For 	the 	purposes 	of 	this 	brief 	Opinion 	and 	Order, 	the 	Court
largely 	assumes 	familiarity 	with 	the 	procedural 	history 	and
allegations 	of 	this 	case.
* 	* 	*
In 	brief:
A police 	officer 	had 	a 	car 	towed, 	see 	Complaint 	and 	Request 	for
Injunction 	("Complaint") 	(ECF 	1) 	at 	5, 	and 	the 	owner 1 	of 	the 	car
( "the 	Plaintiff") 	sued: 	( 1) 	the 	relevant 	police 	department, 2 	( 2)
the 	company 	that 	towed 	the 	car, 3 	and 	(3) 	the 	insurance 	company
that 	eventually 	took 	possession 	of 	the 	car. 4 	See 	Amended 	and
Supplemental 	Verified 	Petition 	for 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	under
FRCP 	65 (a) 	("Supplemental 	Petition") 	(ECF 	7) 	at 	3.
From here, 	these 	three 	entities 	are 	collectively 	called 	"the
Defendants."
1
2
3
4
Malcolm Webb.
Hillside 	Municipal 	Police 	Department.
Sisbarro 	Towing 	& Recovery, 	LLC.
State 	National 	Insurance 	Companies, 	Inc.
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The 	core 	of 	the 	Plaintiff's 	claim: 	the 	seizure 	of 	the 	car
violated 	his 	rights 	under 	the 	federal 	Constitution. 	See
Complaint 	at 	5. 5
Along 	with 	his 	complaint, 	the 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	a
preliminary 	injunction 	seeking 	the 	return 	of 	his 	car. 	See
Emergency 	Petition 	for 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	and 	Replevin
Pursuant 	to 	FRCP 	64 	and 	65 (a) (1) - (2) 	(ECF 	2) 	at 	1.
The 	motion 	was 	denied. 	See Webb 	v. 	Hillside 	Mun. 	Police 	Dep't,
2025 	WL 	1899560, 	at 	*6 	(D.N.J. 	July 	8, 	2025).
The 	Defendants 	have 	now moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	underlying
complaint. 	See 	Defendants 	Hillside 	Municipal 	Police 	Department
and 	Statewide 	National 	Insurance 	Companies, 	Inc.'s 	Brief 	in
Support 	of Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Pursuant 	to 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
12 (b) (6) 	(ECF 	38-1) 	at 	1; 	Defendant's 	Legal 	Brief 	in 	Support 	of
Sisbarro 	Towing 	& Recovery, 	LLC's 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF 	39-1)
at 	2.
Their motions 	are 	granted.
* 	* 	*
5 	The 	complaint 	invokes 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	as 	the
cause 	of 	action 	that 	allows 	the 	Plaintiff's 	federal
constitutional 	claims 	to 	go 	forward. 	See 	Complaint 	at 	3. 	This
does 	not 	work, 	because 	the 	Act 	does 	not 	purport 	to 	empower
federal 	courts 	to 	hear 	federal 	constitutional 	claims. 	See 	N.J.
Stat. 	Ann. 	§ 	10: 6-2 (d) 	(allowing 	for 	suits 	in 	state 	court). 	But
the 	Plaintiff 	is 	proceeding 	prose, 	so 	the 	Court 	must 	"apply 	the
applicable 	law, 	irrespective 	of 	whether 	[he] 	has 	mentioned 	it 	by
name." 	Higgins 	v. 	Beyer, 	293 	F.3d 	683, 	688 	(3d 	Cir. 	2002)
(cleaned 	up). 	Hewing 	to 	this, 	the 	Court 	construes 	the 	Plaintiff
as 	making 	use 	of 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983, 	the 	federal 	statute 	that
supplies 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	in 	cases 	with 	claims 	like 	the 	ones
pressed 	here. 	See 	Fields 	v. 	City 	of 	Salem Hous. 	Auth., 	2015 	WL
4171611, 	at 	*3 	n.2 	(D.N.J. 	July 	10, 	2015) 	(construing 	prose
complaint 	raising 	constitutional 	claim as 	proceeding 	under
Section 	1983); 	Zomerfeld v. 	Boro, 	2023 	WL 	2985148, 	at 	*3 	& n.5
(M.D. 	Pa. 	Feb. 	6, 	2023) 	(same); 	Khazali 	v. 	Washington, 	2023 	WL
3866767, 	at 	*l 	(W.D. 	Wash. 	June 	7, 	2023) 	(same).
2
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Start 	with 	the 	Plaintiff's 	constitutional 	claims 	against 	the
police 	department. 6
At 	the 	preliminary 	injunction 	stage, 	the 	Court 	noted 	the
Plaintiff was 	unlikely 	to 	succeed 	on 	the 	merits 	because 	"a
municipal 	police 	department 	is 	not 	typically 	considered 	a
'person' 	for 	the 	purposes 	of 	Section 	1983." 	Webb, 	2025 	WL
1899560, 	at 	*4.
The 	Plaintiff 	now 	seems 	to 	concede 	that 	a 	police 	department
cannot 	be 	sued 	under 	Section 	1983. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	Memorandum
of 	Law 	in 	Opposition 	to 	HPD/State 	National's 	Rule 	12(b) (6)
Motion 	("Plaintiff's 	HPD/State 	National 	Brief") 	(ECF 	40-1) 	at 	4.
But 	he 	argues 	that 	"the 	[appropriate] 	remedy 	is 	substitution,
not 	merits 	dismissal," 	and 	that 	"the 	Court 	should 	substitute
[the 	municipality] 	for 	[the 	police 	department]." 	Id.
Sometimes 	substituting 	one 	party 	for 	another makes 	no 	real
practical 	difference. 	And 	in 	those 	circumstances, 	in 	the 	face
of 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	based 	on 	the 	wrong 	party being 	named
it 	may well 	make 	sense 	to 	simply 	replace 	one 	party 	(the
improperly named 	one) 	with 	another 	party.
But 	that 	does 	not 	work 	here.
This 	is 	because municipality-defendants 	are 	not 	readily 	fungible
with 	other 	sorts 	of 	defendants 	in 	the 	context 	of 	constitutional
litigation. 	A constitutional 	claim against 	a 	municipality 	can
only 	get 	off 	the 	ground 	if 	a 	distinct 	set 	of 	factual 	allegations
is 	put 	forward. 	See 	Monell 	v. 	Dep't 	of 	Soc. 	Servs. 	of 	N.Y., 	436
U.S. 	658, 	694 	(1978).
If 	a 	municipality-defendant 	is 	simply 	substituted 	in, 	those
factual 	allegations 	would 	presumably need 	to 	be 	pulled 	in 	from
the 	Plaintiff's 	legal 	brief. 	But 	briefs 	are 	not 	where
allegations 	are 	made. 	Factual 	allegations 	should be 	laid 	out 	in
a 	complaint, 	in 	part 	so 	that 	the 	complaint 	can 	perform 	all 	of
the 	work we 	expect 	of 	it 	--- 	including 	ensuring 	(i) 	that 	the
defendant 	unmissably 	understands 	the 	full 	scope 	of 	the
plaintiff's 	claims, 	and 	(ii) 	that 	any needed motion 	practice
does 	not 	take 	place 	against 	a 	moving 	target. 	Cf. 	Rose 	v.
Butterfly Network, 	Inc., 	2025 	WL 	501427, 	at 	*5 	(D.N.J. 	Feb. 	13,
2025).
6 Except 	the 	constitutional 	claim under 	the 	Thirteenth Amendment.
That 	is 	taken 	up 	later.
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Accordingly, 	the 	police 	department 	will 	not 	be 	substituted 	out
for 	the 	relevant 	municipality; 	rather, 	the 	claims 	against 	the
police 	department 	will 	be 	dismissed.
Should 	the 	prose 	Plaintiff 	wish 	to 	file 	an 	amended 	complaint
against 	the 	municipality, 	he 	will 	be 	permitted 	to 	do 	so.
* 	* 	*
Move 	now 	to 	the 	constitutional 	claims 	against 	the 	insurance
company. 7
At 	the 	preliminary 	injunction 	stage, 	the 	Court 	held 	that 	the
Plaintiff 	was 	unlikely 	to 	succeed 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	his 	claims
against 	the 	insurance 	company 	because 	"the 	Plaintiff 	d[id] 	not
try 	to 	establish 	that 	it 	is 	a 	state 	actor." 	Webb, 	2025 	WL
1899560, 	at 	*4.
Now, 	the 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	insurance 	company 	can 	be
treated 	as 	a 	state 	actor 	because 	the 	complaint 	plausibly 	alleges
"joint 	action 	with 	police 	in 	the 	challenged 	deprivation."
Plaintiff's 	HPD/State 	National 	Brief 	at 	4-5.
Sometimes, 	a 	private 	entity 	(like 	the 	insurance 	company) 	can 	be
treated 	as 	a 	government 	actor 	--- 	and 	accordingly 	be 	held 	to
account 	under 	federal 	constitutional 	law.
The 	Third 	Circuit 	has 	outlined 	three 	broad 	tests 	to
determine 	whether 	a 	private 	entity 	is 	a 	state 	actor. 	See
Kach 	v. 	Hose, 	589 	F.3d 	626, 	646 	(3d 	Cir. 	2009). 	These 	are:
"(l) 	whether 	the 	private 	entity 	has 	exercised powers 	that
are 	traditionally 	the 	exclusive 	prerogative 	of 	the 	state;
(2) 	whether 	the 	private 	party 	has 	acted 	with 	the 	help 	of 	or
in 	concert 	with 	state 	officials; 	and 	(3) 	whether 	the 	state
has 	so 	far 	insinuated 	itself 	into 	a 	position 	of
interdependence 	with 	the 	acting 	party 	that 	it 	must 	be
recognized 	as 	a 	joint 	participant 	in 	the 	challenged
activity." 	Id. 	(cleaned 	up).
Rxeed 	LLC 	v. 	Caremark LLC, 	771 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	495, 	498 	n.3 	(D.N.J.
2025).
The 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	made 	any 	argument 	as 	to 	(1) 	or 	(3).
7 	Again, 	except 	the 	Thirteenth Amendment 	claim, 	which 	is
considered below.
4
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He 	seems 	to 	rely 	here 	on 	(2) 	--- 	contending 	that 	the 	insurance
company 	has 	engaged 	in 	"joint 	action 	with 	police." 	Plaintiff's
HPD/State 	National 	Brief 	at 	5.
But 	there 	is 	no 	basis 	for 	this 	in 	what 	the 	Plaintiff 	has
alleged. 	There 	is 	no 	mention 	of 	the 	insurance 	company 	in 	the
complaint. 	Or 	in 	the 	affidavit 	the 	Plaintiff 	provided 	in
support 	of 	his 	preliminary 	injunction motion.
The 	insurance 	company 	is 	referred 	to 	in 	a 	supplemental 	petition
filed 	by 	the 	Plaintiff .
. 	Despite 	this 	pending 	litigation 	and 	formal 	notice,
the 	vehicle 	was 	unlawfully 	transferred 	to 	[the 	insurance
company] 	on 	or 	around 	February 	19, 	2025, 	via 	a 	demand
letter 	. 	received by 	[the] 	Plaintiff 	with 	a 	ransom
demand 	of 	$31,356.70 .
. 	The 	transfer 	was 	executed without 	legal 	title,
judicial 	authority, 	or 	perfected 	lien 	--- 	deriving 	from 	the
original 	unconstitutional 	seizure 	--- 	and 	resulted 	in
further 	irreparable 	harm, 	for 	which 	this 	Court's 	prior
inaction materially 	contributed.
Supplemental 	Petition 	at 	2.
But 	these 	allegations 	cannot 	move 	the 	needle. 	They 	do 	not
suggest 	any 	"joint 	action" 	because 	they 	do 	not 	say 	anything
about 	the 	insurance 	company working 	with 	government 	officials.
The 	claims 	against 	the 	insurance 	company must 	be 	dismissed.
* 	* 	*
Finally, 	consider 	the 	constitutional 	claims 8 	against 	the 	towing
company.
Earlier, 	the 	Court 	held 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	had 	failed 	to 	come
forward 	with 	"bona 	fide 	facts" 	establishing 	that 	"the 	towing
compan[y] 	[is 	a] 	state 	actor." 	Webb, 	2025 	WL 	1899560, 	at 	*5.
Now, 	the 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	towing 	company 	"willful[ly]
participat[ed] 	in 	the 	deprivation."
Law 	in 	Opposition 	to 	Sisbarro 	Towing
Dismiss 	under 	Rule 	12(b) (6) 	and 	Rule
Plaintiff's 	Memorandum of
& Recovery, 	LLC's 	Motion 	to
12 (b) (1) 	(ECF 	40) 	at 	5.
8 	Once 	again, 	except 	the 	Thirteenth Amendment 	claim.
5
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To 	back up 	this 	argument, 	which 	seems 	to 	invoke 	the 	second 	Kach
test, 	see 	589 	F.3d 	at 	646, 	the 	complaint 	alleges 	only 	that 	the
police 	"unlawfully 	seized" 	his 	car 	"[i]n 	coordination 	with 	[the
towing 	company]." 	Complaint 	at 	5. 	The 	affidavit 	the 	Plaintiff
provided 	in 	support 	of 	his 	motion 	for 	a 	preliminary 	injunction
similarly 	states 	that 	the 	police 	department 	"coordinated with
[the 	towing 	company] 	to 	unlawfully 	seize 	[the 	Plaintiff's]
personal 	private 	consumer 	goods 	and 	strip[] 	[his] 	private
plates." 	Affidavit 	of 	Truth 	in 	Support 	of 	Emergency 	Petition
for 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	and 	Replevin 	(ECF 	2-1) 	at 	2.
But 	these 	are 	little more 	than 	"bottom-line 	legal
conclusion[s] ." 	Webb, 	2025 	WL 	1899560, 	at 	*5.
Alleging 	there 	was 	"coordination," 	Complaint 	at 	5, 	is, 	at 	best,
a 	shorthand way 	of 	bringing 	to 	bear 	the 	legal 	standard, 	a 	quick
and 	causal 	way 	of 	claiming 	that 	the 	towing 	company 	"acted with
the 	help 	of 	or 	in 	concert 	with 	state 	officials." 	Kach, 	589 	F.3d
at 	646 	(cleaned 	up).
But 	to 	survive 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	what 	is 	needed 	are 	building-
block 	factual 	allegations 	that, 	when 	added 	up, 	plausibly 	satisfy
the 	relevant 	legal 	test. 9 	What 	does 	not 	suffice 	is 	what 	the
Plaintiff 	has 	provided 	here 	--- 	a 	statement 	of 	the 	relevant
legal 	test 	(or 	a 	shorthand 	articulation 	of 	the 	test).
Laying 	out 	who 	coordinated with 	who, 	where 	they 	did 	it, 	when
they 	did 	it, 	how 	they 	did, 	what 	the 	substance 	of 	the
coordination 	was 	--- 	all 	of 	that 	may 	potentially 	advance 	the
ball. 	But 	simply 	saying 	that 	there 	was 	coordination 	does 	not. 10
* 	* 	*
Two 	additional 	points.
First: 	the 	Plaintiff 	presses 	Thirteenth Amendment 	claims 	against
each 	Defendant.
9 	A relevant 	legal 	test 	like 	the 	second 	Kach 	test.
10 	And 	as 	noted, 	see 	Webb, 	2025 	WL 	1899560, 	at 	*5, 	the
coordination 	implicit 	in 	having 	a 	contractual 	relationship 	with
a 	government 	actor 	is, 	standing 	alone, 	almost 	surely not 	enough
to 	make 	it 	past 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss. 	See 	Rxeed, 	771 	F. 	Supp. 	3d
at 	498.
6
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The 	Court 	previously 	held 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	was 	unlikely 	to
succeed 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	this 	claim because 	"he 	is 	not 	being
compelled 	to 	perform 	services 	for 	someone 	else." 	Webb, 	2025 	WL
1899560, 	at 	*6.
The 	Plaintiff 	has 	offered 	no 	reason 	to 	set 	aside 	this
conclusion.
dismissed.
So 	his 	Thirteenth Amendment 	claims 	must 	be
Second: 	in 	addition 	to 	his 	federal 	claims, 	the 	Plaintiff 	also
"presses 	a 	state 	law 	claim under 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Civil 	Rights
Act" 	against 	each 	Defendant. 	Id.
But 	as 	the 	Court 	held 	before, 	these 	claims 	fail 	for 	the 	same
reasons 	the 	Plaintiff's 	federal 	constitutional 	claims 	do. 	See
id.
The 	Plaintiff 	has 	offered 	no 	reason 	to 	undo 	that 	ruling. 	So 	his
New 	Jersey 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	claim must 	also 	be 	dismissed.
* 	* 	*
The motions 	to 	dismiss 	at 	ECF 	38 	and 	ECF 	39 	are 	granted.
Should 	the 	Plaintiff 	wish 	to 	file 	a 	complaint 	that 	runs 	solely
against 	the 	Township 	of 	Hillside, 	New 	Jersey, 	he 	may 	do 	so,
provided 	it 	is 	filed 	on 	or 	before 	February 	14, 	2026.
Should 	the 	Plaintiff 	which 	to 	file 	an 	amended 	complaint 	that
includes 	allegations 	against 	Sisbarro 	Towing 	& Recovery LLC 	or
State 	National 	Insurance 	Companies, 	Inc., 	or 	both, 	he 	may 	do 	so
(a) 	with 	the 	consent 	of 	the 	relevant 	opposing 	party, 	or 	(b) 	with
leave 	from 	the 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judg ' ..::
It 	is 	on 	this 	13th day 	of 	January, 	ORDERED.
E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
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