Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

2:24-cv-00269Njd14.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT 	COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LOI SKA 	J.,
No. 	24-cv-00269 	(MEF)
Plaintiff,
OPINION 	and ORDER
v.
COMMISSIONER OF 	SOCIAL 	SECURITY,
Defendant.
Table 	of 	Contents
I.
II.
Backg:round
A.
B.
C.
Step
A.
B.
Procedural 	Historx:
Legal 	Framework
This 	Case
Three
Paragraph 	B
Paragraph 	C
III. Residual 	Functional 	Capacity
IV. 	Conclusion
* 	* 	*
A woman 	applied 	for 	Social 	Security 	disability 	benefits 	and 	was
denied.
She 	filed 	this 	lawsuit 	to 	challenge 	the 	denial.
The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	the 	denial 	was 	mainly 	supported by
substantial 	evidence, 	as 	it 	needed 	to 	be.
But 	the 	Court 	also 	concludes 	that 	a 	limited 	remand 	for 	further
proceedings 	is 	necessary 	as 	to 	two 	particular 	issues.
* 	* 	*
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I . 	Background
A. 	Procedural 	History
The 	Commissioner 	of 	Social 	Security 	(from 	here, 	"the
Commissioner") 	denied 	an 	application 	for 	disability 	benefits.
See 	Plaintiff's 	Moving 	Brief 	("Plaintiff's 	Brief") 	(ECF 	9) 	at 	4-
5.
The 	applicant 1 	challenged 	the 	denial, 	and 	this 	Court, 	through
Judge 	Zoss, 	reversed 	the 	Commissioner's 	decision 	and 	remanded
the 	case 	for 	reconsideration. 	See 	Johnson 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc.
Sec., 	No. 	17-cv-11765, 	slip 	op. 	at 	2 	(D.N.J. 	Jul. 	24, 	2019) 	(ECF
1 7) .
On 	remand, 	a 	proceeding 	was 	held 	before 	an 	administrative 	law
judge 	("ALJ") 	and 	the 	Commissioner, 	acting 	on 	the 	ALJ's
decision, 	again 	denied 	the 	application. 2
The 	applicant 	now 	challenges 	the 	Commissioner's 	second 	denial
and 	asks 	that 	it 	be 	reversed 	or 	remanded. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	Brief
at 	5-6.
From here, 	the 	applicant 	is 	called 	"the 	Plaintiff."
B. 	Legal 	Framework
"To 	qualify 	for 	disability 	benefits, 	a 	claimant 	must 	be 	disabled
under 	the 	Social 	Security Act." 	Fouch 	v. 	Barnhart, 	80 	F. 	App'x
181, 	184 	(3d 	Cir. 	2003).
"An 	individual 	is 	disabled 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	. 	. 	Act 	.
only 	if 	his 	. 	'impairments 	are 	of 	such 	severity 	that 	he 	is
not 	only 	unable 	to 	do 	his 	previous 	work 	but 	cannot, 	considering
his 	age, 	education, 	and 	work 	experience, 	engage 	in 	any 	other
kind 	of 	substantial 	gainful 	work 	which 	exists 	in 	the 	national
economy.'" 	Smith 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	631 	F.3d 	632, 	634 	(3d
Cir. 	2010) 	(quoting 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	423(d) (2) (A)).
"The 	Social 	Security Administration 	has 	promulgated 	a 	five-step
evaluation 	process 	to 	determine 	whether 	an 	individual 	is
1 	Loiska 	J.
2 	The 	ALJ's 	19-page 	written 	opinion 	is 	at 	Loiska 	J. 	(S.S.A.
A.L.J. 	Oct. 	4, 	2023). 	It 	can 	be 	found 	beginning 	at 	page 	373 	of
the 	administrative 	record. 	The 	administrative 	record 	is 	at 	ECF
4, 	and 	is 	abbreviated 	from 	here 	as 	"AR."
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disabled." 	Jones 	v. 	Barnhart, 	364 	F.3d 	501, 	503 	(3d 	Cir. 	2004)
(citing 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520; 	Plummer 	v. 	Apfel, 	186 	F.3d 	422,
428 	(3d 	Cir. 	1999)).
At 	step 	one, 	the 	Commissioner 	looks 	to 	whether 	a 	benefits
applicant 	is 	doing 	any 	"substantial 	gainful 	[work] 	activity."
20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520(a) (4) (i).
If 	yes, 	the 	applicant 	is 	not 	considered 	disabled,
the 	end 	of 	the 	road. 	See 	id.; 	id. 	§ 	404.1520(b).
are 	provided. 	See 	Jones, 	364 	F.3d 	at 	503.
and 	that 	is
No 	benefits
If 	the 	applicant 	is 	not 	engaged 	in 	"substantial 	gainful 	[work]
activity," 	then 	the 	analysis 	moves 	to 	step 	two. 	See 	20 	C.F.R.
§ 	404 .1520 (a) (4).
At 	step 	two, 	the 	Commissioner 	asks 	whether 	the 	applicant 	has 	a
"severe 	medically 	determinable 	physical 	or mental
impairment 	. 	. 	or 	a 	combination 	of 	[such] 	impairments." 	20
C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520(a) (4) (ii).
If 	no, 	the 	analysis 	ends. 	The 	applicant 	is 	not 	considered
disabled, 	and 	does 	not 	get 	benefits. 	See 	id.; 	id. 	§
404.1520(c); 	Jones, 	364 	F.3d 	at 	503.
If 	yes, 	on 	to 	step 	three. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520(a) (4).
At 	step 	three, 	the 	question 	is 	whether 	there 	is 	a 	close-enough
equivalency between 	(i) 	the 	applicant's 	physical 	or mental
impairments, 	and 	(ii) 	a 	"listing" 	--- 	one 	of 	the 	particular
impairments 	spelled 	out 	("list[ed]") 	in 	certain 	regulations.
See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520(a) (4) (iii).
If 	there 	is 	an 	equivalency, 	the 	applicant 	"is 	per 	se 	disabled
and 	no 	further 	analysis 	is 	necessary." 	Burnett 	v. 	Comm'r 	of
Soc. 	Sec. 	Admin., 	220 	F.3d 	112, 	119 	(3d 	Cir. 	2000). 	He 	is
entitled 	to 	benefits. 	See 	Jones, 	364 	F.3d 	at 	503.
If 	there 	is 	no 	equivalency
and 	(ii) 	--- 	then 	the 	analysis
§ 	404 .1520 (a) (4).
if 	there 	is 	daylight 	between 	(i)
goes 	to 	step 	four. 	See 	20 	C.F.R.
At 	step 	four, 	the 	Commissioner 	determines 	whether 	the 	benefits
applicant 	has 	the 	"residual 	functional 	capacity" 3 	to 	do 	the 	work
he 	did 	before. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520(a) (4) (iv).
3 	Residual 	functional 	capacity 	is 	what 	"an 	individual 	is 	still
able 	to 	do 	despite 	the 	limitations 	caused by 	his 	or 	her
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If 	the 	applicant 	can 	do 	his 	past 	work, 	he 	is 	not 	disabled 	and
gets 	no 	benefits. 	See 	id.; 	Jones, 	364 	F.3d 	at 	503.
If 	the 	applicant 	cannot 	do 	his 	past
moves 	to 	the 	fifth 	and 	final 	step.
404 .1520 (a) (4).
work, 	then 	the 	analysis
See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§
At 	step 	five, 	the 	Commissioner 	determines 	whether 	the 	applicant
can 	do 	work 	other 	than 	his 	past 	work 	--- 	given 	his 	"residual
functional 	capacity[,] 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience," 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520 (a) (4) (v), 	and 	with 	an 	eye 	on
the 	kinds 	of 	jobs 	that 	are 	available 	in 	the 	economy. 	See
Newell, 	347 	F.3d 	at 	546.
If, 	given 	his 	residual 	functional 	capacity, 	the 	applicant 	can 	do
other 	work 	--- 	then 	he 	does 	not 	get 	benefits. 	See 	Jones, 	364
F.3d 	at 	503.
If, 	given 	his 	residual 	functional 	capacity, 	the 	applicant 	cannot
do 	other 	work, 	then 	he 	is 	disabled 	and 	is 	therefore 	eligible 	for
benefits. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1520(a) (4) (v).
C. 	This 	Case
Here, 	in 	the 	case 	of 	the 	Plaintiff, 	an ALJ worked 	through 	each
of 	the 	above 	five 	steps. 	See 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	375-91.
More 	below 	as 	relevant 	on 	the 	ins 	and 	outs 	of 	the 	ALJ's
analysis.
For 	now, 	note 	that 	the 	ALJ determined 	at 	step 	five 	that 	the
Plaintiff 	was 	not 	entitled 	to 	benefits. 	See 	id. 	at 	391. 	Given
her 	residual 	functional 	capacity, 	the 	ALJ 	concluded, 	there 	was
some 	work 	in 	the 	national 	economy 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	could 	do.
See 	id. 	at 	389-91.
This 	conclusion, 	the 	Plaintiff 	argues, 	was 	wrong.
First, 	the 	Plaintiff 	argues, 	things 	should not 	have 	gotten 	to
step 	five 	--- 	because 	the 	ALJ's 	analysis 	was 	improper 	at 	step
three. 	This 	argument 	is 	assessed 	in 	Part 	II.
impairments." 	Fargnoli 	v. 	Massanari, 	247 	F.3d 	34, 	40 	(3d 	Cir.
2001) 	(cleaned 	up).
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Second, 	the 	Plaintiff 	contends, 	the 	residual 	functional 	capacity
determination made 	by 	the ALJ 	rested 	on 	a 	set 	of 	errors. 	That
argument 	is 	taken 	up 	in 	Part 	III.
II. 	Step 	Three
At 	step 	three, 	the 	ALJ 	determined 	that 	the 	Plaintiff's
impairments 	did 	not 	match 	up 	with 	any 	of 	the 	"listings" 	set 	out
in 	the 	relevant 	regulations. 	See 	id. 	at 	376.
Because 	of 	this, 	the 	ALJ 	took 	one 	fork 	down 	the 	road, 	but 	not
the 	other.
The 	ALJ 	did 	not 	hold 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	was 	"per 	se 	disabled,"
Burnett, 	220 	F.3d 	at 	119, 	and 	therefore 	entitled 	to 	benefits.
See 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	376-78.
Rather, 	the ALJ moved 	on 	to 	step 	four 	and 	looked 	to 	the
Plaintiff's 	residual 	functional 	capacity. 	See 	id. 	at 	378.
Mo~ing 	past 	step 	three 	and 	on 	to 	step 	four 	was 	an 	error, 	the
Plaintiff 	argues, 	because 	her 	impairments 	were 	equivalent 	to 	two
listings 	--- 	Listing 	12.04 	and 	Listing 	12.06. 	See 	Plaintiff's
Brief 	6-7, 	10. 	Therefore, 	the 	argument 	goes, 	she 	was 	per 	se
disabled 	and 	that 	should 	have 	been 	the 	end 	of 	it. 	She 	was
entitled 	to 	benefits, 	and 	residual 	functional 	capacity 	questions
were 	immaterial.
* 	* 	*
To 	evaluate 	the 	Plaintiff's 	argument, 	some 	quick background.
Listing 	12.04 	focuses 	on 	"[d]epressive, 	bipolar, 	and 	related
disorders," 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1 	§ 	12.04, 	and
Listing 	12.06 	zeroes-in 	on 	"[a]nxiety 	and 	obsessive-compulsive
disorders." 	Id. 	§ 	12.06.
Listing 	12.04 	and 	Listing 	12.06 	have 	certain 	building-block
components. 	These 	are 	commonly 	called 	the 	paragraph A criteria,
the 	paragraph 	B criteria, 	and 	the 	paragraph 	C criteria. 	See
generally 	Gantt 	v. 	Comm'r 	Soc. 	Sec., 	205 	F. 	App'x 	65, 	66 	(3d
Cir. 	2006).
A claimant's 	impairment 	is 	equivalent 	to 	Listing 	12.04 	or
Listing 	12.06 	if 	(i) 	the 	paragraph A criteria 	and 	the 	paragraph
B criteria 	are 	satisfied, 	or 	(ii) 	the 	paragraph A and 	the
paragraph 	C criteria 	are 	met. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P,
App'x 	1 	§ 	12.00(A) (2).
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* 	* 	*
Turn 	back 	now 	to 	this 	case.
Here, 	the 	ALJ 	determined 	that 	neither 	the 	paragraph 	B criteria
nor 	the 	paragraph 	C criteria 	were 	met, 	see 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	378
--- 	so 	the 	Plaintiff's 	impairments 	(as 	found 	by 	the 	ALJ 	at 	step
two) 	did 	not 	qualify 	as 	a 	per 	se 	disability 	(at 	step 	three).
The 	Plaintiff 	challenges 	the 	ALJ's 	paragraph 	Band paragraph 	C
conclusions 	here. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	6-33.
She 	mainly 	argues 	that 	these 	were 	not 	backed 	up 	by 	substantial
evidence. 	See 	id. 	at 	6.
In 	assessing 	that 	argument, 	there 	are 	three 	main 	guideposts.
First, 	"substantial 	evidence" 	is 	"such 	relevant 	evidence 	as 	a
reasonable 	mind might 	accept 	as 	adequate" 	to 	support 	the
relevant 	determination. 	Burnett, 	220 	F.3d 	at 	118 	(cleaned 	up);
see 	also 	Johnson 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	529 	F.3d 	198, 	200 	(3d
Cir. 	2008).
Second, 	this 	Court's 	role 	is 	to 	decide 	if 	the 	ALJ's 	decision
rested 	on 	a 	solid-enough 	foundation 	of 	"adequate" 	evidence 	---
not 	to 	determine 	how 	it 	might 	have 	weighed 	things 	out 	if 	it 	were
the 	Court 	that 	was 	charged with 	making 	the 	front-line 	decision
as 	to 	what 	the 	evidence 	adds 	up 	to 	in 	the 	first 	place. 	See
Zirnsak v. 	Colvin, 	777 	F.3d 	607, 	611 	(3d 	Cir. 	2014) 	(the 	court
"must 	not 	substitute 	[its] 	own 	judgment 	for 	that 	of 	the 	fact
finder"); 	see 	also 	Thomas 	v. 	Massanari, 	28 	F. 	App'x 	146, 	147 	(3d
Cir. 	2002); 	Davern 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	660 	F. 	App'x 	169, 	174
(3d 	Cir. 	2016); 	Williams 	v. 	Sullivan, 	970 	F.2d 	1178, 	1182 	(3d
Cir. 	1992).
And 	third, 	"the 	burden 	is 	on 	the 	claimant 	to 	present 	medical
findings 	that 	show 	his 	or 	her 	impairment 	matches 	a 	listing 	or 	is
equal 	in 	severity 	to 	a 	listed 	impairment." 	Burnett, 	220 	F.3d 	at
120 	n.2 	(citing Williams, 	970 	F.2d 	at 	1186)
With 	all 	this 	background, 	look 	now 	to 	whether 	substantial
evidence 	supported 	the 	ALJ's 	conclusions 	that 	the 	paragraph 	B
and paragraph 	C criteria 	were 	not 	met.
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A. Paragraph B
The 	paragraph 	B criteria 	concern 	four 	areas 	of mental
functioning. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1
§ 	12.00(E) (1)-(4).
These 	are: 	(1) 	understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	applying
information; 	( 2) 	interacting 	with 	others; 	( 3) 	concentrating,
persisting, 	or 	maintaining 	pace; 	and 	(4) 	adapting 	or 	managing
oneself. 	See 	id.
Each 	area 	is 	evaluated 	on 	"a 	five-point" 	metric, 	that 	runs 	up
the 	ladder 	from 	no 	limitation 	to 	a 	"mild, 	moderate, 	[or] 	marked"
limitation, 	and 	then 	finally 	up 	to 	the 	top 	rung 	--- 	an 	"extreme"
limitation. 	Id. 	§ 	12.00(F) (2) . 4
The 	paragraph 	B criteria 	are 	satisfied where 	a 	claimant 	(i) 	has
an 	"extreme 	limitation" 	in 	one 	of 	the 	four 	areas 	of mental
functioning, 	or 	(ii) 	a 	"marked 	limitation 	of 	two" 	of 	the 	four
areas 	of mental 	functioning. 	Id.
4 	Per 	the 	regulations:
No 	limitation 	(or 	none): 	"You 	are 	able 	to 	function 	in 	this
area 	independently, 	appropriately, 	effectively, 	and 	on 	a
sustained 	basis." 	Id. 	§ 	12. 00 (F) (2) (a).
Mild 	limitation: 	"Your 	functioning 	in 	this 	area
independently, 	appropriately, 	effectively, 	and 	on 	a
sustained basis 	is 	slightly 	limited." 	Id. 	§ 	12. 0 0 ( F) ( 2) (b)
(emphasis 	added).
Moderate 	limitation: 	"Your 	functioning 	in 	this 	area
independently, 	appropriately, 	effectively, 	and 	on 	a
sustained basis 	is 	fair." 	Id. 	§ 	12. 00 (F) (2) (c) 	(emphasis
added).
Marked 	limitation: 	"Your 	functioning 	in 	this 	area
independently, 	appropriately, 	effectively, 	and 	on 	a
sustained 	basis 	is 	seriously 	limited." 	Id.
§ 	12. 00 (F) (2) (d) 	(emphasis 	added).
Extreme 	limitation: 	"You 	are 	not 	able 	to 	function 	in 	this
area 	independently, 	appropriately, 	effectively, 	and 	on 	a
sustained 	basis." 	Id. 	§ 	12.00(F) (2) (e) 	(emphasis 	added).
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* 	* 	*
Here, 	the 	ALJ worked 	through 	each 	of 	the 	four 	mental 	functioning
areas, 	see 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	377-78, 	and 	decided 	that 	in 	each
area 	the 	Plaintiff's 	limitation 	was 	below 	the 	threshold 	---
neither 	"marked" 	or 	"extreme."
Were 	each 	of 	these 	four 	decisions 	based 	on 	substantial 	evidence?
Take 	that 	up 	now.
1. 	Substantial 	Evidence
The 	first 	paragraph 	B mental 	functioning 	area 	is 	understanding,
remembering, 	or 	applying 	information. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404,
subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1 	§ 	12.00(E) (1).
The 	ALJ 	found 	the 	Plaintiff 	had 	a 	"moderate" 	limitation 	in 	this
area. 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	377.
In 	doing 	so, 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	evidence 	suggesting 	the
Plaintiff 	had 	some 	difficulties 	with memory. 	The 	ALJ 	noted 	that
the 	Plaintiff 	"tested 	as 	having 	some 	memory 	limitations 	at 	her
August 	16, 	2012[] 	psychological 	consultative 	examination." 	Id.
And 	that 	while 	the 	Plaintiff's 	"immediate memory was 	intact,
. 	she 	was 	unable 	to 	perform 	any 	remote 	memory 	tasks" 	at 	her
"November 	19, 	2013 	psychological 	consultative 	examination." 	Id.
The 	ALJ 	also 	looked 	to 	evidence 	that 	tilted 	the 	other 	way 	---
evidence 	that 	suggested 	the 	Plaintiff's 	memory 	troubles 	were 	not
quite 	as 	severe.
For 	example, 	the 	ALJ 	reviewed 	a 	report 	the 	Plaintiff 	submitted
to 	the 	Social 	Security Administration 	in 	October 	2013. 	See 	id.
(citing 	Exhibit 	4E, 	AR 	206-12). 	And 	based 	on 	the 	report, 	the
ALJ 	emphasized, 	the 	Plaintiff 	reported 	"not 	need[ing] 	any
special 	reminders 	to 	take 	medications, 	care 	for 	her 	personal
needs[,] 	or 	to 	go 	places." 	Id. 	In 	that 	same 	report, 	the
Plaintiff 	represented 	that 	her 	"understanding" 	and 	"memory" 	were
not 	impacted 	"by 	her 	conditions." 	Id. 5
5 	The 	ALJ's 	decision might 	be 	read 	to 	suggest 	that 	these
representations 	were 	made 	during 	the 	November 	2013 	consultative
examination. 	But 	they 	do 	not 	appear 	in 	the 	consultative
examiner's 	records. 	Instead, 	they 	can 	be 	found 	in 	the 	above-
referenced 	October 	2013 	report, 	which 	the 	ALJ 	cited 	to 	in 	the
relevant 	part 	of 	the 	decision. 	See 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	377.
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All 	of 	this 	evidence 	took 	some 	balancing 	out 	--- 	between 	the
more 	serious 	"remote" 	memory 	troubles 	identified 	in 	the 	November
2013 	exam, 	and 	the 	less 	worrisome 	no-need-for-"special
reminders" 	conclusion 	of 	the 	October 	2013 	report.
In 	weighing 	things, 	the 	ALJ 	landed 	on 	the 	conclusion 	that 	the
Plaintiff's 	ability 	to 	understand, 	remember, 	or 	apply
information 	was 	"fair," 	and 	that 	she 	therefore 	had 	only 	a
moderate 	limitation 	in 	this 	area. 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P,
App' x 	1 	§ 	12 . 0 0 ( F) ( 2) ( c) .
That 	conclusion 	was 	plainly 	supported by 	substantial 	evidence.
See 	Chandler 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	667 	F.3d 	356, 	359 	(3d 	Cir.
2011) 	(the 	court 	is 	"not 	permitted 	to 	re-weigh 	the 	evidence 	or
impose 	[its] 	own 	factual 	determinations")
* 	* 	*
The 	second 	paragraph 	B mental 	functioning 	area: 	interacting with
others. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1 	§ 	12.00 (E) (2)
Here, 	the ALJ 	also 	determined 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	had 	a
"moderate" 	limitation. 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	377.
As 	before, 	the 	evidence 	tugged 	in 	two 	directions.
There 	was 	some 	evidence, 	identified by 	the 	ALJ, 	of 	serious
struggles. 	Per 	the 	ALJ, 	the 	Plaintiff 	"testified to 	having mood
swings 	and 	snapping 	at 	people," 	and 	to 	"get[ting] 	panic 	attacks
when 	she 	leaves 	home 	and 	is 	in 	crowds." 	Id. 	The 	ALJ 	also 	noted
that 	the 	Plaintiff 	reported 	"not 	spend[ing] 	time 	with 	others" 	in
the 	above-referenced 	October 	2013 	report. 	Id.
But 	not 	all 	the 	evidence 	was 	along 	those 	lines.
The ALJ 	analyzed 	the 	report 	of 	the 	Plaintiff's 	"November 	24,
2013[] 	psychological 	consultative 	examination" 	and 	observed
that, 	as 	reflected 	in 	that 	report, 	the 	Plaintiff 	"exhibited
cooperative 	behavior" 	and 	"her manner 	of 	relating, 	social 	skills
and 	overall 	presentation" 	were 	marked by 	only 	"mild 	agitation."
Id. 	Similarly, 	the ALJ 	noted 	that 	several 	medical 	professionals
examined 	the 	Plaintiff 	and 	identified 	only 	"mild 	social
limitations." 	Id. 	The 	ALJ 	also 	noted 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	went
grocery 	shopping, 	used 	public 	transportation, 	took medicine 	to
manage 	panic 	attack 	symptoms, 	and 	seemed 	to 	have 	a 	smooth 	enough
time 	at 	work 	--- 	"get[ting] 	along 	well 	with 	bosses," 	and 	"never
[having] 	been 	fired 	or 	laid 	off 	because 	of 	problems 	getting
along 	with 	others." 	Id.
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Steering 	between 	the 	somewhat 	equivocal 	evidence 	put 	on 	the
table 	before 	her 	that 	was 	the 	ALJ's 	responsibility. 	Here,
the 	ALJ 	assessed 	the 	relevant 	evidence 	and 	concluded 	that 	the
Plaintiff's 	ability 	to 	interact 	with 	others 	was 	"fair," 	and 	thus
that 	she 	had 	a 	moderate 	limitation 	in 	this 	area. 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt.
404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1 	§ 	12.00(F) (2) (c),
That 	conclusion 	was 	backed 	up 	by 	substantial 	evidence, 	and 	there
is 	no 	basis 	for 	this 	Court 	to 	second-guess 	it. 	See 	Chandler,
667 	F.3d 	at 	359.
* 	* 	*
As 	to 	the 	third 	paragraph 	B area: 	concentrating, 	persisting, 	or
maintaining 	pace, 	see 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1 	§
12. 0 0 (E) ( 3) , 	the 	ALJ 	found 	a 	"moderate" 	limitation. 	Loi ska 	J.,
AR 	at 	377.
In 	getting 	there, 	the 	ALJ 	looked 	to 	evidence 	suggesting 	that 	the
Plaintiff 	could 	concentrate 	and pay 	attention. 	See 	id. 	(noting
an 	examination 	report 	that 	described 	the 	Plaintiff's 	"attention
and 	concentration" 	as 	"intact"). 	That 	the 	Plaintiff 	could
"attend[] 	interviews, 	drive[] 	a 	car, 	use[] 	public
transportation, 	read[], 	finish 	what 	she 	starts, 	. 	and.
follow 	written 	and 	spoken 	instructions 	well." 	Id. 	and 	that 	the
Plaintiff 	could 	"handle money" 	and 	read 	in 	her 	spare 	time. 	Id.
On 	the 	other 	hand, 	the 	ALJ 	also 	looked 	to 	some 	evidence
suggesting 	that 	the 	Plaintiff's 	"psychological 	impairments
impacted her 	attention 	and 	concentration." 	Id.
In 	light 	of 	the 	pushes 	and pulls 	in 	the 	overall 	body 	of
information, 	the 	ALJ's 	"moderate" 	conclusion 	was 	supported by
substantial 	evidence.
* 	* 	*
The 	fourth 	area 	of mental 	functioning 	is 	adapting 	or managing
oneself, 	see 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1 	§ 	12.00(E) (4),
as 	to 	which 	the 	ALJ determined 	the 	Plaintiff 	had 	a 	"mild"
limitation. 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	377.
As 	before, 	there 	was 	evidence 	on 	both 	sides 	of 	the 	ledger.
Some 	evidence 	before 	the ALJ 	suggested 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	had
difficulties 	managing 	herself. 	In 	particular, 	that 	her
"judgment 	ranged 	from 	fair 	to 	poor 	due 	to mood 	fluctuations,"
per 	the 	November 	24, 	2013 	examination 	report. 	Id.
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But 	some 	evidence 	ran 	the 	other 	way. 	For 	example, 	based 	on 	live
testimony 	from 	the 	Plaintiff 	and 	the 	report 	from 	the 	November 	24
exam, 	the ALJ highlighted 	the 	Plaintiff's 	ability 	to 	"dress,
bathe, 	. 	groom herself[,] 	and 	do 	the 	laundry"; 	to 	"manage
money"; 	and 	to 	"travel[] 	independently 	through 	her 	community."
Id. 	The 	ALJ 	also 	noted 	that 	the 	October 	13 	report 	showed 	the
Plaintiff 	could 	drive, 	use 	public 	transit, 	go 	to 	interviews, 	and
handle 	stress 	well 	enough. 	See 	id. 	at 	378.
In 	light 	of 	all 	this, 	the 	ALJ 	concluded 	that 	the 	Plaintiff's
adapting/managing 	limitation 	was 	"mild." 	Id. 	at 	377. 	And 	the
information 	laid 	out 	in 	the 	preceding 	paragraphs 	shows 	that
conclusion was 	keyed 	to 	substantial 	evidence.
2. 	Other Objections
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	out 	just 	above, 	the 	Plaintiff's 	no-
substantial-evidence 	argument 	does 	not 	work 	as 	to 	the 	ALJ's
paragraph 	B analysis. 	See 	Part 	II.A.1.
The 	Plaintiff 	also 	presses 	some 	other 	objections 	to 	the 	ALJ's
paragraph 	B analysis. 	Tick 	through 	these 	now.
* 	* 	*
To 	start, 	the 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the ALJ 	failed 	to 	look 	at
"the 	combined 	effect 	of 	all 	of 	[her] 	impairments" 	at 	step 	three.
Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	7.
But 	this 	is 	inaccurate. 	The 	ALJ 	recognized 	her 	obligation 	to
look 	at 	the 	Plaintiff's 	"impairment 	or 	combination 	of
impairments" 	in 	her 	recitation 	of 	the 	governing 	law. 	Loiska 	J.,
AR 	at 	374 	(emphasis 	added). 	And 	she 	determined 	that 	the
Plaintiff 	did 	not 	have 	"an 	impairment 	or 	combination 	of
impairments 	that 	meets 	or medically 	equals 	the 	severity 	of 	one
of 	the 	listed 	impairments." 	Id. 	at 	376.
If 	this 	was 	not 	enough, 	it 	is 	for 	the 	Plaintiff 	to 	explain 	why.
She 	has 	not 	tried 	to 	do 	so.
* 	* 	*
Next, 	the 	Plaintiff 	contends 	the ALJ was 	required 	to 	follow 	a
specific 	"protocol," 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	13, 	when 	working
through 	the 	paragraph 	B criteria. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt.
P, 	App'x 	1 	§ 	12.00(E).
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But 	the 	underlying 	regulations 	do 	not 	require 	the 	analysis 	to
run 	down 	a 	particular 	course 	--- 	with 	issues 	taken 	up, 	for
example, 	in 	a 	specific 	order.
Rather, 	the 	regulations 	provide 	"examples 	[that] 	illustrate 	the
nature 	of 	th[ese] 	area[s] 	of mental 	functioning," 	and 	they
specifically 	note 	that 	"documentation 	of 	all 	of 	the 	examples" 	is
"not 	require[d] ." 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1 	§
12.00(E) (1)-(4). 	This 	is 	not 	prescriptive. 	And 	it 	is 	a 	long
way 	from 	a 	mandated 	"protocol."
Indeed, 	the 	Third 	Circuit 	has 	held 	that 	the 	ALJ does 	not 	need 	to
"adhere 	to 	a 	particular 	format 	in 	conducting 	his 	[step 	three]
analysis." 	Jones, 	364 	F.3d 	at 	505. 	What 	matters 	is 	whether
there 	was 	"sufficient 	development 	of 	the 	record 	and 	explanation
of 	findings 	to 	permit 	meaningful 	review." 	Id. 	Here, 	there 	was.
* 	* 	*
The 	Plaintiff 	also 	argues 	that 	the ALJ 	should 	have 	zoomed 	in
only 	on 	work-related maters 	--- 	and 	therefore 	should 	not 	have
considered 	the 	Plaintiff's 	performance 	of 	her 	non-work-related
daily 	activities. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	14-16.
But 	why 	not?
The 	question 	for 	the ALJ was, 	in 	part, 	how 	the 	Plaintiff managed
herself. 	So 	why 	look 	away 	from 	non-work-related 	evidence 	---
evidence 	as 	to 	whether, 	for 	example, 	she 	could 	drive 	herself
around 	town 	or 	do 	her 	own 	grocery 	shopping? 	That 	sort 	of
evidence 	can 	plainly 	shed 	light 	on 	how 	a 	person might 	handle
themselves 	at 	work.
Similarly, 	the 	question 	before 	the 	ALJ was, 	in 	part, 	about 	the
extent 	of 	the 	Plaintiff's 	memory 	troubles. 	So 	why 	not 	ask
whether, 	for 	example, 	the 	Plaintiff 	needed 	reminders 	to 	take 	her
medications 	--- 	a 	non-work-related 	issue? 	Would 	that 	not 	speak
to 	how 	her 	sharp 	her memory might 	be 	on 	the 	job?
In 	this 	context, 	laying 	down 	hard 	boundary markers 	between 	one
category 	of 	evidence 	and 	another 	would 	have 	been 	artificial. 	It
would 	not 	have 	been 	true 	to 	life. 	How 	a 	person 	handles 	the 	non-
work-activities 	the 	ALJ 	considered 	here 	suggest 	things 	about 	a
person's 	mental 	functioning 	more 	generally 	--- 	and 	therefore 	can
help 	to 	clarify 	the 	sort 	of 	work 	she might 	be 	able 	to 	do.
Categorically 	ignoring 	the 	non-work 	evidence 	put 	in 	play here
would 	have 	been 	at 	odds 	with 	common 	sense. 	And 	in 	this 	case,
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lopping 	off 	that 	evidence 	could 	have 	diminished, 	not 	enhanced,
the 	accuracy 	of 	the 	ALJ's 	decision-making.
The 	regulations 	do 	not 	suggest 	any 	need 	to 	look 	away 	from 	all
non-work-related 	evidence. 	And 	the 	caselaw 	does 	not 	either.
See 	Marilyn 	H. 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	2024 	WL 	1092503, 	at 	*6
(D.N.J. 	Mar. 	13, 	2024) 	(holding 	that 	"[u]se 	of 	daily 	activities"
to 	"support[] 	a 	finding 	that 	Plaintiff 	had 	no 	marked 	or 	extreme
limitations 	in 	the 	'B' 	criteria 	areas 	. 	. 	is 	permissible");
Adrienne 	L. 	v. 	O'Malley, 	2024 	WL 	208963, 	at 	*13 	(D.N.J. 	Jan. 	19,
2024) 	("It 	was 	also 	proper 	for 	the 	ALJ 	to 	consider 	other 	record
evidence, 	including 	Plaintiff's 	daily 	life 	activities, 	when
analyzing 	Dr. 	Brown's 	findings 	and 	the 	extent 	of 	Plaintiff's
mental 	impairments."); 	Trzeciak v. 	Colvin, 	2016 	WL 	4769731, 	at
*5 	(D.N.J. 	Sept. 	12, 	2016) 	(affirming 	an ALJ's 	conclusion 	that
the 	paragraph 	B criteria 	were 	not 	satisfied, 	which 	was 	based 	in
part 	on 	the 	plaintiff's 	report 	that 	she 	could 	"clean, 	do 	the
laundry, 	wash 	the 	dishes, 	and 	prepare 	simple 	meals 	three 	times 	a
week") 	( cleaned 	up) ; 	Freeman 	v. 	Comm' r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec. , 	2014 	WL
1293865, 	at 	*6 	(M.D. 	Pa. 	Mar. 	31, 	2014) 	(affirming 	an 	ALJ' s
conclusion 	that 	the 	paragraph 	B criteria 	were 	not 	satisfied,
which 	was 	based 	in 	part 	on 	the 	plaintiff's 	ability 	to 	"cook
simple 	meals, 	clean, 	shop, 	take 	care 	of 	his 	personal 	needs, 	and
manage 	funds 	competently"); 	Jacqueline 	M.J. 	v. 	O'Malley, 	2024 	WL
4234964, 	at 	*5 	(D. 	Minn. 	Sept. 	19, 	2024) 	(similar).
* 	* 	*
The 	Plaintiff's 	next 	argument: 	the 	ALJ's 	paragraph 	B analysis
must 	be 	put 	aside 	because 	it 	did 	not 	account 	for 	her 	treating
physician's 	reports 	of 	"panic 	attacks, 	major 	depression 	and mood
swings 	indicative 	of 	bipolar 	disorder." 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at
23.
But 	the 	ALJ 	did 	note 	the 	treating 	physician's 	diagnosis 	of
"major 	depression, 	anxiety 	and 	. 	. 	panic 	attacks." 	Loiska 	J.,
AR 	at 	383. 	The 	ALJ 	just 	concluded 	that 	the 	physician's 	opinion
should be 	given 	only 	"little 	weight" 	because 	it 	was
"inconsistent 	with 	the 	[Plaintiff's] 	own 	testimony 	and 	[the
consultative 	examiner's] 	. 	findings," 	was 	"not 	well
supported by medically 	acceptable 	clinical 	techniques[,] 	and
[wa]s 	not 	consistent 	with 	the 	other 	substantial 	evidence 	in 	the
record." 	Id. 	at 	386.
Similarly, 	the 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	the 	ALJ 	did 	not 	work
through 	three 	particular 	pieces 	of 	information 	from 	the 	reports
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of 	the 	consultative 	examiner: 	( 1) 	her 	specific 	diagnoses; 	( 2)
her 	conclusion 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	"would 	have 	difficulty
learning 	new 	tasks 	due 	to 	difficulties 	with memory"; 	and 	(3) 	her
conclusion 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	presented 	with 	"psychiatric
problems 	which may 	significantly 	interfere 	with 	[her] 	ability 	to
function 	on 	a 	daily 	basis." 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	23 	(cleaned
up).
But 	same 	point. 	The 	ALJ 	discussed many 	of 	the 	specific 	points
the 	Plaintiff 	raised. 	See 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	383 	(noting 	the
consultative 	examiner 	"diagnosed major 	depressive 	disorder
without 	psychotic 	features" 	and 	"rule[d] 	out 	bipolar 	[disorder]"
following 	the 	first 	examination); 	id. 	at 	384 	(noting 	the
consultative 	examiner 	diagnosed 	the 	Plaintiff 	with 	"depressive
disorder" 	after 	the 	second 	examination); 	id. 	at 	386 	(noting 	the
examiner's 	finding 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	"would 	have 	difficulties
in 	learning 	new 	tasks 	and 	performing 	complex 	tasks 	independently
due 	to 	difficulty 	with memory") . 6
B. Paragraph C
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	out 	above, 	the 	Plaintiff's 	challenge 	to 	the
ALJ's 	paragraph 	B determination 	does 	not 	work. 	See 	Part 	II.A.
Take 	up 	now 	her 	challenges 	to 	the 	paragraph 	C determination.
To 	meet 	the 	requirements 	of 	paragraph 	C, 	a 	claimant 	must
establish 	(1) 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	mental 	health 	disorder 	lasting
more 	than 	two 	years, 	see 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1
§ 	12. 00 (G) (2) (a); 	(2) 	reliance 	on 	"medical 	treatment, 	mental
health 	therapy, 	psychosocial 	support[], 	or 	a 	highly 	structured
setting[]" 	to 	manage 	symptoms, 	id.§ 	12.00(G)(2)(b); 	and 	(3)
"minimal 	capacity 	to 	adapt 	to 	changes 	in 	[her] 	environment 	or 	to
6 	It 	may 	be 	that 	the 	Plaintiff's 	argument 	is 	that 	while 	the 	ALJ
analyzed 	certain 	reports, 	she 	did 	not 	do 	so 	as 	part 	of 	the
paragraph 	B analysis 	in 	particular. 	But 	that 	runs 	aground 	on
the 	Third 	Circuit's 	directive 	to 	"read 	[the 	decision] 	as 	a
whole." 	Jones, 	364 	F.3d 	at 	505. 	(And 	note: 	if 	every 	piece 	of
evidence 	does 	not 	need 	to 	be 	explicitly 	discussed 	by 	the 	ALJ, 	as
the 	Third 	Circuit 	has 	suggested, 	see, 	e.g., 	Fargnoli, 	247 	F.3d
at 	42, 	then 	it 	would 	seem 	to 	follow 	that 	there 	is 	generally 	no
problem when 	the 	ALJ works 	through 	a 	piece 	of 	evidence 	(as
here), 	but 	is 	said 	to 	have 	done 	so 	in 	the 	wrong 	spot 	in 	her
opinion.)
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demands 	that 	are 	not 	already 	part 	of 	[her] 	daily 	life." 	Id.
§ 	12.00(G) (2) (c).
* 	* 	*
As 	to 	the 	second paragraph 	C requirement, 	the 	Plaintiff 	presses
three 	arguments. 	First, 	that 	she 	"h[as] 	a 	history 	of mental
health 	therapy 	offering psychological 	support." 	Plaintiff's
Brief 	at 	28. 	Second, 	that 	she 	takes 	"numerous 	psychotropic
medications." 	Id. 	And 	third, 	that 	she 	"lives 	alone 	. 	in 	an
acknowledged 	solitary 	existence 	without 	relationships 	with
friends 	or 	family members." 	Id.
As 	to 	the 	first 	argument, 	related 	to 	therapy, 	the 	Plaintiff
points 	to 	no 	record 	evidence 	that 	was 	put 	before 	the 	ALJ. 	Nor
does 	she 	explain 	what 	therapy 	she 	assertedly 	received. 	Or
describe 	any 	specific 	providers, 	or 	how 	often 	she 	received
treatment 	from 	them.
Similar problem 	as 	to 	her 	second 	argument, 	related 	to
medications. 	The 	Plaintiff provides 	no 	description 	of what
evidence 	was 	before 	the 	ALJ 	--- 	as 	to 	the 	medications 	the
Plaintiff 	assertedly 	took, 	the 	frequency 	with 	which 	they were
taken, 	etc.
As 	to 	the 	third 	and 	final 	point 	--- 	the 	assertion 	that 	the
Plaintiff 	"lives 	alone," 	id., 	is 	supported by 	a 	cite 	to 	evidence
before 	the 	ALJ. 	See 	id. 	But 	living 	alone 	is 	not 	uncommon, 	and
having 	little 	to 	no 	relationship 	with 	family 	and 	friends 	is 	not
necessarily 	very 	uncommon 	either. 	There 	is 	no 	reason 	to 	think
this 	is 	especially 	clarifying 	in 	this 	context, 	and 	the 	Plaintiff
does 	not 	explain 	how 	living 	alone 	constitutes 	"a 	highly
structured 	setting," 	20 	C.F.R. 	pt. 	404, 	subpt. 	P, 	App'x 	1 	§
12. 00 (G) (2) (b), 	as 	it 	must 	for 	the 	purposes 	of 	the 	second
paragraph 	C requirement.
* 	* 	*
In 	sum: 	because 	the 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	articulated 	how 	she
satisfied 	the 	paragraph 	C criteria 	based 	on 	the 	evidence 	put
before 	the 	ALJ, 	her 	challenge 	to 	the 	ALJ's 	paragraph 	C analysis
must 	fail.
III. 	Residual 	Functional 	Capacity
The 	ALJ held 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	was 	not 	per 	se 	disabled 	(at 	step
three) 	because 	her 	impairments 	were 	not 	equivalent 	to 	Listing
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12.04 	or 	Listing 	12.06 	--- 	and 	for 	the 	reasons 	set 	out 	above 	in
Part 	II, 	there 	is 	no 	basis 	for 	displacing 	the 	ALJ's 	conclusion.
Because 	of 	her 	step 	three 	conclusion, 	the 	ALJ moved 	on 	to
consider 	the 	Plaintiff's 	residual 	functional 	capacity.
Recall 	that 	"[r]esidual 	functional 	capacity 	is 	. 	. 	that 	which
an 	individual 	is 	still 	able 	to 	do 	despite 	the 	limitations 	caused
by 	his 	or 	her 	impairments." 	Fargnoli, 	247 	F.3d 	at 	40 	(cleaned
up) .
And 	per 	the 	ALJ, 	this 	was 	the 	Plaintiff's 	residual 	functional
capacity:
She 	is 	able 	to 	understand, 	remember, 	and 	perform 	simple,
routine 	and 	repetitive 	tasks; 	in 	a 	work 	environment 	free 	of
fast-paced 	production 	requirements, 	such 	as 	working 	on 	a
conveyer 	belt; 	and 	can 	have 	occasional 	interaction 	with 	the
public 	and 	coworkers, 	however, 	may 	have 	frequent
interaction 	with 	coworkers 	within 	the 	first 	60-90 	days
while 	training.
Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	378.
* 	* 	*
The 	Plaintiff's 	main 	argument: 	that 	the 	quoted 	residual
functional 	capacity 	assessment 	leaned 	too 	heavily 	on 	"the
findings 	[of 	the 	consultative 	examiner] 	tending 	to 	show 	[the]
[P]laintiff 	can 	work," 	while 	giving 	"absolutely no 	weight 	to 	the
findings 	[of 	the 	consultative 	examiner] 	that 	prove 	she 	can't."
Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	38-39.
This 	argument 	does 	not 	work.
The 	ALJ was 	not 	required 	to 	take 	the 	consultative 	examiner's
opinion 	in 	an 	all-or-nothing 	way. 	Rather, 	the 	ALJ was 	entitled
to 	do 	what 	she 	did 	--- 	to 	lean more 	heavily 	on 	only 	part 	of 	the
examiner's 	opinion. 	See 	Adorno 	v. 	Shalala, 	40 	F.3d 	43, 	48 	(3d
Cir. 	1994) 	("The 	Secretary may 	properly 	accept 	some 	parts 	of 	the
medical 	evidence 	and 	reject 	other 	parts[.]"); 	see 	also, 	e.g.,
Barrett 	v. 	Saul, 	840 	F. 	App'x 	916, 	919 	(9th 	Cir. 	2020)
(affirming 	an 	ALJ's 	decision 	to 	"giv[e] 	less 	weight 	to 	one
aspect 	of" 	a 	doctor's 	opinion); 	Stancavage 	v. 	Saul, 	469 	F. 	Supp.
3d 	311, 	328 	(M.D. 	Pa. 	2020) 	("An ALJ 	is 	also 	entitled 	generally
to 	credit 	parts 	of 	an 	opinion 	without 	crediting 	the 	entire
opinion.") 	(cleaned 	up); 	Connors 	v. 	Astrue, 	2011 	WL 	2359055, 	at
*9 	(D.N.H. 	June 	10, 	2011) 	(concluding 	substantial 	evidence
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supported 	an 	ALJ's 	decision 	to 	"credit 	some 	parts 	[of 	a 	medical
opinion] 	while 	discrediting 	others"); 	Eric W. 	v. 	O'Malley, 	2024
WL 	4333297, 	at 	*3 	(N.D. 	Ill. 	Sept. 	27, 	2024) 	("An ALJ 	is 	not
required 	to 	credit 	every 	part 	of 	a 	medical 	opinion 	just 	because
he 	credits 	one 	part.") 	( cleaned 	up) .
And 	to 	the 	extent 	the 	ALJ was 	required 	to 	"give 	some 	reason 	for
discounting 	the 	evidence 	she 	rejects," 	Diaz 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc.
Sec., 	577 	F.3d 	500, 	505-06 	(3d 	Cir. 	2009), 	the 	ALJ 	did 	that
here.
Per 	the 	ALJ, 	the 	consultative 	examiner's 	determination 	that 	the
Plaintiff 	"was 	able 	to 	follow 	and 	understand 	simple 	directions
and 	instructions, 	was 	able 	to 	perform many 	simple 	tasks
independently, 	would 	be 	able 	to 	maintain 	a 	regular 	schedule[,]
and 	would 	be 	able 	to 	maintain 	attention 	and 	concentration" 	---
all 	of 	this 	was 	given 	real 	weight 	because 	it 	linked 	up 	with 	the
Plaintiff's 	"reported 	activities 	of 	daily 	living" 	and 	"the
record." 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	386.
But 	the 	other 	key 	part 	of 	the 	consultative 	examiner's 	findings,
as 	to 	the 	Plaintiff's 	"difficulties 	in 	learning 	new 	tasks 	and
performing 	complex 	tasks 	independently 	due 	to 	[her] 	memory," 	id.
--- 	this, 	per 	the 	ALJ, 	was 	entitled 	to 	less 	credit. 	Why?
Because 	it 	stood 	out 	there 	on 	its 	own, 	the 	ALJ 	explained, 	not
meaningfully 	supported by 	other 	evidence. 	See 	id. 	at 	386-87
(concluding 	this 	opinion 	was, 	among 	other 	things, 	at 	odds 	with
the 	fact 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	"resides 	alone, 	is 	relatively
independent 	in 	activities 	of 	daily 	living, 	. 	has 	denied
needing 	special 	reminders[,] 	and 	has 	been 	found 	to 	have 	intact
memory") .
This 	Court 	is 	"not 	permitted 	to 	re-weigh 	the 	evidence 	or 	impose
[its] 	own 	factual 	determinations," 	see 	Chandler, 	667 	F.3d 	at
359, 	and 	the 	ALJ's 	decision 	to 	rest 	on 	the 	more 	corroborated
part 	of 	the 	consultative 	examiner's 	findings 	will 	not 	be
disturbed. 7
7 	The 	Plaintiff 	also 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ's 	residual 	functional
capacity 	assessment 	did 	not 	consider 	some 	of 	her 	limitations 	in
mental 	functioning. 	See 	Plaintiff's 	Brief 	at 	41-43. 	But 	this
is 	at 	odds 	with 	the 	record. 	See, 	e.g., 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	384
("In 	regard 	to 	her 	depression, 	the 	claimant 	would 	only be
impacted minimally 	in 	her 	social 	interaction 	with 	the 	public 	or
coworkers, 	and moderately 	in 	understanding, 	remembering 	and
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* 	* 	*
There 	are, 	though, 	two 	aspects 	of 	the 	ALJ's 	residual 	functional
capacity 	conclusion 	that 	will 	require 	a 	limited 	remand.
* 	* 	*
First, 	the ALJ determined 	that 	the 	Plaintiff was 	ordinarily
limited 	to 	"occasional 	interaction 	with 	the 	public 	and
coworkers," 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	378, 	but 	could 	have 	"frequent
interaction 	with 	coworkers 	within 	the 	first 	60-90 	days 	while
training." 	Id.
But 	it 	is 	not 	clear 	why 	the 	Plaintiff 	would 	be 	unable 	to 	have
certain 	interactions 	in 	the 	long 	run 	(as 	the 	ALJ held), 	but
could be 	expected 	to 	have 	seemingly 	similar 	interactions 	during
her 	training 	period 	(as 	the 	ALJ 	also 	held).
This 	necessitates 	a 	remand, 	so 	that 	the 	ALJ 	can 	analyze 	this
issue.
Courts 	throughout 	the 	Nation 	have 	so 	held 	in 	closely 	similar
circumstances. 	See 	Leitz 	v. 	Kijakazi, 	2023 	WL 	4342114, 	at 	*2
(9th 	Cir. 	July 	5, 	2023); 	Peter 	T.S. 	v. 	Dudek, 	2025 	WL 	964959, 	at
*5-6 	(N.D. 	Ill. 	Mar. 	31, 	2025); 	Yazmin 	Q. 	v. 	O'Malley, 	2024 	WL
4567277, 	at 	*6 	(E.D. 	Pa. 	Oct. 	24, 	2024); 	Scott 	v. 	O'Malley, 	2024
WL 	4817729, 	at 	*7-8 	(D. 	Del. 	Nov. 	18, 	2024); 	~ 	v. 	Comm'r 	of
Soc. 	Sec., 	2022 	WL 	16701880, 	at 	*3 	(D.N.J. 	Feb. 	15, 	2022);
Clarissa 	W.-J. 	v. 	O'Malley, 	2024 	WL 	3541932, 	at 	*18-20 	(D. 	Minn.
July 	10, 	2024), 	report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2024 	WL
3540855 	(D. 	Minn. 	July 	25, 	2024); 	Cook v. 	Kijakazi, 	2022 	WL
1711654, 	at 	*2 	(E.D. 	Pa. 	May 	27, 	2022); 	N.B. 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc.
Sec. 	Admin., 	2022 	WL 	263431, 	at 	*6 	(D.N.J. 	Jan. 	28, 	2022); 	Weber
v. 	Saul, 	2021 	WL 	99988, 	at 	*6 	(W.D. 	Wis. 	Jan. 	12, 	2021); 	Clampit
v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	at 	*6 	(N.D. 	Ohio 	Mar. 	30, 	2023), 	report
and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2023 	WL 	2956613 	(N.D. 	Ohio 	Apr. 	14,
2023); 	Slate 	v. 	Kijakazi, 	2022 	WL 	1046290, 	at 	*6 	(D. 	Nev. 	Apr.
6, 	2022); 	Shahitta 	C. 	v. 	Comm'r 	of 	Soc. 	Sec., 	2023 	WL 	8797918,
at 	*2 	(W.D.N.Y. 	Dec. 	20, 	2023) . 8
applying 	information, 	and 	in 	concentration, 	persistence 	or 	pace
and mildly 	in 	activities 	of 	daily 	living.").
8 	For 	instances 	in 	which 	fuller 	analysis 	was 	undertaken, 	see, 	for
example, 	Karrissa 	D. 	v. 	Bisignano, 	2025 	WL 	2779140, 	at 	*5 	(D.
Minn. 	Sept. 	30, 	2025); 	and 	Jess 	B. 	v. 	Kijakazi, 	2023 	WL 	6457322,
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* 	* 	*
On 	remand, 	the 	ALJ 	shall 	also 	analyze 	a 	second 	issue.
As 	part 	of 	her 	residual 	functional 	capacity 	analysis, 	the 	ALJ
determined 	that 	the 	Plaintiff 	had 	a 	moderate 	limitation 	in
interacting 	with 	others, 	see 	Loiska 	J., 	AR 	at 	377, 	and 	therefore
could 	have 	only 	"occasional 	interaction 	with 	the 	public 	and
coworkers." 	Id. 	at 	378.
But 	if 	limits 	on 	interactions 	with 	the 	"public 	and 	coworkers,"
id., 	were 	required 	on 	account 	of 	the 	Plaintiff's 	moderate
limitation, 	then 	case-specific 	analysis 	is 	required 	as 	to
whether 	limits 	were 	also 	needed 	as 	to 	the 	Plaintiff's
interactions 	with 	supervisors. 	See,~' 	Matchett 	v. 	Comm'r,
Soc. 	Sec. 	Admin., 	2019 	WL 	581801, 	at 	*3 	(D.N.J. 	Feb. 	13, 	2019)
("The 	Court 	cannot 	determine 	on 	the 	present 	record why 	the 	ALJ
did 	not 	include 	in 	the 	residual 	functional 	capacity
determination 	a 	limitation 	on 	interaction 	with 	supervisors 	when
the 	evidence 	--- 	to 	which 	the 	ALJ 	gave 	significant 	weight 	---
would 	appear 	to 	support 	such 	a 	limitation, 	consistent 	with 	the
limitations 	the 	ALJ placed 	on 	interactions 	with 	the 	public 	and
co-workers."); 	Peggy 	C., 	2021 	WL 	3206812, 	at 	*6-7 	(similar);
Veronica 	B., 	2022 	WL 	131136, 	at 	*6 	(similar) 	9
* 	* 	*
IV. 	Conclusion
The 	Commissioner's 	determination 	here 	is 	largely 	supported by
substantial 	evidence 	and 	is 	affirmed 	as 	to 	steps 	one, 	two, 	and
three.
at 	*9 	(S.D. 	W. 	Va. 	Aug. 	21, 	2023), 	report 	and 	recommendation
adopted, 	2023 	WL 	6449442 	(S.D. 	W. 	Va. 	Oct. 	3, 	2023).
9 	It 	may 	be 	appropriate 	on 	remand 	for 	the 	ALJ 	to 	consider 	new
evidence 	or 	new 	argument 	as 	to 	the 	two 	issues 	identified 	in 	the
text. 	But 	the 	precise 	scope 	of 	the 	remand, 	beyond 	the
requirement 	to 	provide 	a 	fuller 	analysis 	on 	the 	two 	issues, 	is
for 	the 	ALJ 	to 	take 	up. 	(If 	the 	analysis 	alluded 	to 	in 	the 	text
leads 	to 	bottom-line 	changes 	in 	the 	ALJ's 	residual 	functional
capacity 	assessment, 	then 	the 	ALJ 	should 	work 	through 	on 	remand
the 	implications 	of 	any 	such 	changes 	for 	her 	overall 	step 	four
and 	step 	five 	analysis.)
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But 	the 	Commissioner's 	residual 	functional 	capacity 	assessment
must 	be 	vacated. 	This 	is 	not 	a 	remand 	as 	to 	the 	entirety 	of 	the
ALJ's 	work. 	See 	Sullivan 	v. 	Hudson, 	490 	U.S. 	877, 	885 	(1989)
(observing 	that 	district 	courts 	can 	determine 	"the 	scope 	of 	the
remand"). 	On 	remand, 	the 	Commissioner 	shall 	address 	the 	two
discrete 	issues 	discussed 	in 	Part 	III, 	and, 	if 	necessary, 	their
implications 	for 	the 	rest 	of 	the 	analysis. 	See 	footnote 	9.
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	14th 	day 	of 	January, 	2026, 	$0 ORDERED.
LMichael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
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