BADALAMENTI v. RESIDEO TECHNOLOGIES, INC. et al

2:22-cv-05592Njd27.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SALVATORE and LISA BADALAMENTI,
on behalf of themselves and the
Putative Class,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RESIDEO TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC.,
Defendants.
No. 22-cv-05592 (MEF)(CF)
OPINION and ORDER
* 	* 	*
For the purposes of this Opinion and Order, the Court largely
assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history of
this case.
* 	* 	*
Some background:
The Plaintiff1 filed a products-liability complaint. 	See Class
Action Complaint and Jury Demand (ECF 1) (“First Complaint”).
Motion practice followed, and the complaint was dismissed in
part during November of 2024. 	See Badalamenti v. Resideo
Techs., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 3d 534, 549 (D.N.J. 2024).
Around a month later, the Court issued this order:
In light of the Court’s discussion with the parties during
the . . . conference, and Plaintiff having advised that he
wishes to replead certain claims, and in the interest of
efficiency for both the parties and the Court, Plaintiff
may file an amended complaint --- which includes ALL facts
1 	Salvatore Badalamenti.
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and claims he seeks to allege in this action, and is guided
by the . . . Opinion and Order.
December 11, 2024 Order (ECF 41) (“December 2024 Order”).
A month after that, in January of 2025, the Plaintiff (now
joined by a relative2) filed an amended products-liability
complaint. 	See Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand
(ECF 44) (“Second Complaint”).
There was another round of motion practice, and the Court then
dismissed the second complaint. 	See Badalamenti v. Resideo
Techs., Inc., 2025 WL 3013023, at *25 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2025).
* 	* 	*
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), the Plaintiffs now
ask to file a third complaint. 	See Plaintiffs’ Letter (ECF 59);
Plaintiffs’ Brief in Response to the Court’s Text Order of
November 6, 2025 (“Plaintiffs’ Brief”) (ECF 61) at 1.3
The basis for the request: the Plaintiffs want to add in new
allegations based on a particular 34-page spreadsheet. 	See
Plaintiffs’ Brief, Exhibit 1 (ECF 61-1) at 69-102; Plaintiffs’
Brief, Exhibit 2 (ECF 61-2) ¶¶ 86-96, 104-13, 117, 121-23, 149,
156.
The Plaintiffs’ Rule 15 request is opposed by the Defendants.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Opposition [to]
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend (“Defendants’ Opposition”) (ECF 66)
at 1.
The Court will deny it.
* 	* 	*
The core problem with the Plaintiffs’ request is that they had
the 34-page spreadsheet in June 2023 --- and that was long
before January 2025, when they filed their previous complaint,
the now-dismissed second one. 	See id. at 1-2, 15; see also
2 	Lisa Badalamenti.
3 	There is no practical difference between the two open
questions here: (i) whether the Court’s October 2025 dismissal
of the second complaint was with prejudice and (ii) whether the
Plaintiffs should be allowed to again replead. 	See Badalamenti,
2025 WL 3013023, at *25 n.41 (leaving these questions open).
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Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Further Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Leave to Amend (“Plaintiffs’ Reply”) (ECF 67) at 13-14.
The Plaintiffs did not review the spreadsheet before filing
complaint-number-two, and so they did not do before what they
want to do now --- use the spreadsheet to build out the
allegations in their pleadings.
In this case, that cannot be justified, and the Plaintiffs’
request to file a third compliant will be denied.
* 	* 	*
Start the analysis by walking through five case-specific reasons
why the Plaintiffs (i) should have reviewed the spreadsheet
before filing the second complaint and, at that point, (ii)
should have used the spreadsheet, to flesh out their
allegations.4
The first of the five reasons is timing.
The Plaintiffs did not put hands on the spreadsheet just under
the wire. 	Say the night or the week before they were teeing up
the second complaint for filing. 	Rather, they had the
spreadsheet for a long time --- for around 18 months before they
filed their second complaint. 	See Plaintiffs’ Reply at 3.
The second reason is context.
The document was not buried. 	There was no haystack: the
spreadsheet was part of a modest-sized production --- of 1241
pages. 	See Defendants’ Opposition, Exhibit 1 (ECF 66-2). 	And
the spreadsheet was no hard-to-find needle. 	The relevant cover
letter made things easy. 	It specifically identified the
spreadsheet by name and bates number. 	See id.
Third, source.
The 34-page spreadsheet was produced to the Plaintiffs by
Underwriters Laboratories. 	See id.; see also Plaintiffs’ Reply
at 13. 	And the Plaintiffs’ legal theory here depends at its
core on allegations about interactions between the Defendants
and UL. 	See First Complaint ¶¶ 8, 11-14, 22-24, 42, 48-58, 72-
4 	As a matter of their professional responsibilities, the
Plaintiffs’ lawyers may also have had a general, background duty
to review and use the spreadsheet before the second complaint
was filed.
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73, 95, 100, 106; Second Complaint ¶¶ 9-10, 12-13, 15-16, 22,
25-29, 35-39, 55, 57, 61-71, 76, 80-95, 106-07, 124, 131, 136,
142; 	Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 14) at 1, 3-5, 7-12;
Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF 50) at 1-2, 5-7, 9-13, 16,
18-19.
Given that backdrop, what UL handed over was all but surely to
be at the heart of the case. 	Something to dig into. 	Not
something to put aside, to be reviewed only later and only as a
fallback --- if the second complaint were eventually dismissed.
Fourth, the Court’s order.
After its in-part dismissal of the first complaint, the Court
ordered that “ALL facts and claims” that were to be pressed “in
t[he] action” needed to be in the second complaint. 	See
December 2024 Order.
The order set up a fork in the road, and marked it out in bright
lights. 	Down one path: work through the on-hand discovery and
use it in the second complaint. 	Or go the other route: opt not
to review the information that has come in, and run the risk
that “facts and claims,” id., associated with ignored discovery
(like the spreadsheet) will not be able to become part of the
pleadings.
The Plaintiffs chose the second approach. 	In doing so, they
“relied at their peril on the possibility of adding to their
complaint.” 	In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267,
280-81 (3d Cir. 2004) (denying leave to amend, in part on this
basis).
Fifth, content.
The spreadsheet is relatively short. 	For anyone with a strong
feel for the allegations here, the document all but speaks for
itself.
And the Plaintiffs suggest nothing that is meaningfully to the
contrary.
They do not contend, for example, that understanding the
spreadsheet required a new sift through the overall discovery.
Or that teasing out the spreadsheet’s meaning depended on next
steps that needed taking, like getting new document subpoenas
out the door or identifying and interviewing new witnesses. 	The
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spreadsheet was not a loose end that had to be chased down
before its import could become clear; rather, in the context of
the Plaintiffs’ broader allegations, it was mainly self-
explanatory.
And the Plaintiffs do not argue that there was something about
the spreadsheet’s meaning that only became obvious later, in
retrospect.
Per the Plaintiffs, the spreadsheet’s asserted utility is that
it helps to supply “the foundational ‘false statement’ that the
Court noted was missing from [the] Plaintiffs’ original
pleading.” 	See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 11. 	On that understanding,
the spreadsheet could help to plug a hole spotlighted by the
Court in its ruling on the first complaint, not in its decision
on the second complaint. 	See Badalamenti, 755 F. Supp. 3d at
547 n.16.
Bottom line: beyond any background professional responsibilities
the Plaintiffs’ lawyers may have had,5 there were added reasons
why the spreadsheet should have been reviewed and used before
the second complaint was filed. 	It should have been reviewed
given when it was received, the context of its production, the
entity it came from, and the Court’s December 2024 order. 	And
the spreadsheet should have been used given its content; it made
sense enough on its own, without any real need to first reel in
more information.
* 	* 	*
Against the conclusion set out just above, the Plaintiffs do not
offer a hard push-back.
Indeed, they concede that they simply did not review the
spreadsheet when it came in. 	See Plaintiffs’ Reply at 14 (“With
discovery stayed and [the] Defendant’s dispositive motion
pending, a complete review of the . . . documents was not
necessary given the posture of the case.”).
But that does not work.
If the purpose of getting discovery were simply to lay down
stepping-stones to getting more discovery --- then maybe it
would make sense not to review documents that have come in while
5 	See footnote 4.
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discovery is on pause. 	After all, at that point, there is no
open path to obtaining more materials.
But discovery is undertaken for many reasons. 	One is so that
plaintiffs can flesh out the allegations in their pleadings. 	So
why not do a complete read-through of the discovery in advance
of filing a new pleading, whether discovery is stayed at that
point or not?
* 	* 	*
In short: the spreadsheet was received in June 2023; the second
complaint was filed in January 2025; and the Plaintiffs should
have, years ago, reviewed and used the 34-page spreadsheet if
they wanted to press allegations based on it.
The implication of this:
Because they did not put forward the spreadsheet-based
allegations before (when they filed their second complaint), the
Court will not allow them to do so now (via a proposed third
complaint).
* 	* 	*
Relatively free repleading is built into the DNA of federal
civil litigation. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also
Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 89 (3d Cir. 2019);
Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 150 n.21 (3d Cir. 2017).
But there are outer limits in our law, too. 	See, e.g., Spartan
Concrete Prods., LLC v. Argos USVI, Corp., 929 F.3d 107, 115 (3d
Cir. 2019).6
The Court has discretion in this area. 	See Garrett, 938 F.3d at
89; see also Cresci v. City of Bayonne, 2024 WL 94099, at *2 (3d
Cir. Jan. 9, 2024).
And here, it will use that discretion to deny leave to amend.
6 	If there were not, defendants could be unfairly pressured, by
being subjected to the uncertainties and cascading costs of open
cases. 	Plaintiffs would not feel compelled to put their best
foot forward the first time (or the second). 	And if complaints
could be amended too freely, then too much of the court’s time
could be chewed through --- to the detriment of the court’s
obligations to the other parties who have cases before it. 	Time
spent here cannot be spent there.
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To see why, look to the various factors laid out by the Supreme
Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
The one that looms especially large in this case: undue delay.
See id. at 182.
“The concept of ‘undue delay’ includes consideration of whether
new information came to light or was available earlier to the
moving party.” 	In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d at
280.
The “undue delay” factor recognizes that a gap between when
amendment becomes possible and when it is actually sought
can, in certain circumstances, be grounds to deny leave to
amend. 	While simple delay cannot justify denying leave to
amend by itself, delay that is “undue” --- a delay that is
protracted and unjustified --- can place a burden on the
court or counterparty . . . [T]he question of undue delay
requires that we focus on the movant’s reasons for not
amending sooner while bearing in mind the liberal pleading
philosophy of the federal rules. 	Following this principle,
we have refused to overturn denials of motions for leave to
amend where the moving party offered no cogent reason for
the delay in seeking the amendment.
Mullin, 875 F.3d at 151 (cleaned up); see also CMR D.N. Corp. v.
City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 635 (3d Cir. 2013) (no abuse
of discretion in denying leave to amend where the plaintiff did
not “offer[] any cogent explanation for th[e] delay”).
In this case, no “cogent” reason has been offered up.
It is one thing to not review discovery because of a mistake,
like a clerical error. 	See Mullin, 875 F.3d at 154-56. 	But
that is not this case. 	Here, there was apparently an
affirmative choice made to not review the spreadsheet. 	See
Plaintiffs’ Reply at 13-14 (explaining this).
Moreover, there was no “attempt[] to correct,” Mullin, 875 F.3d
at 154, the decision to not review the discovery --- by, say,
(i) filing an amended complaint just after the press of
responding to the first motion to dismiss had passed and there
was time to look through the old discovery, cf. Defendants’
Opposition at 15-16, or (ii) simply adding allegations based on
the spreadsheet into the second complaint, when it was filed in
January 2025.
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And finally, “length of the delay,” Mullin, 875 F.3d at 154, can
potentially7 be part of the analysis, and it weighs against
allowing for the filing of a third complaint. 	Amendment is now
being sought around 29 months after the spreadsheet was first
received. 	See Defendants’ Opposition at 1-2.
“[L]eave to amend has been denied when the moving party knew
about facts on which the proposed amendment was based but
omitted the necessary allegations from the original pleading.”
6 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1488 (3d ed.
2025); see also Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“When a party fails to take advantage of previous
opportunities to amend, without adequate explanation, leave to
amend is properly denied.”).
And that is in essence what happened here. 	Strictly speaking,
the Plaintiffs did not know certain facts. 	But that is only
because they chose not to find out what was in the discovery
they had obtained.
In short: there is plainly “undue delay” here --- and that
would, on its own, supply reason enough to deny the Rule 15
motion. 	See Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Hous. of
V.I., Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1981) (“In the absence of
substantial or undue prejudice, denial must be grounded in bad
faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay,
repeated failure to cure deficiency by amendments previously
allowed or futility of amendment.”); Est. of Oliva ex rel.
McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 803 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
that where a plaintiff “has had previous opportunities to
amend,” delay may be undue “[i]rrespective of whether [another
party] would have suffered prejudice” from the delay).
* 	* 	*
Beyond undue delay, prejudice to the Defendants is also relevant
in this case. 	See generally Mullin, 875 F.3d at 155-57.
For one thing, “a significant, unjustified, or ‘undue’ delay in
seeking the amendment may itself constitute prejudice sufficient
7 	If delay is especially short it can sometimes excuse a passive
failure, like neglect. 	See Mullin, 875 F.3d at 154-55. 	But it
is less clear under the cases whether the fact that there was
only a short delay period can excuse an affirmative choice, like
the decision here not to review discovery.
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to justify denial of a motion for leave to amend.” 	CMR, 703
F.3d at 629.
And moreover, note that the Plaintiffs contend that allegations
based on the 34-page spreadsheet would push their overall claims
over the “plausible” line, such that if they are allowed to now
file a third complaint they will prevail on any motion to
dismiss from the Defendants. 	See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 7-16.
But if that is right,8 then (i) the Plaintiffs’ not including the
spreadsheet allegations in their second complaint, paired with
(ii) the Court now granting the Plaintiffs’ current request and
allowing a third complaint --- that would add up to a real waste
of the Defendants’ resources.
Why? 	Because if the Plaintiffs had used the spreadsheet in
their January 2025 second complaint, then that complaint would
have stood up,9 such that a motion to dismiss directed at that
second complaint would have failed. 	So only two motions to
dismiss would need to have been briefed in this case by the
Defendants, not three.
To say it in a different way:
Per the Plaintiffs, the spreadsheet allegations would get their
claims over the line. 	So if they had included them in the
second complaint, the Defendants would have had to file two
motions to dismiss; the second one would have been a loser. 	But
because the Plaintiffs did not include the spreadsheet
allegations in the second complaint, the spreadsheet allegations
can now end up only in a third complaint. 	And if the Court were
to let the Plaintiffs file a third complaint, the Defendants
would have been required to press three motions to dismiss.
* 	* 	*
Pivot now from prejudice to the Defendants to the impact on
“judicial economy” --- an independent concern in this area. 	See
Mullin, 875 F.3d at 157-58.
8 	If it is not, the current Rule 15 motion seeking leave to
amend can be denied on another ground --- because the amendment
would be futile. 	See Defendants’ Opposition at 17-21.
9 	Again, this is on the Plaintiffs’ supposition that the
allegations contained in the spreadsheet are enough to clear the
“plausible” bar. 	Cf. footnote 8.
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Judicial resolution of three motions to dismiss would be a
course necessitated by the Plaintiffs’ decision not to review
the discovery, for the reasons set out in the previous section.
That is more work than resolving two motions to dismiss. 	It
pulls away from time that can be spent on other cases, and
therefore undermines judicial economy.
* 	* 	*
In a nutshell: the Plaintiffs should have timely reviewed and
used the materials they had worked to get --- certainly before
the filing of the second complaint.10 	Their decision not to
review and use the spreadsheet amounted to undue delay. 	And it
caused the Defendants prejudice, and the Court to waste time.
The Rule 15 motion to file a new complaint will be denied.11
* 	* 	*
The caselaw confirms this result.
Look first to Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406 (3d Cir. 1993) --
- in which the court of appeals affirmed a district court’s
denial of leave to file a fourth complaint where, among other
things, “[m]ost of the facts were available to [the] plaintiff .
. . before she filed her original complaint in 1986, and
probably all of them were available when she amended her
complaint in May and August of 1987.” 	Id. at 1414.
Or take Jang v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc., 729 F.3d 357 (3d
Cir. 2013), where the Third Circuit concluded that a district
court had not abused its discretion in denying leave to amend
because the plaintiff “offered no cogent explanation” for his
10 	Recall: the spreadsheet was obtained in June 2023. 	See
Plaintiffs’ Reply at 3, 13; Defendants’ Opposition at 1-2, 8,
12, 15. 	And the Plaintiffs filed the second complaint in
January 2025.
11 	Things might have been different if this were a civil rights
lawsuit, because of the “solicitude” given to such cases in
leave-to-replead law. 	See Mullin, 875 F.3d at 153. 	But this is
a commercial dispute.
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“failure” to “move[] to amend his complaint at any time before
the District Court granted the dismissal.” 	729 F.3d at 368.12
The plaintiff’s “explanation,” id., for the delay in that case
looked something like the account the Plaintiffs have provied
here. 	The Jang plaintiff noted that “‘it was early in the
case’” and that “‘the pleadings had not previously been
tested.’” 	Id. 	The court of appeals was unmoved. 	Those types
of reasons were not enough to render the district court’s
exercise of its discretion improper. 	Id.
Move to In re Adams Golf, Inc. Securities Litigation, 381 F.3d
267 (3d Cir. 2004) --- in which the court of appeals upheld a
district court’s decision to disallow leave to amend where “the
purported new allegations consist[ed] not of new information,
but, rather, information available at all times relevant to
th[e] action and facts not necessarily curative of the pleading
problems at issue.” 	Id. at 280-81.
The Adams Golf “plaintiffs could have introduced the allegations
in the motion to amend long before the Court granted the motion
to dismiss.” 	Id. at 280.13 	Those plaintiffs therefore bore
responsibility for not timely adding new allegations, having
“clearly risked the prospect of the entry of a final dismissal
order.” 	Id. 	In other words, the plaintiffs’ “‘misplaced
confidence’ in their original pleading,” id. (citation omitted),
did not warrant granting them a chance to replead.
Finally, consider Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263
(3d Cir. 2008). 	In affirming a district court’s denial of leave
to amend, the court of appeals put it this way:
[The plaintiff] had a straightforward, but very necessary,
job to do. He had to correct his complaint and begin to sue
the proper entities. 	The defendants placed him immediately
on notice of his error. 	And yet he waited over three years
and allowed the District Court to reach the brink of ruling
dispositively on the entire suit before he undertook to
fulfill his responsibility. 	To allow amendment at that
point might send the court through a substantial period of
12 	Here, the spreadsheet was received in June 2023, while the
motion to dismiss the first complaint was pending; as noted, no
amended complaint was filed while the motion was pending.
13 	See footnote 12.
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additional discovery and motions. 	We find a considerable
potential burden in this, one that would warrant denial of
leave to amend . . . unless [the plaintiff] produced a
persuasive explanation for his delay.
[The plaintiff] offered no excuse or explanation to the
District Court for his delay . . . .
Id. at 267.
So too here.
The “straightforward, but very necessary, job to do,” id., was
complying with the Court’s order. 	Teeing up “ALL facts and
claims” in the second complaint. 	See December 2024 Order. 	Not
the alternative: ignoring the discovery, seeing things how went,
and then digging into the material only if (as happened) the
Court did not rule as the Plaintiffs hoped.
And while in Bjourgung there was merely a “potential burden” on
the court, Bjorgung, 550 F.3d at 267, here the burden actually
materialized. 	The Court produced an extensive second motion-to-
dismiss opinion that, on the Plaintiffs’ theory, was unnecessary
--- because it would have come out the other way had the
Plaintiffs included the spreadsheet-based allegations in the
second complaint.
And again, as in Bjourgung, there is no meaningful “excuse or
explanation” here. 	Id. 	The spreadsheet was available around 18
months before the second complaint was filed. 	It should have
been reviewed and incorporated into that complaint. 	It was not.
The Third Circuit “has declined to reward a wait-and-see
approach to pleading.” 	Jang, 729 F.3d at 368 (citation
omitted).
But that is the route the Plaintiffs took here. 	They did not
review the relevant discovery, and in doing so they took the
chance that the second motion to dismiss would be granted, as it
was. 	But this “wait-and-see,” id., amounted to undue delay and
unnecessarily consumed their adversary’s time and the Court’s.
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Applying 	the 	Rule 	15 	standard, 14 	the 	Court 	will 	opt 	not 	to 	permit
the 	filing 	of 	an 	added 	complaint. 	The 	Plaintiffs' 	motion 	at 	ECF
61 	is 	denied.
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	27th 	day 	of 	January, 	2026, 	s6 ORDERED.
_,// ,/~/r
.,:'/,-;;;::"/
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
14 	The 	Rule 	16 	standard may 	possibly be 	the 	governing 	one 	here,
see 	generally 	Premier 	Comp 	Sols., 	LLC 	v. 	UPMC, 	970 	F.3d 	316 	(3d
Cir. 	2020), 	because 	of 	the 	Plaintiffs' 	seeming 	disregard 	for 	the
"ALL 	facts 	and 	claims" 	order. 	But 	that 	does 	not 	matter 	for 	now.
The 	lower 	Rule 	15 	standard 	for 	allowing 	repleading 	is 	not 	met.
So 	the 	higher 	Rule 	16 	standard 	is 	not 	met 	either.
13
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