GARNER v. SIOBHAN et al

2:20-cv-07791Njd07.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALI GARNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCO COLON; SCO CHAVES; SCO
O’BRIEN; STATE OF NEW
JERSEY; NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 20-7791 (BRM) (JSA)
OPINION
JESSICA S. ALLEN, U.S.M.J.
This matter comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Ali Garner’s unopposed1 motion
for leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 146). No oral argument was heard. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78(b). Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s submission, for the reasons set forth
below, and for good cause shown, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint is DENIED.
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
This case arises out of an alleged physical assault that occurred on November 10, 2017.
1 A review of the official court docket confirms that Defendants did not file any opposition to the motion.
2 The Court assumes the parties are familiar with the lengthy history of this case. Only the background
relevant to the present motion is set forth herein.
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(ECF No. 1, Ex. A ¶ 3). Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison, filed his
complaint in New Jersey state court on October 15, 2019, alleging violations of his constitutional
rights. (See id., ¶¶ 16-21). Following removal (see ECF No. 1), Defendants SCO Jesse Colon,
SCO Isac Chaves, SCO Siobhan G. O’Brien, the State of New Jersey, and the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (sometimes collectively “Defendants”) moved to dismiss the
complaint. (ECF No. 3). On March 21, 2021, the Honorable Brian R. Martinotti, U.S.D.J. granted
the motion to dismiss in part. (ECF Nos. 4 & 5). Having construed Plaintiff’s complaint as
claiming civil rights violations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, District Judge Martinotti
dismissed all claims against O’Brien and the state entities and every claim against Colon and
Chaves except the excessive force claims. (ECF Nos. 4-5). District Judge Martinotti also directed
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint on or before April 19, 2021. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff did not
do so.
Instead, the case proceeded to discovery. The parties presented multiple disputes requiring
judicial intervention and extensions of the fact discovery deadline. (See ECF Nos. 7, 9, 17-18, 22,
24, 26, 28, 32-35, 37, 41, 51, 56, 61, 63). On May 11, 2023, the Court issued an order, extending
fact discovery one final time until June 20, 2023. (ECF No. 63).
However, less than one month before the close of fact discovery, Plaintiff filed his first
motion for leave to amend on May 26, 2023, seeking to reinstate O’Brien as a defendant and
repleading conspiracy and retaliation claims against O’Brien, Colon, and Chaves. (ECF No. 65).
On June 5, 2023, the Court denied the motion without prejudice because Plaintiff did not include
a red-lined version of his proposed amendment “indicat[ing] in what respect(s) it differs from the”
original complaint. L. Civ. R. 15.1(a)(2). (ECF No. 67 at 1). The Court directed Plaintiff to refile
his motion by July 5, 2023. (Id. at 2). He did not do so.
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Rather, he moved for reconsideration of the June 5th Order. (ECF No. 71). The Court
denied reconsideration on September 19, 2023, and granted Plaintiff another opportunity to seek
leave to amend by October 19, 2023. (ECF No. 80 at 2-3). Again, Plaintiff did not do so. Instead,
on October 3, 2023, he appealed the order denying reconsideration. (ECF No. 86).
District Judge Martinotti denied Plaintiff’s appeal on May 1, 2025. (ECF No. 137).
Thereafter, with discovery closed, on July 31, 2025, the Court entered a Text Order directing the
parties to file any motions for summary judgment by September 30, 2025. (ECF No. 145). Before
any party moved, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to amend on August 12, 2025. (ECF
No. 146).
II. RENEWED MOTION TO AMEND
In his renewed motion, Plaintiff contends that he did not “amend the Complaint any sooner
because he” was “bounced from prison to prison” after the alleged assault and could not “find a
prison paralegal” to help him prosecute this case amidst the transfers. (Id.) With the instant
motion, Plaintiff submitted a new red-lined proposed amended complaint (“PAC”). (Proposed
Am. Compl.; ECF No. 146, Ex. B). Plaintiff claims the PAC cures the defects in his original
Sections 1983 and 1985 conspiracy and retaliation claims against O’Brien, Colon, and Chaves.
(See ECF No. 146).
Pertinent to this motion, the PAC also alleges that Plaintiff “exhausted all available
administrative remedies” within the state prisoner grievance system. (Proposed Am. Compl., ¶ 7).
Specifically, it alleges that Plaintiff “requested a polygraph test,” “submitted paper-form
grievances,” and requested a “confrontation with” O’Brien, Colon, and Chaves after he was
transferred from East Jersey State Prison to Northern State Prison. (Id., ¶ 18). Northern State
Prison staff allegedly refused the polygraph request and ignored the paper grievances, but granted
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the confrontation. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the confrontation “took approximately thirty days,”
during which he suffered numerous physical and emotional injuries while confined “in
administrative segregation” without outdoor “access to the prison yard.” (Id., ¶ 19). The PAC
further alleges that Plaintiff submitted additional grievances about the alleged 2017 assault after
he was transferred a second time to New Jersey State Prison, where he is currently confined. (Id.,
¶ 20). New Jersey State Prison allegedly ignored the paper grievances but referred his electronic
grievances to the Special Investigation Division, which Plaintiff found “satisfactory.” (Id.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), “a complaint may be amended once as a
matter of right and afterward by leave of the court,” Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d
Cir. 1984), or with the opposing party’s written consent, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts “should
freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This mandate encompasses
a broad range of equitable factors, including whether there is (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith, (3)
prejudice, (4) failure to cure deficiencies through previous amendments; or (5) futility of the
proposed amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1964); Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434
F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir. 2006). Ultimately, the decision to grant or deny leave rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331
(1971).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Undue Delay
When considering delay in the context of Rule 15, “the mere passage of time does not
require that a motion to amend a complaint be denied . . . [i]n fact, delay alone is an insufficient
ground to deny leave to amend.” Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273
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(3d Cir. 2001) (citing Adams, 739 F.2d at 868). “The district court has discretion to deny the
request only if the plaintiff’s delay in seeking to amend is undue, motivated by bad faith, or
prejudicial to the opposing party.” Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir.
2008) (citing Adams, 739 F.3d at 864). Delay in seeking leave to amend may become “undue”
and “thereby create[] grounds for the district court to refuse leave, when it places an unwarranted
burden on the court or when the plaintiff has had previous opportunities to amend.” Id. at 266
(citing Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273). Thus, as the Third Circuit has noted, the question of undue
delay requires the Court to focus on the moving party’s “reasons for not amending sooner.” Id.
(quoting Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273). The Court then must balance those stated reasons “against
the burden of delay on the [] Court.” Id. (citing Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 520
(3d Cir. 1988)).
The Third Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the denial of motions to amend made after
lengthy periods of delay where the amendment would cause prejudice to the Court or additional
delay in the proceedings. E.g., CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 629-30 (3d
Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of leave to amend where the plaintiff sought amendment more than
three years after filing its complaint and provided “no good reason” for its delay) (collecting cases);
Berger v. Edgewater Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 911, 924 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of leave to
amend sought more than four months after information supporting amendment was available, after
lengthy discovery period, and when amendment would inject new issues and delay the case);
Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Corp., 879 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of leave to
amend when motion was made after months of unexplained delay and on eve of close of discovery
and trial).
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On this record, the Court cannot discern a reasonable basis for waiting two years before
renewing his motion to amend the complaint let alone until after discovery closed and the Court
set a summary judgment motion briefing schedule. To the contrary, the Court finds that Plaintiff
“failed to take advantage of” the “numerous opportunities” previously given “to correct any
deficiencies in” his original complaint. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993).
The case docket confirms that the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend three times, beginning in
2021. (ECF Nos. 5, 67 at 2, 80 at 2-3). Each time, Plaintiff did not file a proposed amendment
including the proposed changes. Instead, he sought reconsideration of this Court’s decision and
appealed same. (See ECF Nos. 71, 86).
Plaintiff attempts to justify his delay by claiming that his prison transfers prevented him
from obtaining assistance from an inmate paralegal. (ECF No. 146). The Court finds this
explanation does not justify his delay in seeking to amend. Although Plaintiff is free to consult
inmate paralegals, he must still timely prosecute his own case. Plaintiff cites no authority, and the
Court has found none, to support his position that his inability to find an inmate paralegal excuses
his delay. (See id.) As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff alone is responsible for his choices, and he must
now live with the consequences. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding
pro se plaintiffs “solely responsible for the progress of [their] case” and therefore “personally
responsible for delays”).
Further, granting leave at this stage of the litigation would place an unwarranted burden on
the Court. During the past five years, the Court and the parties have expended significant time and
resources on this case. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 4-5, 7, 9, 17-18, 22, 24, 26, 32-35, 37, 41, 51, 56, 61,
63, 93, 97, 99-100, 102, 105, 112, 122, 137). The Court has given the parties fulsome opportunity
to conduct discovery. Allowing the amendment to reinstate previously dismissed legal claims and
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a third defendant, O’Brien, (see ECF No. 146), would necessitate reopening discovery and place
a burden of delay on the Court. In other words, the amendment would “send the court” down
another long road “of substantial discovery and motions.” Bjorgung, 550 F.3d at 267. This
outcome would extend litigation well into the future and frustrate “the Court’s effort to move this
case toward an efficient resolution on the merits.” IQVIA Inc. v. Veeva Sys., 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5949, at *13 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2022).
In sum, the decision to grant or deny leave to amend a pleading is ultimately a matter of
discretion. Zenith Radio Corp., 401 U.S. at 331. The Court finds that Plaintiff has significantly
delayed, without cogent reason, in seeking leave to amend. Further, the proposed amendment
would burden the Court and delay resolution of this protracted case. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the motion was brought after undue delay. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, DENIES
the motion to amend on this basis.
B. Futility
District courts may deny leave to amend based on undue delay alone. Phillips v. Borough
of Keyport, 179 F.R.D. 140, 144 (D.N.J. 1998). However, as explained below, the Court finds that
denial is also appropriate on futility grounds.
Futility follows “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” In
re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). A proposed
amendment is futile when it “would [still] fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). In other words, the court may deny leave to
amend if “the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Massarsky v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983).
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Based on its review of the PAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable
claim pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and thus the
amendment is futile. Under the PLRA, prisoners cannot sue in federal court “with respect to prison
conditions” until they exhaust all available “administrative remedies.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Although Plaintiff’s unopposed motion does not argue3 exhaustion, the Court may sua sponte raise
this issue consistent with the PLRA. The PLRA expressly allows the Court to dismiss a civil
action “on its own motion” if the plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S.
731 (2001). Moreover, the Court has “inherent authority to dismiss claims sua sponte for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Worster-Sims v. Tropicana Entm’t, Inc., 46 F.
Supp. 3d 513, 517 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting Xu v. Walsh, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123732, at *3-4
(D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2014)); accord Bintliff-Ritchie v. Am. Reinsurance Co., 285 F. App’x 940, 943
(3d Cir. 2008).
To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a prisoner must “properly present[] his or her claims
through one ‘complete round’” of his or her prison’s “established” grievance process, pursuant to
the prison system’s own “deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 90-92 (2006) (citations omitted). “[T]he prison’s requirements” establish “the boundaries
of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). An inmate must substantially
comply with the prison’s “administrative remedy scheme.” Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77-78
(3d Cir. 2000). Substantial compliance requires the prisoner to “avail[] [themselves] of every
3 The Court deems the PAC’s standalone statement that “Plaintiff exhausted all available administrative
remedies” (Proposed Am. Compl., ¶ 7) to be a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” which it
is “not bound to accept as true.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
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process at every turn” until “there is no further process available to [them] within the grievance
system.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2004). “[A]n untimely or otherwise
procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” does not qualify. Bakhtiari v.
Spaulding, 779 F. App’x 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2019). And the prisoner must “properly” exhaust all
appeals before filing their lawsuit. See Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 78; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 222.
Because Plaintiff is a state prisoner, he must follow New Jersey’s Inmate Remedy System
procedures. A New Jersey inmate must file a formal grievance in writing using one of two
specified forms. N.J.A.C. § 10A:1-4.4(c). Based on which form the prisoner uses, correctional
facility staff must then “review and respond to” the grievance within either fifteen or thirty
calendar days, “unless the request is determined to be an urgent request or a request is determined
to require further deliberation.” N.J.A.C. § 10A:1-4.5(d). After receiving a response, inmates may
appeal any adverse outcome to the prison facility’s chief administrator. N.J.A.C. §§ 10A:1-4.6(b),
(d). Once such an appeal is filed, the chief prison administrator must decide it “within ten business
days of receipt.” N.J.A.C. § 10A:1-4.6(c). That decision constitutes “the final” decision “of the
New Jersey Department of Corrections.” N.J.A.C. § 10A:1-4.6(d). The prisoner cannot sue until
they receive this final decision. Baskerville v. Jackson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78257, at *10
(D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2021).
Strictly speaking, the exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense, not a pleading
requirement; the PLRA does not require prisoners “to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion
in their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. However, “where a prisoner’s failure to exhaust” all
available administrative remedies is readily “apparent from the face of the complaint,” the “court
may dismiss it on that basis.” Talley v. Clark, 111 F.4th 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).
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In applying that standard, the Court finds the reasoning in Mays v. Untig, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22826 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2010), instructive.
In Mays, the district court found no sign from the proposed amendment that the plaintiff
exhausted all available administrative remedies because he “fail[ed] to state conclusively that [his]
grievances pertained to his failure to protect [lawsuit],” “provide[d] scant details about the contents
of the grievances,” and did “not allege that he ever attempted to” appeal prison authorities’
responses “when he was dissatisfied with the results.” Id. at *7-9. Based on these deficiencies,
the court deemed the proposed amendment futile. Id. at *10; accord Baskerville, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78257, at *9 (dismissal where the plaintiff “did not file an appeal” to “any of [his]
grievances”).
The Court applies the same reasoning here and thus finds from the face of the PAC that
Plaintiff did not properly exhaust all Inmate Remedy System steps. In the PAC, he alleges that
Northern State Prison denied his “request for a polygraph test.” (Proposed Am. Compl., ¶ 18).
However, he does not allege whether he appealed this denial. Plaintiff also alleges that Northern
State Prison ignored his “paper-form grievances complaining about beating and [being] falsely
accused of assaulting Officer Colon.” (Id.) However, he does not state when he submitted these
grievances or when the prison was required to respond to them.
Further, he alleges that he submitted additional paper and electronic “inquiries and
grievances” after he was transferred to New Jersey State Prison. (Id., ¶ 20). However, he does not
say when he submitted them or what they contained. While he alleges that prison staff told him
that the Special Investigation Division would investigate his allegations, (id.), he does not say how
those investigations concluded or what the investigators found. Nor does he indicate that he ever
appealed from any unfavorable or inaccurate findings.
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Finally, the Court finds nothing in the PAC to suggest that Plaintiff’s grievances contained
the same factual allegations that underlie this lawsuit. Plaintiff alleges that several of his injuries
arose from spending time “in administrative segregation” while the prison investigated the
disciplinary charges that O’Brien, Colon, and Chaves filed against him. (Id., ¶ 19). But it is not
clear if any of his grievances discussed these injuries, as opposed to those from the initial 2017
physical assault. (See id.).
Indeed, it is not even clear how, or if, Plaintiff’s grievances delineate his respective
allegations against O’Brien, Colon, and Chaves. At most, the PAC alleges that Plaintiff submitted
grievances to Northern State Prison “about being beat[en] and falsely accused of assaulting Officer
Colon.” (Id., ¶ 18). To reinstate O’Brien as a defendant and restore his conspiracy and retaliation
claims, Plaintiff must have already raised the facts underlying each claim against each person in
his prison grievances. See, e.g., Thompson v. Aviles (In re Thompson), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2068, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2007) (dismissing the complaint when none of the plaintiff’s eight
grievances raised the specific cause of injury alleged in his federal lawsuit). Because he does not
address whether he timely did so before filing this lawsuit, the Court finds his proposed amendment
futile.
In light of the foregoing, the Court determines that the PAC does not state a cognizable
claim that can proceed in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Therefore, in its discretion, the
Court DENIES leave to amend on this additional basis. Because the Court finds the proposed
amendment is futile and follows undue delay, it need not address whether the PAC substantively
cures the pleading defects identified in District Judge Martinotti’s Order and Opinion dismissing
Plaintiff’s original conspiracy and retaliation claims against O’Brien, Colon, and Chaves. (See
ECF Nos. 4-5).
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IV. DECISION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint
(ECF No. 146) is DENIED. An appropriate Order will be entered.
s/Jessica S. Allen____________
Hon. Jessica S. Allen
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: January 6, 2026
cc: Hon. Brian R. Martinotti, U.S.D.J.
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