TAYLOR v. AM RETAIL GROUP, INC. et al

2:20-cv-03158Njd16.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
BRIAN L. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
AM RETAIL GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 20-03158 (JXN)(JSA)
OPINION
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by the Honorable
Jessica 	S. 	Allen, 	U.S.M.J. 	(“Judge 	Allen”), 	dated 	November 	14, 	2023 	(ECF 	No. 	254)
recommending the Court (1) grant Defendants AM Retail Group, Inc. and Shawndale Jackson’s
(collectively, “Defendants”) cross-motion to dismiss Plaintiff Brian L. Taylor’s (“Plaintiff”)
complaint (ECF No. 243) with prejudice for failure to comply with discovery orders; and (2)
deny Plaintiff’s motion to extend fact discovery (ECF No. 241) as moot. The Court has
conducted a de novo review of the R&R, the parties’ submissions, and the record before the
Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS Judge Allen’s R&R. Defendants’
cross-motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion to extend
discovery is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action in the New Jersey Superior Court in August 2019; Defendants
timely removed to this Court on March 23, 2020. (See Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.) The
Complaint 	alleges 	employment-related 	discrimination 	and 	statutory 	claims 	arising 	from
Plaintiff’s termination by Defendants, including claims under Title VII, the New Jersey Law
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Against Discrimination, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Id.)
After repeated discovery extensions, Judge Allen issued a June 15, 2023 Order directing
the parties to meet, confer, and schedule fact-witness depositions, extending the fact-discovery
deadline to August 30, 2023, and warning the parties that no further extensions would be granted
absent extenuating circumstances. (See June 15, 2023 Order, ECF No. 221.) The June 15, 2023
Order memorialized that the parties had substantially completed written discovery and detailed
the Court’s conclusions regarding third-party productions. (Id. at 1–2.) The Order noted that
defense counsel had received voluminous records from the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) after protracted effort, but that Plaintiff did not execute and return a requested SSA
authorization until May 2, 2023. (Id.) The Order also denied Plaintiff’s requests for additional
records from the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“NJDOL”) to
the extent that Plaintiff failed to show the additional material’s relevance to his discrimination-
based claims. (June 15, 2023 Order at 2–3.) Judge Allen directed the parties to meet and confer
concerning deposition scheduling, to submit short letters by July 7, 2023, confirming agreed
dates (or advising of disputes), and to complete all fact discovery by August 30, 2023; Judge
Allen expressly cautioned that “there shall be no further extensions of the fact discovery deadline
absent extenuating circumstances.” (Id. at 5.)
On June 20, 2023, however, defense counsel informed Judge Allen that Plaintiff refused
to meet and confer about scheduling depositions. (ECF No. 222.) Plaintiff did not object to the
June 15, 2023 Order, but filed a motion to adjourn the case (ECF No. 225), which the Court
denied (ECF No. 226).
Judge Allen then issued a July 19, 2023 Order requiring Plaintiff to provide defense
counsel by July 28, 2023 with his availability to be deposed and ordered Plaintiff’s deposition to
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be completed by August 15, 2023. (July 19, 2023 Order, ECF No. 227.) The parties scheduled
Plaintiff’s in-person deposition for August 3, 2023. (ECF No. 232.) Two days before his
scheduled deposition, defense counsel informed Judge Allen that Plaintiff would not appear;
Plaintiff argued that he did not consent to an in-person deposition and instead requested that the
proceeding be held virtually. (ECF No. 233.)
Thereafter, Judge Allen entered an August 4, 2023 Order granting Defendants’ request
for Plaintiff’s deposition to take place in person, and scheduling the deposition for August 15,
2023. (Aug. 4, 2023 Order, ECF No. 236). The August 4, 2023 Order warned that Plaintiff’s
failure to appear could result in sanctions, including dismissal. (Id.)
Four days before his deposition, defense counsel informed Judge Allen that Plaintiff was
“only tentatively available” for his deposition “because his request for a disability interpreter and
the location of the deposition were outstanding issues that needed to be addressed.” (R&R
(quoting ECF No. 237).) Accordingly, Judge Allen entered an August 14, 2023 Order that
Plaintiff’s deposition was to take place at defense counsel’s law office the next day at 10:00 a.m.
(Aug. 14, 2023 Order, ECF No. 239.) Defense counsel appeared on the scheduled date; Plaintiff
did not, and the record contains no satisfactory explanation for his failure to comply with the
Court’s orders. (See Defs.’ Letter, ECF No. 240; Defs.’ Moving Br., ECF No. 243.)
On August 31, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 37(b)(2) and 41(b) because Plaintiff refused to
participate in court-ordered discovery. (Defs.’ Moving Br.) Plaintiff responded with a motion to
extend fact discovery filed August 17, 2023. (Pl.’s Mot. to Extend, ECF No. 241.)
Judge Allen filed an R&R on November 14, 2023 addressing the competing motions.
(See R&R, ECF No. 254.) Judge Allen considered the parties’ submissions, the procedural
1 “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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history, and the governing authority. (See id. at 2–7.) The R&R summarized the operative facts
and concluded, after applying the Poulis six-factor balancing test2—that dismissal with prejudice
was warranted. (Id. at 7–10.) In particular, the R&R emphasized Judge Allen’s repeated orders
directing Plaintiff to provide deposition dates and to appear, the explicit warnings that failure to
comply could result in dismissal, and Plaintiff’s failure to oppose the cross-motion despite two
extended deadlines to do so. (Id.)
Plaintiff thereafter moved for reconsideration of the R&R. (Mot. for Recons., ECF No.
255.) Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion. (Defs.’ Opp’n to Recons., ECF No. 259.) On
December 26, 2023, Judge Allen denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, explaining the
narrow standards for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) and concluding that “Plaintiff
ha[d] not met the standard insofar as he ha[d] not articulated a fact or law overlooked by the
Court.” (Order Denying Recons., ECF No. 260.) Ultimately, Plaintiff did not file a timely
objection to the R&R in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Rule 72(b)(2), and Local Civil
Rule 72.1(c)(2). Accordingly, the matter came before this Court for review of the R&R and the
underlying record.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
When the magistrate judge addresses “dispositive” motions, such as motions to dismiss,
the magistrate judge submits an R&R to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72; L. Civ. R. 72.1(a)(2). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge]. The judge may also
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate [judge] with instructions.” 28
2 Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) (articulating six factors guiding dismissal
for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders, including (1) personal responsibility, (2) prejudice to the
adversary, (3) history of dilatoriness, (4) willfulness or bad faith, (5) availability of lesser sanctions, and (6)
meritoriousness of the claim); see also R&R at 6–9 (analyzing each Poulis factor and concluding that the balance
“strongly weighs in favor of dismissal of the case”).
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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2). An R&R does not have force of law unless
and until the Court enters an order accepting or rejecting it. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of
Am., AFL-CIO v. N.J. Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1005 (3d Cir. 1987).
With respect to dispositive motions, the district court must make a de novo determination
of those portions of the R&R to which a litigant objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b); L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2); see also State Farm Indem. v. Fornaro, 227 F.Supp.2d 229,
231 (D.N.J. 2002); Zinberg v. Wash. Bancorp, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 397, 401 (D.N.J. 1990)
(concluding that the court makes a de novo review of the parts of the report to which the parties
object). A magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive matter will be reversed only for an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc’ns & Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64
(D.N.J. 1996) (“Where, as here, the magistrate has ruled on a non-dispositive matter such as a
discovery motion, his or her ruling is entitled to great deference and is reversible only for abuse
of discretion.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, this Court has reviewed the R&R de novo and agrees in all respects
with Judge Allen’s reasoning. Judge Allen’s R&R is fact-bound and correctly applies controlling
Third Circuit doctrine to the record before the Court. The R&R recommends dismissal of the
Complaint after a careful accounting of the parties’ discovery history and Judge Allen’s repeated
admonitions that continued noncompliance could result in dismissal. (See R&R at 2–5.) The
question before this Court is limited: whether Judge Allen’s recommendation should be adopted,
modified, or rejected, considering the record, the parties’ submissions, and applicable law.
A. Procedural Threshold — Objections and Reconsideration
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff did not file timely, specific Rule 72(b) objections that
would ordinarily trigger de novo review of Judge Allen’s factual findings and legal conclusions.
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See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2). Instead, Plaintiff filed
a motion for reconsideration (Mot. for Recons.), which Judge Allen properly denied for failing to
identify a controlling decision or a fact overlooked by the court. (See Order Denying Recons. at
2.) The 	denial 	reiterated 	the 	well-established 	rule 	that 	motions 	for 	reconsideration 	are
extraordinary relief appropriate only where there is (1) an intervening change in controlling law,
(2) newly available evidence, or (3) a need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Banda v. Burlington County, 263 F. App’x 182, 183 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Max’s Seafood Café v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)); L. Civ R. 7.1(i) (party requesting reconsideration
must “concisely” set forth “the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge
or Magistrate Judge has overlooked.”); see also Yurecko v. Port Auth. Trans. Hudson Corp., 279
F. Supp. 2d 606, 609 (D.N.J. 2003) (A party’s “mere disagreement” with a decision does not
warrant reconsideration).
As stated in the Order, Plaintiff’s motion did not satisfy these standards; it amounted to
disagreement with Judge Allen’s recommended disposition rather than identification of any
controlling 	authority 	or 	fact 	that 	the 	judge 	overlooked. 	(See 	generally 	Order 	Denying
Recons.) The Court has nevertheless reviewed the R&R and the entire record. Because no
timely, specific Rule 72(b) objections were filed, the Court may adopt Judge Allen’s findings
unless they are clearly erroneous. See N.J. Zinc Co., 828 F.2d at 1005. Nevertheless, the Court
has reviewed the R&R and the record de novo and finds that Judge Allen’s legal analysis and the
disposition are correct for the reasons that follow.
B. Application of the Poulis Factors
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with procedural rules
or a court order, courts apply the six-factor Poulis test. 747 F.2d at 868. Those factors are: (1) the
extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) prejudice to the adversary; (3) a history of
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dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct was willful or in bad faith; (5) the availability and
effectiveness of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim. Id. No single
Poulis factor is dispositive; the Court’s task is to weigh them in aggregate and to sanction only
when the balance so warrants. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992). Judge
Allen correctly applied all six Poulis factors.
1. 	Personal Responsibility of the Plaintiff
The first Poulis factor “evaluates whether a party or counsel is primarily responsible for
the conduct at issue.” Johnson v. Walmart Stores E., LP, 772 F. Supp. 3d 551, 557 (D.N.J. 2025).
Counseled parties rely on their attorneys; pro se litigants, by contrast, are “solely responsible”
for the progress of their cases. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff,
proceeding pro se, bore the responsibility to comply with the scheduling and discovery orders
governing his case.
As the June 15, 2023 Order made clear, written discovery was substantially complete,
and the case was to proceed to depositions. The Letter Order also directed the parties to meet and
confer, to submit scheduling letters by July 7, 2023, and to complete fact discovery by August
30, 2023. (See June 15, 2023 Order.) The June 15, 2023 Order further warned that there would
be no further extensions absent extenuating circumstances. (Id.) Moreover, Judge Allen’s
subsequent July 19, August 4, and August 14, 2023 Orders plainly put Plaintiff on notice that
depositions—including his own—were on a fixed schedule. Plaintiff nevertheless failed to
appear for his own deposition without any adequate explanation. (See ECF Nos. 239, 240; R&R
at 3–4.) Under these facts, the first Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal. See Briscoe, 538
F.3d at 258-59.
2. 	Prejudice to the Adversary
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The second Poulis factor considers the prejudice to Defendants resulting from Plaintiff’s
conduct. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. This is “a particularly important factor.” Hildebrand v.
Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2019). Prejudice does not mean irreparable harm.
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). “[T]he burden imposed by
impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently
prejudicial.” Id. This “include[s] the burden that a party must bear when forced to file motions in
response to the strategic discovery tactics of an adversary.” Id. at 223.
Defendants have demonstrated concrete prejudice. The R&R reflects Judge Allen’s
assessment that written discovery was substantially complete and that Defendants had received
voluminous 	third-party 	records 	such 	that 	depositions 	were 	necessary 	to 	complete 	fact
development. (R&R at 2–3.)3 Plaintiff’s refusal to appear frustrated Defendants’ ability to
complete discovery, forced them to expend time and resources preparing for a deposition that did
not occur, and impeded their capacity to prepare dispositive motions or trial strategy. (See ECF
Nos. 239, 240, 243-1 at 7–9; R&R at 3–4, 6–7.) This factor thus weighs in favor of dismissal.4
3 The record indicates that Defendants obtained extensive third-party documentation during the two-year discovery
period, including (1) Social Security Administration (“SSA”) records produced following multiple extensions and
court directives beginning in October 2021 (see ECF Nos. 100, 136, 162, 178, 176); (2) certified unemployment
compensation records from the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“NJDOL”),
produced August 25, 2021, and appended to Plaintiff’s November 14, 2022 submission (ECF No. 189-1 at 2); and
(3) related correspondence, subpoenas, and authorizations facilitating those productions (see ECF Nos. 184, 188,
189, 219). The June 15, 2023 Letter Order summarized these efforts, noting that Defendants had received
“voluminous records regarding Plaintiff” from the SSA, that Plaintiff did not return the fully executed authorization
until May 2, 2023, and that NJDOL had certified its prior production as a “true and accurate representative of the
records maintained” by the agency. (June 15, 2023 Order at 2–3.) Collectively, these materials provided a complete
evidentiary foundation for the parties to proceed to depositions.
4 Courts have found dismissal is appropriate where a party’s failure to comply with discovery obligations is
prejudicial. Razzoli v. Jersey City Police Dep’t, No. 16-5545, 2019 WL 2720772, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2019),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-5545, 2019 WL 2717723 (D.N.J. June 27, 2019) (noting that failure to
comply with discovery obligations may prejudice adversary by “impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a
full and complete trial strategy.”) (quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222). Prejudice has been demonstrated when a movant
is “forced to file several motions and expend significant time and resources to obtain relevant discovery.” Malat v.
Borough of Haddon Heights, No. 10-1386, 2011 WL 4962223, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 10-1386, 2011 WL 4962186 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2011) (citation omitted).
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3. 	History of Dilatoriness
The third Poulis factor considers a history of dilatoriness. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.
“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as
consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court
orders.” Johnson, 772 F. Supp. 3d at 558 (quoting Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension
Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)). “Courts have found a history of dilatoriness
supporting dismissal when a plaintiff’s failure to comply with court orders, appear for hearings,
or engage in discovery is extensive and repeated.” Id. (quoting Reilly v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
670 F.Supp.3d 126, 144 (D.N.J. 2023)). “While extensive delay may weigh in favor of dismissal,
‘a party’s problematic acts must be evaluated in light of its behavior over the life of the case.’”
Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875).
The record establishes a history of dilatory conduct. Plaintiff ignored four of Judge
Allen’s Orders to schedule and appear for his deposition. (See R&R at 7–9 (detailing repeated
orders); June 15, 2023 Order; July 19, 2023 Order; Aug. 4, 2023 Order; Aug. 14, 2023 Order).)
Plaintiff twice indicated his availability for deposition and twice failed to appear despite multiple
scheduling extensions and explicit written warnings that additional delay would not be tolerated.
(R&R at 7–9.)
4. 	Willfulness and Bad Faith
The fourth Poulis factor weighs “whether the conduct was ‘the type of willful or
contumacious behavior which was characterized as flagrant bad faith.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262
(quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875). Willfulness “involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Id.
(quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875). “This factor applies upon ‘callous disregard of responsibilities’
by a party or counsel, not merely ‘negligent behavior.’” Johnson, 772 F. Supp. 3d at 559
(quoting Reilly, 670 F.Supp.3d at 145). “[W]here the record is unclear as to whether a party acted
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in bad faith, a consistent failure to obey orders of the [C]ourt, at the very least, renders a party’s
actions willful for the purposes of the fourth Poulis factor.” Yancey v. Wal-Mart Corp., No. 15-
6646, 2022 WL 972489, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Hayes v.
Nestor, No. 09-6092, 2013 WL 5176703, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2013)).
As Judge Adams found, the record does not reflect bad faith. But Plaintiff’s failure to
comply with four court orders indicates willfulness.
5. 	Effectiveness of Alternative Sanctions
The fifth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider whether less severe sanctions could
remedy the misconduct, as dismissal is a sanction of last resort. Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 136.
Alternatives include “a warning, a formal reprimand, placing the case at the bottom of the
calendar, a fine, the imposition of costs or attorney fees or the preclusion of claims or defenses.”
Yancey, 2022 WL 972489, at *10 (quoting Hayes, 2013 WL 5176703, at *5).
Judge Allen, correctly and prudently, considered whether lesser sanctions would suffice.
The Court previously afforded Plaintiff multiple extensions to complete briefing and to provide
deposition availability (see ECF Nos. 247–51), and the June 15, 2023 Order reflects the Court’s
view that additional third-party discovery was not a valid reason to postpone depositions
indefinitely (June 15, 2023 Order). Given that pattern of delay and the practical limitations of
monetary sanctions against a pro se litigant, Judge Allen correctly concluded that alternative
sanctions would be ineffective. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002);
Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373. This factor, therefore, supports dismissal.
6. 	Merits of the Claim
The sixth Poulis factor considers whether the complaint would survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. The record, however, does not permit the Court to
resolve the merits conclusively because Plaintiff’s obstruction curtailed fact development. Where
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a party’s noncompliance prevents the adversary and the Court from ascertaining the factual basis
of a claim, the “meritoriousness” factor necessarily carries reduced weight. See Hildebrand, 923
F.3d at 136 (explaining that the “meritoriousness” inquiry under Poulis asks whether the
allegations, if established, would support recovery, but that the factor is not dispositive when
other factors strongly favor dismissal). Nevertheless, the absence of a clear merits disposition
does not bar dismissal where the remaining Poulis factors—particularly personal responsibility,
prejudice to the adversary, a pattern of dilatoriness, and the futility of lesser sanctions—
decisively support that outcome. See Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373 (“Not all of the Poulis factors
need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint. The decision must be made in the context of the
district court’s extended contact with the litigant.”) (cleaned up); Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191
(affirming dismissal where plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with orders justified the
sanction notwithstanding the uncertain merits of his claims).
Accordingly, while the “meritoriousness” factor may be neutral or indeterminate in light
of the limited factual record, it does not outweigh the strong showing under the remaining Poulis
factors that dismissal with prejudice is warranted.
C. Pro Se Considerations
The Court construes pro se filings liberally and gives pro se litigants some procedural
leniency. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d
365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). But leniency does not exempt a pro se litigant from complying with
rules and court orders. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never
suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse
mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–
631 (1962) (recognizing a district court’s inherent authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute).
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Here, Judge Allen appropriately balanced those pro se considerations against the Court’s
and Defendants’ legitimate interests in ensuring compliance with discovery obligations and
preventing prejudice. (See R&R at 9–10 (acknowledging Plaintiff’s pro se status but concluding
that dismissal was nevertheless warranted after multiple warnings and opportunities to comply).)
That balance warrants deference and is appropriate.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS Judge Allen’s R&R (ECF No. 254).
Accordingly, Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss (ECF No. 243) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s
Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to appear for his deposition
and failure to comply with court orders, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) and 41(b). Further,
Plaintiff’s motion to extend fact discovery (ECF No. 241) is DISMISSED AS MOOT. An
appropriate Order follows.
DATED: January 16th, 2026 	_______________________
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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