Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1:26-cv-01350Njd23.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DALVA YERLESKA CRUZ-
DAVILA,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26–cv–01350–ESK
OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on petitioner Dalva Yerleska Cruz-
Davila’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Petition) (ECF No. 1) and this Court’s February 12, 2026 order (ECF No. 3.)
Respondents oppose the Petition. (ECF No. 5.)
1. Petitioner is a citizen of Nicaragua. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) She entered
the United States without inspection on December 9, 2022. (Id. ¶ 16.)
2. She was briefly detained by border patrol upon entry, but she was
released on the alternatives to detention program. (Id. ¶ 17.)
3. The Department of Homeland Security (Department) issued a Notice
to Appear (Notice) on April 5, 2023 identifying petitioner as a noncitizen who
was “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled … .”
(ECF No. 2 p. 3 (emphasis added)).
4. Petitioner reported to the Department for a scheduled check-in on
February 1, 2026. (Id. ¶ 20.) She was arrested and detained in Delaney Hall
Detention Facility (Delaney Hall), in Newark, New Jersey. (Id.)
5. There is no indication that petitioner has a criminal history or that
she is currently subject to a final order of removal. (Id. ¶ 21.)
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing and no final order of removal having
been entered, Department agents arrested and detained petitioner without
providing her any bond hearing or other individualized custody determination
following her detention. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.)
7. Respondents filed an answer on February 13, 2026 arguing that
petitioner is properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because she is
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a noncitizen “who entered without inspection or parole and was initially
detained by immigration authorities in the interior of the country without
having been lawfully admitted. As such, she is an ‘applicant for admission’
who is not entitled to a bond hearing.” (ECF No. 5 p. 2.)
8. Additionally, respondents acknowledge that the statutory arguments
and facts in this case are materially identical to those that the Court has
already rejected in Ayala Amaya v. Bondi, No. 25–cv–16428, 2025 WL 3033880,
D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2025) and other cases. (Id. p. 1 & n. 1.)
9. I conclude that petitioner is being unlawfully detained under
respondents’ repeated invocation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 because petitioner was
apprehended inside the United States after residing here for an extended
period, and therefore she should have been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226,
which requires an opportunity to seek bond.1 See Ayala Amaya, 2025 WL
3033880, at *2–3.
10. I further note that federal courts have in near unanimity similarly
rejected respondents’ position in approximately 300 cases to date, a number
which climbs with every passing day. See, e.g., Demirel v. Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila.,
No. 25–cv–05488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (noting “the
law is clear” and that “of the 288 district court decisions to address the issue,
282 have determined that § 1226(a) applies or likely applies in situations
similar to those presented here. Those decisions are plainly correct.”); but see
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, ____ F.4th ____, No. 25–20496, 2026 WL 323330
(5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (holding that noncitizen’s status as an applicant for
admission does not turn on where or how the noncitizen entered the United
States).2
11. The basis for the petitioner’s continued “detention [was] blatantly
unlawful from the start, the only commensurate and appropriate equitable
remedy to even partially restore [petitioner] is to immediate[ly] release [her]
and enjoin the Government from further similar transgressions.” Martinez v.
McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). “[T]he Supreme Court
1 I note that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over
petitioner’s challenge to his continued detention because the challenge is collateral to
“the removal process,” and is not “inextricably linked” to any removal action. See
Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 274 (3d Cir. 2026).
2 Buenrostro-Mendez is not binding authority, and I am unpersuaded by its
reasoning for many of the reasons articulated in Judge Douglas’s dissent, including
that the majority’s interpretation risks rendering significant portions of the statutory
scheme superfluous and internally inconsistent. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
2026 WL 323330, at *10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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has repeatedly upheld prisoners’ rights to challenge the constitutionality of
their detentions, and allow[ed] courts to implement corrective remedies,
regardless of whether there were other bases for the petitioners to be
subsequently detained … .” Id. at 366.
12. I decline to allow respondents to transform an unlawful detention
into a lawful one through alternative, retrospective, post hoc justification
presented mid-litigation, as doing so would give the Government a free pass to
violate a person’s statutory and constitutional rights first and search for
authority later. “The Constitution does not permit the United States
Government to target people on the streets, arrest them without serving any
papers, deny them meaningful due process, and detain them for arbitrary or
indefinite periods of time while they engage in phishing expeditions to justify
the arrests.” Id. at 373; see also Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475,
486 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (releasing petitioner and explaining that the court “cannot
credit [r]espondents’ new position as to the basis for . . . detention, which was
adopted post hoc and raised for the first time in this litigation.”); Arias Gudino
v. Lowe, 785 F. Supp. 3d 27, 46 n. 8 (M.D. Pa. 2025) (releasing petitioner and
discussing the impropriety of allowing the government to proceed on “post hoc
justifications for detention”).
13. Furthermore, I issued an order on February 12, 2026 that prohibited
respondents from transferring petitioner outside the District of New Jersey
until further order. (ECF No. 3.) On February 18, 2026, I became aware that
petitioner had been transferred to Port Isabel Service Detention Center, Texas.
(ECF No. 7.) According to respondents, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) transferred petitioner to Texas on February 16, 2026 despite
being informed of my order on February 12, 2026. (ECF No. 9 p. 1.) ICE
reportedly transferred petitioner “as part of efforts to avoid reaching maximum
capacity as Delaney Hall and missed a hold that had been placed on
[p]etitioner’s transfer … .” (Id.) Respondents report that petitioner was
returned to Delaney Hall on February 19, 2026. (Id.) This violation is part
of a disturbing trend of court orders being disregarded in this District and
diminishes my confidence that an order to provide petitioner with an
individualized bond hearing would be followed.
Accordingly,
IT IS on this 23rd day of February 2026 ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner’s § 2241 Petition is GRANTED. Respondents shall on
this date IMMEDIATELY RELEASE petitioner under the same conditions, if
any, that existed prior to her detention, including, but not limited to, release:
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(1) within the State of New Jersey; (2) without the imposition of additional
conditions (such as ankle monitors or electronic tracking devices); and (3) with
all clothing and outerwear worn at the time of detention, or other appropriate
attire.
2. Respondents shall return to petitioner all personal property
belonging to petitioner—including, but not limited to, any driver’s license,
passport, immigration documents, currency, or cellphone—that was seized at
the time of detention and that is currently in their custody, possession, or
control, whether maintained directly by respondents or by any contracted or
affiliated facility, and that such property shall be returned in the same
condition as it existed immediately prior to petitioner’s detention.
3. Respondents shall file a letter on the docket confirming the date and
time of petitioner’s release and that the conditions set forth above have been
satisfied.
4. Respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from rearresting
or otherwise detaining petitioner under § 1225, which this Court has found
inapplicable to her.
5. Respondents shall not arrest, detain, or otherwise take petitioner
into custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for a period of 14 days following her
release, so as to ensure full effectuation of this Court’s judgment and to prevent
circumvention of the relief granted.
6. Any future detention or re-detention of petitioner must comply with
all statutory and constitutional requirements, including the identification of a
lawful statutory basis for detention and the provision of adequate procedural
and substantive due process.
7. To the extent that respondents seek to re-arrest or otherwise re-
detain petitioner under any statutory authority, including but not limited to
§§ 1225 or 1226, this Court shall retain jurisdiction over the matter and
petitioner may move to reopen these proceedings before this Court without the
need to file a new habeas petition.
8. The motion for a temporary restraining order at ECF No. 6 is
DISMISSED AS MOOT.
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9. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.
/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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