1:25-cv-13556•SCOTT v. THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PHILADELPHIA et al
SCOTT v. THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF PHILADELPHIA et al
1:25-cv-13556Njd19.12.2025
Gesamter Gesetzestext
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
HONORABLE KAREN M, WILLIAMS
NORMAN L, SCOTT, SR.,,
No. 25-13556 (KMW-SAK)
Plaintiff,
¥.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THE CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL OF AND ORDER
PHILADELPHIA, COOPER UNIVERSITY
HEALTH SYSTEM,
Defendants.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of pro se Plaintiff Norman L. Scott, Sr.’s
(“Plaintiff”) Motion for Reconsideration and Amended Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Application’) (Dkt. No. 5) pursuant to 28 U.S.C, §
1915(a)(1); and
WHEREAS, “[i]t is well settled that a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e) and/or Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) is ‘an extremely limited procedural
vehicle.’” Jehan v. Disability Memt. Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting
Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc., 830 F.Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992)), “A
court will grant a motion for reconsideration where ‘dispositive factual matters or controlling
decisions of law’ were presented to the court but not considered.” Jd, (quoting Pelham v. United
States, 661 F.Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.N._I. 1987)). “Motions for reconsideration will not be granted
where a party simply asks the court to analyze the same facts and cases it had already considered
in reaching its original decision, or the only apparent purpose for filing the motion is to assert the
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
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reasons why the moving party disagrees with the court’s decision.” Jd. (citing see Carteret Sav.
Bank, FA, v. Shushan, 721 F.Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.JI. 19899}; and
WHEREAS, here, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration does not allege the Court
wrongly applied the law or overiooked any relevant facts of record, but in fact acknowledges that
his “original IFP application omitted certain financial information,” which was “an inadvertent
oversight” on Plaintiffs behalf, (see Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. No, 5 at 1-2); and
THE COURT NOTING that, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Amended IFP Application,
Plaintiff declares that his average monthly income is $2,200.00 and his average monthly expenses
are approximately $2,600.00. IFP Application { 1, 8. Plaintiff does not have other liquid assets,
nor does he list a spouse to contribute income or share in expenses, Jf 1-8; and
WHEREAS, here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs monthly income, savings, and expenses
as set forth in his Amended IFP Application establish that he cannot pay the costs of litigation; and
THE COURT FINDING that because Plaintiff’s income is modest, the Court GRANTS
the IFP application. The Court is now required to screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B),! and dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief,
or otherwise seeks relief from an immune defendant, For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
WHEREAS, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendant The Children’s Hospital
of Philadelphia ((CHOP”) and Cooper University Healthcare (“Cooper”) for civil conspiracy,
retaliation, tortious interference with an economic opportunity, and for alleged “Misuse of judicial
estoppel to defeat Plaintiff’s valid discrimination claims,” (Complaint, Dkt. No. | at 6, 8); and
' “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 LS.C. § 1915(e)2)(B\Gi)
is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federa? Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v.
Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 Gd Cir, 2612),
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WHEREAS, Plaintiff alleges that this action arises from another lawsuit he filed against
CHOP wherein CHOP “falsely accused” Plaintiff of bringing recording devices into the workplace,
and filed a motion for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel related to a bankruptcy
proceeding. (Compl., at 7.), Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently applied for employment at
Cooper and, when rejected, sued Cooper for alleged discrimination and retaliation, (/d/.); and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff alleges that during discovery in the Cooper lawsuit, Cooper
indicated that it intended to file a motion for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel—
mirroring CHOP’s argument in the CHOP litigation—and referenced the same recording device
allegation that “originated solely in the CHOP case.” (/d.) Plaintiff avers that Cooper’s knowledge
of CHOP’s “accusations and legal strategy” indicates “improper communication between
defendants or their legal counsel,” and that he believes “Cooper received confidential or nonpublic
litigation information from CHOP, or jointly conspired to use such tactics to discredit Plaintiff.”
(d.}; and
WHEREAS, under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78
(2009), The pleading should “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); and
WHEREAS, to plead a civil rights claim, a plaintiff must “stat[e] the conduct, time, place,
and persons responsible.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 Gd Cir, 2005); and
WHEREAS, the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee who has “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice ... or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” related to the same. 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-3(a). To make out
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a prima facie claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: “(1) [that he engaged in]
protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous
with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employce’s
protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.” Daniels v. Sch, Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181,
193 (3d Cir. 2015); and
WHEREAS, here, Plaintiff does not specifically identify the alleged “protected activity”
in which he was engaged, see id.; and
WHEREAS, here, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to Title
VII based on arguments raised by counsel in the course of litigation, the litigation privilege bars
liability for such claims. See Rickenbach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 635 F. Supp. 2d 389, 401
(D.N.J, 2009) (noting the litigation privilege ensures that “[s]tatements by attorneys, parties and
their representatives made in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged and immune from liability.”); and
WHEREAS, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that CHOP shared
undisclosed “confidential,” “non-public litigation information” with Cooper is not plausibly
alleged, as Plaintiff has failed to identify any basis for this belief or identified any records that
were allegedly shared in violation of any confidentiality agreement or protective order prohibiting
their distribution, (see generally Compl.); and
THE COURT NOTING that Plaintiff alleges that it was not until after Cooper denied him
employment and Plaintiff sued Cooper, that Cooper allegedly coordinated with CHOP on litigation
strategy. Thus, Cooper’s rejection of Plaintiff's employment application could not have been an
“adverse action” in “retaliation” for Plaintiff's lawsuit against it. Moreover, Plaintiff does not cite
any provision of Title VII or other authority indicating that CHOP and Cooper’s alleged
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coordination regarding litigation strategy would itself constitute an “adverse action” proscribed by
Title VI, see Moore y. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Many may suffer
.., harassment at work, but if the reason for that harassment is one that is not proscribed by Title
VI, it follows that Title VII provides no relief.”); and
WHEREAS, to constitute “protected activity,” the employee must hold “an objectively
reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity [he] oppose[s}’ violates the applicable anti-
discrimination statute. Moore, 461 F.3d at 341; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff brings his civil conspiracy claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which prohibits all racial discrimination in making public and private contracts. Runyou v
MeCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976); McGovern y. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 120 Gd Cir.
2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that § 1981 prohibited intentional racial discrimination in
private, as well as public, contracting”). Plaintiff's Complaint includes the conclusory allegation
that “Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by coordinating legal strategies designed to penalize
him for exercising his civil rights and filing EEOC complaints.” (Compl., at 8.) Plaintiff's
Complaint does not contain any allegations concerning whether he ultimately filed an EEOC
complaint, when, against whom, or the basis of those complaints. (See generally id.); see Evancho,
423 F.3d at 353. Nor does Plaintiff allege whether he held “an objectively reasonable belief, in
good faith, that the activity [he] opposefd]” in his alleged EEOC complainis and civil rights
lawsuits violated the applicable anti-discrimination statutes, See Moore, 461 F.3d at 341; and
WHEREAS, the Third Circuit has held that “{a} complaint does not state a claim upon
which relief may be granted unless it asserts the satisfaction of the precondition to suit specified
by Title VII: prior submission of the claim to the EEOC for conciliation or resolution.” Robinson
vw. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (Gd Cir. 1997); and
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THE COURT FINDING that Plaintiff’s failure to plead that he exhausted administrative
remedies by filing an EEOC complaint alone is sufficient to dismiss Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s
Complaint for retaliation in violation of Title VII and conspiracy to commit same, see id.; and
WHEREAS, to state a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a plaintiff’s existing or reasonable
expectation of economic benefit or advantage; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that expectancy;
(3) the defendant’s wrongful, intentional interference with that expectancy; (4) the reasonable
probability that the plaintiff would have received the anticipated economic benefit in the absence
of the interference; and (5) damages resulting from the defendant’s interference.” Lightning Lube,
Inc. y. Witeo Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1167 Gd Cir. 1993); and
THE COURT FINDING that, here, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a reasonable
probability that he would have received an anticipated economic benefit—ie, an offer of
employment from Cooper-—in the absence of wrongful, intentional interference by one of the
Defendants, See id, Nor has Plaintiff plausibly alleged an underlying wrong committed by
Defendants, See Rickenbach, 635 F. Supp. 2d at 401, Accordingly, the Court finds that Count TI
of Plaintiff’s Complaint for Tortious Interference is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim,
(see ComplL., at 8); and
WHEREAS, Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges “abuse of process” and “misuse of
judicial estoppel.” (dd.) Plaintiff's “abuse of process” claim is based on his allegation that
Defendants misused the doctrine of judicial estoppel to dismiss his discrimination claims. Ud.)
“Basic to the tort of malicious abuse of process is the requirement that the defendant perform
‘further acts’ after issuance of process ‘which represent the perversion or abuse of the legitimate
purposes of that process.’” Penwag Prop. Co., Inc. v. Landau, 148 N.J. Super. 493, 499 (App. Div.
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1977), aff'd, 76N.J. 595 (1978). “In the absence of some coercive or illegitimate use of the judicial
process there can be no claim for its abuse.” Jd; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no allegations identifying which court(s) his
related actions against Defendants are pending before; and
THE COURT FINDING that, here, Plaintiff does not allege any conduct by Defendants
wherein they abused judicial process. See Penwag Prop. Co., Inc., 148 N.J. Super, at 499. The
Court further notes that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to appeal or challenge any previous
unfavorable state court rulings through federal litigation, this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to grant that relief. See Gochin v. Haaz, 724 F. App’x 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2018); see alse
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting
standards for the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to
challenge the application of judicial estoppel by another court of this District, Plaintiff’s recourse
was to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit —not this Court. See United States v. Foy,
803 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding a district court has jurisdiction over a Rule 60 mation
“seeking relief from a judgment because the court will have ancillary jurisdiction to consider a
challenge to its own judgment or order,” but noting district courts do not independently possess
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the judgments or orders of other district courts); see also Fed.
R. App. P. 3(a)(1) (‘An appeal... from a district court to a court of appeals may be taken only by
filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk... .”).
CONSEQUENTLY, for all the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown;
IT IS on this iA day of December, 2025, hereby:
ORDERED Plaintiff's Amended IFP application is GRANTED, and further
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ORDERED Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. No. 5) is DENIED as moot; and
further
ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint within 30 days
of issuance of this order to address the deficiencies noted herein; and further
ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not amend his Complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of
Court is directed to close the case without further Order from the Court.
KAREN M. WILLIAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEWas bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
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