MACELLARI v. JUDGE JORGE F. COOMBS

1:25-cv-06780Njd11.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

[Docket No. 1]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
MARIO MACELLARI,
Plaintiff,
v.
JORGE F. COOMBS,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-6780
MEMORANDUM ORDER
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
Pro se Plaintiff Mario Macellari asks this Court to allow him to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP) so he can sue Defendant Jorge F. Coombs, a sitting Atlantic County
Superior Court Judge who apparently remanded Macellari to pretrial detention. 28
U.S.C. § 1915 allows federal courts to waive the prepayment of court fees if the litigant
“is unable to pay such fees.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Once a court grants an IFP
application, § 1915 requires the Court to screen the litigant’s complaint to ensure,
among other things, it states a claim and that the lawsuit is not frivolous or malicious.
Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Third Circuit courts only grant leave to proceed IFP “based on a showing of
indigence.” Douris v. Newtown Borough, Inc., 207 F. App’x 242, 243 (3d Cir. 2006).
While IFP status is not reserved solely for the “absolutely destitute[,]” the litigant
“must establish that he is unable to pay the costs of his suit.” Hurst v. Shalk, 659 F.
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App’x 133, 134 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d
598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989)). The litigant seeking IFP status shoulders the burden “to
provide the [Court] with the financial information it need[s] to make a determination
as to whether he qualifie[s] for [IFP] status.” Freeman v. Edens, 2007 WL 2406789, at
*1 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2007) (first, second, and third alterations in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, after considering Macellari’s Affidavit of Poverty and Account
Certification, and the accompanying Offender Management System account record,
the Court finds that he cannot pay the court fees. [Docket No. 1-1.] Thus, the Court
grants his IFP application.
Still, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), the Court screens Macellari’s
Complaint to ensure he states a claim for relief and that his lawsuit is not “frivolous or
malicious.” Macellari’s pro se status does not relieve him of his obligation to allege
enough facts in the Complaint to support these claims. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
In his Complaint, Macellari appears to raise claims against Judge Coombs
stemming from his alleged conduct while presiding over his pending state criminal
matter. [Compl. at 6.] He claims that Judge Coombs violated his Due Process rights
by remanding him into custody without “fair bail” of the “presumption of
innocen[ce].” [Id.]
Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, “a judge is not immune from liability
for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” or “for
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actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
Kirkland v. Dileo, 581 F. App’x 111, 115 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (superseded on other grounds)).
After liberally reading Macellari’s Complaint, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007), the Court is unable to glean any allegations against Judge Coombs that do
not stem from his official duties or indicate he acted beyond the scope of his
jurisdiction. Moreover, Macellari has failed to provide any factual support for his Due
Process claim beyond his conclusory statement. [Compl. at 6.] Accordingly, this Court
dismisses Macellari’s Complaint without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
For the above reasons, and for other good cause shown,
IT IS on this 11th day of February 2026, hereby:
ORDERED that the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP application; and it is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE [Docket No. 1]; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff may have the above-entitled case reopened, if,
within thirty days of the date of the entry of this Memorandum Order, Plaintiff files
an amended Complaint; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant shall not be served before the Court’s sua sponte
screen of an amended Complaint; and it is further
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ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum
Order on Plaintiff to his address of record by regular U.S. mail; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE this matter.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge
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