1:25-cv-02528•JOHNSON v. NJ TRANSIT BUS OPERATIONS INC. et al
Gesamter Gesetzestext
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Case 1:25-cv-02528-KMW-EAP Document 33 _ Filed 01/16/26 Page 1 of 5 PagelD: <pagelD> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE SINOWA JOHNSON, HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS Plaintiff, Civil Action Vv. No, 1:25-cv-2528 (KMW-EAP) NJ TRANSIT BUS OPERATIONS INC, et al., MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendants. THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant NJ Transit Bus Operations’ (“Defendant NJT”) and Defendant ATU Local 880’s (“Defendant ATU”) Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 13, 24.) Plaintiff Sinowa Johnson (“Plaintiff”) opposed these Motions and cross moved to Stay the case (ECF No. 29.) Defendant ATU replied (ECF No. 30), as did Defendant NJT (ECF No. 31.) The Court, having considered Defendants’ respective Motions, the Opposition thereto, and Defendants’ Replies, decides the Motions on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 78.1; and WHEREAS, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have an independent obligation to address issues of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte and may do so at any stage of the litigation. Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 Gd Cir, 2010); Lincoln Ben, Life Co. v. AEILife, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 Gd Cir. 2015). Ifa federal district court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); and WHEREAS, to establish subject matter jurisdiction, a pleading must either present a AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO Case 1:25-cv-02528-KMW-EAP Document 33 _ Filed 01/16/26 Page 2 of 5 PagelD: <pagelD> federal claim! or trigger the court’s diversity? jurisdiction. See Gibson vy. Tip Towing & Recovery LLC, No, 23-2919, 2024 WL 658977 at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2024); and WHEREAS, here, Plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), as well as supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for her claim under New Jersey’s Employer-Employee Relations Act (“EERA”);? and WHEREAS, both Defendant NJT and Defendant ATU argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff cannot properly bring claims against them under the LMRA nor the NLRA;* and WHEREAS, the NLRA® defines “employer” as “any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly” but explicitly excludes “any State or political subdivision thereof.” 29 U.S.C, § 152; and WHEREAS, “labor organization” is defined in the NLRA as “any organization of any kind...in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of ! To assert a federal claim, a pleading must assert an action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See Gibson v. Tip Towing & Recovery LLC, No, 23-2919, 2024 WL 658977 at *1 n.2, 3d Cir, Feb, §6, 2024), The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when “the face of a properly pleaded complaint asserts a federal question.” Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co, v. Harding, 655 F, App’x 113, 114 Gd Cir, 2016) (citing Caterpillar, inc, y. Williams, 482 U.S, 386, 392 (1987). 2 To assert diversity jurisdiction, a pleading must demonstrate complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, (meaning that each defendant must be a citizen of a different state than each plaintiff), with the amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00, Gibson, 2024 WL 658977, at *1 1.2. 3 The Complaint alleges that Defendant NJT is “an employer as defined by the NLRA, EERA, and LMRA.” (ECF No. | at € 6) and that Defendant ATU is “a labor organization within the meaning of the New Jersey law and the LMRA.” (ECF No, | at 7.) * Defendant NIT argues that it is not an “employer” as defined by the Act (ECF No, 13-1 at p, 9}, and Defendant ATU argues that it is not a “labor organization” as defined by the Act. (ECF No. 24-1 at p. 3.) 3 The LMRA defines “employer”, “employee”, and “labor organization” by the definition set forth in the NLRA. See 29 ULS.C, § 142 Case 1:25-cv-02528-KMW-EAP Document 33 _ Filed 01/16/26 Page 3 of 5 PagelD: <pagelD> dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” /d; and WHEREAS, the Act defines “employee” as “any employee ...but shall not include any individual employed...by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.” Jd; and THE COURT FINDING that, an “employer” within the meaning of the Act cannot be a State or a political subdivision of the State.° Therefore, an “employee” for purposes of the Act cannot be an individual employed by a State or a politicial subdivision of the State; and THE COURT FURTHER FINDING that, under the Act, a “labor organization” must serve “employees” as defind by the Act, in dealing with an “employer” as defined by the Act. Therefore, under the Act, a “labor organization” cannot exist for the purpose of serving individuals employed by the State or a political subdivision of the State; and WHEREAS, here, Defendant NJT was established “in the Executive Branch of the State Government” under N.J.S.A, § 27:25-4(a), and was “constituted as an instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental functions.” N.J, Stat. Ann. § 27:25-4(a); and WHEREAS, Defendant NJT is governed by a thirteen member board that consists of the Commissioner of Transportation, the State Treasurer, a member of the Executive Branch to be selected by the Governor, eight public members who shali be appointed by the Governor, and two nonvoting board members appointed by the Governor as recommended by the labor organization. Id. at § 27.25-4(b); and 6 Whether an entity constitutes a political subdivision depends on if it was “either (1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.” Criffy v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 529 F.2d 1355, 1358 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing N. 2. R. B. v. Nat. Gas Util, Dist. of Hawkins Cnty, Tenn, 402 U.S, 600, 604 (1971),) Case 1:25-cv-02528-KMW-EAP Document 33 _ Filed 01/16/26 Page 4 of 5 PagelD: <pagelD> THE COURT FINDING that Defendant NIT is a policitical subdivision of New Jersey;’ and THE COURT FURTHER FINDING that since Defendant NIJT is a politicial subdivision of New Jersey, it is not an “employer” within the definition of the LMRA. Therefore, Defendant NJT’s employees are not “employees” within the definition of the LMRA, and Defendant ATU cannot be considered a “labor organization” under the LMRA; and THE COURT FURTHER FINDING that because these questions are treated as ones of jurisdiction, Pue, 2023 WL at *2 (citing Cri/ly, 528 F.2d at 1357), the Court is compelled to conclude that the Plaintiff cannot establish that the Court has federal question jurisdiction under the LMRA or the NLRA; and WHEREAS, Plaintiff's remaining claim is a state law claim alleging a violation of the EERA;® and WHEREAS, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under § 1367 when the Court does not have original jurisdiction over a properly brought federal claim. Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v, Ethyl Corp., 993 F. Supp, 271, 281 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd, 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir, 1999). 7 Indeed, the Third Circuit has previously held that Defendant NIT is a politicial subdivision that cannot be sued under the LMRA. Pue v. New Jersey Transit Corp., No. 22-2616, 2023 WL 2930298, at *2 3d Cir. Apr. 13, 2023), ® Defendant NIT and Defendant ATU both argue that the Public Employment Relations Commission (“PERC”) has exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiffs EERA claim, and therefore, even if the Court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state claim, the Court would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the EERA claim anyway. Plaintiff argues that the Court should construe her Complaint to bring a common law claim of vioiation of duty of fair representation, which PERC would not have exclusive jurisdiction over. However, the Court need not analyze the merits of these arguments because, as explained above, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in this case. ® Tt is well settled that whether a federa! court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed is at the discretion of the Court. Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 282 Gd Cir, 2021); Diaz y, Bullock, 268 F. Supp. 3d 640, 659 (DN. 2017). However, the Third Circuit has instructed that “absent extraordinary circumstances,” supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims “should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable.” Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch, Dirs. of Albert Gallatin Area Sch, Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir, 4 Case 1:25-cv-02528-KMW-EAP Document 33 _ Filed 01/16/26 Page 5 of 5 PagelD: <pagelD> IT IS this be “day of January, 2026, hereby ORDERED A. Defendant NJT’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED in its entirety and all claims therein are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; B. Defendant ATU’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED in its entirety and all claims therein are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Cc. Plaintiff's Motion to Stay (ECF No. 29) is DENIED AS MOOT.”® pene KAREN M. WILLIAMS United States District Judge 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted}; see also Brunifield v. AU. City Hous. Auth, No, 21-cv-16061, 2025 WL 227311, at #13 (D.NJ. Jan. 17, 2025) Gemanding state-law claims after entering summary judgment on federal discrimination claims); SM. o/b/o BM. v. Freehold Reg’! Sch. Dist, Bd. of Educ., No. 22-cv-107, 2024 WL 180827, at *15 (D.NLJ. Jan. 17, 2024) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over NJLAD claims following summary judgment on federal claims), aff'd sub nom. S.M4. on behalfof B.M. v. Freehold Reg’? High Sch, Dist, Bd. af Educ., No. 24-1299, 2025 WL 1565359 (3d Cir. June 3, 2025). However, “[t]he power of the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction, though largely unrestricted, requires, at a minimum, a federal claim of sufficient substance to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.” Tully vy. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).) (emphasis added.) As such, the Court must first have subject matter jurisdiction based on a federa! claim before it can even consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. In this case, the Court has determined that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the LMRA. Therefore, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state lav EERA claim. 10 When the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case, it cannot hear any outstanding motions. Coles v, Sanks, No. 23-1982, 2023 WL 5985190 at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2023). As the Court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, it cannot hear Plaintiff's Motion to Stay the case, and the Motion must be denied as moot.
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