RUSNAK v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. et al

1:25-cv-01850Njd18.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

[ECF No. 17]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
SUSAN RUSNAK,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., et
al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 25-1850 (ESK/EAP)
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc.’s1 (“UPS”)
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer, ECF No. 17 (Def.’s Mot.). Plaintiff Susan Rusnak
opposes the motion. ECF No. 18 (Pl.’s Opp.). Defendant timely submitted its reply. ECF No. 20
(Def.’s Reply). The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and decides this matter without
oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the
reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against her current employer, Defendant
UPS. ECF No. 1 (Compl.). Plaintiff alleges that UPS discriminated against her based on her age
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (“ADEA”), id. Count
I, ¶¶ 71-76, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1, et seq.
1 	According to Defendant, Plaintiff has named “UPS Healthcare” as a party, but no such
entity exists. See ECF No. 17-1 (Def.’s Br.), n. 2. Because Defendant UPS brings this Motion on
behalf of all named defendants, the Court refers only to “Defendant.” Id.
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(“NJLAD”), id. Count II, ¶¶ 77-83. On April 30, 2025, Defendant filed its answer. ECF No. 5
(Answer). In accordance with the operative Scheduling Order, Defendant timely filed the present
motion to amend its answer. Def.’s Mot.; ECF No. 17-1 (Def.’s Br.). On August 19, 2025, Plaintiff
filed opposition, Pl.’s Opp., and Defendant then filed a reply, Def.’s Reply. This matter is now ripe
for disposition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action alleging that UPS discriminated against her based on her age.
Compl. at 1. According to the Complaint, UPS hired Plaintiff in April 2002, and she held the
position of Customer Experience Development Manager until approximately March 2024. Id. ¶¶
22-23. Plaintiff alleges that on approximately February 15, 2024, her “second-level supervisor”
informed her that UPS was eliminating her position and “explained that he wanted ‘younger’ and
‘fresh’ ideas.” 	Id. ¶¶ 26-27. 	On or about February 20, 2024, Defendant “posted Plaintiff’s
position” and others that had “just been eliminated days earlier.” Id. ¶¶ 36-38. After applying for
three of these open positions, including her own previous position, Defendant informed Plaintiff
that she was rejected from all three positions. Id. ¶¶ 40, 44. In or around March 2024, Defendant
announced Plaintiff’s “replacement” for her prior role, who Plaintiff contends is younger, has
fewer years of service at UPS, and has less experience than Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 46-49.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual:
although Defendant asserts that she was terminated because her position was eliminated, Plaintiff
alleges that she was terminated because of her age, in violation of the ADEA and NJLAD. Id. ¶
54.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs amendments to pleadings before trial. 	A
party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within either 21 days after serving it, or
if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, the earlier of 21 days after service
of a responsive pleading or 21 days after a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1). If those deadlines have expired, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 	“The court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” Id. The Third Circuit has adopted a liberal approach to the
amendment of pleadings. Spartan Concrete Prods., LLC v. Argos USVI, Corp., 929 F.3d 107, 115
(3d Cir. 2019); see also Donovan v. W. R. Berkley Corp., 566 F. Supp. 3d 224, 229 (D.N.J. 2021)
(“Generally, there is a presumption in allowing the moving party to amend its pleadings.”).
However, a court may deny a motion for leave to amend in one of four instances: (1) the
amendment would be futile; (2) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith, or
dilatory motives; (3) the amendment would prejudice the non-moving party; or (4) the moving
party was put on notice of deficiencies in its pleading but chose not to resolve them. U.S. ex rel.
Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Ultimately, the decision whether to grant leave to amend lies
within the sound discretion of the court. Arab Afr. Int’l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir.
1993).
DISCUSSION
Defendant seeks to amend its answer to (1) describe the position posted on or around
February 20, 2024, which Plaintiff alleges was her prior role, as a “newly reformatted” position
instead of a “newly created position,” see ECF No. 17-3, Def.’s Br., Ex. B (Redline Proposed Am.
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Answer) ¶¶ 36, 42, 48-50; and (2) admit that “Plaintiff applied for three open positions within the
healthcare marketing department” on February 21, 2024, see id. ¶ 40. 	Defendant argues that its
motion to amend should be granted because it seeks only to clarify the record, and none of the
factors justifying the denial of an amendment under Rule 15 are present in this case. Def.’s Br. at
2-3.
Plaintiff opposes the motion “because Defendants have provided no reason for making
substantive changes on critical positions in this matter.” 	Pl.’s Opp. at 5. 	Plaintiff argues that
Defendant must provide a reason to “justify” its request to amend the answer, and further,
Defendant’s motion should be denied because the proposed amendments are “substantive” and not
“mere clarifications or adjustments.” Id. Plaintiff, however, concedes that “there is no prejudice
to Plaintiff,” and asserts no other objections. Id. at 6. In reply, Defendant asserts that it did, in
fact, provide a reason for its proposed amendments—a need to clarify the record following initial
discovery—and that, even if these changes were purportedly substantive, Plaintiff offers no legal
support for her argument that motions to amend pleadings under Rule 15 should be denied when
the moving party proposes substantive changes. Def.’s Reply at 3-4. Defendant emphasizes that
none of the Foman v. Davis factors justifying denial are present in this case, and notes that not
only did Plaintiff concede there is no prejudice against her, but she also failed to raise any objection
based on futility, bad faith, or undue delay. Id. at 6-7 (citing 371 U.S. at 182).
Here, the Court finds that none of the Foman factors justifying denial of leave to amend
are present. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, leave should be denied only when the Foman factors
suggest an amendment would be “unjust.” Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 203 (3d Cir.
2006). 	Plaintiff concedes that there is no prejudice against her in allowing the amendment and
fails to state an objection on the basis of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
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the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of
amendment[.]” 	Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see also WPG Subsidiary Holdings I, LLC v. City of
Elizabeth, No. 15-7876, 2016 WL 3844207, at *4 (D.N.J. July 15, 2016) (holding that if leave to
amend had been required, the court would grant it because “[t]he parties opposing amendment
have made no demonstration as to the discretionary factors identified in Foman v. Davis”). The
Court is satisfied that Defendant validly seeks to clarify the record following initial discovery.
See, e.g., Leased Optical Dep’ts-Montgomery Ward, Inc. v. Opti-Ctr., Inc., 120 F.R.D. 476, 478
(D.N.J. 1988) (granting a motion to amend the complaint because it “clarifies and draws focus to
plaintiffs’ allegations without making substantive changes” and “serves the beneficial needs of
trial preparation while causing no known prejudice to defendants”). 	And when Defendant’s
proposed amendment is viewed in light of the Third Circuit’s liberal approach to the amendment
of pleadings, and given the general “presumption in allowing the moving party to amend its
pleadings,” Donovan v. W. R. Berkley Corp., 566 F. Supp. 3d 224, 229 (D.N.J. 2021), the Court
finds that the motion must be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for leave to file an amended answer is
GRANTED. An appropriate Order follows.
s/Elizabeth A. Pascal
ELIZABETH A. PASCAL
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Hon. Edward S. Kiel, U.S.D.J.
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