EL MUJADDID v. WEHLING

1:25-cv-00738Njd03.03.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

[ECF Nos. 17, 18, 40]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
EL AEMER EL MUJADDID,
Plaintiff,
v.
LYNN A. WEHLING,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-738 (ESK)(EAP)
OMNIBUS OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on three motions: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify
Counsel, see ECF No. 18 (Pl.’s Disqualification Mot.); (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, see ECF
No. 40 (Pl.’s Mot. to Strike); and (3) Defendant Lynn A. Wehling’s Cross-Motion to Vacate the
Clerk’s Entry of Default, see ECF No. 17 (Def.’s Mot.).1 The Court has considered the parties’
submissions2 and decides these motions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78(b) and Local Rule 78.1. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify
1 	The Court notes that Defendant’s consolidated briefing also opposes Plaintiff’s Motion
for Default Judgment, ECF No. 14, and requests an extension of time to answer or otherwise
respond to the complaint and moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. 	See Def.’s Mot. 	On
November 1, 2025, the Honorable Edward S. Kiel administratively terminated Plaintiff’s motion
for default judgment pending resolution of Defendant’s cross-motion and Plaintiff’s motion to
disqualify counsel. See ECF No. 26 (Text Order). As to Defendant’s request for additional time
to respond to the amended complaint, given that Defendant already filed a motion to dismiss in
response, her request for an extension is denied as moot. As to the pending motion to dismiss, on
December 2, 2025, the Honorable Edward S. Kiel, United States District Court Judge, stayed that
portion of the motion until resolution of the aspect of the motion seeking to vacate the entry of
default. See ECF No. 54 (Text Order).
2 	Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Submission in support of his Motion to Disqualify
Counsel, see ECF No. 39 (Pl.’s Supp.); Defendant Wehling filed opposition to Plaintiff’s
Disqualification Motion, see ECF No. 52 (Def.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Disqualification Mot.); and Plaintiff
replied, see ECF No. 53 (Pl.’s Reply). Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is unopposed. Plaintiff opposes
Defendant’s Motion to Vacate. See ECF No. 21 (Pl.’s Opp.).
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counsel is DENIED; Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is DENIED; and Defendant’s Cross-Motion to
Vacate the Clerk’s Entry of Default is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff El Mujaddid is a prolific filer in this District. Nearly all of his suits relate
to the alleged wrongs he suffered in 2010 when he was subjected to certain criminal proceedings
in Cumberland County, New Jersey. 	Because his litigation history is relevant to the present
motions, the Court summarizes Plaintiff’s prior lawsuits and the present action before proceeding
with its analysis.
Plaintiff alleges that the present action “arises from the preparation of three (3) invalid . . .
arrest warrant applications and the subsequent discovery of fabricated electronic arrest warrants.”
ECF No. 8 (Am. Compl.) at 1, see also id. ¶¶ 7-8. 	According to the Amended Complaint,
Defendant Lynn A. Wehling was employed as a detective with the Cumberland County
Prosecutor’s Office when she allegedly committed a variety of constitutional violations arising
from Plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent criminal proceedings in 2010. Id. ¶ 2. Defendant Wehling
allegedly falsified warrants, “unlawfully accessed and embedded Plaintiff’s Social Security
number” into these documents, and “misappropriate[ed]” his identity. 	Id. at 1. 	Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendant Wehling “recreated” the false warrant applications in January 2023. Id. ¶
74. 	And while Plaintiff’s record was ultimately expunged in 2024, “Plaintiff’s name remains
misassociated [sic]” with a different indicted individual in New Jersey public records, such that
“[t]he ongoing publication of this misinformation . . . causes ongoing reputational injury,
emotional distress, and public confusion” for which Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. Id. at 1-2; see
also id. ¶ 83. Together, Plaintiff alleges nineteen causes of action.3
3 	Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: “Deprivation of Equal Benefits of All
Laws and Proceedings and Like Punishment,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count One), Am.
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This case, however, is not the first in which Plaintiff has made these allegations. Following
this alleged wrongdoing in 2010, Plaintiff brought suits in both state and federal court related to
his arrest and the subsequent criminal proceedings against him that repeated many of the same
allegations made here. See El Aemer El Mujaddid v. City of Vineland, Docket No. CAM-L-4550-
13 (Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County) (the “State Action”); see also
Mujaddid v. Wehling, No. 12-7750, 2016 WL 310742, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2016), aff’d, 663 F.
App’x 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (the “Federal Action”); see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 26, 56. On August
1, 2014, the New Jersey Superior Court dismissed the State Action entirely. See Def.’s Mot. at 14,
(citing ECF No. 17-2, Exs. A (the State Court Opinion) & C (the State Court Order)); see also El
Aemer El Mujaddid v. City of Vineland, A-1669-22 (N.J. App. Div. July 3, 2024) (affirming lower
court’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion to vacate orders that dismissed the case in 2014). On
January 25, 2016, the federal court dismissed Plaintiff’s Federal Action with prejudice. Mujaddid
Compl. ¶¶ 90-102; “Malicious Abuse of Process,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Two),
id. ¶¶ 103-09, arising from Defendant Wehling’s actions in 2010 and later in 2024; First
Amendment retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Three), id. ¶¶ 110-16; deprivation
of procedural and substantive due process rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Four),
id. ¶¶ 117-24; “Malicious Prosecution Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,” (Count
Five), id. ¶¶ 125-32; “Fraud upon the Court,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Six), id. ¶¶
133-44; “Unauthorized Use of Social Security Number,” a substantive due process violation under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Seven), id. ¶¶ 145-51; “Violation of Constitutional Rights Arising from
Obstruction of Crime Victim Status and Misclassification of Federal Criminal Complaints,” in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Eight), id. ¶¶ 152-57; racial discrimination in violation of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count Nine), id. ¶¶ 158-68; “Discrimination Based on
Perceived Disability,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12101, the Americans with Disability Act (Count
Ten), id. ¶¶ 169-77; “Violation of the Human Trafficking Acts,” citing 18 U.S.C. § 1595 and
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8 (Count Eleven), id. ¶¶ 178-86; “Civil RICO Violations Under 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) and (d) and N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et seq. (Count Twelve), id. ¶¶ 187-96; “Injunctive Relief for
Ongoing Constitutional Violations,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Thirteen), id. ¶¶ 197-
204; “Injunctive Relief for Racial Discrimination and Unequal Treatment,” in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (Count Fourteen), id. ¶¶ 205-13; “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(IIED)” (Count Fifteen), id. ¶¶ 214-24; “Defamation and Libel” (Count Sixteen), id. ¶¶ 225-34;
“Common Law Fraud” (Count Seventeen), id. ¶¶ 235-43; “Violation of the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination (NJLAD)” (Count Eighteen), id. ¶¶ 244-52; and “Violation of the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq. (Count Nineteen), id. ¶¶ 253-64.
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v. Wehling, 2016 WL 310742, at *6.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Despite these dismissals, Plaintiff returns to federal court with the present litigation. On
January 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed the current lawsuit against Defendant Lynn A. Wehling. See ECF
No. 1 (Compl.). On May 10, 2025, Plaintiff amended his complaint. See ECF No. 8 (Am. Compl.).
On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time to serve the Amended Complaint, see
ECF No. 10, which the Court granted on May 29, 2025, see ECF No. 11 (Order). On June 5, 2025,
Plaintiff filed an executed summons for Defendant, reflecting that Defendant’s response to the
Amended Complaint was due on June 20, 2025. See ECF No. 12.
Defendant failed to file her response timely. On June 21, 2025, Plaintiff moved for clerk’s
entry of a default against Defendant. See ECF No. 13. On June 23, 2025, the Clerk entered default
against Defendant. See generally Dkt.
On July 1, 2025, Defendant cross-moved to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default, in
addition to other relief. See ECF No. 17 (Def.’s Mot.). On July 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed opposition
to Defendant’s Motion. See ECF No. 21 (Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot.).
Plaintiff thereafter filed his Disqualification Motion, ECF No. 18; Motion to Strike, ECF
No. 40; and more than twenty other documents, including new motions, letters, and “supplemental
notices,” many of which have since been either stricken or administratively terminated.4 	On
November 10, 2025, Defendant Wehling requested additional time to oppose the Disqualification
Motion, ECF No. 30, which Plaintiff opposed, ECF No. 32. On November 12, 2025, the Court
4 	Plaintiff filed several additional documents regarding his motion to disqualify counsel.
See ECF Nos. 36, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50. On November 24, 2025, Judge Kiel struck
Plaintiff’s filings at ECF Nos. 45, 47, 48, 49, and 50. See ECF No. 51 (Text Order).
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granted Defendant’s extension request. ECF No. 31.5 On November 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a
“Supplemental Submission” to his Motion to Disqualify Counsel. ECF No. 39 (Pl.’s Supp.) at 1.
On November 24, 2025, Defendant filed her opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify
Counsel, ECF No. 52, and Plaintiff filed a reply, ECF No. 53.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike remains unopposed as of the date of this Opinion. See Dkt.
These motions are now ripe for disposition.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel
On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff moved to disqualify the New Jersey Office of the Attorney
General (“NJOAG”) from representing Defendant Wehling because (1) its representation of Ms.
Wehling violates the Rules of Professional Conduct as an alleged “conflict of interest,” id. at 1-2;
(2) the NJOAG’s representation violates the ethical duties set forth in various Executive Orders
issued by the New Jersey Governor, id. at 2-3; and (3) N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2 “prohibits the State from
defending employees accused of ‘criminal conduct, or actual fraud, actual malice or willful
misconduct’ [as] outside the scope of employment,” and that is what Plaintiff has accused
Defendant Wehling of in the present litigation, id. at 3.6 	Plaintiff also argues that the NJOAG
cannot represent Ms. Wehling because she is not a state employee, based on “evidence . . . recently
5 	On November 12, 2025, Plaintiff objected to the Court’s Order granting the extension,
ECF No. 35, and moved to “vacate and reassign [the] case.” See ECF No. 37. On November 20,
2025, Judge Kiel denied that motion. See ECF No. 44.
6 	The Court need not and does not consider Plaintiff’s additional arguments as they are
irrelevant to the present motion. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts Defendant has taken “contradictory
positions regarding whether [he] was charged or convicted” and should be estopped from
“relitigating” these claims here. 	See id. at 3 (stating that “[j]udicial estoppel bars a party from
taking a legal position inconsistent with one successfully asserted in prior proceedings[,]” without
additional argument, and that “[c]ollateral estoppel and res judicata bar relitigation of factual issues
and claims previously adjudicated,” without additional argument). However, the Court does not
find that Defendant is engaging in any such “relitigation,” and even if the Court had so found, this
is not relevant to the Court’s analysis concerning whether the NJOAG should be disqualified.
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obtained by Plaintiff[]”and case law. Pl.’s Supp. at 1 (citing Kaminskas v. Off. of the Att’y Gen.,
236 N.J. 415 (2019) and Monmouth Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off. v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., 480 N.J.
Super. 33 (App. Div. 2024)).7
In opposition, Defendant Wehling argues that Plaintiff’s motion fails for four reasons: “(1)
he has not presented a conflict of interest under the applicable rules of professional conduct; (2)
he does not have standing to challenge the [NJOAG]’s decision to represent a state employee; (3)
the cases upon which [Plaintiff] relies do not support his arguments at all; and (4) his
characterization of Defendant Wehling’s conduct is not controlling or dispositive as to the issue of
representation.” Def.’s Opp. to Disqualification Mot. at 2 (footnote omitted).
In reply, Plaintiff sets forth several arguments, only some of which are relevant to a motion
to disqualify counsel.8 As they pertain to the present motion, Plaintiff argues that (1) Defendant
made “false statements” in its opposition that further support Plaintiff’s disqualification motion
7 	Plaintiff’s new “evidence” consists of a representation letter between the NJOAG and
Defendant Wehling dated November 7, 2025, Pl.’s Supp., Ex. B, and alleged “billing logs”
obtained by Plaintiff, id., Ex. A. 	According to Plaintiff, the NJOAG’s filings made prior to
November 7, 2025, are void for allegedly preceding the date on the representation letter, id. at 3-
5, and the logs “provide[] incontrovertible proof that” Ms. Wehling is a county, not state,
employee, id. at 2-4. However, a purported representation letter is not dispositive of whether an
attorney-client 	relationship exists, and 	any 	alleged internal billing logs are irrelevant 	to
determining an employee’s status for purposes of indemnification. Accordingly, the Court does
not consider this purported evidence.
8 	Plaintiff’s Reply presents entirely new arguments supporting disqualification. See ECF
No. 53 (Pl.’s Reply) at 8-9 (asserting that the NJOAG failed to comply with certain “prerequisites”
and cannot represent Defendant Wehling), 11-12 (asserting that Ms. Wehling was a complaining
witness such that she is subject to suit). These arguments are procedurally improper and thus will
not be considered by the Court. See Milan v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., No. 18-
13735, 2025 WL 842313, at *4, n. 4 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2025) (“However, ‘a party cannot raise issues
for the first time in a reply brief.’”) (quoting Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729, 731 n. 3 (3d Cir.
1998))). Plaintiff also presents various estoppel arguments alleging Defendant seeks to “relitigate”
facts underlying this case that are irrelevant to his Motion and thus will not be considered by the
Court. See Pl.’s Reply at 1-6; see also id. at 10-11 (asserting the NJOAG’s inability to represent
county employees like Ms. Wehling has already been litigated and decided). Finally, Plaintiff also
asserts that neither issue nor claim preclusion bar his claims here, but this is also irrelevant to his
Motion to Disqualify counsel. See id. at 12, 14-15.
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because they demonstrate the NJOAG’s failure to demonstrate candor to the tribunal, see Pl.’s
Reply at 1, 4 (“NJOAG’s continued reliance on the fiction of a ‘search warrant against Dixon’ in
its internal communications . . . demonstrates a profound disregard for factual accuracy and a
pattern of asserting claims without evidentiary basis . . . and further underscores NJOAG's lack of
candor to the tribunal”), 12-13, 14; (2) Plaintiff has standing to challenge the NJOAG’s decision
to represent Ms. Wehling, see id. at 6-8, and that decision is improper because the “NJOAG cannot
deny the existence of malice or conduct outside the scope of employment” based on previous
judicial “findings,” see id. at 5; and (3) because Ms. Wehling is a county, not a state, employee,
she cannot be represented by the NJOAG, see id. at 9-11. The Court addresses each argument in
turn.
1. 	Legal Standard
A “‘district court’s power to disqualify an attorney derives from its inherent authority to
supervise the professional conduct of attorneys appearing before it.’” Marchisotto v. Malik, No.
20-20426, 2024 WL 1929504, at *2 (D.N.J. May 2, 2024) (quoting United States v. Miller, 624
F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980)). The conduct of attorneys admitted to practice before the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey is governed by the Rules of Professional
Conduct (“RPC”) as revised by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 	See L. Civ. R. 103.1(a). 	The
moving party must show “‘disqualification is warranted, either because a [Rule of Professional
Conduct] was violated or because sufficient doubt exists as to the propriety of further
representation.’” Marchisotto, 2024 WL 1929504, at *2 (quoting Shaikh v. Germadnig, No. 22-
2053, 2022 WL 16716116, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2022) (further citations omitted)).
The “party seeking to disqualify counsel carries a heavy burden and must satisfy a high
standard of proof.” Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 246
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(D.N.J. 1998). “The motion must be supported by facts that must be closely scrutinized ‘to prevent
unjust results.’” Gillespie v. Newark Bd. of Educ., No. 21-18990, 2024 WL 2354502, at *4 (D.N.J.
May 23, 2024) (quoting Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Crossland Sav., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341,
345 (D.N.J. 1996)); see also Carreno v. City of Newark, 834 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (D.N.J. 2011).
However, “[e]ven where a violation is shown . . . disqualification is not automatic, for ‘[e]ven
when an ethical conflict exists (or is assumed to exist), a court may conclude based on the facts
before it that disqualification is not an appropriate remedy.’” Marchisotto, 2024 WL 1929504, at
*2 (quoting In re Boy Scouts of Am., 35 F.4th 149, 159 (3d Cir. 2022)).
“Courts are especially reluctant to impose this drastic remedy where, as here, a party seeks
to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the state defendants pursuant to its
statutory obligation under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act to ‘provide for the defense’ of actions
brought against current or former state employees ‘on account of . . . act[s] or omission[s] in the
scope of [their] employment.’” Id. (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1); see also Rohm & Haas Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 187 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding “courts disfavor such motions
and grant them only when absolutely necessary”) (further quotations omitted).
2. 	Plaintiff Fails to Show An RPC Violation Warranting Possible Disqualification
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he NJOAG’s continued representation of Defendant Wehling raises
serious concerns” under the RPC. See Pl.’s Disqualification Mot. at 1. According to Plaintiff, (1)
there is an actual conflict of interest violative of RPC 1.7 because the NJOAG cannot “ethically
represent an individual accused of violating the public’s trust”; (2) “[s]tate-employed attorneys
must avoid any representation that might create the appearance of impropriety or misuse of public
resources”; and (3) the NJOAG cannot represent Defendant Wehling because its “representatives
have repeatedly made materially misleading statements” in this Court that violate RPC 3.3
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governing candor toward the tribunal.9 Id. at 1-2.
In opposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff “has provided no basis or evidence that
suggests the [NJOAG] has ever represented him” to show any conflict of interest under RPC 1.7.
Def.’s Opp. at 6. In reply, Plaintiff argues that the NJOAG made “misrepresentations” in its
opposition brief that violate RPC 3.3 governing candor to the tribunal and further support
disqualification. Pl.’s Reply at 1, 4, 12-13, 14.
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of presenting an actual conflict
of interest that could warrant disqualification under any cited rule.
First, Plaintiff fails to show any violation of RPC 1.7. Rule 1.7 states that “a lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” Under that
rule, a concurrent conflict of interest exists if “(1) the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client,
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” Here, Plaintiff does not present any facts
showing even the potential for a conflict of interest. Nothing before the Court suggests that the
NJOAG ever represented—or could have represented—Plaintiff in a prior proceeding.
Second, Plaintiff fails to show any violation of RPC 1.9. Rule 1.9(a) states that “[a] lawyer
who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another client in the same or
a substantially related matter in which that client’s interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing.”
9 	The Court notes briefly that Plaintiff also argues the NJOAG must be disqualified for
allegedly violating ethical duties set forth in certain of the New Jersey Governor’s Executive
Orders. Id. at 2-3. However, Plaintiff fails to provide any legal support demonstrating that, even
if such violations occurred—which the Court does not find—that this is a proper basis for
disqualification. Accordingly, this argument fails.
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“Applying RPC 1.9 requires an assessment of whether [Plaintiff] is a former client of the
[NJOAG], whether the current representation of [Defendant] is in the same or a substantially
related matter, whether the representation is materially adverse to [Plaintiff], and if so, whether
consent was given to proceed with the litigation after full disclosure.” Rohm & Haas Co., 187 F.
Supp. 2d at 228. 	Plaintiff does not provide any facts from which the Court could conduct this
analysis; indeed, Plaintiff offers no factual support that the NJOAG ever represented or could have
represented him. The mere fact that the NJOAG has previously been involved in prior litigation
on Ms. Wehling’s behalf is irrelevant to the analysis.
Third, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to show that the NJOAG violates RPC 1.11(d). RPC
1.11 governs successive government and private employment. 	Under that rule, Plaintiff argues
that “[s]tate-employed attorneys must avoid any representation that might create the appearance
of impropriety or misuse of public resources to protect state actors from accountability.” 	That
principle, however, is not governed by RPC 1.11(d).10 	To the extent Plaintiff argues that the
10 	Rule 1.11(d) states:
(d) 	Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer
serving as a government lawyer or public officer or employee of the
government:
(1) 	shall be subject to RPC 1.9(c)(2) in respect of
information relating to a private party acquired by the lawyer while
in private practice or nongovernmental employment.
(2) 	shall not participate in a matter (i) in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private
practice or nongovernmental employment, or (ii) for which the
lawyer had substantial responsibility while in private practice or
nongovernmental employment, or (iii) with respect to which the
interests of the appropriate government agency are materially
adverse to the interests of a private party represented by the lawyer
while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless
under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be,
authorized to act in the lawyer’s stead in the matter or unless the
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NJOAG should be disqualified “to avoid any representation that might create the appearance of
impropriety” under any rule of professional conduct, the Court also rejects that argument. Pl.’s
Disqualification Mot. at 2. 	Although Plaintiff asserts the NJOAG cannot “ethically” represent
Defendant Wehling because she is accused of misconduct, “it is not an ethics violation to represent
a client accused of even serious misconduct.” Marchisotto, 2024 WL 1929504, at *4. Further,
“[w]hile the doctrine of appearance of impropriety once served as a basis for disqualification under
RPC 1.7, the appearance of impropriety was removed from the New Jersey Rules of Professional
Conduct in 2004.” Johnson v. Gloucester Cnty. Improvement Auth., Civ. No. 16-8422, 2019 WL
13277445, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2019) (internal citation omitted). And the Court is unpersuaded
that any such impropriety exists here, as set forth more fully below.
Fourth, Plaintiff fails to show that the NJOAG’s representation violates RPC 3.3, and even
if he had, the Court is unpersuaded that such a violation would warrant disqualification. 	Rule
3.3(a) governs an attorney’s obligation of candor to the tribunal.11 Plaintiff argues the NJOAG
private party gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, and
(3) 	shall not negotiate for private employment with any
person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a
matter 	in 	which 	the 	lawyer 	is 	participating 	personally 	and
substantially or for which the lawyer has substantial responsibility,
except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk shall be subject to RPC
1.12(c).
RPC 1.11(d).
11 	RPC 3.3 states:
(a) 	A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) 	make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal;
(2) 	fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting an illegal, criminal or
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should be disqualified because it “repeatedly made materially misleading statements in multiple
judicial forums” regarding Plaintiff’s prior 2010 arrest. Pl.’s Disqualification Mot. at 2. Plaintiff
further alleges in his Reply that the NJOAG continues to make false statements in its opposition
briefing in contravention of RPC 3.3. See Pl.’s Reply at 1, 4, 12-13, 14. Yet again, Plaintiff fails
to support this bare allegation with sufficient facts, and even if he had, Plaintiff makes no showing
that disqualification is warranted for such a violation. 	See Gillespie, 2024 WL 2354502, at *5
(“Even assuming violations of RPC 3.1 or 3.3, Plaintiff has failed to identify any instance where
an attorney has been disqualified based on any such violation. Typically, consequences for these
violations come in the form of sanctions.”).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show any violation of New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct that could warrant the NJOAG’s disqualification.
3. 	Plaintiff Fails to Substantiate Any Other Basis for Disqualification
a. 	Defendant 	Demonstrates 	She 	Is 	a 	State 	Employee 	for 	Purposes 	of
Indemnification, and Plaintiff’s Cited Cases Do Not Warrant Another
Conclusion
Plaintiff argues that the NJOAG must be disqualified because Ms. Wehling is a county
fraudulent act by the client;
(3) 	fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by
opposing counsel;
(4) 	offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures; or
(5) 	fail to disclose to the tribunal a material fact knowing
that the omission is reasonably certain to mislead the tribunal,
except that it shall not be a breach of this rule if the disclosure is
protected by a recognized privilege or is otherwise prohibited by
law.
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employee, not a state employee. In support of his position, Plaintiff cites two cases: Kaminskas v.
Office of the Attorney General, 236 N.J. 415 (2019) and Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office v.
Office of the Attorney General., 480 N.J. Super. 33 (App. Div. 2024). See Pl.’s Supp. at 1-3; see
also Pl.’s Reply at 9-11. In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s citations are misplaced
and that Ms. Wehling is a state employee under these circumstances. See Def.’s Opp. at 5.
The Court agrees with Defendant. “The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled definitively
that when county prosecutors act in their law enforcement or investigatory capacity, ‘they act as
agents and officers of the State, qualifying as State employees under N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 for the
purpose of determining vicarious liability under the [Tort Claims Act].’” 	Estate of Bardzell v.
Gomperts, 515 F. Supp. 3d 256, 268-69 (D.N.J. 2021) (citing Wright v. State, 169 N.J. 422, 451-
52 (2001)).12
Here, it is apparent from the face of the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Wehling is a former county prosecutor who acted in an investigatory capacity during
the events giving rise to the present lawsuit. 	See generally Am. Compl. 	Plaintiff’s citations to
Kaminskas and Monmouth County do not support his argument but rather bolster the seminal
finding in Wright. Compare Wright, 169 N.J. at 451-52 (holding that the State is vicariously liable
for actions taken by county prosecutors in the performance of their law enforcement duties) with
Kaminskas, 236 N.J. at 426-28 (affirming that the county, not the NJOAG, was responsible for
defending and indemnifying local police officers for alleged misconduct, but not disturbing the
holding of Wright as to county prosecutors) and Monmouth Cnty., 480 N.J. Super. at 44 (citing
12 	“The OAG’s duty to defend arises solely from the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A.
59:1-1 to -12-3.” 	Monmouth Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 480 N.J. Super. at 40 (citing Chasin v.
Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 425 (1999)). Because “[n]either party has identified any other
governing statute, common law or contractual obligation to defend,” the Court will analyze the
applicable TCA provisions. Id.
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Wright for the proposition that “[w]hen prosecutors act in their law enforcement capacity, ‘they
act as agents of the State,’” but holding that the Office of the Attorney General was not required
to defend the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office under the Tort Claims Act “[b]ecause the
underlying complaint [did] not seek monetary damages for tortious conduct”).
b. 	The NJOAG Is Not Prohibited from Representing Defendant Wehling
Plaintiff argues that N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2 “prohibits” the State from representing Defendant
Wehling because she is accused of misconduct. 	Pl.’s Disqualification Mot. at 3. 	Defendant
opposes and argues that the NJOAG is statutorily required to represent Ms. Wehling under these
circumstances, and that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the NJOAG’s ultimate decision to
represent Ms. Wehling. Id. at 6-7. In reply, Plaintiff argues that he has standing to challenge the
NJOAG’s decision by citing to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, certain cases, and his “taxpayer
standing,” see Pl.’s Reply at 6-8, and he further argues that because Ms. Wehling’s misconduct
was “judicially determine[ed]” in earlier proceedings, the NJOAG is judicially estopped from
taking a contrary position here, see id. at 4.
First, the Court agrees that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the Attorney General’s
decision to represent Wehling. Indeed, “[t]he TCA delegates to the Attorney General the authority
to determine whether the State will indemnify a public official.” In re Camden Police Cases, Nos.
11-1315, 10-4757, 2011 WL 3651318, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011) (citing N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2;
Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 428 (2006)).
Second, even if Plaintiff could establish standing, N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2 does not “prohibit”
the NJOAG from representing a state employee accused of misconduct. Indeed, the TCA states
that 	“the Attorney 	General 	must 	provide a 	defense 	for 	a state 	employee who 	requests
representation, unless the Attorney General determines that it is more probable than not that: (1)
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the employee acted outside the scope of his employment; (2) the employee engaged in actual fraud
or willful misconduct, or acted with actual malice; or (3) the defense of the employee would create
a conflict of interest with the State.” Prado, 186 N.J. at 428 (citing N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2).
Here, Ms. Wehling is merely accused of misconduct, and the NJOAG exercised its
discretion to represent her. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the state court’s previous finding that
Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a malicious prosecution claim does not equate to a finding that Ms.
Wehling did, in fact, commit this tort. And nothing in the present record reflects that the NJOAG
found that any of the grounds for refusing a defense to Ms. Wehling were applicable here. See,
e.g., Pl.’s Supp., Ex. B (Representation Ltr.).
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s arguments in support of disqualifying the NJOAG fail.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel is denied.
B. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
On November 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to “strik[e] all filings submitted by Deputy
Attorney General Azeem Chaudry and the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General . . . prior to
November 7, 2025, on the ground that no lawful authorization existed for State-funded
representation of Defendant Wehling until that date, as confirmed by newly produced evidence.”
Def.’s Mot. to Strike at 1.13 According to Plaintiff, the “newly produced evidence” consists of a
representation letter between the NJOAG and Defendant Wehling, dated November 7, 2025, and
certain purported internal billing records.14 Id. at 1-2.
Courts have inherent power “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.” 	Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016) (quoting Link v.
13 	Because this motion is not paginated, the Court refers to the automatically generated
ECF pagination for all pin cites.
14 	Plaintiff also repeats many of the same arguments made in his Disqualification Motion.
See id. at 3. The Court rejects these arguments here on the same basis.
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Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). In the Third Circuit, “case law provides that a court
may strike improper filings from its docket pursuant to its inherent authority to control its docket.”
Willett v. Dahlberg, No. 24-24, 2025 WL 1568802, at *4 (D.V.I. June 3, 2025) (quoting Vitot
Equip. Corp. v. Underwater Mechanix Servs., LLC, No. 23-00009, 2024 WL 231450, at *3 (D.V.I.
Jan. 22, 2024); see also Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 567 (3d Cir. 1985) (“A
court’s inherent power to manage its caseload, control its docket, and regulate the conduct of
attorneys before it, provides authority to fashion tools that aid the court in getting on with the
business of deciding cases.”); see also Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 10-1283, 2015
WL 3966434, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 8, 2015) (holding that in a court’s exercise of its inherent
authority to control its docket, it may strike from the record an improperly filed document) (citing
cases).
Here, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the date of the NJOAG’s representation
letter (i.e., November 7, 2025) and associated billing records render the NJOAG’s previous filings
in this matter improper. 	Plaintiff has offered no authority for his position that the date of a
representation letter is the only point at which the NJOAG may appear in an action on behalf of a
state employee, and the Court has found none. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is denied.
C. 	Defendant’s Cross-Motion to Vacate Clerk’s Entry of Default
On July 1, 2025, Defendant cross-moved against Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment to
vacate clerk’s entry of default. 	Def.’s Mot. 	Defendant argues that the Clerk’s entry of default
should be set aside because Plaintiff would not suffer any prejudice, Defendant has meritorious
defenses to Plaintiff’s claims, and default was not the result of Defendant’s culpable conduct. See
id. at 24-26.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) governs default in civil cases. That Rule provides
in pertinent part:
[W]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s
default.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once the clerk has entered a default, the aggrieved defendant must seek
leave of court to lift it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c). Under that Rule, a court may
“set aside an entry of default for good cause[.]” Id. Although a decision to set aside the entry of
default “is left primarily to the discretion of the district court,” the Third Circuit has stressed that
it “does not favor entry of defaults or default judgments.” 	United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S.
Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1984). Thus, “doubtful cases [must] be resolved in favor of
the party moving to set aside the default judgment ‘so that cases may be decided on their merits.’”
Id. at 194-95 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Mrs. Ressler’s Food Prods. v. KZY
Logistics LLC, 675 F. App’x 136, 137 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that “entry of default is an ‘extreme
sanction’” that is “generally disfavored”).
Courts consider three factors when determining if a defendant in default has demonstrated
good cause:
(1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the
defendant has a meritorious defense; [and] (3) whether the default
was the result of the defendant’s culpable conduct. 15
$55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 195 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Prime Hookah,
15 	Several courts have considered a fourth factor—the availability of alternative
sanctions—in the Rule 55(c) analysis. 	See, e.g., Paris v. Pennsauken Sch. Dist., No. 12-7355,
2013 WL 4047638, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2013); Nat’l Specialty Ins. Co. v. Papa, No. 11-2798,
2012 WL 868944, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2012); see also Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d
71, 73 (3d Cir. 1987). However, “the balance of authority adopts the three-factor approach.” Lewis
v. Tribeca Lending, No. 08-1144, 2009 WL 3353153, *2 n.16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2009) (collecting
cases). Here, the Court will conform to the weight of authority and conduct a three-factor analysis.
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Inc. v. MK Distribs., Inc., No. 19-7283, 2019 WL 13339086, at *1-2 (D.N.J. July 15, 2019)
(citation omitted) (enumerating and applying the foregoing factors); Fidelity Warranty Servs., Inc.
v. Edison Motor Cars, Inc., No. 16-5728, 2022 WL 356934, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2022) (citations
omitted) (same). 	In deciding the motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations made in the
motion to vacate the clerk’s entry of default as true. See Panda Ams., Inc. v. Future Fund Invs.
Corp., No. 25-2641, 2025 WL 2828346, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2025) (citing 1199 SEIU United
Healthcare Workers E. v. Amboy Care Ctr., Inc., No. 15-309, 2015 WL 3649031, at *2 (D.N.J.
June 11, 2015)).
A. 	Prejudice
“[P]rejudice accrues due to the loss of evidence, increased potential for fraud or collusion,
or a substantial reliance on the judgment.” HEI Invs., LLC v. Black Diamond Capital Appreciation
Fund, LP, No. 15-746, 2016 WL 952338, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2016) (citing Feliciano v. Reliant
Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 1982)). Delay, without more, “rarely serves to establish
the degree of prejudice sufficient to prevent the opening [of] a default judgment entered at an early
stage of the proceeding.” Emcasco, 834 F.2d at 74 (alteration in original) (quoting Feliciano, 691
F.2d at 656-57); see also Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) v. Glob. Recycling & Demolition, LLC, 300 F.R.D.
253, 256 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“‘Delays in [p]laintiff’s potential recovery or potential expenses incurred
from litigating the matter on the merits do not constitute the kind of prejudice the [c]ourt should
consider in deciding whether to set aside an entry of default.’” (quotation omitted)).
Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff will not suffer any prejudice “because he has already
litigated his civil rights claims . . . in both State court and this Court based upon the same
allegations.” 	Def.’s Mot. at 25. 	In opposition, Plaintiff argues he would suffer “irreparable
prejudice” if Defendant’s motion is granted, because any vacatur of the clerk’s entry of default
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would result in “further delay in expungement and public record correction,” “[c]ontinued false
association with an indictment,” “[r]eputational harm, lost opportunity, and litigation cost
burdens,” and “[c]ontinued denial of relief from a returned Moorish ID already order[ed] by court.”
Pl.’s Opp. at 14-15.
Here, however, “‘[d]elays in [p]laintiff’s potential recovery or potential expenses incurred
from litigating the matter on the merits do not constitute the kind of prejudice the [c]ourt should
consider in deciding whether to set aside an entry of default.’” 	Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) v. Glob.
Recycling & Demolition, LLC, 300 F.R.D. 253, 256 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of vacating default.
B. 	Meritorious Defense
A meritorious defense constitutes a complete bar to the action at trial. $55,518.05 in U.S.
Currency, 728 F.2d at 195; see also HEI Invs., 2016 WL 952338, at *3. The defendant must assert
facts supporting the existence of a meritorious defense rather than simply denying the allegations
of the complaint. NuMed Rehab., Inc. v. TNS Nursing Homes of Pa., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 222, 224
(E.D. Pa. 1999). Ultimately, however, the court “need not decide the legal issue”; rather, it may
simply make a finding that the “proffered defense is not ‘facially unmeritorious.’” Emcasco, 834
F.2d at 73-74 (quoting Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1983)).
“In cases seeking to vacate only the entry of default, as opposed to the default judgment, ‘courts
in this circuit seem unwilling to deny the motion to set aside entry of default solely on the basis
that no meritorious defense exists.’” DirecTV, LLC v. Alvarez, No. 15-6827, 2017 WL 4284526,
at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2017) (quoting Mike Rosen & Assocs., P.C. v. Omega Builders, Ltd., 940
F. Supp. 115, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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Defendant submits that the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the entire
controversy doctrine constitute meritorious defenses based on the adjudications in Plaintiff’s prior
State and Federal Actions. 	Def.’s Mot. at 25. 	Plaintiff opposes, asserting that Defendant
“misapplie[s]” all three doctrines, because “Plaintiff was the prevailing party in the municipal and
criminal proceedings,” Plaintiff’s claims “were never adjudicated on the merits,” and “[o]ngoing
injury and fraud nullify preclusion.” Pl.’s Opp. at 15.
While Plaintiff may challenge the merits of these defenses, the Court finds that Defendant
has satisfied her burden of showing that her “proffered defense is not ‘facially unmeritorious’” at
this stage of the litigation. Emcasco, 834 F.2d at 73-74 (quoting Gross v. Stereo Component Sys.,
Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1983)). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff seeks to relitigate the same
causes of action and issues that were previously adjudicated in other cases. 	Defendant then
provides ample factual support for this argument, which is sufficient to satisfy its relatively low
burden of showing a non-facially unmeritorious defense. 	Accordingly, because the Court finds
that Defendant has presented a meritorious defense, this factor weighs in favor of vacating the
Clerk’s entry of default.
C. 	Culpable Conduct
The final factor examines “whether the default was the result of the defendant’s culpable
conduct.” Id. (citations omitted). “Culpable conduct surpasses mere negligence and consists of
willful, intentional, reckless or bad faith behavior.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Waller, No. 15-3002,
2016 WL 184422, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2016) (quotations omitted). “Although reckless disregard
for repeated communications from plaintiffs and the court . . . can satisfy the culpable conduct
standard, a mere failure to respond to a claim despite having notice is generally not culpable
conduct.” 	Id. (cleaned up) (citing Wingate Inns Int’l v. P.G.S., LLC, No. 09-6198, 2011 WL
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256327, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2011) (finding no culpable conduct where failure to respond “was
the result of miscommunication and ignorance, not bad faith or strategy”)). The court must also
consider the extent to which the error is attributable exclusively to the defendant’s counsel.
Momah v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 161 F.R.D. 304, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
Defendant 	submits 	that the failure to 	respond 	to 	the complaint 	was 	due to 	“an
administrative oversight and miscommunication” whereby the deadline to respond was incorrectly
calendared. Def.’s Mot. at 26; ECF No. 17-2, Certification of DAG Azeem M. Chaudry ¶ 4. The
Court accepts Defendant’s representations and finds no support for Plaintiff’s bald allegation of
bad faith. Therefore, the Court finds this third factor weighs in favor of granting vacatur of the
Clerk’s entry of default.
Because a balance of the relevant factors weigh in favor of vacating the Clerk’s Entry of
Default, Defendant’s Cross-Motion is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Counsel, ECF No. 18, is
DENIED; Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 40, is DENIED; and Defendant’s Cross-Motion
to Vacate the Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 17, is GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.
s/Elizabeth A. Pascal
ELIZABETH A. PASCAL
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Hon. Edward S. Kiel, U.S.D.J.
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