Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

1:20-cv-09894Njd05.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
J.Y.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil No. 20-9894 (RMB)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
Attorney Adrienne Freya Jarvis, Esq., moves for attorney’s fees under Section 406(b)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), based on a contingent-fee arrangement between
her and Social Security claimant, Plaintiff J.Y. 	For representing her in the Social Security
matter, Plaintiff agreed that Jarvis would receive 25% of any past due disability benefits award
that the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) doled out
to her. The Commissioner having awarded Plaintiff $89,973 in past due disability benefits,
Jarvis now seeks $22,493.25 in attorney’s fees from the award, or 25% thereof. 	For the
reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT Jarvis’s fee application.2
1 Due to the significant privacy concerns in Social Security cases, any non-governmental party
will be identified and referenced solely by initials in opinions issued in Social Security cases
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. See D.N.J. Standing Order
2021-10.
2 In granting Jarvis’s Amended Motion for Attorney’s Fees, [Docket No. 21], the Court will
DENY AS MOOT the original Motion for Attorney’s Fees, [Docket No. 20].
Case 1:20-cv-09894-RMB Document 25 Filed 02/05/26 Page 1 of 7 PageID: <pageID>
2
I. 	BACKGROUND
According to their contingent-fee agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay Jarvis the greater
of 25% of a past due disability benefits award or an Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),
28 U.S.C. § 2412, award as compensation for representing her in federal court on her Social
Security appeal. [Docket No. 22-1.] Thereupon, in 2020, Jarvis filed a Social Security appeal
in this Court seeking to overturn the Commissioner’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for
disability benefits. 	[Docket No. 1.] 	Jarvis retained the services of another attorney, Eric
Schnaufer, Esq., to assist with the appeal. [Docket No. 22-4, ¶ 5 (“Schnaufer Decl.”).] After
reviewing the papers, including the moving and reply briefs filed by Jarvis, this Court vacated
the Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case for more administrative proceedings.
[Docket Nos. 13, 15–17.] Jarvis and the Commissioner then stipulated to an EAJA award of
$5,530.85 in attorney’s fees. [Docket No. 18.] The Court entered the consent order awarding
Jarvis said amount under the EAJA. [Docket No. 19.]
On remand, in 2025, the Commissioner found Plaintiff disabled, and awarded her
$89,973 in past due disability benefits. 	[Docket No. 22, at 2 (“Jarvis Br.”).] 	The
Commissioner is withholding $22,493.25 of this award, which represents Jarvis’s 25% share.
[Docket No. 22-2, at 4.] 	Jarvis now seeks a fee award for that amount based on her
contingent-fee agreement with Plaintiff. [Docket No. 21.] 	Jarvis spent 6.1 hours and
Schnaufer 20 hours working on Plaintiff’s Social Security appeal, totaling 26.1 hours. [Docket
No. 22-3, ¶ 18 (“Jarvis Decl.”); Schnaufer Decl. ¶ 6.] While neither Jarvis nor Schnaufer have
a non-contingent hourly rate for Social Security matters, their typical hourly rate is about $500
per hour. [Jarvis Decl. ¶ 11 ($525 per hour); Schnaufer Decl. ¶¶ 3–4 ($485 per hour).] Jarvis
contends the $22,493.25 in attorney’s fees is reasonable given the time counsel spent on the
Case 1:20-cv-09894-RMB Document 25 Filed 02/05/26 Page 2 of 7 PageID: <pageID>
3
appeal, the risk of non-recovery, and the favorable result counsel obtained for Plaintiff before
this Court and on remand. [Jarvis Br., at 7–10.] Jarvis also notes that the requested fee award
is in line with those previously awarded by this Court. 	[Id., at 10 (collecting cases).] 	The
Commissioner neither supports nor opposes Jarvis’s Amended Motion For Attorney’s Fees.
[Docket No. 24, at 1.]
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Act allows an attorney to have a contingent-fee arrangement with
a Social Security claimant under which the attorney receives a percentage of the benefits
award. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (explaining the Act “does not displace
contingent-fee agreements”). Section 406(b) of the Act provides:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this title
who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine
and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not
in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant
is entitled by reason of such judgment[.]
42 U.S.C. § 406(b). “Contingent fee arrangements are ‘the primary means by which fees are
set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court.’” Laurice A.H. v.
Kijakazi, 2023 WL 8237336, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2023) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807).
By Section 406(b)’s plain terms, contingent-fee arrangements providing for fees beyond 25%
of past due benefits are “unenforceable.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807.
While Congress permits contingent-fee arrangements in the Social Security realm,
courts must police those agreements to ensure they are reasonable. Id. (“[Section] 406(b) calls
for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield
reasonable results in particular cases.”). 	In so doing, courts look to “the experience of
counsel, the nature of contingent fees and the risk of non-recovery, counsel’s typical hourly
Case 1:20-cv-09894-RMB Document 25 Filed 02/05/26 Page 3 of 7 PageID: <pageID>
4
rate, the EAJA fee previously requested, and whether the attorney is responsible for any
unreasonable delays in the proceeding.” Leak v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 5513191, at *1
(D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2017). “Courts should [also] consider the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the claimant—including any representation at the agency
level[.]” Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845, 855 (2d Cir. 2022). “While § 406(b) fees compensate
counsel for court-related work, consideration of ‘the time spent and work performed by
counsel on the case when it was pending at the agency level’ can inform a district court’s
understanding of ‘the overall complexity of the case, the lawyering skills necessary to handle
it effectively, the risks involved, and the significance of the result achieved in district court.’”
Id. (quoting Mudd v. Barnhart, 418 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2005)). 	And courts must never
forget “the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” 	Acosta v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
2022 WL 1598947, at *1 (3d Cir. May 20, 2022) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793).
Courts can reduce “an attorney’s recovery based on the character of the representation
and the results the representative achieved,” or “[i]f the attorney is responsible for delay.”
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Courts will also reduce a fee award when “the benefits are large in
comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.” Id. 	Put differently, courts will
reduce a fee award to prevent windfalls to attorneys. Id. In evaluating fee applications, courts
have struggled to determine what constitutes a windfall to attorneys. See Arnold v. O’Malley,
106 F.4th 595, 600–01 (7th Cir. 2024); accord Fields, 24 F.4th at 853–54. The windfall analysis
is not “a way of reintroducing the lodestar method” to determine whether a fee under § 406(b)
is reasonable. 	Fields, 24 F.4th at 854. 	Because “even a relatively high hourly rate may be
perfectly reasonable, and not a windfall, in the context of any given case.” Id. Finally, if the
attorney has received a fee award under the EAJA, the attorney must refund that award to
Case 1:20-cv-09894-RMB Document 25 Filed 02/05/26 Page 4 of 7 PageID: <pageID>
5
the Social Security claimant. 	Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (alteration in original) (internal
citation omitted) (“Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with
fees payable under § 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits in this
manner: Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions, but the claimant's attorney must
‘refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.’”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Against this backdrop, the Court turns to Jarvis’s fee application. The Court considers
first her relevant legal experience. See Leak, 2017 WL 5513191, at *1. Jarvis has substantial
experience 	handling 	Social 	Security 	matters, 	having 	represented 	approximately 	4,100
claimants in more than 2,500 administrative hearings in three decades of practice. 	[Jarvis
Decl. ¶¶ 5–7.] 	Schnaufer also has substantial experience litigating Social Security matters.
[Schnaufer Decl. ¶ 2.]
Next, the Court considers Jarvis’s hourly rate and the nature of the contingent fees
sought. Leak, 2017 WL 5513191, at *1. 	Jarvis seeks $22,493.25 in attorney’s fees from
Plaintiff’s $89,973 past due disability benefits award, which constitutes 25% of the award.
[Jarvis Br., at 6.] Under the contingent-fee agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay Jarvis 25% from
any past due disability benefits award as compensation for representing her in the Social
Security appeal. 	[Docket No. 22-1.] 	Jarvis spent a total of 26.1 hours on Plaintiff’s Social
Security appeal, which computes to an hourly rate of $861.81. [Jarvis Br., at 9.] Courts in
this District have found similar imputed hourly rates reasonable under the circumstances. See
Wells v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 447768, at *1–*2 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2024) (approving
imputed hourly rate of $1,056.34); Gonzalez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 6513349, at *2–
*3 n.3 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2017) (approving imputed hourly rate of $992.82); cf. Leak, 2017 WL
Case 1:20-cv-09894-RMB Document 25 Filed 02/05/26 Page 5 of 7 PageID: <pageID>
6
5513191, at *1–*2 (finding fee award of over $28,000 reasonable where attorney imputed
hourly rate of $745.24); Amy P. v. Colvin, 2024 WL 5264247, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2024)
(finding contingent-fee award of $47,800.75 and imputed hourly rate of $531.20 per hour
reasonable). 	This Court has reviewed the briefs Jarvis filed on Plaintiff’s behalf seeking to
overturn the Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits. [Docket Nos. 13,
15.] 	This Court found Jarvis’s arguments persuasive, resulting in a remand order and,
ultimately, a finding of disability and an award of $89,973 in past due disability benefits after
about five years of litigation. [Docket Nos. 16, 22-2; Jarvis Br., at 2.] Given the circumstances
of this case and the issues raised in the appeal, the Court finds the sought after contingent fee
is reasonable.
Moreover, there was a high risk of non-recovery. When Plaintiff filed this Social
Security appeal, the Commissioner had an average award rate of 33.2%. SOC . S EC . ADMIN.,
ANNUAL 	STATISTICAL 	R EPORT 	ON 	THE 	SOCIAL 	SECURITY 	D ISABILITY 	INSURANCE
PROGRAM, 2024, at 160 (December 2025). In light of this figure, Plaintiff’s recovery was far
from certain. Further, there is no evidence before the Court that Jarvis caused any delay to
increase her fees. In fact, based on the docket, Jarvis acted swiftly for her client, achieving a
favorable result in this Court and before the agency on remand. 	And neither the
Commissioner nor Plaintiff have objected to Jarvis’s fee application.
Because of Jarvis’s experience, standard hourly rate, labor expended, and risk of non-
recovery, the Court finds reasonable the $22,493.25 requested fee. See Curry v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2023 WL 6533443, at *1–*2 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2023) (finding $30,735.75 fee reasonable
where counsel certified to working a total of 28.7 hours in federal court). 	Jarvis, as she
Case 1:20-cv-09894-RMB Document 25 Filed 02/05/26 Page 6 of 7 PageID: <pageID>
7
recognizes, must remit the $5,530.85 EAJA award she received from Plaintiff. Gisbrecht, 535
U.S. at 796; [Jarvis Br., at 10.]
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, and for good cause shown,
IT IS, on this 5th day of February 2026, hereby:
1. 	ORDERED that Counsel Adrienne Freya Jarvis’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees under
Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act, [Docket No. 20], is DENIED AS MOOT;
and it is further
2. 	ORDERED that Counsel Adrienne Freya Jarvis’s Amended Motion for Attorney’s
Fees under Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act, [Docket No.21], is GRANTED;
and it is further
3. 	ORDERED that Counsel Adrienne Freya Jarvis shall remit to Plaintiff J.Y. the
$5,530.85 awarded under the EAJA by this Court’s previous order, [Docket No. 19];
and it is finally
4. 	ORDERED that Counsel Adrienne Freya Jarvis shall be awarded $22,493.25 in
attorney’s fees from Plaintiff J.Y.’s past due disability benefits award.
/s/ Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge
Case 1:20-cv-09894-RMB Document 25 Filed 02/05/26 Page 7 of 7 PageID: <pageID>

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.