Ford v. Gotlieb et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
DYLAN FORD
v. Civil No. 26-cv-00344-LM-TSM
BRIAN GOTLIEB
JOY CAMPANELLI
RODNEYSE BICHOTTE-HERMELYN
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Self-represented Plaintiff, Dylan Ford, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint
(Doc. No. 1) against Brian Gotlieb, Joy Campanelli, and Rodneyse Bichotte-Hermelyn. Plaintiff’s
Complaint was accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) which was
referred to the undersigned magistrate judge. Doc. No. 2. The Complaint is before the court for
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and LR 4.3(d)(2). For the reasons that
follow, the court recommends that the district judge dismiss the Complaint.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a federal court to dismiss an action if the court determines
that the action fails to state a claim, is frivolous, or seeks damages from a defendant with
immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); LR 4.3(d)(2). To determine if a pleading states a claim
upon which relief can be granted, the court takes as true the facts asserted in the complaint, and
inferences reasonably drawn from those facts, strips away the legal conclusions, and considers
whether the complaint states a claim that is plausible on its face. Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723
F.3d 91, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In conducting
Case 1:26-cv-00344-LM-TSM Document 3 Filed 05/13/26 Page 1 of 3

preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and LR 4.3(d)(2), the court construes pro se
pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
DISCUSSION
In his meager three-sentence Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:
1. Brian Gotlieb and Joy Campanelli obstructed justice,
2. Rodneyse Bichotte-Hermelyn participated in the process, [and]
3. The compensation amount is to be decided by the jury.
Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1-3. Even applying the liberal standard afforded pro se complaints, these bare
bones allegations do not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, nor does
the Complaint state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (providing
that a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”); Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007) (a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”)). For this reason, dismissal is warranted.
While generally, the court would recommend that the district judge afford Plaintiff an
opportunity to cure the defects in the Complaint, here, dismissal without leave to amend is
warranted because this suit appears to be malicious and an abuse of process. Plaintiff, who lists a
return address in South Sioux City, Nebraska,1 filed his Complaint in this court on May 4, 2026.
See Doc. No. 1. Around the same time, Plaintiff, filed the same deficient Complaint in several
courts around the country including the Western District of Michigan (1:26-cv-01413-JMB-SJB),
the Middle District of Georgia (5:26-cv-00170-MTT), the Middle District of Alabama (2:26-cv-
1 While Plaintiff’s return address is in Nebraska, the envelope in which he mailed his Complaint
is postmarked in New York. Plaintiff does not identify Defendants in any way beyond their names.
Case 1:26-cv-00344-LM-TSM Document 3 Filed 05/13/26 Page 2 of 3

00303-RAH-JTA), and the District of Rhode Island (1:26-cv-00271-MSM-PAS), as well as many
other district courts.
Given Plaintiff’s filing history and this lawsuit’s failure to demonstrate, or even suggest,
any connection to New Hampshire, it is clear that Plaintiff’s repetitious filings are an abuse of
judicial process, rather than legitimate claims against Defendants. Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300,
1308 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[A] plaintiff’s duplicative complaint is an abuse of the judicial process and
is properly dismissed” as malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.); accord McWilliams v. Colorado,
121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993); Bailey
v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988); Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). Therefore, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should dismiss the Complaint (Doc. No. 1) in
its entirety. If the district judge approves this recommendation, the Clerk’s Office should enter
judgment and close the case. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objection period
may be extended upon motion. Only those issues raised in the written objections “‘are subject to
review in the district court,’” and any issues “‘not preserved by such objection are precluded on
appeal.’” Santos-Santos v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
_________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
May 13, 2026
cc: Dylan Ford, pro se
Case 1:26-cv-00344-LM-TSM Document 3 Filed 05/13/26 Page 3 of 3