Collier v. NH, State of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
RANDALL COLLIER
v. 	Case No. 26-cv-226-SM-TSM
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se litigant Randall Collier’s initial filing and an addendum to that
filing (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-1), both entitled, “Notice of Removal.” Appearing here in forma pauperis,
Collier seeks to remove his state court cases and to obtain injunctive relief relating to those matters.
Collier’s “Notice of Removal” is before this court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) and LR 4.3(d)(2). Also before this court is Collier’s motion “to issue an immediate
injunction and protective order 	against all State of New Hampshire actors, 	agents, law
enforcement, circuit court referees, [and] executive administrators” (Doc. No. 4). 	The district
judge referred that motion to the magistrate judge for a Report and Recommendation. 	Apr. 20,
2026 Order.
For the foregoing reasons, removal jurisdiction is absent, and a summary remand of each
state case is warranted. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention doctrine provide
additional grounds for the district judge to deny Collier’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc.
No. 4). The Order issued on this date grants Collier thirty days to file an “Amended Complaint”
1 The last page of Collier’s “Notice of Removal” lists entities and people who appear to be
participants in his state cases including the courts themselves. Those listed are: the N.H. Circuit
Court, 4th Circuit, Family Division-Laconia; N.H. Circuit Court, 8th Circuit, Family Division-
Keene and District Division-Keene; N.H. Superior Court, Cheshire County; New Hampshire
Supreme Court (“NHSC”); Hillary May; Tarbell and Brodich P.A.; Attorney Duncan A. Edgar,
N.H. Attorney General’s Office; Attorney Dennis J. Thiverge, N.H. State Police; Attorney
Kimberly A. Kossick, Cheshire County Attorney’s Office; and Attorney Thomas M. Rogers. It is
unclear whether Collier intends to name any of those people and entities as defendants here.
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(not a removal notice), naming each party he intends to sue as a defendant in a federal civil rights
action, if any, and stating the facts upon which he asserts federal claims for relief as well as the
nature of the relief sought. This court may subject that Amended Complaint to further preliminary
review, as appropriate, and for that reason, this R&R, if approved, will not end this case.
BACKGROUND
Collier’s state cases relate to child custody, child support, domestic violence, and protective
orders. He is the defendant in state criminal cases involving charges that he violated a protective
order. The Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1) lists Collier’s state proceedings, in which he is the
defendant or respondent, as well as cases in which he is the petitioner or plaintiff.2
2 The following is Collier’s list of proceedings to be removed or enjoined, sorted by case type:
New Hampshire Supreme Court Cases:
• 	Collier v. 4th Cir. Ct. Fam. Div., No. 2025-0423 (N.H.) (Collier’s appeal of
Collier v. 4th Cir. Ct. Fam. Div., No. 213-2025-cv-00077 (N.H. Super., Cheshire
Cty.));
• 	Petition of Collier, No. 2026-0122 (N.H.) (Collier’s Rule 11 Petition for original
jurisdiction seeking review of matters in State v. Collier, No. 213-2025-cr-00431
(N.H. Super., Cheshire Cty.); State v. Collier, No. 213-2026-cr-00021 (N.H.
Super., Cheshire Cty.); State v. Collier, No. 449-2025-cr-00776 (N.H. Cir. Ct.,
8th Cir., Dist. Div.-Keene); State v. Collier, No. 449-2025-cr-01147 (N.H. Cir.
Ct., 8th Cir., Dist. Div.-Keene); In re State, May & Collier, No. 649-2025-dm-
00255 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 8th Cir., Family Div.-Keene)).
Proceedings in N.H. Circuit Courts, District and Family Divisions:
• 	In the Matter of State, May & Collier, No. 649-2025-dm-00255 (N.H. Cir. Ct.,
8th Cir., Family Div.-Keene);
• 	In the Matter of May & Collier, No. 650-2013-dm-00010 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 4th Cir.,
Family Div.- Laconia);
• 	In the Matter of May & Collier, No. 650-2013-dv-00016 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 4th Cir.,
Dist. Div.-Laconia).
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Collier has been an active litigant in federal court relating to the same matters. He filed
three prior federal court cases in the District of New Hampshire seeking to enjoin or challenge
state court orders issued in related state family court proceedings. Those cases were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction and the immunity of the state judges, courts, and other defendants. See Collier
v. N.H. Cir. Ct., Fam. Div., No. 25-cv-036-SE-TSM, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73260 (D.N.H. Mar.
24, 2025) (ECF No. 5), R&R approved, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72762 (D.N.H. Apr. 16, 2025)
(ECF No. 8) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Collier v. Carrol, No. 24-cv-015-JL-AJ, 2024 WL
3239637, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117733 (D.N.H. May 15, 2024) (ECF No. 13), R&R approved,
2024 WL 3226483, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114028 (D.N.H., June 24, 2024) (ECF No. 16)
(dismissed for lack of jurisdiction), aff’d, No. 24-1657 (1st Cir. Dec. 30, 2024) (affirmed on basis
of Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity); Jan. 31, 2023 Order, Collier v. Carrol, No. 22-
cv-00162-LM (D.N.H.) (ECF No. 22) (dismissed based on Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
Collier presents similar claims here in a different way. He seeks to remove his state cases
to this court for further proceedings or equitable relief. His Notice of Removal summarizes his
reasons for seeking removal, as follows:
Removal is necessitated by the following systemic failures within the New
Hampshire state court system: conflicted judicial testimonies; conflicting state
statutes; criminal statutes deployed in civil litigation without supporting evidence;
evidentiary rules that are selectively ignored; and the demonstrated ability of state
Criminal Matters in N.H. Superior Court or District Division Courts:
• 	State v. Collier, No. 213-2025-cr-00431 (N.H. Super., Cheshire Cty.) (appeal of
State v. Collier, No. 449-2025-cr-00776 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 8th Cir., Dist. Div.-
Keene);
• 	State v. Collier, No. 213-2026-cr-00021 (N.H. Super., Cheshire Cty.) (appeal of
State v. Collier, No. 449-2025-cr-01147 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 8th Cir., Dist. Div.-
Keene).
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judicial officers to waive any procedural rule at any time, rendering constitutional
protections illusory.
Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1) at pg. 4.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	Preliminary Review
This court screens the initial filings of plaintiffs and removal defendants who appear in
federal court without prepaying the filing fee under LR 4.3(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The
court may dismiss claims or cases sua sponte if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, a
defendant is immune from the relief sought, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
might be granted, or the action is frivolous or malicious. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); LR 4.3(d)(2).
This court construes Collier’s pleadings liberally as they appear to have been prepared without a
lawyer’s assistance. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
II. 	Screening of Removal Notices
Civil state cases removed to federal court may be summarily remanded for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Plazzi v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,
52 F.4th 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2022).
In any case removed from a state court, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.”
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
State criminal defendants may remove pending state prosecutions to federal court in very
limited circumstances, as defined by federal statutes. Whenever a state criminal defendant files a
notice of removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4) specifically requires the federal court to examine the
notice promptly and to remand summarily where the removal documents show that removal is not
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proper:
If it clearly appears on the face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that
removal should not be permitted, the court shall make an order for summary
remand.
Id. “The filing of a notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall not prevent the State Court
. . . from proceeding further, except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless the
prosecution is first remanded.” Id. § 1455(b)(3).
In general, the party “seeking to remove a case to the federal court has the burden of
demonstrating the existence of federal jurisdiction,” and “removal jurisdiction is strictly construed
against” the removing party. 	Massachusetts v. Azubuko, 616 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175 (D. Mass.
2009) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–109 (1941)); BIW Deceived
v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of Am., 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st
Cir.1997)).
III. 	Preliminary Injunction Standard
A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish that “‘he is likely to succeed
on the .merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Glossip
v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 876 (2015) (citation omitted). The likelihood of success and irreparable
harm are factors that weigh most heavily in the analysis. See Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v.
MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Screening of Collier’s Removal Notices for Jurisdictional Issues
A. Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443
Collier cites 28 U.S.C. § 1443 as the statute authorizing the removal of his state
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proceedings. That statute provides, as follows:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State
court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent
with such law.
28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), (2).
“[R]emoval statute[s] should be strictly construed, and any doubts about the propriety of
removal should be resolved against the removal of an action.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,
Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. AstraZeneca PLC (In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price
Litig.), 431 F. Supp. 2d 109, 116 (D. Mass. 2006). 	To remove a criminal prosecution under
§ 1443(1), the Supreme Court has held that the state court defendant must demonstrate both of the
following: (1) “that the right allegedly denied . . . arises under a federal law providing for specific
civil rights stated in terms of racial equality,” and (2) that the “specified federal rights” are denied
or cannot be enforced “in the courts of [the] State.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219
(1975) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Collier’s claims do not bring his state proceedings within the scope of removal jurisdiction
under § 1443(1), which is limited to cases involving alleged violations of federal rights stated in
terms of racial equality. Collier seeks removal because of what he considers to be systemic failures
in the New Hampshire state courts. 	He does not allege, however, that such systemic failures
subject him to racial discrimination; his claims are based on rights that are generally applicable,
which do not provide grounds for removing a case to federal court under § 1443(1). Johnson, 421
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U.S. at 219 (citing City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 825 (1966)); see also Peltier v.
Peltier, 548 F.2d 1083, 1083-84 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (alleged sex discrimination in
divorce proceedings did not authorize removal under § 1443(1)). Collier’s reliance on federal laws
or rights of general applicability and his failure to allege any unlawful race discrimination in his
state proceedings are patent deficiencies in his removal notices that warrant a summary remand,
to the extent removal is based on § 1443(1).3
Section 1443(2) also fails to provide removal jurisdiction over Collier’s cases. 	Section
1443(2) “confers a privilege of removal only upon federal officers or agents and those authorized
3 The federal rights stated in Collier’s Notice of Removal include the Seventh Amendment and the
Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, which are not proper bases
for removal under § 1443(1). See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 219 (due process violations do not provide
grounds for removal under § 1443(1)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baasch, 644 F.2d 94, 97
(2d Cir. 1981) (alleged violation of Seventh Amendment does not meet “limited criteria for
invoking the civil rights removal statute”). 	His reference to the Equal Protection Clause in his
Notice of Removal, in the absence of allegations of racial discrimination, also fails to provide
grounds for removal under § 1443(1). See Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 1295-96 (11th Cir.
2001) (“broad assertions of violations of rights” under Equal Protection Clause or 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 are insufficient to support removal). Collier’s citations to the Declaration of Independence;
the separation of powers; the system of checks and balances, Article III, and the Supremacy Clause
in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution are similarly unavailing. See Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Laskos,
561 F. App’x 827, 829 (11th Cir. 2014) (Supremacy Clause); Coleman v. Mississippi, No. 3:25-
cv-663-KHJ-MTP, 2025 WL 3899503, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 269516, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 17,
2025), R&R approved, 2026 WL 39303, at *1, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1405, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan.
6, 2026) (“neither Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, nor any of the federal
statutes Coleman cites support this Court's [removal] jurisdiction over Coleman’s [state criminal]
case”); United States v. Leggett, No. 8:25-cv-2456-KKM-AEP, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211815,
at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2025) (separation of powers); Socal Fund 1, LLC v. Jimenez-Ortiz,
No. CV 12-4678 PSG (JCx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77418, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 1, 2012)
(Declaration of Independence). Collier’s passing reference to 18 U.S.C. § 242, in the context of
arguing why there should be no absolute immunity for judges, also fails to satisfy the first prong
of § 1443(1); that federal criminal law does not create a private right of action, see Cok v.
Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989), and fails to support removal under § 1443(1) in the
absence of any allegations of race discrimination. See Port Austin v. Stapleton, 628 F. Supp. 3d
702, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2022); Florida v. Cave, No. 19-61830-CIV, 2019 WL 3302571, at *1, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122645, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2019).
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to act with or for them in affirmatively executing duties under any federal law providing for equal
civil rights.” Peacock, 384 U.S. at 824. Collier’s Notice of Removal does not allege that he is a
federal agent, state official, or other authorized person prosecuted for executing such duties. Id.
& n.22. A summary remand of Collier’s state prosecutions and civil cases is warranted, as removal
jurisdiction is lacking under the federal removal statutes he cites.
B. Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
Collier’s citation to federal laws in his Notice of Removal further suggests an intent to
remove his state civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which allows a state court defendant to
remove a pending state civil proceeding to federal court if the federal court would have original
jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). It is the removing defendant’s burden to show
that removal is proper. See Fayard v. Northeast Vehicle Servs., LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir.
2008); see also Acosta–Ramírez v. Banco Popular de P.R., 712 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2013).
Collier’s filings, construed liberally, seek to invoke federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 as grounds for removal. Under § 1331, district courts have jurisdiction over “all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id.
To determine whether the claim [in a state case] arises under federal law, [federal
courts] examine the “well pleaded” allegations of the [state court] complaint and
ignore potential defenses: “[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the
United States only when the [state court] plaintiff's statement of his own cause of
action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.
Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). In general, defendants cannot remove a
plaintiff’s state law claims to federal court based on any federal counterclaim or federal defense,
including defenses anticipated in the state court plaintiff’s pleadings. See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover
Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 54 (2009); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1987).
Turning to each of the state civil cases and NHSC matters Collier seeks to remove, this
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court notes that Collier is the state court plaintiff in Collier v. 4th Cir. Ct. Fam. Div., No. 2025-
0423 (N.H.). As Collier is not the defendant in that case, he plainly cannot establish any grounds
for removal under § 1441(a). Cf. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 442 (2019)
(“the phrase ‘the defendant or the defendants’ in § 1441(a)” does not include third-party
counterclaim defendants). Accordingly, a summary remand of that case is warranted.
Collier lists another NHSC case by docket number, Petition of Collier, No. 2026-0122
(N.H.), which is his Rule 11 petition seeking to invoke the NHSC’s original jurisdiction under
N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 11. The NHSC denied that Rule 11 petition on March 24, 2026. Even if Collier
were not barred from removing that case simply by virtue of his identity as the NHSC petitioner,
he could not remove that proceeding here for reasons stated elsewhere in this Report and
Recommendation; the same criminal matters, family court proceedings, and state district court
cases underlying that unsuccessful Rule 11 Petition are separately listed in his “Notice of
Removal” here (Doc. No. 1). For reasons stated in this Report and Recommendation with respect
to the absence of removal jurisdiction as to any of those underlying matters, Collier’s attempt to
remove his Rule 11 Petition is also unauthorized by any federal law. 	Accordingly, a summary
remand of Case No. 2026-0122 is warranted for lack of removal jurisdiction.
The remaining state cases listed in Collier’s Notice of Removal are family court matters
involving child support, child custody, and a 2013 domestic violence/protective order proceeding.
The claims in those cases appear to be based on state laws. 	See, e.g., RSA 173-B (domestic
violence protective orders), 457 to 461-A (domestic relations, including child custody, child
support, and enforcement). 	Collier has the burden of showing the existence of removal
jurisdiction, and he has not filed any copies of any pleadings in those matters or otherwise
demonstrated that the complaints initiating those proceedings assert federal claims. See Peltier,
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548 F.2d at 1083 n.2 (no federal statutes appear to provide for removal jurisdiction over state law
divorce proceeding). 	As this court lacks grounds for concluding that the state court plaintiff’s
claims in those cases involve federal issues that could provide grounds for removal, a summary
remand is warranted.
II. Preliminary Injunction
A. Injunctive Relief to Effect Removal
Collier moves for injunctive relief (Doc. No. 4) to give effect to his notices of removal and
to prevent the state courts from taking further action in the cases listed in his notice of removal.
Because this court lacks removal jurisdiction over his claims, Collier has failed to make the
requisite showing of a likelihood of success on the merits of any of his claims. Accordingly, the
district judge should deny Collier’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Doc. No. 4).
B. Younger Abstention
To the extent Collier seeks other forms of equitable relief in this case, including a request
that this court: declare that state court orders are void or voidable, enjoin the criminal prosecutions
currently pending in Cheshire County Superior Court and his child support enforcement
proceedings, and prevent the enforcement of any other state court orders to which he alludes in
Document Nos. 1, 1-1, and 4, his requests are unavailing. Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), federal courts must abstain from enjoining certain types of proceedings in state court,
absent 	extraordinary 	circumstances. 	Younger 	abstention 	applies 	in 	three 	types 	of 	state
proceedings: ongoing “(i) criminal prosecutions, (ii) ‘civil proceedings that are akin to criminal
prosecutions,’ and (iii) proceedings ‘that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts.’” 	Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 2015).
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(quoting Sprint Comm., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013)). 	“Abstention is appropriate
when the requested relief would interfere (1) with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that
implicates an important state interest; and (3) that provides an adequate opportunity for the federal
plaintiff to advance his federal constitutional challenge.” 	Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34-35
(1st Cir. 2007). When Younger applies, abstention is mandatory, and the federal court is deprived
of any discretion to grant injunctive relief. See Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976).
The Younger abstention doctrine squarely applies to Collier’s criminal cases pending in
Cheshire County Superior Court, to the ongoing child support enforcement proceedings where he
is the target, and to any contempt proceedings or similar actions taken by the state judges to ensure
compliance with court orders. 	See Sobel v. Prudenti, 25 F. Supp. 3d 340, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(court abstained under Younger in case where parent claimed that rulings in state child support
case violated rights to due process); Rogers v. N.H. Circuit Court, No. 16-cv-107-JL, 2016 WL
3919414, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93961, at *4-7 (D.N.H. Jun. 3, 2016) (court abstained
under Younger where parent claimed violations of due process rights in New Hampshire family
court proceedings), R&R adopted, 2016 WL 3920169, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93957 (D.N.H. July
18, 2016); see also Tahai v. Stanfill, No. 2:26-cv-00057-LEW, 2026 WL 1020634, at *1-2, 2026
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82154, at *2 (D. Me. Apr. 15, 2026) (R&R) (Younger abstention applied where
parent claimed that delays in state child custody proceedings deprived him of parental rights, and
parent sought declaratory judgment stating that the delay violated due process as well as
injunctions forcing state court to implement procedural safeguards).
The few extraordinary circumstances involving such cases where abstention is not required
include state prosecutions brought in bad faith for purposes of harassment, cases in which the state
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forum provides inadequate protection of federal rights, and cases where the statute at issue is
“‘flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.’” Sirva Relocation, 794
F.3d at 192 (citations omitted). Nothing in the record here suggests any bad faith or harassment,
or inadequacy of the state forums (including the New Hampshire Supreme Court) for assertion of
Collier’s federal claims, or any other extraordinary circumstances here, which could exempt his
requests for equitable relief from abstention under Younger. See generally Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional area of state concern,” and Court in that
case was “unwilling to conclude that state processes are unequal to the task of accommodating the
various interests and deciding the constitutional questions that may arise in child-welfare
litigation.”). 	Plaintiff here has an adequate opportunity in the state courts to raise his federal
claims, including his claims of due process violations and violations of other federal constitutional
provisions, and he can seek further review of adverse orders in the NHSC and through a petition
for certiorari review as appropriate. See Rogers, 2016 WL 3919414, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93961, at *7 (“family court has inherent power to control its proceedings and to issue orders for
the purpose of ensuring that all parties have a full and fair opportunity to advance claims and
defenses” (citing In re O’Neil, 159 N.H. 615, 622, 992 A.2d 672, 677 (2010))). Evidence that the
state courts have dismissed Collier’s claims or denied his motions is not proof that the state
proceedings are inadequate to protect his federal rights. “So long as a plaintiff is not barred on
procedural or technical grounds from raising alleged constitutional infirmities, it cannot be said
that state court review of constitutional claims is inadequate for Younger purposes.” 	Hansel v.
Town Court, 56 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 1995).
The fact that state . . . courts may reject (or have rejected) arguments on the merits
. . . does not mean those courts have deprived a plaintiff of the opportunity to make
the argument. And, it is only where, for procedural or other reasons, the state courts
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deprive the plaintiff of such an opportunity that Younger does not apply. A party
. . . may appeal its claim through the state system, eventually asking the United
States Supreme Court to review the federal question that it believes the state
erroneously decided; or, such a party, seeking a federal forum, may file its federal
action before the state proceeding begins. But, that party, already engaged in a state
proceeding, cannot ordinarily obtain a hearing in federal court on its federal claim
simply because it believes the state will reject the claim on the merits.
Duty Free Shop, Inc. v. Admin. de Terrenos, 889 F.2d 1181, 1183 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations omitted
and emphasis in original). 	Collier has failed to make the necessary showing of extraordinary
circumstances that could allow this court to retain jurisdiction over his injunctive and declaratory
relief claims at issue, rendering those claims the proper subject of Younger abstention.
C. Rooker-Feldman and 4th Circuit Family Court Claims
Not all the state proceedings Collier seeks to enjoin were pending before he filed this case.
Collier filed this case after the NHSC affirmed the dismissal of Collier’s Superior Court case
against the 4th Circuit family court in Laconia, see Collier v. 4th Cir. Ct. Fam. Div., No. 2025-
0423 (N.H. Mar. 24, 2026) (affirming dismissal of Collier v. 4th Cir. Ct., Fam. Div., No. 213-
2025-cv-00077 (N.H. Super. Ct., Cheshire Cty.)). In addition, Collier’s domestic relations case
litigated in family court in Laconia, underlying those proceedings, is also a closed case, see In the
Matter of May & Collier, No. 650-2013-dm-00010 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 4th Cir., Family Div.- Laconia).
That those cases were closed and the subject of state court judgments at the time he filed this case
suggests an independent jurisdictional ground for denying relief, arising from the statutory
authority of the U.S. Supreme Court, not this court, to review federal issues implicated by final
judgments of the NHSC.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits federal [district] courts from adjudicating cases
brought by state-court losing parties challenging state-court judgments” seeking federal district
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court review and reversal of the state court judgment, Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 235 (2023).
Rooker-Feldman does not preclude parties from reviewing independent federal claims, such as a
challenge to the constitutionality of the state law that provides the rule of decision in the state
cases. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011). Collier, however, does not appear to be
asserting any independent claim that he did not already raise in the state court cases, and he plainly
seeks to challenge collaterally and enjoin orders issued by the state courts. To the extent Collier
seeks this court’s review and reversal of the orders dismissing his claims in the Laconia family
court cases, Collier’s claims for relief here are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and,
accordingly, Collier may not obtain injunctive relief on those claims.
III. Preliminary Review of Claims Asserted by Collier
Collier filed this case by filing a removal notice. He did not name defendants to his federal
claims; rather, he listed all of the state courts, attorneys, and other participants in his state court
cases as parties or entities who would receive notice of his removal documents. His decision not
to structure his claims here in the form of a civil complaint naming specific defendants complicates
this court’s ability to subject his pleadings to preliminary review under LR 4.3(d) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, in the Order issued on this date, the court grants Collier thirty days to
file an “Amended Complaint” (not a removal notice), naming each party he intends to sue as a
defendant, if any, and stating the facts upon which he claims relief as well as the nature of the
relief sought. 	This court may subject that Amended Complaint to preliminary review, as
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the magistrate judge recommends as follows:
(1) 	The district judge should issue an Order of Remand, remanding
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Collier’s state cases listed in his Notice of Removal (Doc. Nos. 1, 1-
1) to the State courts, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1455(b)(4), and then the Clerk’s Office of this Court must mail a
certified copy of that Order of Remand to the Clerks of: the N.H.
Supreme Court; the Cheshire County Superior Court; the N.H.
Circuit Court, 8th Circuit, District Division-Keene and Family
Division-Keene; and the N.H. Circuit Court, 4th Circuit, Family
Division-Laconia; and
(2) 	The district judge should deny Collier’s motion for a preliminary
injunction (Doc. No. 4).
(3) 	Because 	the 	Order 	issued 	on 	the 	date 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation 	provides 	Collier 	an 	opportunity 	to 	file 	an
Amended Complaint, approval of this Report and Recommendation
will not terminate this case, unless otherwise ordered by this court.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
receipt of this notice. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. Only those issues raised in the objection(s) to this Report and Recommendation are
subject to review in the district court. See Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d
554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010). Any issues not preserved by such objection(s) are precluded on appeal.
See id. Failure to file specific written objections to the Report and Recommendation within the
specified time waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________
Talesha L. Saint-Marc
United States Magistrate Judge
April 23, 2026
cc: 	Randall Collier, pro se
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