Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Dusty Lee Dignard,
Claimant
v. 	Case No. 25-cv-482-SM-AJ
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 048
Frank Bisignano, Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Defendant
O R D E R
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), claimant,
Dusty Lee Dignard, moves to reverse or vacate the Commissioner’s
decision denying her applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and
Supplemental Security Income Benefits under Title XVI. 	See 42
U.S.C. §§ 423, 1381-1383c (collectively, the “Act”). 	The
Commissioner objects and moves for an order affirming his
decision.
For the reasons discussed, claimant’s motion is denied and
the Commissioner’s motion is granted.
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Factual Background
I. 	Procedural History.
In May of 2022, claimant protectively filed an application
for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and in January of
2017, she protectively filed an application for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”). 	In both applications, she alleged that
she was disabled and had been unable to work since February 1,
2020. 	She was 31 years old at the time and had acquired
sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through
December 31, 2025. 	After claimant’s applications were denied
initially and again on reconsideration, she requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
On August 21, 2024, claimant, her attorney, and an
impartial vocational expert appeared by video before an ALJ, who
considered claimant’s applications de novo. 	Subsequently, the
ALJ who presided over that hearing became unavailable and the
matter was transferred to a different ALJ. 	After considering
the record evidence and the transcript of the hearing, the
newly-assigned ALJ issued his written decision, concluding that
claimant was not disabled, as that term is defined in the Act,
at any time prior to the date of his decision (October 25,
2024). 	Claimant then requested review by the Appeals Council.
That request was denied. 	Accordingly, the ALJ’s denial of
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claimant’s applications for benefits became the final decision
of the Commissioner, subject to judicial review. 	Subsequently,
claimant filed a timely action in this court, asserting that the
ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and that
he denied her due process by failing to convene a second
evidentiary hearing.
Claimant then filed a “Motion for Order Reversing Decision
of the Commissioner” (document no. 4). 	In response, the
Commissioner filed a “Motion for an Order to Affirm the
Commissioner’s Decision” (document no. 5). 	Those motions are
pending.
II. 	Factual Background.
A detailed factual background can be found in claimant’s
statement of facts (document no. 4-2) and the Commissioner’s
supplemental statement of facts (document no. 6). 	Those facts
relevant to the disposition of this matter are discussed as
appropriate.
Standard of Review
I. 	“Substantial Evidence” and Deferential Review.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court is empowered “to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
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judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 	Factual findings and credibility
determinations made by the Commissioner are conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence. 	See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). 	See also Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991). 	Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 	Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 	Importantly,
then, it is something less than a preponderance of the evidence.
So, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from
the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence. 	See Consolo v.
Federal Maritime Comm’n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). 	See also
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
II. 	The Parties’ Respective Burdens.
An individual seeking SSI and/or DIB benefits is disabled
under the Act if he or she is unable “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
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last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 	42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	See also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The Act places a heavy initial burden on the claimant to
establish the existence of a disabling impairment. 	See Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1987); Santiago v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). 	To
satisfy that burden, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that her impairments prevent her from
performing her former type of work. 	See Manso-Pizarro v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 76 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir.
1996); Gray v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 371 (1st Cir. 1985). 	If
the claimant demonstrates an inability to perform her previous
work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there
are other jobs in the national economy that she can perform, in
light of her age, education, and prior work experience. 	See
Vazquez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 683 F.2d 1, 2
(1st Cir. 1982). 	See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 404.1560,
416.912, and 416.960.
In assessing a disability claim, the Commissioner considers
both objective and subjective factors, including: (1) objective
medical facts; (2) the claimant’s subjective claims of pain and
disability, as supported by the claimant’s testimony or that of
other witnesses; and (3) the claimant’s educational background,
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age, and work experience. 	See, e.g., Avery v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 797 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1986);
Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 690 F.2d 5,
6 (1st Cir. 1982). 	Ultimately, a claimant is disabled only if
her:
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that [she] is not only unable to do
[her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which [she] lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for [her], or
whether [she] would be hired if [she] applied for
work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 	See also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
With those principles in mind, the court reviews claimant’s
motion to reverse and the Commissioner’s motion to affirm his
decision.
Background - The ALJ’s Findings
In concluding that claimant was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act, the ALJ properly employed the mandatory
five-step sequential evaluation process described in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520 and 416.920. 	See generally Barnhart v. Thomas, 540
U.S. 20, 24 (2003). 	Accordingly, he first determined that
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claimant had not been engaged in substantial gainful employment
since her alleged onset of disability: February 1, 2020. 	Admin.
Rec. at 19. 	Next, he concluded that claimant suffers from the
following severe impairments: “cutaneous lupus, fibromyalgia,
obesity, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).” 	Id. at 20.
But, the ALJ determined that claimant’s impairments, whether
considered alone or in combination, did not meet or medically
equal any of the impairments listed in Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. 	Admin. Rec. at 21. 	Claimant does not object to any
of those findings.
Next, the ALJ concluded that claimant retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the exertional demands of
light work, subject to the following limitations: “she can never
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can occasionally climb ramps
or stairs; can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl or
balance; and is limited to simple, routine tasks without high
production demands.” 	Id. at 23. 	In light of those
restrictions, the ALJ concluded that claimant was not capable of
performing any past relevant work. 	Id. at 28. 	See also Id. at
75-77 (vocational expert’s testimony about claimant’s work
history as a hotel housecleaner/ waitress and a fast-food
worker).
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At the final step of the analysis, the ALJ considered
whether there were any jobs in the national economy that
claimant might perform. 	Relying upon the testimony of the
vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that, “Considering the
claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.”
Id. at 28. 	See also Admin. Rec. at 74-82 (testimony of the
vocational expert). 	Consequently, the ALJ concluded that
claimant was not “disabled,” as that term is defined in the Act,
through the date of his decision.
Discussion
Claimant challenges the ALJ’s decision on two grounds,
asserting that he erred: first, by failing to adequately support
his decision to discount the opinions of claimant’s treating
therapist and her treating rheumatologist; and, second, by
failing to give claimant a (second) hearing on her appeal of the
denial of her applications for benefits (recall that after one
ALJ did afford claimant such a hearing, claimant’s case was
transferred to a second ALJ who concluded - at least implicitly
- that another hearing was not necessary).
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I. 	Opinion Evidence.
Claimant’s medical history is fairly lengthy and the record
is substantial (at more than 1,400 pages). 	But, the parties
focus almost exclusively on the medical opinions rendered by six
medical professionals. 	Two were claimant’s treating providers:
Daniel Kunz, D.O., claimant’s rheumatologist, and Joanne
Spilios, LCMHC, claimant’s therapist. 	Four were state agency
medical experts who reviewed claimant’s medical records both
initially and on reconsideration to determine her level of
disability: two psychologists (Deborah Zera and David Bann) and
two internists (Dr. Mary Ann Nicastro and Dr. King Leong).1
A. 	Claimant’s Rheumatologist.
Dr. Kunz completed a “Physical Residual Functional Capacity
Questionnaire” in which he opined that claimant’s pain would
1 	As explained by the Social Security Administration, “Most
Social Security disability claims are initially processed
through a network of local Social Security Administration (SSA)
field offices and State agencies (usually called Disability
Determination Services or DDSs). . . 	The DDSs, which are fully
funded by the Federal Government, are State agencies responsible
for developing medical evidence and making the initial
determination on whether or not a claimant is disabled or blind
under the law. . . . After completing its development of the
evidence, trained staff at the DDS makes the initial disability
determination. 	Then, the DDS returns the case to the field
office for appropriate action.” 	SSA, “Disability Determination
Process.” 	Available at: https://www.ssa.gov/disability/
determination.htm
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“constantly” interfere with the attention and concentration
necessary to sustain simple, repetitive work tasks; she was
incapable of even “low stress” work; she could not sit for more
than 30 minutes at a time or stand for more than 10 minutes; she
could sit and stand/walk for fewer than two hours in an eight-
hour workday; and she would require a break every 30 minutes.
Admin. Rec. at 1409-12. 	But, the ALJ supportably found those
opinions unpersuasive because they are “inconsistent with Dr.
Kunz’s own treatment records showing that the claimant’s
symptoms are generally well-controlled with medication with only
periodic fibromyalgia flares and little indication of
significant ongoing lupus symptoms.” 	Id. at 27. 	See generally
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1) and (2) (“The more relevant the
objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented
by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinions,
the more persuasive the medical opinions will be. 	The more
consistent a medical opinion is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion will be.”) (cleaned up).
As the ALJ observed, Dr. Kuntz’s treatment notes are not
consistent with the fairly extreme limitations suggested in his
Physical Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire. 	See Dr.
Kunz’s Treatment Notes, Admin. Rec. at 1405 (May of 2021,
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approximately 15 months after claimant’s alleged onset of
disability: “Fibromyalgia. 	Overall, she feels fantastic. 	She
tells me she was in Florida in the sun and exercising and she
really had no pain outside of the tight neck muscles and carpal
tunnel. 	She felt great . . . Cutaneous lupus Doing great.
Asymptomatic. Continues hydroxychloroquine.”); 1400 (February,
2022: “No flares of cutaneous lupus. 	Doing well on
hydroxychloroquine” and “She was doing well in the summer [with
fibromyalgia symptoms] and after I last saw her but now flaring
up.”); 1394 (May, 2022: “Doing well. 	No flares of cutaneous
lupus on HCQ. 	Asymptomatic” and, with respect to fibromyalgia,
“She tells me she is ‘holding my own.’ 	Taking methocarbamol
once or twice daily which really helps when needed. 	She is
active working in the garden.”); 1388 (June, 2022: “She reports
mild flares [of lupus]. 	She tells me she has been in the sun
gardening, does put on sunblock multiple times per day, but is
exposing herself to the sun” and “Continues to have intermittent
episodes of diffuse paresthesias [related to fibromyalgia],
which then turns to pain and resolved within a few hours. 	Not
constant.”); and 1375 (February, 2023: “no flares of cutaneous
lupus on HCQ. Doing well here. 	Fibromyalgia overall better
except for her back. 	She reports mental health is better,
though still is anxious and gets attacks, overall improved. 	She
is exercising daily and doing yoga in the morning.”).
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In contrast to Dr. Kuz’s opinions concerning claimant’s
residual functional capacity, the ALJ noted that two state
agency physicians thoroughly reviewed claimant’s treatment
records, her subjective complaints of pain, and her activities
of daily living. 	Both documented their findings and
conclusions, and both concluded that claimant retained the
ability to perform light work, despite her impairments.
Although the ALJ discounted those opinions somewhat (based upon
claimant’s subjective complaint’s of pain “and medical evidence
showing some worsening of symptoms during flares” id. at 26), he
noted that those opinions were well-supported by explanations,
mutually consistent, and largely consistent with the overall
record. 	Id. 	See also Initial Residual Functional Capacity
Determination made by Dr. Mary Nicastro, Admin. Rec. at 102-110;
Determination on Reconsideration by Dr. King Leong, id. at 128-
35.
There is certainly substantial evidence in the record to
support the medical opinions of the state agency physicians as
well as the ALJ’s decision to afford them fairly significant
weight. 	There is also substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
decision to afford less weight to the somewhat extreme opinions
expressed in Dr. Kunz’s Functional Capacity Questionnaire.
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B. 	Claimant’s Mental Health Counselor.
Joanne Spilios, LCMHC, completed a “Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment” of claimant on August 14, 2024.
Admin. Rec. at 1413-16. 	In it, she opined that claimant had
“mild” to “moderate” impairments affecting understanding and
memory, “marked” to “extreme” impairments affecting sustained
concentration and persistence, “mild” to “moderate” impairments
affecting social interaction, and an “extreme” inability to
tolerate normal levels of stress. 	She also opined that
claimant’s mental impairments would substantially interfere with
her ability to work on a sustained basis at least 20 percent of
the time and she would likely miss work 4-5 days each month
because of those mental impairments. 	Again, however, the ALJ
found little support for such significant limitations in
claimant’s medical records. 	Id. at 27 (noting that Ms. Spilios
“provides little support for these extreme limitations, and the
limitations are inconsistent with the claimant’s mostly normal
mental status findings, her treatment notes reflecting the
claimant’s good response to treatment, and with the claimant’s
demonstrated ability to perform her daily activities, including
gardening, spending time with friends, travelling to Florida,
and serving as a Girl Scout co-leader.”). 	See generally
Claimant’s Treatment Records from Seacoast Mental Health Center,
Admin. Rec. at 1307-70.
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After explaining his reasons for discounting the opinions
of Ms. Spilios, the ALJ supportably found the opinions of the
state agency mental health examiners largely persuasive.
David Bann and Deborah Zera evaluated the claimant’s
mental health records on behalf of the State agency
and found that the claimant has moderate limitations
in her ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain
pace, and otherwise has mild mental limitations. 	They
further found that the claimant may have some
disruptions in a work-day or work-week related to
psychological symptoms but that any such disruptions
“would not likely be more than reasonable.” 	The
opinions of Drs. Bann and Zera are generally
persuasive. 	Their opinions are mutually consistent,
supported by explanations, and generally consistent
with the overall record, including the claimant’s good
response to treatment with mental medication and
therapy, and her ability to perform her daily
activities.
Admin. Rec. at 27 (citations omitted). 	See also Initial
Psychological Review by David Bann, id. at 115-26; and
Determination on Reconsideration by Deborah Zera, id. at 128-32.
Given the state of the record, the court cannot conclude
that the ALJ erred by discounting the somewhat extreme opinions
of claimant’s treating providers and, instead, largely adopting
the findings of the four state agency medical experts who
reviewed claimant’s medical records. 	The ALJ plausibly and
supportably explained why he found those latter opinions to be
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more consistent with the overall record, as well as the reasons
he found the treating providers’ opinions to be inconsistent
with both the overall record and their own treatment notes.
II. 	Due Process and a Second Hearing.
As noted above, after claimant was provided with a de novo
hearing before an ALJ, that ALJ became unavailable and the
matter was transferred to a new ALJ. 	Claimant asserts, without
developed argument, that the lack of a new hearing before the
second ALJ deprived her of her due process rights.
Specifically, she says:
Plaintiff was not afforded due process in the
Commissioner’s handling of her case. 	The hearing was
conducted by one ALJ, but the decision was written by
a separate ALJ at a different hearings office (AR at
17). 	It is unclear if a draft opinion was ever
approved by the initial ALJ or not. 	The ALJ who
authored the decision never took the Plaintiff’s
testimony, nor that of the vocational expert who
testified. 	20 CFR § 404.948 and 416.1448 govern
circumstances in which an ALJ can issue a decision
without a hearing. 	None of those circumstances are
applicable in the immediate case, violating the
Plaintiff’s due process rights.
Claimant’s Memorandum (document no. 4-1) 4. 	The regulations
claimant cites do not, however, apply to this situation because
claimant was afforded a hearing. 	Rather, the circumstances
presented in this case are governed by the Social Security
Programs Operations Manual System (“POMS”), which provides that,
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When an ALJ has held a hearing but has not approved a
draft decision, the HOCALJ or other management ALJ may
reassign the case with concurrence of the RCALJ or
Office of the Chief Administrative Law Judge (OCALJ).
When considering whether to reassign a case after a
hearing has been held, the HOCALJ or other management
ALJ will consider whether the delay in issuing a
decision constitutes a detriment to the public. 	An
example of when a delay constitutes a detriment to the
public is when the case has been in post-hearing
status for an unreasonable period and previous
attempts to assist the ALJ with issuing a decision
have been unsuccessful.
When the HOCALJ or other management ALJ reassigns a
case to a different ALJ after a hearing has been held,
the ALJ to whom the case is reassigned will review all
the evidence of record, including the audio recording
of the hearing.
POMS: HA 01210.055, sect. F.2. (“Reassignment of a Case After a
Hearing Has been Held”) (available at: https://secure.ssa.gov/
poms.nsf/lnx/2501210055). 	POMS also vests in the newly-assigned
ALJ the discretion to determine whether the evidentiary record
is sufficient to render a decision or “whether another hearing
is necessary.” 	Id.
Here, it is plain from the ALJ’s decision that he reviewed
the entire record, including the transcript (or audio recording)
of the earlier hearing. 	See, e.g., Admin. Rec. at 23-24
(discussing at some length claimant’s testimony at the hearing).
And, it is equally plain that he concluded - albeit implicitly -
that a second hearing was not necessary. 	Neither the
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Constitution nor the applicable regulations or SSA operations
manual required anything more. 	See generally Flatford v.
Chater, 93 F.3d 1296 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing the application
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause in the context of
Social Security hearings before an ALJ); Green v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:13 CV 2356, 2015 WL 779043 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2015)
(same).
Conclusion
Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is both limited and
deferential. 	This court is not empowered to consider claimant’s
application de novo, nor may it undertake an independent
assessment of whether she is disabled under the Act.
Consequently, the issue before the court is not whether it
believes claimant is disabled. 	Rather, the permissible inquiry
is “limited to determining whether the ALJ deployed the proper
legal standards and found facts upon the proper quantum of
evidence.” 	Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
Provided the ALJ’s findings are properly supported by
substantial evidence - as they are in this case - the court must
sustain those findings even when there may also be substantial
evidence supporting the contrary position. 	Such is the nature
of judicial review of disability benefit determinations. 	See,
e.g., Tsarelka v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 842 F.2d
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529, 535 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[W]e must uphold the [Commissioner’s]
conclusion, even if the record arguably could justify a
different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence.”); Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,
647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981) (“We must uphold the
[Commissioner’s] findings in this case if a reasonable mind,
reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it
as adequate to support his conclusion.”).
Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the
arguments advanced by both the Commissioner and the claimant,
the court concludes that there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the ALJ’s determination that claimant was not
disabled, as that term is used in the Act, at any time prior to
the date of the ALJ’s decision (October 25, 2024). 	The ALJ’s
determination of claimant’s RFC, his stated reasons for
crediting some medical opinions while discounting others, and
his analysis of claimant’s subjective allegations of disabling
symptoms are well-reasoned and supported by substantial
evidence. 	While the record might arguably support a different
conclusion, there is clearly substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s findings.
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Finally, the court concludes that claimant’s due process
rights were not violated when the ALJ to whom this case was
transferred issued his decision without convening a second
evidentiary hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
the Commissioner’s legal memorandum, claimant’s Motion for Order
Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner (document no. 4) is
denied, and the Commissioner’s Motion for an Order Affirming the
Decision of the Commissioner (document no. 5) is granted. 	The
Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this
order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
April 29, 2026
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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