Rivera-Medrano v. US Department of Homeland Security, Acting Secretary et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Karen Elizabeth Rivera-Medrano
v. Civil No. 20-cv-194-JD
Acting Secretary, United States
Department of Homeland Security
et. al.
O R D E R
Karen Elizabeth Rivera-Medrano, who was being detained
pending removal, brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking an order to require the
federal respondents to hold a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). The court granted the petition in part and entered
judgment on July 21, 2020. In November, Rivera-Medrano filed
three motions, which were referred to the magistrate judge for
review, and the magistrate judge has issued a report and
recommendation to deny the motions. Rivera-Medrano has filed an
objection to the report and recommendation.
Background
Rivera-Medrano is from El Salvador and sought asylum in the
United States. She represented herself during the immigration
proceedings and because of the challenges of doing so, she gave
up her asylum claim. An order of removal issued on January 30,
2018, and she was detained.
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After the American Civil Liberties Union began representing
Rivera-Medrano, the habeas petition was filed here. Rivera-
Medrano asked the court to require the respondents to provide
her a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
The respondents moved to dismiss her petition on the ground
that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governed Rivera-Medrano’s detention,
which the respondents argued did not provide for release on
bond. Because Rivera-Medrano’s motion for an expedited decision
had been granted, the court decided the case on the merits in
the context of the Department’s motion, concluding that she was
entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. The
respondents appealed the court’s decision to the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, Rivera-Medrano v. Wolf, 20-1573 (1st Cir. June
6, 2020).1 Id., doc. 00117675364.
In response to this court’s order, a bond hearing was held
before an immigration judge, who, on April 14, 2020, released
Rivera-Medrano on bond. The Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”), however, reversed that decision on November 18, 2020.
Separately, the BIA denied Rivera-Medrano’s immigration appeal,
1 In filings made in the First Circuit, the government
characterizes the notice of appeal as a protective notice to
allow time for the Office of the Solicitor General to decide
whether to take the appeal. The government has sought and been
granted extensions of time to file its brief. Therefore, the
status of the appeal is somewhat uncertain.
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and she appealed that decision to the First Circuit, Rivera-
Medrano v. Rosen, 20-1667 (1st Cir. filed July 6, 2020).
In November, Rivera-Medrano filed a motion in this court to
enforce judgment and an emergency motion to stay the decision of
the BIA that reversed her release on bond. She argued that the
BIA failed to apply the legal standard stated in the court’s
order and asserted that the court must stay the BIA’s order and
conduct its own bond hearing. Several weeks later, the parties
filed an assented-to motion for entry of a stipulated order
based on the parties’ agreement that allowed Rivera-Medrano to
withdraw her prior motions and asked the court to enter a
stipulated agreement as a court order.
The magistrate judge reviewed the pending motions and
issued a report and recommendation to deny them. Doc. no. 28.
In support, the magistrate stated that, because of the pending
appeals, the motions raised the potential for interfering in the
jurisdiction of the First Circuit Court of Appeals. The
magistrate also noted that the parties had agreed to terms on
which the first two motions would be withdrawn, making any
decision on the assented-motion to enter the proposed stipulated
order merely advisory. Rivera-Medrano filed an objection to the
report and recommendation. The respondents did not file a
response to the report and recommendation.
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Discussion
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, the court makes a de novo determination of those
portions to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The court may accept, reject, or modify the report and
recommendation and may also receive additional evidence or
recommit the matter to the magistrate, if necessary. Id.
A. Assented-to Motion for Entry of Stipulated Order
Rivera-Medrano objects to that part of the report and
recommendation that recommends denying the assented-to motion
for entry of a stipulated order. She agrees with the magistrate
that the court need not reach the merits of the two preceding
motions, which are resolved by the parties’ agreement.2 She
challenges the conclusion in the report and recommendation that
granting the assented-to motion and entering the proposed
stipulated order could interfere with the First Circuit’s
jurisdiction in the matters on appeal, which would divest this
court of jurisdiction to enter the stipulated order.
Rivera-Medrano contends that the magistrate’s
jurisdictional ruling should be reversed because it is not
2 Because the respondents did not object to the report and
recommendation, they are deemed to have accepted the findings
and rulings made therein.
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necessary and was not briefed by the parties. Contrary to
Rivera-Medrano’s argument, the court cannot proceed in the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are
authorized to consider and decide only those cases that fall
within the scope of their jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). For that
reason, a court “is duty-bound to notice, and act upon, defects
in its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.” Spooner v. EEN,
Inc., 644 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2011); Fort Bend County, Texas
v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019). If jurisdiction is
lacking, a court can proceed no further in the case. Godin v.
Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2010).
As the magistrate noted, a valid notice of appeal from a
decision of this court generally divests the court of
jurisdiction over aspects of the case on appeal and confers
jurisdiction in the court of appeals. Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Under that rule,
the district court loses jurisdiction “with respect to any
matter touching upon, or involved in, the appeal.” United
States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1061 (1st Cir. 1993). The rule,
however, is subject to some exceptions. See United States v.
Ruvalcava-Garza, 750 F. App’x 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2018);
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Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 731 F.3d 608, 626 (6th Cir.
2013).
Rivera-Medrano contends that the magistrate’s report and
recommendation is wrong to the extent that it recommends denying
her assented-to motion for entry of the parties’ proposed
stipulated order.3 In support, she argues that the magistrate’s
decision “is prejudicial [to her] because, in the event that she
is re-detained under the BIA’s order, it limits her ability to
(i) file any motion to enforce this Court’s habeas order during
the pendency of the appeal before the First Circuit, and/or (ii)
seek enforcement of the parties’ agreement reflected in
Petitioner’s Assented-to Motion for Entry of Stipulated Order
of Withdrawal (DN 27)—an agreement that involved court approval
to ensure enforceability.” Doc. no. 29, at *2.
The jurisdictional issue anent the assented-to motion is
not whether denying that motion is prejudicial, as Rivera-
Medrano argues. Instead, the issue is whether the court has
jurisdiction to grant the assented-to motion and enter the
3 Despite her focus on the assented-to motion, Rivera-
Medrano also argues that the court has jurisdiction to enforce
its judgment, which is the subject of one of her underlying
motions not the assented-to motion. Based on the objection, the
court is not addressing the motion to enforce judgment on the
merits.
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parties’ agreement as a stipulated order. The magistrate judge
recommended that the motion be denied for lack of jurisdiction.
Based on the assented-to motion, the parties have reached
an agreement on the matters raised in Rivera-Medrano’s motion to
enforce judgment and motion to stay the BIA’s order. Their
agreement is memorialized in the proposed stipulated order:
Upon consideration of Petitioner’s Assented-to
Motion for Entry of Stipulated Order of Withdrawal of
Motion to Enforce Judgment Without Prejudice, it is
hereby AGREED and ORDERED that:
1. Respondents Department of Homeland Security and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agree that, in
exchange for the withdrawal of Petitioner Karen
Elizabeth Rivera-
Medrano’s Motion to Enforce Judgment, Respondents will
stipulate that Ms. Rivera-Medrano will not be re-
detained while her First Circuit Court of Appeals’
petition for review (20-1667) is pending.
2. In addition, Respondents agree that they will not
re-detain Ms. Rivera-Medrano while her removal
(withholding-only) proceedings are pending before the
agency (EOIR), should she prevail in her current
petition for review before the First Circuit Court of
Appeals (20-1667).
3. Respondents’ agreement, however, is conditioned on
Ms. Rivera-Medrano’s agreement that she will present
herself, accompanied by counsel if she desires, to
Respondents (more specifically, the Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO)) so that she can be served
with an Order of Supervision (OSUP) and enrolled in
the Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program, which
will require utilization of a GPS monitor should ERO
decide. Ms. Rivera-Medrano agrees to this condition.
4. In addition, Ms. Rivera-Medrano understands and
agrees that Respondents will reserve its right to re-
arrest and re-detain her if she violates the terms and
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conditions of her OSUP in a manner which demonstrates
that she poses a danger to the community or a flight
risk either during the pendency of her First Circuit
Court of Appeals’ petition for review or if she
prevails in her current petition for review and her
case is remanded to the Immigration Court.
5. This agreement does not impact or prevent
Respondents from re-detaining Ms. Rivera-Medrano if
she does not prevail in her current petition for
review in order to effectuate her final order of
removal from the United States or if the Government
prevails in its appeal before
the First Circuit (20-1573), in which the District
Court’s order requiring that a bond hearing was held
is being challenged.
6. Finally, Ms. Rivera-Medrano reserves her right to
re-file a motion to enforce judgment if there is a
violation of this stipulation. Ms. Rivera-Medrano
also reserves her right to file separate habeas corpus
challenging her detention or re-detention should the
needs arise.
Doc. no. 27-1.
Although briefing has not yet occurred in the government’s
appeal, the appeal appears to challenge the court’s order that
required the government to provide Rivera-Medrano a bond hearing
before an immigration judge and put the burden on the government
to show by clear and convincing evidence that she should not be
released on bond. The parties’ agreement resolves issues about
Rivera-Medrano’s detention status while her appeal is pending
but does not address issues on appeal. Therefore, the
government’s appeal of this court’s decision does not bar
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consideration of the assented-to motion for entry of the
stipulated order.
Another jurisdictional issue exists, however. An agreement
reached among the parties to settle matters among them is a
contract governed by ordinary contract principles. Boston Ex.
Helicopters, LLC v. Maguire, 15-13647-RGS, 2020 WL 6828487, at
*1 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 2020). The court must have jurisdiction
to enforce that contract if a dispute arises. Id. Once
judgment has been entered, the court lacks jurisdiction to
enforce a settlement or agreement among the parties unless
jurisdiction was retained for that purpose when judgment
entered. Id.; see also May v. Fluor Fed. Solutions, LLC, 16-cv-
587-J-32-JRK, 2018 WL 398556, at *3 (M.D. Fl. Jan. 12, 2018);
Wilmington Tr. Co. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.a.r.l. 12-CV-
8686(JPO), 2016 WL 7339112, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2018).
The assented-to motion to enter the proposed stipulated
order of parties’ agreement was filed after judgment was entered
in this case. For that reason, the court was not asked to and
did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement provided in
the assented-to motion. As a result, the court lacks
jurisdiction to enter the proposed stipulated order.
Nevertheless, the parties’ agreement may be enforced in a
different case by any court with jurisdiction over the matter.
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B. Motions to Enforce and to Stay
The parties have agreed that Rivera-Medrano is withdrawing
her motions to enforce this court’s judgment and to stay the
decision of the BIA (documents nos. 25 and 26) in return for
agreed actions or forbearance by the government. That result
renders the pending motions moot.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation (document no. 28) is approved as modified by
this order.
The petitioner’s motions to enforce judgment and for a stay
(documents nos. 24 and 25) are terminated as moot.
The assented-to motion for entry of a stipulated order of
withdrawal (document no. 29) is denied for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
January 22, 2021
cc: Counsel of record.
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