USA v. Jackson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
United States of America
v. Criminal No. 18-cr-132-JD
Opinion No. 2020 DNH 177
Laveneur Jackson
O R D E R
Defendant Laveneur Jackson moves to dismiss Counts 1 and 3
of the superseding indictment (doc. nos. 125, 126).1 The
government did not file a response.
Background
Jackson is charged with two counts (Counts 1 and 3) of
aiding and abetting the making of a material false statement in
connection with the acquisition of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2(a), 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2), and with two counts
(Counts 2 and 4) of possession of a firearm by a prohibited
person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
Jackson pleaded not guilty to the charges.
1 Jackson filed these motions to dismiss while proceeding
pro se. Subsequently, Jackson moved to revoke his pro se status
and to have counsel appointed for him. The court granted
Jackson’s motion and appointed Attorney Simon Brown to represent
Jackson. Because Jackson is now represented by counsel, any
future motions must be submitted through counsel to be
considered by the court.
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Discussion
Jackson moves to dismiss Counts 1 and 3. He argues that 18
U.S.C. §§ 2(a) and 922(a)(6) are unconstitutional and therefore
Counts 1 and 3, which are premised on those statutes, must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(2).2
I. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)
Under § 2(a), “[w]hoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.” Jackson
argues that § 2(a) is unconstitutional as applied to him because
the superseding indictment does not charge an “offense against
the United States.” He also contends that § 2(a) is
unconstitutional on its face because it is impermissibly vague.
A. Offense Against the United States
Jackson argues that, under § 2(a), “an offense against the
United States” is only one where the United States is the
victim. He argues that the firearms dealers – not the United
States – are the victims of the alleged crimes of aiding or
2 “A motion that the court lacks jurisdiction may be made at
any time while the case is pending.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2).
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abetting the making of a material false statement to a licensed
firearms dealer. Because the United States was not a victim of
the alleged criminal activity, Jackson contends, the government
has no authority to prosecute charges under § 2(a).
Jackson’s contention that § 2(a) is only narrowly
applicable to crimes where the United States is the victim is
incorrect. Rather, “[a]iding and abetting is an alternative
charge in every count, whether explicit or implicit.” United
States v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 611 (1st Cir. 1990) (quotation
marks and alterations omitted); see also United States v. Pino-
Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Congress doesn't
have to think about aider and abettor liability when it passes a
new criminal statute, because section 2(a) attaches
automatically. The question is not whether section 2(a) is
applicable-it always is.”); United States v. Jones, 678 F.2d
102, 105 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that § 2(a) “is applicable to
the entire criminal code.”); Breeze v. United States, 398 F.2d
178, 192 (10th Cir. 1968) (“It is here to be recognized that
Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2(a), is a part of the ‘United States
Code— Crimes and Criminal Procedure,’ and one of the GENERAL
PROVISIONS, applicable to the entire United States criminal
code.”). Therefore, Jackson’s argument that § 2(a) is
unconstitutional as applied in his case because the United
States was not the victim of the charged crime is incorrect.
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B. Void for Vagueness
Jackson argues that § 2(a) is unconstitutional on its face
because it is impermissibly vague. Specifically, Jackson
contends that § 2(a) lacks an element requiring proof of a
“culpable state of mind.” Doc. 125 at 20.
A federal law violates the Due Process Clause3 and is void
for vagueness “if it is ‘so vague that it fails to give ordinary
people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so
standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.’” United
States v. Gonzalez, 949 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015)). The void
for vagueness doctrine attempts to ensure that “regulated
parties . . . know what is required of them so they may act
accordingly” and “to prevent a lack of precision in the law that
enables those enforcing the law to apply it in an arbitrary and
discriminatory way.” United States v. Craigue, No. 19-cr-142-
LM, 2020 WL 1027818, at *3 (D.N.H. March 3, 2020) (quoting
United States v. Zhen Zhou Wu, 711 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013)).
Section 2(a) is not impermissibly vague. The meaning of
aiding and abetting is well established. See, e.g., United
States v. Stepanets, 879 F.3d 367, 375 (1st Cir. 2018)
3 “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. const. amend V.
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(“Generally speaking, an aider and abettor is one who knowingly
helps another commit a crime.”); United States v. Lyons, 740
F.3d 702, 715 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting the elements of aiding and
abetting liability under § 2(a)). Therefore, ordinary people
“know what is required of them so they may act accordingly.”
See Zhen Zhou Wu, 711 F.3d at 13.
Contrary to Jackson’s contention, aiding and abetting
requires proof of a culpable state of mind: “in order to
establish criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for aiding and
abetting criminal behavior, and subject to several caveats
. . . , the government need prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the putative aider and abettor knew the facts that make the
principal’s conduct criminal.” United States v. Ford, 821 F.3d
63, 74 (1st Cir. 2016). Because proof of a culpable state of
mind is required to prove guilt for aiding and abetting criminal
behavior, law enforcement’s ability to apply the law in an
arbitrary or discriminatory way is circumscribed. See Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149-50 (2007) (“The Court has made
clear that scienter requirements alleviate vagueness
concerns. . . . The scienter requirements narrow the scope of
the Act’s prohibition and limit prosecutorial discretion.”).
Jackson’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of
§ 2(a) based on impermissible vagueness is denied.
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II. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)
Jackson also moves to dismiss Counts 1 and 3 on the ground
that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to pass
§ 922(a)(6). Jackson asserts that § 922(a)(6) criminalizes
conduct that is “committed wholly within a state, committed on
property [which is] privately owned, and has absolutely no
connection with the federal government whatsoever.” Doc. 126 at
10. Jackson contends that Article I of the Constitution does
not authorize Congress to regulate intrastate sales of firearms.
Under § 922(a)(6), it is unlawful:
for any person in connection with the acquisition or
attempted acquisition of any firearm or ammunition from
a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed
dealer, or licensed collector, knowingly to make any
false or fictitious oral or written statement or to
furnish or exhibit any false, fictitious, or
misrepresented identification, intended or likely to
deceive such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or
collector with respect to any fact material to the
lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such
firearm or ammunition under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 922(a)(6) “contains no reference to commerce,” and,
further, “its legislative history reveals that Congress intended
to regulate certain aspects of intrastate dealings in firearms
because of their effect on interstate commerce.” United States
v. O’Neill, 467 F.2d 1372, 1374 (2d Cir. 1972). Indeed, “[t]he
legislative history repeatedly states that § 922 makes it clear
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that a license is required for an intrastate business as well as
an interstate business.” Id. (quotation marks omitted)
Jackson, however, is incorrect that Congress’s authority
cannot extend to intrastate conduct. Rather, “[t]hat Congress
has the power to regulate local or intrastate activities which
might have a harmful effect upon interstate commerce is well
settled.” Id. Therefore, even though the statute extends to
intrastate transactions, Ҥ 922(a)(6) represents a valid
exercise of Congressional power” and “the indictment suffices
without having to plead or prove that the alleged conduct was
connected with commerce.” Id.; see also United States v.
Crandall, 453 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (1st Cir. 1972) (“Section
922(b) contains no analogous language from which a requirement
that the transaction be in interstate commerce could be
inferred. Nor does the absence of such a requirement render
section 922(b) unconstitutional. That section regulates
transactions with licensed dealers, whose general involvement
with interstate commerce is ample to justify federal regulation
of even their intrastate sales.”). Therefore, Jackson’s
argument that Counts 1 and 3 must be dismissed because
§ 922(a)(6) was enacted beyond Congress’s authority is
incorrect.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Jackson’s motions to dismiss
(doc. nos. 125, 126) are denied.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.
United States District Judge
October 5, 2020
cc: Laveneur Jackson, pro se
Bruce Kenna, Eq.
Simon Brown, Esq.
Anna Z. Krasinski, Esq.
Seth R. Aframe, Esq.
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