USA v. Brown

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
United States of America, )
)
Plaintiff, ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS
vs. )
)
Eugene Allen Brown, ) Case No. 1:21-cr-230
a/k/a Michael Allen Carrillo, )
)
Defendant. )
Before the Court is Eugene Allen Brown’s “Motion to Suppress” filed on June 15, 2022.
See Doc. No. 36. The Government filed a response in opposition to the motion on July 11, 2022.
See Doc. No. 42. A reply was filed on July 15, 2022. See Doc. No. 45. The Court held a suppression
hearing on November 9, 2022. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court held a suppression hearing on November 9, 2022. Williston Police Officer
Garrett Norsten testified at the hearing. The factual background is derived from his testimony, the
law enforcement reports, body camera footage, and dash camera footage in the record.
On August 19, 2021, Officer Norsten was on patrol conducting seatbelt enforcement in
Williston, North Dakota. At approximately 11:17 a.m. Officer Norsten observed a moving vehicle
in which both the passenger and driver appeared to not be wearing their seatbelts. According to
Officer Norsten’s affidavit, he “observed several cracks in the passenger side windshield” as the
vehicle passed. See Doc. No. 42-1. He believed the cracked windshield to be a safety concern. Id.
He also believed the cracked windshield “to be a violation of Williston City Ordinance § 10-139
because based on the size of the crack, [he] believed the driver’s view would be obstructed.” Id.
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Officer Norsten initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. He learned the driver of the vehicle
was Eugene Allen Brown (“Brown”). He notified Brown that the primary reason for the stop was
the cracked windshield. Brown was informed that he would receive a citation for the seatbelt
offense and would receive a warning for the cracked windshield rather than a citation.
Officer Norsten asked Brown to exit the vehicle. Brown then consented to entering the
patrol vehicle while Officer Norsten completed the paperwork and processing for the seatbelt
violation. Once in the patrol car, Officer Norsten asked follow-up questions to information Brown
volunteered about his recent truck purchase and his upcoming move to Canada. This conversation
occurred as Officer Norsten filled out information on his computer for the seatbelt violation.
Officer Norsten testified that a traffic investigation and citation for this offense typically lasts
approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
Officer Norsten called the names of Brown and the passenger into dispatch to check for
warrants. While waiting for a response from dispatch Officer Norsten questioned Brown. Brown
admitted to the presence of marijuana paraphernalia. See Doc. No. 37-1. Officer Norsten then
asked if there was anything else illegal in the vehicle. Brown stated a rifle was in the vehicle. When
asked, Brown informed Officer Norsten that he is a felon, followed by Brown’s redaction
indicating he misunderstood the question.
Brown was subsequently arrested for two counts of felon in possession of a firearm,
possession of an altered firearm, and possession of a concealed weapon. Officer Norsten issued a
seatbelt citation and a written warning for the cracked windshield. He categorized the windshield
warning as an equipment violation.
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II. LEGAL DISCUSSION
Brown seeks to supress evidence and statements derived from the traffic stop on August
19, 2021. Specifically, Brown moves to exclude firearms, ammunition, and statements made
during the stop. Brown contends the evidence obtained from the traffic stop should be suppressed
because there was not a valid basis for the stop. The Government argues that the stop was lawful
because the law enforcement officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, requiring Brown’s
motion to suppress be denied.
Because a traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, an officer must
have probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants are involved in
illegal activity before conducting a traffic stop. See United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 705-
06 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Payne, 534 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2008). Courts assess
reasonable suspicion from the point of view of the officer based upon the totality of the
circumstances known to the officer at the time. United States v. Zamora-Lopez, 685 F.3d 787,
790 (8th Cir. 2012). A determination of whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed
is not to be made with the benefit of hindsight, but rather by looking at what the officer reasonably
knew at the time. Hollins, 685 F.3d at 706. A reasonable suspicion must be more than a hunch.
See United States v. Walker, 555 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2009).
It is well-established in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that a traffic violation, no
matter how minor, provides an officer with probable cause for a traffic stop. United States v.
Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 2012). “As long as an officer objectively has a reasonable
basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law, the officer has probable cause to
conduct a traffic stop.” United States v. Coney, 456 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotations omitted). An officer’s subjective intentions for making a traffic stop are irrelevant once
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he has established probable cause based upon the observation of a traffic violation. United States
v. Fuehrer, 844 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2016).
Section 39-21-39(1) of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
A motor vehicle must be equipped with a windshield. An individual may not drive
any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, or other nontransparent material upon the
front windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows which obstructs the driver's
clear view of the highway or any intersecting highway.
N.D.C.C. § 39-21-39(1). In State v. Bolme, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded operating
a motor vehicle with a cracked windshield is not a violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-21-39(1). 2020 ND
255, 952 N.W.2d. 75. In Bolme, a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop after observing a
crack on the passenger side of the defendant’s windshield because he believed the driver’s view
was obstructed and in violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-21-39(1). The Supreme Court determined
operating a motor vehicle with a crack in the windshield is not a violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-21-
39(1). Nevertheless, the court found the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion because
the court had not interpreted N.D.C.C. § 39-21-39(1) prior to the opinion. The court noted, “absent
the determination provided by this opinion, it was not objectively unreasonable for the officer to
believe a violation occurred.” State v. Bolme, 2020 ND 255, ¶ 12, 952 N.W.2d. 75.
Officer Norsten testified that he initiated the stop because he believed the cracks in the
passenger side of the windshield to be a violation of Williston City Ordinance § 10-139, which is
identical in substance to N.D.C.C. § 39-21-39(1). The ordinance states:
A motor vehicle must be equipped with a windshield. No person may drive any
motor vehicle with any sign, poster, or other nontransparent material upon the front
windshield, side wings, or side or rear windows which obstructs the driver's clear
view of the highway or any intersecting highway.
See Doc. No. 42-3.
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The Supreme Court’s holding in Bolme equally applies to the Williston ordinance since it
is nearly identical to N.D.C.C. § 39-21-39(1). The Williston ordinance is not an appropriate basis
for a traffic stop when the identical state statute is not. Officer Norsten testified that the Williston
ordinance was the law he relied upon when initiating the stop. He did not articulate any other basis
for the stop at the hearing or in his affidavit.
“[T]he validity of a stop depends on whether the officer’s actions were objectively
reasonable in the circumstances, and in mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake,
whether of law or of fact, was an objectively reasonable one.” United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d
767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005). While conceding that a cracked windshield is not a violation of N.D.C.C.
§ 39-21-39(1), the Government argues that Officer Norsten’s mistake of law was objectively
reasonable because the Supreme Court concluded the officer’s belief was objectively reasonable
in Bolme. This is a mischaracterization of the court’s holding in Bolme. The Supreme Court
specifically held the law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion because the court had not
previously determined whether a crack in the windshield was a violation of N.D.C.C. § 39-21-
39(1). Bolme, at ¶ 12. Although Officer Norsten testified that he had not been made aware of the
holding in Bolme, the decision was issued nine months prior to the traffic stop at issue in this case.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an officer’s subjective good faith is not
sufficient to justify a stop because “officers have an obligation to understand the laws that they are
entrusted with enforcing, at least to a level that is objectively reasonable.” United States v. Martin,
411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005). In U.S. v. Washington, the Eighth Circuit concluded an
officer’s belief that a cracked windshield was a violation of a Nebraska statute was objectively
unreasonable. 455 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2006). The court focused on the lack of evidence of “police
manuals or training materials, state case law, legislative history, or any other state custom or
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practice that would create some objectively reasonable basis for the traffic stop.” “The concept of
an objectively reasonable mistake of law cannot be so unmoored from actual legal authority.” Id.
at 828. In the absence of a basis in state law for an officer’s actions and some ambiguity or state
custom that caused the officer’s mistake, officers cannot act upon misunderstandings of clear
statutes. Id.
In the present case, no evidence was presented of any police manuals or training materials,
legislative history, or any other state or local custom or practice that would create an objectively
reasonable basis for the stop. Rather, state case law establishes a clear interpretation of the statute,
which does not support the existence of an objectively reasonable basis for Officer Norsten’s stop.
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding that a cracked windshield is not a violation of N.D.C.C. §
39-21-39(1), Officer Norsten’s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable. The City of
Williston had an obligation to ensure its officers were aware of changes in the law and understand
the law, which was interpreted nine months prior to the traffic stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. The
Court is of the opinion that Officer Norsten acted in good faith, but the city had a responsibility to
keep its officers appraised of cases like Bolme that directly impact the work of patrol officers on a
daily basis. Citing to U.S. v. Sanders, the Government argues that officers are not expected “to
interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney.” 196 F.3d
910, 913 (8th Cir. 1999). However, Officer Norsten did not have to interpret the relevant ordinance
in any way because it was already explicitly interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court. As
a result, Officer Norsten lacked probable cause to conduct a traffic stop. Suffice it to say that
officers have broad authority to stop vehicles for traffic violations, regardless of how minor the
violation may be. However, there must be a legal justification for the stop grounded in the law. In
light of the Bolme decision there was no legal basis for the stop in this case.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Court has carefully reviewed the entire record, the parties’ arguments, the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing, and the relevant case law. For the reasons outlined above,
the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to suppress (Doc. No. 36). All evidence derived from
the traffic stop must be suppressed, including firearms, ammunition, and statements made during
the stop.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 17th day of November, 2022.
/s/ Daniel L. Hovland
Daniel L. Hovland, District Judge
United States District Court
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