Yukon Packaging, LLC v. Jones Sustainable Packaging, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:25-CV-00007-MEO-DCK
YUKON PACKAGING, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
JONES SUSTAINABLE PACKAGING,
LLC,
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Yukon Packaging LLC’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. No. 105). The Court has considered the Motion, the
parties’ briefs and exhibits, and oral argument presented during the hearing on April
24, 2026. For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion.
The Court finds that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on its claim that Defendant
is 	infringing 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	Patent 	No. 	12,595,110. 	Plaintiff 	will 	likely 	suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is not entered, the balance of equities and
hardships favors Plaintiff, and the public interest is best served by an injunction.
Therefore, the Court enjoins Defendant and all those acting in concert with it
(including other members of its corporate family) from making, using, marketing or
selling the insulated shipping container in dispute (or assisting any other person or
entity in doing so).
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I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin patent infringement “involves
substantive matters unique to patent law, therefore, is governed by the law of” the
Federal Circuit.
Revision Mill., Inc. v. Balboa Mfg. Co., 700 F.3d 524, 525 (Fed. Cir.
2012);
	Pathway 	IP 	LLC 	v. 	Individuals, 	Corps., 	Ltd. 	Liab. 	Cos., 	P’ships, 	&
Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Attached Schedule A, No. 24-CV-05218, 2025
WL 655237, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2025). While the Federal Circuit “review[s] the
grant or denial of a preliminary injunction under the law of the regional circuit, here
the Fourth Circuit[,]” the Federal Circuit “gives dominant effect to Federal Circuit
precedent insofar as it reflects considerations specific to patent issues.”
Natera, Inc.
v. NeoGenomics Lab’ys, Inc., 106 F.4th 1369, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting
Murata Mach. USA v. Daifuku Co., 830 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Under both Federal Circuit and Fourth Circuit law, the grant or denial of a
preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of a district court.
Id. at 1375;
Biomedical Device Consultants & Lab’ys of Colo., LLC v. ViVitro Labs, Inc., No. 2023-
2393, 2024 WL 1318251, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2024);
see Metro. Regul. Info. Sys.,
Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 591, 595 (4th Cir. 2013). However,
“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To establish a right to a
preliminary injunction, a party “must make a clear showing that [it] is likely to
succeed on the merits, that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that an
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injunction is in the public interest.”
Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346
(2024) (quoting
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 22).
The burden is on the patent owner to show it is likely to succeed on the merits
as to both infringement and validity.
See BlephEx, LLC v. Myco Indus., Inc., 24 F.4th
1391, 1398–99 (Fed. Cir. 2022);
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239
F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To show that likelihood, “a patentee must show ‘(1)
it will likely prove infringement and (2) its infringement claim will likely withstand
challenges to the validity and enforceability of the patents.’”
Natera, 106 F.4th at
1375 (quoting
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). If the accused infringer “raises a substantial question
concerning either infringement or validity, i.e., asserts an infringement or invalidity
defense that the patentee cannot prove ‘lacks substantial merit,’ the preliminary
injunction should not issue.”
Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1350–51 (quoting
Genentech,
Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997));
accord Biomedical
Device Consultants, 2024 WL 1318251, at *3.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must also show it is likely to suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.
Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown
Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Furthermore, a patentee must
establish a causal nexus between the alleged infringement and the alleged harm.”
Id.
Where the alleged injury is not quantifiable, “the harm cannot be adequately
compensated and is irreparable.”
Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro Co., 848 F.3d
1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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If a preliminary injunction is found to be warranted, then “[c]rafting a
preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent as
much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents.”
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 571, 579 (2017). And “[i]t is well
established . . . that a federal district court has wide discretion to fashion appropriate
injunctive relief in a particular case.”
Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 956 F.2d
1300, 1308 (4th Cir. 1992). Indeed, a court should “mold its decree to meet the
exigencies of the particular case.”
Trump, 582 U.S. at 580. In doing so, a court must
ensure a preliminary injunction is “no more burdensome to the defendant than
necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs,”
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994), and be mindful that “[t]he purpose of such interim
equitable relief is not to conclusively determine the rights of the parties, but to
balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.”
Trump, 582 U.S. at 580 (citation
omitted).
II. 	FACTUAL FINDINGS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff is the owner of patents related to the invention of a three-piece
insulated shipping container, and Defendant Jones Sustainable Packaging, LLC
(“Jones”) makes and sells competing insulated containers.
See Yukon Packaging v.
Jones Sustainable Packaging, No. 5:25-CV-00007-KDB-DCK, 2025 WL 1782582, at
*1 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 2, 2025) (“
Yukon I”). Both companies compete in the “‘cold chain
packaging’ industry” and manufacture packaging designed to ship goods at a
consistent temperature while in transit.
Id. at *2.
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On January 14, 2025, Yukon filed its Complaint in this matter, alleging that
Jones’s cold-chain insulated container (the “Accused Product”) infringed on its
patents. (Doc. No. 1). On April 2, 2025, the Court entered a preliminary injunction
enjoining Jones from “making, offering for sale, selling, using or advertising” its
Accused Product.
Yukon I, 2025 WL 1782582, at *14; (Doc. No. 73 at 27). In
Yukon I,
the Court summarized the procedural history of the case and made detailed findings
of facts regarding the parties, their history, and the dispute. In the interest of brevity,
the Court adopts and reincorporates those findings as if stated here.
See Yukon I,
2025 WL 1782582, at *2–7.
Following the entry of a preliminary injunction in
Yukon I, Jones began
producing a new insulated three-piece shipping container (the “Accused Hinge-Break
Product”). As explained below, Yukon now alleges the Accused Hinge-Break Product
infringes on its new patent. (Doc. No. 105).
A. The ’110 Patent
On January 7, 2025, David Vance, Yukon’s Vice President of Sales and
Business Development, filed a continuation patent application with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) concerning the method of forming container
insulation.
See (Doc. Nos. 105-2 at 4; 109 ¶ 1). On April 7, 2026, the USPTO issued
Patent No. 12,595,110 (“the ’110 Patent”)
. (Doc. No. 105-2 at 4). The ’110 Patent
consists of three claims.
• 	Claim 1
A method of forming container insulation comprising the steps of:
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providing a quantity of post-industrial, pre-consumer cotton or
synthetic waste fiber;
providing an airlay processing machine configured to process
post-industrial, pre-consumer cotton or synthetic waste fiber into
a continuous non-woven sheet having predetermined thickness
and density;
providing 	a 	die-cut 	press 	configured 	to 	cut 	the 	non-woven
continuous 	sheet 	into 	square 	or 	rectangular 	shapes 	thereby
forming insulated pads, wherein each of the insulated pads has a
top surface, a bottom surface, and four edge surfaces;
feeding the post-industrial, pre-consumer cotton or synthetic
waste fiber into the airlay processing machine;
cutting the continuous sheet with the die-cut press to form a first
insulated pad, a second insulated pad, and a third insulated pad,
wherein the first insulated pad, the second insulated pad, and the
third insulated pad each have a same predetermined thickness
and density; and
wherein 	during 	the 	cutting 	step, 	the 	first 	insulated 	pad 	is
configured to be positioned inside a rigid container in contact with
at least a bottom of the rigid container, the second insulated pad
is configured to be positioned inside the rigid container in contact
with at least a top side of the rigid container, and the third
insulated pad is configured to be positioned inside the rigid
container in contact with at least a front side, a rear side, and a
right side of the rigid container.
(Doc. No. 104-3 at 42, 9:12–10:15).
• 	Claim 2
The method of forming container insulation of claim 1, further
comprising the step of encasing the first insulated pad, the second
insulated pad, and the third insulated pad in poly-wrap.
Id. at 10:16-10:19.
• 	Claim 3
The method of forming container insulation of claim 1, further
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comprising the step of applying coffee filer paper, kraft paper, or
fluted-corrugate paper to a surface of each of the first insulated
pad, the second insulated pad, and the third insulated pad.
Id. at 10:20-10:25.
According to the USPTO Examiner’s Reasons for Allowance, ’110 Patent’s
method is unique because the prior art references:
fail to teach or disclose the method wherein during the cutting
step, the first insulated pad is configured to be positioned inside
a rigid container. It would not have been obvious to modify [the
prior art] with the aforementioned limitations because [the prior
art] discloses the production of the claimed insulation, not the
packaging 	steps 	required 	to 	place 	said 	insulation 	into 	the
container. . . . Furthermore, [the prior art] teaches the step of
placing an insulated pad in the container, but this does not occur
during a cutting step.”
(Doc. No. 104-4 at 18).
B. The Accused Hinge-Break Product
After the Court issued the
Yukon I preliminary injunction, Jones began
offering the Accused Hinge-Break Product. According to Jones, the new product:
contains insulation pads within two poly bags placed inside a
corrugated cardboard box with six sides. One insulation pad is
placed adjacent to three interior sides of the box, one insulation
pad is placed adjacent to two interior sides of the box, and one
insulation pad is placed adjacent to one interior side of the box . .
. . The insulation pads placed adjacent to two and one interior
sides are both contained in the same poly wrap bag, with a seal
separating the two insulation pads. The insulation pad placed
adjacent to three interior sides of the box is contained in a second
poly wrap bag. Because the insulation pads cover three, two, and
one interior sides of the cold chain package, none of the insulation
pads are interchangeable.
(Doc. No. 105-7 at 8). Jones asserts that its product “was specifically designed . . . to
not infringe Yukon’s patents.” (Doc. No. 108 at 8).
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C. Yukon’s Business
Prior to the
Yukon I preliminary injunction, both Jones and Yukon sold three-
piece cold chain containers to, among others, their primary mutual customer, Veritiv.
See Yukon I, 2025 WL 1782582, at *11. Veritiv, a large distributor, then resold the
products to third parties, including a health care company (“Customer 1”).
Id. at *4.
The
Yukon I preliminary injunction enjoined Jones from selling its three-piece cold
chain product to Vertiv.
See id. at *14.
In October 2025, Yukon learned that Vertiv’s contract with Customer 1 had
been terminated. (Doc. No. 116-2 ¶ 31). By January 1, 2026, Yukon had lost all of its
business for three-piece cold chain insolation for Customer 1.
Id. Also in January
2026, Yukon learned that Jones had taken over Customer 1’s business and was selling
its Accused Hinge-Break Product.
Id. ¶ 34. 1
Since the loss of Customer 1’s business, Yukon has faced a drastic decrease in
revenue.
See id. ¶¶ 31–39. Yukon has also scaled down the operations of its facilities
and reduced its workforce by over 50%.
See id. ¶¶ 40–56. Yukon anticipates continued
decrease in its workforce and distribution centers absent injunctive relief.
Id. ¶¶ 43,
54. Yukon has also suffered price erosion, with a potential new customer requesting
pricing significantly lower than what Yukon has previously offered.
See id. ¶¶ 57–63.
D. Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction
On April 7, 2026—the same day the USPTO issued the ’110 Patent—Yukon
1 Jones sold its product to Taylor Corporation. Taylor in turn was the supplier to
Customer 1.
See (Doc. No. 113-18 ¶¶ 3–4).
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filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (Doc.
No. 105). In its Motion, Yukon asserts that “[b]y selling and/or offering to sell the
Accused Hinge-Break Product, Jones is directly and indirectly infringing” the ’110
Patent
. Id. at 1–2. On April 24, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. 2 Yukon’s Motion is now ripe for review.
III. 	ANALYSIS, FURTHER FACTUAL FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW
To grant Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, the Court must
consider each of the
Winter factors. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds
that each factor supports granting Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Under the first
Winter factor, Yukon “must make a clear showing that ‘[it] is
likely to succeed on the merits.’”
Starbucks, 602 U.S. at 346 (quoting
Winter, 555 U.S.
at 20). If the accused infringer “raises a substantial question concerning either
infringement or validity, i.e., asserts an infringement or invalidity defense that the
patentee cannot prove ‘lacks substantial merit,’ the preliminary injunction should not
issue.”
Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1350–51 (quoting
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk,
A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). An accused infringer need not make out a
case of non-infringement or actual invalidity to avoid a preliminary injunction.
See
Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1359. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the patentee
has shown it is more likely than not to prevail over a noninfringement or invalidity
2 On April 14, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and orally denied the motion. (Doc. No. 112 at 76:11).
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challenge.
Natera, 106 F.4th at 1376–77. Finally, because it is only a preliminary
assessment of the merits, a “district court [does] not err by not engaging in explicit
claim construction before evaluating the likelihood of infringement” and has “no
obligation to definitively construe claims at the preliminary injunction stage.”
Natera, 106 F.4th at 1375 (citing
Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74
F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
The Court has reviewed the ’110 Patent, the Accused Hinge-Break Product,
and the remaining record. As explained below, the Court finds the Accused Hinge-
Break Product likely infringes upon Claims 1 and 2 of the ’110 Patent and that Jones
has not met its burden at this stage on its validity challenge.
1. 	Infringement of the ’110 Patent
The parties do not disagree regarding the current method Jones uses to make
the Accused Hinge-Break Product. Rather, the parties’ infringement dispute centers
on whether the Accused Hinge-Break Product follows every element of the claimed
’110 Patent. Yukon asserts that it does. (Doc. No. 105-1 at 16–21). Jones, on the other
hand, argues that Yukon’s infringement theory fails because Jones does not follow
claim element [1f]. (Doc. No. 113 at 11). Claim element [1f] states:
wherein
during the cutting step, the first insulated pad is
configured to be positioned inside a rigid container in
contact with at least a bottom of the rigid container, the
second insulated pad is configured to be positioned inside
the rigid container in contact with at least a top side of the
rigid container, and the third insulated pad is configured
to be positioned inside the rigid container in contact with
at least a front side, a rear side, and a right side of the rigid
container.
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(Doc. No. 105-2 at 42, 10:6–15) (emphasis added). Specifically, Jones argues that it
“does not ‘configure’ the accused product ‘during the cutting step.’”
See (Doc. No. 113
at 11–14).
“[T]he words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning.’”
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (first quoting
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996), then citing
Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). In patent
law “the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the
term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”
Id. at 1313.
Claim terms must be interpreted within “the context of the entire patent, including
the specification,” and not just where the disputed term appears.
Id. “In some cases,
the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art
may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases
involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly
understood words.”
Id. at 1314. In other cases, the terms may have a particular
meaning in the field of art and the court must look to “sources available to the public
that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim
language to mean.”
Id. (quoting
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration
Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Sources may “include ‘the words of
the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history,
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and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of
technical terms, and the state of the art.’”
Id.
Here, both parties argue they are applying the ordinary and customary
meaning of the claim terms. Citing to its usage throughout the patent specifications,
Yukon asserts that “‘configured’ simply means ‘made.’” (Doc. No. 115 at 10). Thus,
according to Yukon, when the claim says, “during the cutting step, the first insulated
pad is configured to be positioned,” 	then it means that during the cutting step, the
die-cutting press cuts or makes the insulated pad to the appropriate length and width
so that it may later be positioned within the rigid container.
See id. Jones, on the
other hand, points to statements made by the Examiner in the Reasons for Allowance,
as well as dictionary definitions and other courts’ findings regarding the meaning of
configured. (Doc. No. 113 at 12). According to Jones, these sources demonstrate that
“‘configure’ 	is 	commonly 	understood 	to 	mean 	some 	kind 	of 	positioning 	or
arrangement.”
Id. Under Jones’ suggested reading, the language means that the
insulated pads are positioned inside a rigid container during the cutting step—and
not at a later time.
Id. at 11–12.
Here, the Court agrees with Yukon. Based on a holistic reading, the ordinary
and customary meaning of “configured” is likely something close to “made.”
See Trs.
of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (explaining that claims in the same patent family must be interpreted
consistently). But ultimately, whether configured is closer to “made” or “arranged” is
not dispositive. Rather, the crux of the issue is when the positioning of the pad occurs.
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Importantly, the claim uses two different temporal elements—“during” and “to be.”
When read together, “during” indicates what is happening as part of the cutting step
while “to be” refers to something that will happen in the future, after the cutting step
occurs. A natural reading of “to be” in this statement is synonymous with the phrase
“so that it may be.” Therefore, a plain way of restating the claim is that during the
cutting step, the pad is made so that it may be positioned inside a rigid container.
Jones’s argument to the contrary is not persuasive, as it would require the
Court to rewrite the claim. In fact, in its brief, Jones attempted a rewrite of its own
by repeatedly rearranging the order of the two temporal phrases so that “during”
modifies “to be.”3 But the claim does not say that the “first insulated pad is configured
to be positioned during the cutting step.” In light of the claim’s plain language, the
Court also does not find the Examiner’s Reasons for Allowance helpful to the claim
construction analysis, as it also inverts the temporal element.
See (Doc. No. 104-4 at
18) (“Furthermore, [the prior art] teaches the step of placing an insulated pad in the
container, but this does not occur during a cutting step.”). While the Federal Circuit
has made clear that certain case examiner statements “may be evidence of how one
of skill in the art understood the term at the time of the application,” the Court is not
3
See (Doc. No. 113 at 4) (“These Contentions do not provide any infringement theories
for how the pads in the Hinge-Break Product are ‘configured
to be positioned inside
a rigid container’
‘during the cutting step.’”) (emphasis added);
id. at 13 (“Here, Yukon
has not even attempted to articulate an infringement theory that takes into account
all of the words of the asserted independent claim, including that the claimed method
requires pads to be ‘configured
to be positioned’ ‘
during the cutting step.’”) (emphasis
added);
id. at. 24 (“Should the Court hold that claim 1 of the ’110 patent requires the
pads be ‘configured
to be positioned’ ‘
during the cutting step,’ the prior art also
renders the ’110 patent invalid.”) (emphasis added).
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bound by the statements.
See Salazar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 414 F.3d 1342, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that an applicant is not precluded “from taking a position
contrary to the examiner’s statements when the claim terms are construed during
litigation”);
c.f. Program Rewards Sols. LLC v. Points Int’l Ltd., No. 10 CIV. 1561
RJS, 2012 WL 335660, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (“find[ing] that the plain
language of the specification and the fact that [certain terms did not] appear[ ] in the
claims outweigh the Examiner’s unilateral comment about the invention’s purpose”).
Therefore, the Court finds a likelihood that Yukon will succeed on the merits
of its claim that the Accused Hinge-Break Product infringes the ’110 Patent.
2. 	Challenge to Validity of the’110 Patent
Jones also raises a challenge to the validity of the ’110 Patent based on
obviousness. (Doc. No. 113 at 16–19). “[A]n issued patent comes with a statutory
presumption of validity.”
Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “Because of this presumption, an alleged infringer who raises
invalidity as an affirmative defense has the ultimate burden of persuasion [at trial]
to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, as well as the initial burden of
going forward with evidence to support its invalidity allegation.”
Id. When the
question of validity is raised at the preliminary injunction stage, “the patent enjoys
the same presumption of validity . . . as at other stages of litigation,” and “the burden
is on the challenger to come forward with evidence of invalidity, just as it would be
at trial.”
Id. at 1377 (citing
Canon Comput. Sys., Inc. v. Nu–Kote Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d
1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 	Then “to avoid a conclusion that it is unable to show a
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likelihood of success, [the patentee] . . . has the burden of responding with contrary
evidence . . . .”
Id. The trial court must then weigh the “evidence both for and against
validity that is available at this preliminary stage in the proceedings.”
Id. at 1379.4
“Thus, 	when 	analyzing 	the 	likelihood 	of 	success 	factor, 	the 	trial 	court, 	after
considering all the evidence available at this early stage of the litigation, must
determine whether it is more likely than not that the challenger will be able to prove
at trial, by clear and convincing evidence, that the patent is invalid.”
Id.5
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, “[a] patent for a claimed invention may not be
obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are
such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” In its
opposition, 	Jones 	identifies 	four 	prior 	art 	references: 	U.S. 	Patent 	Application
Publication No. 2021/0347550 (“Vezina”), U.S. Patent Application Publication No.
2018/0257844 (“s, JR.”), U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2018/0299059
(“McGoff”), and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2015/0330001 (“Coates”).
According to Jones, Claim 1 and 2 of the ’110 Patent would have been obvious in light
of the prior art.
5 	When applying this framework, courts analyze whether there is a “substantial
question” of invalidity.
See Titan Tire Corp., 566 F.3d at 1379. (“I[f] the trial court
concludes there is a ‘substantial question’ concerning the validity of the patent,
meaning that the alleged infringer has presented an invalidity defense that the
patentee has not shown lacks substantial merit, it necessarily follows that the
patentee has not succeeded in showing it is likely to succeed at trial on the merits of
the validity issue.”).
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However, it is “not enough. . . to merely demonstrate that elements of the
claimed invention were independently known in the prior art.”
Metalcraft of Mayville,
848 F.3d at 1367. Indeed, “[o]ften, every element of a claimed invention can be found
in the prior art.”
Id. Instead, Jones must “articulate a reason why a skilled artisan
would have been motivated to use” the prior art.
Natera, 106 F.4th at 1377. 6 Here,
Jones offers a single paragraph of conclusory argument on why a person of ordinary
skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art. (Doc. No. 113 at
18–19);
Cf. Natera, 106 F.4th at 1377 (argument “before the district court consisted
of four paragraphs, in which it put forth little more than conclusory argument with
no meaningful supporting documentation”). Jones relies on general statements, like:
“[a] POSITA would have further recognized that the teachings of these references
would all be useful . . . .” without further support. (Doc. No. 113 at 19). Jones also
ignores that Vezina teaches away from the use of cotton, further undermining the
motivation to combine.
See Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
853 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[s]urely a showing that a prior art reference
teaches away from a given combination is evidence that one of skill in the art would
not 	have 	been 	motivated 	to 	make 	that 	combination 	to 	arrive 	at 	the 	claimed
invention.”). Jones has not raised a substantial question as to validity.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Yukon is likely to succeed on the merits.
6 Expert testimony is not generally required at the preliminary injunction “stage
given the lower burden and because the timing of a preliminary injunction may
foreclose the possibility of developing ‘a fully comprehensive presentation of [an
accused infringer’s] defenses.’”
BlephEx, LLC v. Myco Indus., Inc., 24 F.4th 1391,
1403 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting
New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970
F.2d 878, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
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B. Irreparable Harm
Turning to the second
Winter factor, Yukon must show that it is likely to suffer
irreparable harm if Jones is not enjoined from selling the Accused Hinge-Break
Product. A showing of a mere possibility of some future harm is not enough.
Winter,
555 U.S. at 22. A party may not rely on “[c]onjecture, surmise, or a party’s
unsubstantiated fears of what the future may have in store.”
Insulet Corp. v. EOFlow,
Co., 104 F.4th 873, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting
Charlesbank Equity Fund II v.
Blinds To Go., Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2004)). However, while irreparable
harm cannot be speculative, it need not be certain or have already occurred before an
injunction is granted.
See Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 788
(7th Cir. 2011). “Evidence of head-to-head competition and lost market share can
support a showing of irreparable harm.”
Natera, 106 F.4th at 1378 (citing
TEK Glob.,
S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 793 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). Moreover, a party
must also establish a “causal nexus” between the harm and the alleged infringement
in order to show irreparable harm.
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633,
639 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This requirement ensures the harm stems from the defendant’s
wrongful conduct and not some other reason.
Id. at 640.
Here, Yukon alleges that without injunctive relief, it will suffer irreparable
harm because of loss of market share, price erosion, loss of business opportunities,
loss of goodwill, and reputational harm. (Doc. Nos. 105-1 at 21–26; 115 at 15–18). The
Court agrees. Yukon and Jones compete in a two-player market to sell three-piece
insulated containers.
See Yukon I, 2025 WL 1782582, at *6; (Doc. No. 116-2 ¶¶ 8–11).
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The 	record 	demonstrates 	that 	since 	Jones 	began 	offering 	the 	Accused 	Hinge-
Break- Product, Yukon has suffered a substantial loss of revenue. Specifically, as
depicted in the graph below, Yukon lost all of Customer 1’s business for three-piece
cold chain insulation, which accounted for the majority of Yukon’s total 2025
business. (Doc. No. 116-2 ¶ 31).
(Doc. No. 116-2 ¶ 36).7 Yukon has also been forced to lay off over 50% of its workforce
and scale down its operations at its three distribution centers.
See id. ¶¶ 40–56.
Additionally, at least one potential customer has requested significantly lower pricing
than Yukon offered last fall.
Id. ¶ 59.
Based on the record, the Court finds that, absent preliminary injunctive relief,
7 As reflected in the graph, Yukon’s business is seasonal, with the highest sales
occurring in the warmer summer months.
Id.
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there is a likelihood that Jones will continue competing with Yukon in selling three-
piece insulated containers, and that as a result, Yukon will suffer loss of market
share, price erosion, and loss of business opportunities. Additionally, being forced to
compete in a market with another similar product will likely negatively “affect
Yukon’s investment, reputation, goodwill and ability to expand the market for its
product.”
See Yukon I, 2025 WL 1782582, at *11 (finding irreparable harm for
substantially similar reasons); (Doc. No. 73 at 22).
The Court is not persuaded by Jones’ arguments and addresses each argument
in turn. First, Jones asserts that Yukon has failed to show a causal nexus between
the alleged infringement and alleged harm.8 (Doc. No. 113 at 25–26). According to
Jones, Yukon’s only evidence of alleged harm occurred before the ’110 Patent issued
on April 7, 2026. (Doc. No. 113 at 25) (citing
Novozymes A/S v. Danisco A/S, No. 10-
CV-251-BBC, 2010 WL 3783682, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Sep. 24, 2010). Jones argues that
Yukon cannot rely on pre-issuance harm to show a causal nexus because Jones was
legally competing with Yukon at the time of the alleged harm. The Court disagrees.
Governing Federal Circuit authority demonstrates that pre-issuance harm
may be relevant for the Court’s analysis.
See Tinnus Enters., LLC v. Telebrands
Corp., 	846 	F.3d 	1190, 	1207 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	2017) 	(holding 	that 	irreparable 	harm
“pre-dating the patent is, at the very least, circumstantial evidence demonstrating
8 Jones separately argues that an injunction will not cure the harm Yukon has
already suffered. (Doc. No. 113 at 23–24). However, the causal nexus requirement
ensures that the harm stems from the infringement. Jones cites no authority for the
proposition that an injunction must reverse all the harm already suffered by a
patentee.
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the possibility of identical harms once the patent issues”);
BlephEx, LLC v. Myco
Indus., 	Inc., 	24 	F.4th 	1391, 	1404 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	2022) 	(affirming 	district 	court’s
consideration of significant evidence of pre-issuance loss of goodwill and sales along
with price erosion).
Further, Jones’ reliance on
Novozymes A/S is misplaced, because it is a district
court case from a different circuit and factually inapposite. In that case, the plaintiffs
were “not even using the claimed technology themselves and ha[d] identified no plans
to do so.” 2010 WL 3783682, at *4. The district court cautioned that “the patent [may
be] nothing more than a weapon to prevent defendants from competing with them.”
Id. There are no similar allegations here.
In any event, the irreparable harm analysis does not depend solely on evidence
predating the patent. Yukon also relies on a sealed declaration, dated April 23, 2026,
which details Yukon’s current financial situation, as well as the ongoing harm and
anticipated effects of Yukon’s loss of business. (Doc. No. 116-2). Although this post-
issuance evidence may be less robust, when combined with the evidence of pre-
issuance harm, the Court finds a causal nexus between the alleged infringement and
harm. Specifically, the record demonstrates that demand for either party’s product is
driven by the three-piece design feature.
	See, e.g., (Doc. No. 116-2 ¶¶ 1217).
Accordingly, the harm to Yukon stems from the alleged infringement.
See Genband
US LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp., 861 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(discussing the inference of causation when “the infringing features significantly
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increased the product’s desirability”).9
Jones next argues that Yukon has failed to demonstrate price erosion or loss
of market share because “Yukon’s alleged irreparable harm relies heavily on the
assumption that the circumstances and marketplace conditions from a year ago,
including the supposed two-player market, exist today.” (Doc. No. 113 at 26).
However, Jones’ argument again misses the mark. As discussed above, pre-issuance
harm may be relevant to the Court’s analysis, and the Court finds that it is here.
See
Tinnus Enters., LLC, 846 F.3d at 1207–08 (“[T]he pre
Tinnus issuance price erosion
evidence may be relevant to show what would happen if [plaintiff’s product] was no
longer on the market.”). Prior to the issuance of the patent, Yukon lost a substantial
part of its market share and suffered price erosion. And like in
Tinnus, neither party
has suggested that the issuance of the patent somehow eliminated the possibility of
continued harm.
See id. Additionally, Jones’ argument that Yukon is “largely out of
the market” and “not competing” is not borne out by the record. (Doc. No. 113 at 26,
30). Although Yukon has lost a substantial portion of its revenue and been forced to
downsize its business, neither party has proffered evidence that Yukon has already
been excluded from the market.
Jones contends that this is not a two-player market. (Doc. No. 113 at 28). But
the record demonstrates that the relevant market—sales of three-piece cold chain
containers—remains a two-player market. “While the existence of a two-player
9 In its briefing, Jones does not dispute that demand for its product is driven from the
three-piece design.
See generally (Doc. No. 113). Instead, Jones argues only that the
Court should not consider pre-issuance evidence of harm.
Id. at 25–26.
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22
market may well serve as a substantial ground for granting an injunction—e.g.,
because it creates an inference that an infringing sale amounts to a lost sale for the
patentee—the converse is not automatically true.”
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg.
Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Further, “that other infringers may be in
the marketplace the presence of additional competitors “does not negate irreparable
harm.”
Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Although Jones proffered an affidavit regarding possible substitute products,
see
(Doc. No. 113-18), Jones acknowledged at the hearing that it did not have evidence of
any other manufacturer currently producing three-piece container.10 But even if
Jones had that evidence, it would not negate the overall evidence of irreparable harm.
Jones also challenges Yukon’s ability to demonstrate irreparable harm to its
reputation or goodwill because Yukon is rebranding its company. (Doc. No. 113 at 28–
29). Jones cites no authority or evidence regarding the effect of rebranding in support
of its argument. Yukon, on the other hand, submitted evidence demonstrating that it
does business under both Yukon Packaging, LLC and ColdCorr, and that “ColdCorr
is universally synonymous with Yukon within the industry.” (Doc. No. 116-2 ¶3). And
even if Yukon is rebranding, goodwill and reputation amount to more than a name.
For example, a company can lose customer goodwill if after price erosion, the company
later makes an effort to restore the original price.
See Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v.
CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Such harm may occur regardless
10 Yukon’s requested injunction is limited to a three-piece container. To the extent
that Jones is correct that other types of cold chain containers are ready substitutes,
the observation of a prior order in this case remains: Jones is free to sell those other
containers in competition with Yukon.
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23
of whether a product is marketed under one name or another. Here, as explained in
Yukon I, “whether Yukon is able to promote and sell its three-piece insulated
containers as the only company offering a patent-protected product or must instead
compete with Jones in a market with two similar products is a fundamentally
different market position that will presently affect Yukon’s investment, reputation,
goodwill and ability to expand the market for its product.” 2025 WL 1782582, at *11.
Finally, 	Jones 	argues 	that 	“Yukon 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	a 	presumption 	of
irreparable harm even if Yukon is able to show likelihood of success on the merits,”
and that “lost sales alone” cannot support a finding of irreparable harm. (Doc. No.
113 at 29). Neither argument changes the Court’s analysis. There is no presumption
of irreparable harm upon a finding that a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits
of a patent infringement claim.
See Robert Bosch LLC, 659 F.3d at 1149;
see also
Metalcraft of Mayville, 848 F.3d at 1368. The Court is not applying a presumption of
irreparable harm, and as discussed above, the record demonstrates that absent an
injunction, Yukon is likely to suffer far more than lost sales alone.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a likelihood of irreparable harm
sufficient to support a preliminary injunction.
C. Balance of the Equities and Hardships
Turning to the third
Winter factor, the Court must balance the equities and
hardships between the parties.
Winter, 555 U.S. at 21. Here, the Court finds the third
factor again favors Yukon. As the Court previously explained in
Yukon I, because
Yukon and Jones are direct competitors in a two-player market, the presence or
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absence of an injunction will affect both companies. Yukon and Jones both cite
possible termination of employees and financial hardships as potential results of the
Court’s decision. While the Court in no way wishes to minimize the difficult business
decisions Jones may face because of the injunction, absent Court intervention, Yukon
faces more drastic effects, including possibly being forced to close its doors. (Doc. No.
116-2 ¶ 39). Additionally, as the Court noted in
Yukon I, the balancing of the equities
favors Yukon because Yukon has proven that Jones is likely infringing the ‘110
Patent. Yukon is, therefore, in the more “equitable” position.
See Yukon I, 2025 WL
1782582, at *12.
D. Public Interest
Finally, under the fourth
Winter factor, the Court must consider whether the
injunction is in the public interest.
Winter, 555 U.S. at 21. In doing so, “the district
court should focus on whether a critical public interest would be injured by the grant
of injunctive relief.”
Metalcraft of Mayville, 848 F.3d at 1369 (citing
Hybritech Inc. v.
Abbott Lab’ys, 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Jones argues that this factor
weighs heavily against the injunction because of the impact on third parties. (Doc.
No. 113 at 31). Specifically, Jones focuses on one customer, Taylor’s Corporation, and
argues that “Taylor’s Corporation’s supply chain would experience major disruptions
and it likely would be forced to undergo a RFP process to find an alternative supplier
that would take weeks at a minimum.”
Id. The Court is not persuaded by Jones’s
argument. Yukon indicates that it has enough product on hand and can scale up
operations in time “sufficient to prevent any disruption in the marketplace.” (Doc. No.
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116-2 ¶¶ 25–26). At the same time, Jones estimates that it could take up to three
weeks before Taylor depletes its existing stock. (Doc. No. 113-17 ¶ 16).11 The Court
finds that to the extent that there is a public interest in the availability of three-piece
insulated containers, it can be met by Yukon. Additionally, as explained in
Yukon I,
there is a public “interest in protecting the rights of patent holders, which encourage
and support innovation and commercial progress.”
Yukon I, 2025 WL 1782582, at
*13. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of an injunction.
E. Preservation of the Status Quo
Separately, Jones also argues that granting an injunction will upset rather
than preserve the status quo. (Doc. No. 113 at 8–9). The Court finds
BlephEx, LLC v.
Myco Indus., Inc., 24 F.4th 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2022) instructive. In
BlephEx, LLC, the
Federal Circuit explained that “preservation of the status quo is not the sole aim of
preliminary injunctions,” nor is it “an overriding concern that trumps consideration
of the four preliminary injunction factors.” 24 F.4th at 1405. Indeed, “[e]ven where a
patent is applied for and granted after the allegedly infringing product enters the
market, a preliminary injunction may still be used to prevent future trespasses on
11 The Court acknowledges that Jones estimates “certain sizes [of the Accused Hinge-
Break- Product] at specific locations [may be depleted] within as little as three
business days.” (Doc. No. 113-17 ¶ 16). Taylor also submitted an Affidavit stating that
“[i]f [Jones] were prohibited from selling the [Accused Hinge-Break Product], Taylor
would experience a major disruption in its supply chain.” (Doc. No. 113-18 ¶ 10).
However, the record establishes Yukon has sufficient three-piece product to prevent
disruption of the marketplace. To the extent Taylor wishes to engage in an RFP or
purchase non-three-piece cold chain packaging, it remains free to do so.
See (Doc. No.
113-18 ¶¶ 5, 8). Further, Taylor is not the ultimate user of the Accused Hinge-Break
Product. Rather, it is a supplier. (Doc. No. 113-18 ¶ 3). There is nothing in the record
from a user of the cold chain packaging that rebuts Yukon’s statements.
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26
the patent, so long as the district court correctly applies the relevant factors.”
Id. at
1404. Here, the Court finds Jones’s status quo argument unavailing, especially
considering that all four
Winter factors weigh in favor of issuing an injunction.
For the reasons explained herein, a preliminary injunction is warranted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	(Doc. 	No. 	105) 	is
GRANTED;
2. 	The Court hereby enters a preliminary injunction during the pendency of
this matter as follows: Defendant and its agents, officers, employees,
attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with Defendant,
including but not limited to Jones Nonwovens and the Jones Family of
Companies, Inc., are enjoined from making, offering for sale, selling, using
or advertising 	the “Accused Hinge-Break Product” as described above (in
any size); and
3. 	Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, Plaintiff shall post a bond in
the amount of $10,000 as security to pay the costs and damages of any party
found to be wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: May 8, 2026
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