Walker v. Dismukes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 3:25-cv-00368-MR
HENRY WALKER, )
)
Petitioner, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
LESLIE COOLEY DISMUKES,1 )
Secretary of the North Carolina )
Department of Adult Correction, )
)
Respondent. )
________________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Henry Walker (herein
“Petitioner”) on June 2, 2025. [Doc. 1]. Also before the Court are the
Petitioner’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [Doc. 2], and Motion to
Compel Release of Information. [Doc. 5].
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina. The Petitioner
is serving a consolidated sentence of 238 to 298 months of incarceration
1 Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts requires that “the petition must name as respondent the state officer who has
custody” of the petitioner. Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. North Carolina law mandates
that the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction (NCDAC) is the
custodian of all state inmates. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-4 (2023). Accordingly, Leslie Cooley
Dismukes, the current Secretary of the NCDAC, is the proper Respondent in this action.
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imposed by the Anson County Superior Court following a jury trial and his
convictions for attempted first degree murder, robbery with a dangerous
weapon, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
bodily injury, and possession of a firearm by a felon. [Doc. 1 at 12]. The
Petitioner appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals which affirmed
his convictions and sentence. State v. Walker, No. COA23-681 (N.C. App.
Mar. 19, 2024) (unpublished); [Doc. 1-1 at pp. 12-25]. Petitioner sought
further direct review in the North Carolina Supreme Court which denied his
petition for discretionary review on May 21, 2024. State v. Walker, No.
84P24 (N.C. 2024) (Docket Sheet); [Doc. 1-1 at 11]. The Petitioner did not
seek further direct review in the U.S. Supreme Court or file for any post-
conviction collateral relief in state court. [Doc. 1 at 14]. Petitioner filed his
federal habeas action in this Court on June 2, 2025. [Doc. 1].
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts surrounding the Petitioner’s convictions were summarized by
the North Carolina Court of Appeals as follows:
In June 2021, [Petitioner] pawned two chains to 74-year-
old Henry Colson. A few weeks later, on 13 July 2021, [Petitioner]
called Colson several times asking for the return of the chains.
Colson and a girlfriend were traveling back from the beach; when
they arrived at Colson’s Wadesboro home, [Petitioner] was
waiting. As Colson’s girlfriend slept in his truck, [Petitioner]
followed Colson into the house demanding the return of the
chains. Colson started toward his bedroom to get the chains:
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“[W]hen I got to the door, [Petitioner] shot me. When he shot me,
I tried to close the door on him, and that’s when he shot through
the door again and he pushed it. And I grabbed the gun [and we]
struggl[ed] with the gun.” [Petitioner] shot Colson twice in the
back with a 9-millimeter handgun. While Colson was on his
knees, seriously injured, [Petitioner] emptied Colson’s pockets.
[Petitioner] took Colson’s wallet, watch, and $1,500.00 in cash
and fled from the scene.
As Colson crawled to the front porch to summon help,
someone called the police. Medics arrived and transported
Colson to the airport, from which he was airlifted to Carolinas
Medical Center in Charlotte. Colson underwent multiple
surgeries, was hospitalized for two months, and suffered
permanent injuries including a bullet that remains lodged behind
his lungs.
Walker, No. COA23-681, slip op. at pp. 2-3.
In his direct appeal, the Petitioner raised two issues for review:
“[Petitioner] argues that the trial court erred 1) by allowing [Petitioner] to
represent himself at trial without first conducting the colloquy required under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242; and 2) by failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte
after the victim referred, during cross-examination, to an online reference
that [Petitioner] had previously robbed a bank.” Walker, No. COA23-681,
slip op. at pp.1-2. “After careful review,” the state appellate court concluded
that the Petitioner “received a fair trial, free from error.” Id. at 2.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In accordance with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts, the Court has reviewed the petition. Rule 4,
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28 U.S.C.A. foll. §2254. Rule 4 further directs the district court to dismiss a
habeas petition when it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Id.; Wolfe v. Johnson, 565
F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2009).
In reviewing Petitioner’s claims, the Court must consider the
requirements governing petitions for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).
That section of the AEDPA applies to “a person in custody under a state-
court judgment who seeks a determination that the custody violates the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Rule 1(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.
foll. § 2254. A federal court may not grant § 2254 relief as to any claim
“adjudicated on the merits” in state court unless the state court’s adjudication
of such claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
Id. § 2254(d).
A state court’s decision constitutes an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) when the state court
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correctly identifies the “governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the . . . case.” Barnes v. Joyner, 751
F.3d 229, 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To find an “unreasonable
application of federal law” requires a “substantially higher threshold” to
overcome. Schiro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). In making this
assessment, the habeas court looks “to whether the state court’s application
of law was objectively unreasonable and not simply whether the state court
applied the law incorrectly.” Barnes, 751 F.3d at 238-39 (citation omitted).
For a state court’s factual determination to be held unreasonable under
§ 2254(d)(2), “[the determination] must be more than merely incorrect or
erroneous.” Williams v. Stirling, 914 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted). The state court’s finding must be “sufficiently against the weight of
the evidence that it is objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). The
AEDPA also provides that “a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct” absent “clear and convincing
evidence” to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). These provisions of the
AEDPA, “operating in tandem,” require that a petitioner seeking relief under
§ 2254(d)(2) establish that the state court’s factual finding was “incorrect by
clear and convincing evidence, and that the corresponding factual
determination was objectively unreasonable in light of the record before the
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court.” Merzbacher v. Shearin, 706 F.3d 356, 364 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 348 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
In sum, a federal court ‘‘shall not’’ grant a writ of habeas corpus unless
the earlier decision took an ‘‘unreasonable’’ view of the facts or law. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). By design, this ‘‘standard is difficult to meet.’’ Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). The term ‘‘unreasonable’’ refers not to
‘‘ordinary error,’’ plain error, or even to circumstances where the petitioner
offers ‘‘a strong case for relief,’’ but rather to “extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice syste[m].” Id. (internal citation omitted). The critical
question is whether the state court “managed to blunder so badly that every
fairminded jurist would disagree” with its outcome. Mays v. Hines, 141 S.
Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Petitioner raises the same two arguments in his § 2254 petition2
as he raised before the state appellate courts on direct review. More
2 While Petitioner has alleged four Grounds for relief in his petition, Ground One presents
the same claim that the state trial court erred by allowing Petitioner to represent himself
at trial without first conducting the colloquy required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242.
[Doc. 1 at pp. 7-8; 16]. Grounds Two, Three, and Four, collectively, present the same
claim that the state trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte after the
victim referred, during cross-examination, to an online reference that Petitioner had
previously robbed a bank. [Id. at pp.8-9; 18-21].
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importantly, however, in this matter Petitioner contends only that the North
Carolina courts erroneously interpreted North Carolina law. With regard to
Petitioner’s first claim that the state trial court should have denied his request
to represent himself at trial, Petitioner invokes only North Carolina precedent.
“The execution of a written waiver is no substitute for compliance by the trial
court with the statute, (a) written waiver is ‘something in addition to the
requirements of N.C. Gen. State. § 15A-1242, not … an alternative to it.’
State v. Evans, 153 N.C. App. 313, 315, 569 S.E.2d 673, 675 [2007].” [Doc.
1 at 7]. The state appellate court thoroughly addressed this claim on state
law grounds and concluded, reasonably so, that “the trial court did not err by
allowing [Petitioner] to proceed pro se.” Walker, No. COA23-681, slip op. at
pp. 5-10 (internal citation omitted).
Next, putting aside the fact that Petitioner invited the second error
about which he complains – that the victim, on cross examination, referenced
Petitioner had previously robbed a bank – Petitioner asserts only a state law
violation here as well. “Petitioner relies heavily on the court’s decision in
State v. Aycoth, 270 N.C. 270, 272, 154 S.E.2d 59, 60 [1967], in which the
petitioner objected and requested mistrial and the court found that a
statement that the petitioner had been indicted for murder was of such
serious nature that the prejudicial effect could not be overcome by the court’s
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instruction.” [Doc. 1 at 9]. Petitioner, thus, has argued no deprivation of any
federal rights in either claim put forth in this habeas action.
A state inmate may invoke federal habeas jurisdiction only if he can
establish that he is a person convicted under a state-court judgment and that
he is in “custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Supreme Court has made clear that a
federal habeas court will not review any claim that concerns how a state court
construes or applies its own statutory law and precedents.
We have stated many times that “federal habeas corpus relief
does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764, 780, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990); see
also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S. Ct. 871, 874–75,
79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). Today, we reemphasize that it is not the
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas
review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction
violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 63 (1991).
The Petitioner alleges no federal law violations anywhere in his § 2254
petition. And for good reason – Petitioner did not assert, and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals never so much as mentioned, any federal
constitutional, statutory, or case law violations in its decision affirming the
trial court’s rulings in Petitioner’s case. Despite Petitioner’s unsuccessful
litigation of his state-law claims in his direct appeal, he cannot seek review
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of them in this habeas action. As such, Petitioner’s claims as asserted herein
are without merit.
IV. CONCLUSION
All of Petitioner’s asserted Grounds for relief are claims that were
adjudicated on the merits in the courts of North Carolina and the state courts’
adjudication of those claims resulted in decisions construing only North
Carolina law. Hence, the state courts’ adjudication of Petitioner’s claims did
not and could not result in any decision that was contrary to, or even involved
the application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Further, because Petitioner has
tendered no evidence to challenge any material facts underlying his state
judgment, the state courts’ adjudication of Petitioner’s claims did not result in
any decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state trial court proceedings. For
these reasons, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief under his § 2254 Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the same should be denied and dismissed.
Based on Petitioner’s declaration and application to proceed without
prepayment of fees [Doc. 2], the Court is satisfied that Petitioner is indeed
indigent and should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will
grant Petitioner’s IFP motion.
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Finally, Petitioner has filed a motion seeking to require the custodian
of the victim’s medical records to furnish him said documents so that he may
contest the number of times the victim was shot. [Doc. 5 at pp. 1-2].
Petitioner, however, makes no assertion that some person other than himself
accosted the victim, and the jury reasonably concluded from the evidence
before it that Petitioner was indeed the lone gunman. As the uncontested
sole assailant, the number of times Petitioner shot the victim has no bearing
upon either claim Petitioner brought in state court, or more importantly,
sought to bring before this Court. To the extent Petitioner now seeks to raise
a Brady3 claim based upon his unsupported allegations that the state
prosecutor unlawfully suppressed the victim’s medical records, any such
claim is unexhausted, procedurally defaulted, and subject to summary
dismissal. Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s Motion to Compel.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,
the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (noting that, in
order to satisfy § 2253(c), a prisoner must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 474, 484 (2000) (holding
3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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that, when relief is denied on procedural grounds, a prisoner must establish
both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition
states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right).
O R D E R
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is DENIED and
DISMISSED;
2. The Petitioner’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [Doc. 2] is
GRANTED;
3. The Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Release of Information [Doc. 5]
is DENIED;
4. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability pursuant
to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases;
5. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to correct the Docket to
show Leslie Cooley Dismukes, the current Secretary of the North
Carolina Department of Adult Correction, as the proper Respondent
in this action; and
6. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this case.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: March 2, 2026
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