Littlejohn v. Dismukes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CASE NO. 1:24-cv-00073-MR
JERMAINE VALGAUE LITTLEJOHN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
LESLIE COOLEY DISMUKES, )
Secretary, North Carolina )
Department of Adult Correction, )
)
Respondent. )
________________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court for initial review with regard to the
pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Jermaine Valgaue
Littlejohn (“Petitioner”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 11, 2024,
[Doc. 1], and Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed
December 19, 2025. [Doc. 6].
I. BACKGROUND
The Petitioner originally commenced this action by filing his federal
habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina. The Eastern District Court thereafter transferred Petitioner’s
action to this Court as the proper venue. [Doc. 3]. Upon receipt of
Petitioner’s action from the Eastern District, this Court noticed that the
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 11

2
petition form Petitioner filled out to begin this lawsuit did not contain pages 8
through 13. The Court could not conduct its initial review of Petitioner’s case
without having the entire petition form completed, and thus granted Petitioner
21 days to file an Amended § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
containing all 16 pages and completed as appropriate. Petitioner filed his
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus December 19, 2025.1 [Doc. 6].
Petitioner is a North Carolina prisoner.2 Petitioner was convicted by
guilty plea in the Cleveland County Superior Court, on January 8, 2020, of
two counts of Trafficking in a Schedule II Controlled Substance, case file
numbers 18-CRS-54892; and -54896; and one count of Possession of a
Firearm by a Felon, case file number 19-CRS-142. [Doc. 1-1 at pp. 7-8, 11-
12; NCDAC Database at 2]. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of 70-to-93 months for the first drug trafficking conviction.
[NCDAC Database at 2]. The state trial court consolidated for judgment the
second drug trafficking conviction with the firearm conviction and imposed
1 Petitioner’s amended petition, in all material respects, is a duplicate version of his
original petition with the addition of the requested pages which Petitioner left blank.
2 See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=1
633322&searchOffenderId=1633322&searchDOBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersear
chresults&listpage=1 (herein “NCDAC Database”); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 11

3
upon Petitioner a consecutive 70-to-93-month active sentence of
imprisonment. [Id.; Doc. 1-1 at pp. 9-10].
While Petitioner indicates on his § 2254 petition form that he filed a
direct appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals following his convictions
[Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 6 at 2], Petitioner is mistaken in this regard. [Doc. 1-1 at
2]. After his sentencing hearing conducted January 8, 2020, Petitioner did
not file a direct appeal but filed instead a Motion for Appropriate Relief
(“MAR”) in the Cleveland County Superior Court November 22, 2021. [Id. at
pp. 13-23]. Petitioner alleged in his MAR a single claim that his indictment
for trafficking in methamphetamine was defective as it did not detail the
specific weight of methamphetamine he trafficked. Petitioner asserted that
this omission was a jurisdictional defect that deprived the state trial court of
jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea and that his guilty plea did not waive
jurisdictional defects. [Id. at 2].
The state trial court found Petitioner’s MAR to be without merit,
concluding that “[i]t is sufficient for an indictment to state that a defendant
possessed 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine
to support an indictment for trafficking methamphetamine. The inclusion of a
more specific weight is not required for the indictment to be valid.” [Doc. 1-1
at 2]. To support its conclusion, the state trial court cited only to North
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 11

4
Carolina precedent: State v. Epps, 95 N.C. App. 173,175, 381 S.E.2d 879,
881 (1989) (holding that a valid indictment must be specific enough to “(1)
identify the offense with which the accused is sought to be charged; (2)
protect the accused from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense;
(3) enable the accused to prepare for trial; and (4) enable the court, on
conviction or plea of nolo contendere or guilty, to pronounce sentence”); and
State v. De La Sancha Cobos, 211 N.C. App. 536, 540, 711 S.E.2d 464, 468
(2011) (holding that “[i]n order to allege all of the essential elements, an
indictment for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine must allege that the defendant
facilitated the transfer of 28 grams or more of cocaine”). The state trial court
denied Petitioner’s MAR by written order filed December 22, 2021. [Doc. 1-
1 at pp. 2-4].
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the North Carolina Court
of Appeals on November 14, 2023, seeking the appellate court’s review of
his MAR denial by the trial court. [Doc. 1-1 at 1]. The appellate court denied
review by order entered February 21, 2024. [Id.]. Petitioner commenced
this § 2254 action on March 11, 2024. [Doc. 1].
II. DISCUSSION
In accordance with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts, the Court has reviewed the petition and
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 11

5
amended petition. Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. §2254. Rule 4 further directs the
district court to dismiss a habeas petition when it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Id.; Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2009). For the reasons that
follow, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief and his petition and amended
petition will be denied and dismissed.
A. Petitioner Did Not Commence This Action Timely
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
provides a statute of limitations for § 2254 petitions by a person in custody
pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The petition
must be filed within one year of the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 11

6
Id. The limitation period is tolled during the pendency of a properly filed state
post-conviction action. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Because Petitioner did not pursue a direct appeal following his
convictions on January 8, 2020, his state court judgments became final
fourteen days later on January 22, 2020. N.C. R. App. 4(a). The AEDPA’s
one-year statute of limitations thus began running for 365 days on January
22, 2020, until it expired the following year on January 21, 2021. While a
properly filed post-conviction action contesting a state criminal judgment will
toll the running of the limitations period, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), Petitioner
did not file his MAR in the Cleveland County Superior Court until November
22, 2021, some ten months after the limitations period had expired. As such,
the one-year period of limitation was neither tolled nor resurrected as
Petitioner’s MAR was filed after the one-year limitations period had already
expired. Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2000).
The Petitioner’s § 2254 petition filed March 11, 2024, approximately
three years and two months past the January 21, 2021, deadline, is beyond
the statute of limitations. The petition is subject to dismissal as time-barred
under § 2244(d)(1)(A) unless the Petitioner can show that he is entitled to
statutory tolling under § 2244 (d)(1)(B)-(D), or that equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations applies. In cases such as this, the Court ordinarily would
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 6 of 11

7
enter an order granting the Petitioner 21 days in which to explain why this
matter should not be dismissed as untimely, including any reasons why the
Court should apply statutory or equitable tolling. Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d
701, 706 (4th Cir. 2002). To do so in this case, however, would be a futile
act. Petitioner’s claim is subject to denial and this action is subject to
dismissal on substantive grounds.
B. Petitioner Asserts No State Violation of Federal Law
Petitioner raises in this action the same single claim that he raised in
his MAR, specifically, the state trial court was deprived of jurisdiction due to
a defect in the grand jury’s indictment. [Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 6 at 5]. In reviewing
Petitioner’s claim, the Court must consider the requirements governing
petitions for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). That section of the AEDPA
applies to “a person in custody under a state-court judgment who seeks a
determination that the custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” Rule 1(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. A federal court may
not grant § 2254 relief as to any claim “adjudicated on the merits” in state
court unless the state court’s adjudication of such claim:
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 7 of 11

8
Id. § 2254(d)(1).
A state court’s decision constitutes an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) when the state court
correctly identifies the “governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the . . . case.” Barnes v. Joyner, 751
F.3d 229, 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To find an “unreasonable
application of federal law” requires a “substantially higher threshold” to
overcome. Schiro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). In making this
assessment, the habeas court looks “to whether the state court’s application
of law was objectively unreasonable and not simply whether the state court
applied the law incorrectly.” Barnes, 751 F.3d at 238-39 (citation omitted).
As noted at the outset of this subsection, the Petitioner raises the same
claim in his § 2254 petition as he raised before the state MAR court, and later
the state appellate court on certiorari review. More importantly, however, in
this matter Petitioner contends only that these North Carolina courts
erroneously interpreted North Carolina law when upholding his convictions.
The Petitioner has argued no deprivation of any federal rights in this habeas
action, and neither state court relied upon any federal law in denying
Petitioner collateral relief.
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 8 of 11

9
A state inmate may invoke federal habeas jurisdiction only if he can
establish that he is a person convicted under a state court judgment and that
he is in “custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Supreme Court has made clear that a
federal habeas court will not review any claim that concerns how a state court
construes or applies its own statutory law and precedent.
We have stated many times that “federal habeas corpus relief
does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764, 780, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990); see
also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S. Ct. 871, 874–75,
79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). Today, we reemphasize that it is not the
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas
review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction
violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 63 (1991).
The Petitioner alleges no federal law violation anywhere in his § 2254
petition or amended petition. And for good reason – Petitioner did not assert,
and the North Carolina courts never so much as mentioned, any federal
constitutional, statutory, or case law violations in their decisions denying
Petitioner relief. Despite Petitioner’s unsuccessful litigation of his state-law
claim in his state post-conviction proceedings, he cannot now seek review of
the state’s decisions in this habeas action absent some federal law violation.
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 9 of 11

10
Because no such federal law violation is present, Petitioner’s § 2254 claim
is without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court rejects Petitioner’s claim for
relief. Petitioner’s § 2254 petition will be denied and dismissed.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,
the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (noting that, in
order to satisfy § 2253(c), a petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (holding
that, when relief is denied on procedural grounds, a petitioner must establish
both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition
states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right).
O R D E R
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docs. 1; 6] is DENIED
and DISMISSED;
2. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability
pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; and
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 10 of 11

11
3. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed:
1/12/2026
Case 1:24-cv-00073-MR Document 7 Filed 01/12/26 Page 11 of 11