USA v. Farrar

9:20-cr-00005Mtd27.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID PAUL FARRAR,
Defendant.
CR 20–05–M–DLC
ORDER
On December 17, 2025, Defendant David Paul Farrar filed a motion to
reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 75.) The government
opposes the motion. (Id. at 1.) Farrar’s projected release date is December 25,
2036. See Inmate Locator, http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (accessed January 26,
2026). For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the motion.
A NALYSIS
The First Step Act gives district courts wide discretion to reduce an existing
term of imprisonment so long as a defendant first seeks relief from the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) and the reduction: (1) takes into consideration the sentencing
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) is warranted by “extraordinary and
compelling reasons,” or the defendant is at least 70 years old and has served at
least 30 years in prison; and (3) is consistent with the applicable policy statements
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of the United States Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United
States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The Sentencing
Commission’s relevant policy statement adds that the Court may not reduce a term
of imprisonment unless “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other
person or to the community.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13(a)(2) (U.S.
Sent’g Comm’n 2025).
Farrar argues that his array of medical conditions amount to extraordinary
and compelling circumstances that warrant immediate release or sentence
reduction. (Doc. 76 at 6.)
I. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A defendant may only file a motion for compassionate release with the
district court once he has “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a
failure of the BOP to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30
days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility,
whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). On October 25, 2024, Warden
Jared Rardin denied Farrar’s administrative request for a reduction in sentence.
(Doc. 76-2 at 1.) As such, it appears as though Farrar has exhausted his
administrative remedies.
II. 	Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
The Sentencing Commission provides explicit examples of what constitutes
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an “extraordinary and compelling reason,” including where the defendant is
“suffering from a serious physical or medical condition . . . that substantially
diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment
of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover,” or
where “[t]he defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-
term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the
defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.” U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025).
Additionally, an extraordinary and compelling reason exists where the defendant
presents the following circumstances—
(i) 	the defendant is housed at a correctional facility affected or at
imminent risk of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of
infectious disease, or (II) an ongoing public health emergency
declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority;
(ii) 	due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, the
defendant 	is 	at 	increased 	risk 	of 	suffering 	severe 	medical
complications or death as a result of exposure to the ongoing
outbreak of infectious disease or the ongoing public health
emergency described in clause (i); and
(iii) 	such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner.
Id. § 1B.13(b)(1)(D).
The defendant may also “present any other circumstance or combination of
circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the”
examples provided by the Sentencing Commission, “are similar in gravity to” the
examples provided. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5). However, “rehabilitation of the defendant
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is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason.” Id. § 1B1.13(d).
Farrar argues that he qualifies for compassionate release due to his medical
conditions and a combination of other circumstances. Beginning with the medical
conditions, Farrar suffers from knee pain, depression, seizure disorder, tremors,
occipital neuralgia, osteopenia, diabetes, asthma, colon polyps, diverticulitis,
rhinitis, hyperlipidemia, chronic ankle pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, restless legs,
gastroesophageal reflux disease, urinary tract symptoms, chronic low back pain,
cataracts, glaucoma, PTSD, substance abuse disorder, and obstructive sleep apnea.
(Doc. 76 at 7 (citing Doc. 77-2 at 2–3).) Farrar specifically highlights his Type II
diabetes and persistent seizure disorder, epilepsy, “which has been a problem for
Mr. Farrar since he suffered a traumatic brain injury during his Naval service.” (Id.
at 8.) As of October 2025, Farrar also suffers from a cardiac murmur. (Doc. 77-1 at
1.) Farrar contends that “[g]iven [his] age and underlying mental health conditions,
he is a medically vulnerable inmate who cannot provide sufficient self-care, even
in a medical facility like FMC Rochester.” (Doc. 76 at 8–9.)
Farrar argues that he also qualifies for compassionate release under §
1B1.13(b)(5), due to his sentence length, lack of criminal history, and
rehabilitation efforts. (Id. at 9.) Specifically, Farrar has no disciplinary history and
has demonstrated significant progress toward rehabilitation. (Id. at 11.)
In response, the Government submits that Farrar’s medical conditions have
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not substantially diminished Farrar’s ability to provide self-care while in custody.
(Doc. 78 at 4.)
The Court agrees with the Government and finds that Farrar has not
demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances that warrant an early
release. Many of Farrar’s medical conditions are long existing and were present at
the time the Court sentenced Farrar. (See Doc. 71 at 21–23 (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”) describing Farrar’s degenerative arthritis, chronic
ankle and knee pain, traumatic brain injury, epileptic seizures, COPD, umbilical
hernia, colon polyps, hypertension, restless leg syndrome, diabetes, depression,
PTSD, and extended substance abuse history).) Farrar does suffer from a new
medical condition: a heart murmur which may require valve replacement. (Doc.
77-1 at 1.) Based on this new condition, documented by BOP in October 2025,
Farrar has been referred for a follow-up to determine if he needs valve
replacement. (Id.) Over the course of Farrar’s incarceration, Farrar has received
extensive medical treatment, as evidenced by the 972 pages of BOP medical and
mental health records. Each time Farrar has reported symptoms or issues, he has
been promptly seen by a medical professional.
While Farrar undoubtedly has serious progressive medical problems that
require ongoing medical treatment, the Court finds that those conditions are being
adequately treated by the BOP at the Federal Medical Center in which Farrar is
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incarcerated. Farrar’s medical issues do not “substantially diminish [Farrar’s
ability] to provide self-care within the environment of a correction facility.” See §
1B1.13(b)(1).
The Court must address the federal sentencing objectives set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), which include the “nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant,” the need for the sentence “to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense,” to deter criminal conduct and protect the public,
and to provide effective correctional treatment, including education or vocational
training and medical care. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2). Courts may also
consider the advisory guideline range and the need to “avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities” among similarly situated defendants. See id. § 3553(a)(4),
(6).
On December 10, 2020, Farrar was sentenced in this matter to a custodial
sentence of 240 months to be followed by 10 years of supervised release after
pleading guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), and one count of transportation of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1). (Doc. 69.)
The offense conduct in this case involved Farrar surreptitiously recording
children and women using the bath, toilet, and changing clothes in Farrar’s
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residence. (PSR ¶ 12.) Farrar also possessed videos of himself sexually abusing a
prepubescent girl. (Id.)
Farrar’s total criminal history score was three at the time of sentencing,
placing him in criminal history category II. (Id. ¶ 78.) His total offense level was
40, which included the following adjustments: 3 four-level upward adjustments
and 2 two-level upward adjustments for specific offense characteristics; 1 three-
level upward adjustment pursuant to USSG §3D1.4; and 1 two-level and 1 one-
level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. (Id. ¶¶ 46–73.)
Accordingly, Farrar’s guideline imprisonment range was 324 to 600 months. (Id. ¶
107.) The Court varied downward based in part on Farrar’s physical condition,
mental and emotional condition, drug or alcohol dependence, and age, finding that
a custodial sentence of 240 months was consistent with the 3553(a) factors. (Doc.
70 at 3.) Therefore, the Court has already considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors in considering what is a sufficient but not greater than necessary sentence
for Farrar.
The Court finds Farrar’s criminal history very concerning. The Court
believes Farrar still presents a risk of danger to the community. Completion of the
sentence imposed will best serve the aims of sentencing under § 3553(a),
especially the need to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the
offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public.
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C ONCLUSION
Farrar has not demonstrated an extraordinary and compelling reason to
warrant a reduction of his custodial sentence. The § 3553(a) factors support denial
of Farrar’s request.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Farrar’s motion to reduce sentence
(Doc. 75) is DENIED.
DATED this 27th day of January, 2026.
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