Montana Electrical Joint Apprenticeship & Training Commitee v. Wagner et al

2:25-cv-00078Mtd12.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION
MONTANA ELECTRICAL JOINT
APPRENTICESHIP & TRAINING
COMMITTEE,
Plaintiff, CV-25-78-BU-JTJ
vs.
GRACE WAGNER, BRIDGER MEMORANDUM AND
AMENT, JONATHAN KOTKA, ORDER
KOLE MCGRATH, TRAVIS
WIXSTEN, and DOES I–X,
Defendants.
_________________________________________________________________
I. Introduction
On June 27, 2025, Plaintiff Montana Electrical Joint Apprenticeship &
Training Committee (JATC) filed an action in state court, asserting breach of
contract claims against Defendants Grace Wagner, Bridger Ament, Jonathan Kotka,
Kole McGrath, and Travis Wixsten (Defendants). On August 15, 2025, Defendants
filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 1441 and 1446. (Doc. 1.)
JATC has filed a Motion to Remand with supporting briefs arguing that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because its claims are not subject to complete
preemption under § 502(a) of ERISA. (§ 502). (Docs. 11, 12 and 18). Defendants
oppose the motion. (Doc. 15). The Court heard oral argument on December 9, 2025.
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Having considered the parties' briefs, the oral arguments and the applicable
law, the Court GRANTS JATC’s Motion to Remand for the reasons set forth below.
II. Background
JATC administers an apprenticeship training program funded by union
employers. In consideration for the training provided, participating apprentices sign
Scholarship Loan Agreements (SLAs) requiring them to repay the JATC for
expenses incurred in offering the training by either (a) accepting qualifying union
employment as journeymen electricians, in which case the debt would be repaid by
in-kind service; or (b) reimbursing the JATC directly. (Doc. 1, ¶ 18).
JATC’s state court Complaint asserts breach of contract claims against each
Defendant because after allegedly receiving the training they allegedly failed to
accept qualifying union employment at all or for a sufficient time to earn enough in-
kind credits to repay the training costs and they failed to repay the resulting amount
owed to the JATC. (Id. ¶¶ 17-38) JATC seeks to recover from Defendants the
reasonable cost of the training it provided to them. (Id., ¶¶ 44-68).
III. Legal Standard
A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court if the
federal court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The
removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles,
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Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). When federal jurisdiction is doubtful,
remand is necessary. Id.
In the context of ERISA removal, the removing party "must show either that
the state-law causes of action are completely preempted by § 502(a), or that some
other basis exists for federal question jurisdiction." Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto &
Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 2009). § 514 of ERISA, (§ 514),
claimed conflict preemption, does not vest a federal court with subject matter
jurisdiction. Id.; Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1998).
IV. Discussion
Defendants argue that JATC's apprenticeship training program and the SLAs
constitute "employee welfare benefit plans" under ERISA because they are
maintained by employer associations and labor unions to provide apprenticeship
training and scholarship funds. (Doc. 1, ¶7). Defendants contend that because the
United States Supreme Court determined in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.
200 (2004), that causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provision
of § 502(a) are removable to federal court, this court has jurisdiction over JATC’s
claims. (Doc.1, ¶13). Defendants also argue that § 514’s conflict preemption
provision preempts JTC’s state law claims.
JATC emphasizes that § 502(a) is the only provision that may vest a federal
court with jurisdiction. Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 945. (Doc. 18, p. 2). JATC
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argues that Defendants cannot meet either prong of Davila’s two-step test for
complete preemption under § 502(a). JATC further argues that because § 502(a) is
the only section that provides this Court with jurisdiction, the Court need not
consider Defendants’ theory of conflict preemption under § 514(a).
The decisive issue before the Court is whether it has subject matter jurisdiction
under § 502(a). This civil enforcement provision confers exclusive federal
jurisdiction, as Congress clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within
its scope removable to federal court. Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 945 (citing
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)). But “if the doctrine
of ‘complete preemption’ does not apply, even if the defendant has a defense of
conflict preemption within the meaning of § 514(a) because the plaintiff’s claims
‘relate to’ an ERISA plan, the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction.”
Id.
A. § 502(a) does not completely preempt JATC’s state law breach
of contract claims against Defendants.
In Davila, the Court established a two-step test for complete preemption under
§ 502(a). A state law claim is completely preempted if: (1) an individual, at some
point in time, could have brought the claim under § 502(a); and (2) where there is
no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant's actions. Davila,
542 U.S. at 210; Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 946 (quoting Davila).
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1. JATC could not have brought its breach of contract
claims against Defendants under § 502(a)(3)
Under step one of the Davila test, the applicable provision of § 502(a) is
subsection (3), which provides that “a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary may bring
an action (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan.”. 1 The plain language of § 502(a)(3) authorizes only injunctive
and other equitable remedies to enjoin or redress violations of ERISA or the plan.
The issue then is whether JATC could have brought its state law breach of contract
claims against the Defendants under § 502(a)(3).
In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U. S. 356, 363 (2006),
the Court stated that whether a remedy a plaintiff seeks is legal or equitable depends
on (1) the basis for the claim and (2) the nature of the underlying remedies sought.
“Equitable remedies are as a general rule directed against some specific thing; they
give or enforce a right to or over some particular thing rather than a right to recover
1 Subsections (1) and (2) of § 502(a) do not apply. § 502(a)(1) claims must be brought
“by a participant or beneficiary” for relief directly authorized by ERISA. JATC is
not “a participant or beneficiary,” and therefore its claims cannot be brought under
§ 502(a)(1). JATC’s claims also do not relate to § 502(a)(2), which authorizes the
Secretary of Labor, a participant, a beneficiary, or a fiduciary to bring a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.
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a sum of money generally out of the defendant’s assets.” Montanile v. Board of
Trustees of National Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan, 577 U.S. 136, 145
(2016).
In Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship and Training Comm. of United Ass’n Local
Union No. 675 v. Foster, 332 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2003), (Honolulu JATC) the JATC
brought an action against the defendant whom it had provided apprenticeship
training for four-and-a-half years on the condition that the defendant work for a
union employer upon completion of his apprenticeship. Id. at 1235. The JATC sued
the defendant under § 502(a)(3) seeking monetary damages because the defendant
breached his agreement with the JATC by working for a non-union employer and
failing to repay the JATC the amount it had expended upon training him. Id. The
defendant argued that the JATC could not sue him under § 502(a)(3) because the
remedy it was seeking was legal and not equitable and § 502(a)(3) only provides for
equitable remedies. Id. at 1236-37. The district court granted the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment by finding that the JATC “was not entitled to the relief it
sought under (§ 502(a)(3)).” Id. at 1237. The JATC appealed.
The Honolulu JATC court affirmed the district court. In so doing, the court
framed the controlling issue as “whether the restitution sought by the (JATC) is legal
or equitable in nature: only the latter is allowed under § 502(a)(3).” Id. (citing Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v Knudson, 535 U.S. 204, 218 (2002)). Relying on the
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Great-West Life Court’s analysis of whether a claim was legal or equitable, the
Honolulu JATC reasoned as follows in holding that the JATC’s claim against the
defendant falls outside the scope of “appropriate equitable relief” authorized by (§
502(a)(3)):
In order for (JATC) to proceed with its action against Foster, the restitution it
seeks must be equitable. It is not. Rather, (JATC) seeks to impose general
personal liability on Foster for the costs it advanced under the scholarship loan
agreement. (JATC's) First Amended Complaint says as much: “This is an
action for repayment of loans pursuant to apprenticeship scholarship loan
agreements and promissory notes entered into between Plaintiff and
Defendant.” There is no indication that the funds are specific or identifiable,
or that (JATC) seeks anything other than monetary compensation on a breach
of contract claim. Indeed, no funds were actually transferred to Foster—
(JATC) merely seeks reimbursement for the costs it incurred for his training.
As the Supreme Court explained in Great–West Life:
The basis for petitioners' claim is ... that petitioners are contractually entitled
to some funds for benefits that they conferred. The kind of restitution that
petitioners seek, therefore, is not equitable—the imposition of a constructive
trust or equitable lien on particular property—but legal—the imposition of
personal liability for the benefits that they conferred upon respondents.
Id. at 1238 (citing Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 214).
Here, the JATC, like the JATC in Honolulu JATC, is not seeking equitable
relief from Defendants. Rather, it is seeking legal relief in the form of monetary
damages from Defendants because of their alleged breach of the SLAs. § 502(a)(3)
simply does not provide a legal remedy for recovery of monetary damages directly
from a plan participant based upon an alleged breach of contract. Because §
502(a)(3) provides equitable remedies only, JATC could not have brought its state
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law breach of contract claims against Defendants under § 502(a)(3). Thus,
Defendants have failed to establish the first prong of the Davila two-part test and
this court lacks jurisdiction over the JATC’s state law breach of contract claims
against them.
2. Whether JATC’s Claims Arise From An Independent
Legal Duty
Defendants have failed to establish that Plaintiff's state law breach of contract
claims against them satisfy the first prong of the Davila test. Therefore, Defendants
cannot establish that § 502(a) completely preempts Plaintiff’s breach of contract
claims and the court need not address the second prong of the Davila two-step test.
B. § 514(a) Conflict Preemption Fails Vest The Court with Jurisdiction
Defendants also argue that because JATC’s state law claims may “relate to”
an ERISA benefit plan, and may therefore be preempted under § 514(a), that the
court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. However, a defense of conflict
preemption under § 514(a) does not confer federal question jurisdiction on a federal
district court. Marin Gen. Hosp., 581 F.3d at 945.
V. CONCLUSION
Defendants have failed to establish that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law breach of contract claims against them. § 502(a)
complete preemption does not exist, and there is no other basis for federal question
jurisdiction.
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Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc.11) is GRANTED. This action is
REMANDED to Montana’s Second Judicial District Court from where it
was removed.
2. The Clerk of Court shall mail a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of
Court for Montana’s Second Judicial District Court.
DATED this 12th day of January 2026.
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