Roe et al v. Noem et al

2:25-cv-00040Mtd26.01.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION
JOHN ROE and JANE DOE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity
as Secretary of Homeland Security; the
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; and TODD LYONS, in
his official capacity as Acting Director
of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Defendants.
CV 25–40–BU–DLC
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”), Todd Lyons, and Kristi Noem’s (“Defendants” or “the
Government”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. (Doc. 32.) The Court
held a hearing on the Motion on December 2, 2025 (Doc. 40), and the matter is
ripe for ruling. For the reasons herein, the Motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
I. 	The F-1 Visa Program and SEVIS
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) permits noncitizens to enroll
in government-approved academic institutions as F-1 nonimmigrant students. See 8
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U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F); 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(2). Foreign students may enter the
United States on an F-1 visa, and, upon entry, be granted F-1 student status and
remain in the United States for the duration of their status. “Duration of status” is
defined as “the time during which an F-1 student is pursuing a full course of study
at an educational institution certified [] for attendance by foreign students, or
engaging in authorized practical training following completion of studies.” Id. §
214.2(f)(5)(i).
The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a subagency of
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), administers the F-1 student
program and tracks information on students with F-1 student status through the
Student and Exchange Visitor Program (“SEVP”). Id. § 1372(a)(1)(A). To sponsor
a student’s F-1 status, an academic institution must first file an application for
School Certification through the SEVIS program, a SEVP-managed internet-based
system used to track and monitor schools and noncitizen students in the United
States. Id. § 214.3. Montana State University (“MSU”) has been formally approved
to sponsor F-1 students, and the institution has a Designated School Official
(“DSO”) to advise and oversee foreign students.
F-1 students may participate in two types of practical training programs:
Curricular Practical Training (“CPT”) and Optional Practical Training (“OPT”). Id.
§ 214.2(f)(10). CPT is any “alternative work/study, internship, cooperative
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education or any other type of required internship or practicum that is offered by
sponsoring employers through cooperative agreements with the school.” Id. §
214.2(f)(1)(i). OPT consists of temporary employment that is “directly related to
the student’s major area of study.” Id. § 214.2(f)(10)(ii).
A nonimmigrant student who “fail[s] to maintain the nonimmigrant status in
which the alien was admitted” is subject to removal from the United States. 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). A student fails to maintain their F-1 status for a number
of reasons, including, for example, engaging in unauthorized employment,
providing false information to DHS, or being convicted of a crime of violence with
a potential sentence of greater than one year. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(e)–(g). The
student must also maintain a full course of study at an educational institution
certified by SEVP. Id. § 214.2(f)(5)(i). Separately, the Code of Federal Regulations
permits the termination of nonimmigrant status in three specific circumstances: (1)
a previously granted waiver under Section 212(d)(3) or (4) of the Act is revoked;
(2) a private bill to confer lawful permanent residence is introduced in Congress; or
(3) DHS published a notification in the Federal Register identifying national
security, diplomatic, or public safety reasons for termination. Id. § 214.1(d).
A nonimmigrant student who fails to maintain F-1 status must leave the
United States immediately or seek reinstatement. Id. § 214.2(f)(5)(iv). Though a
student may seek reinstatement of his status in SEVIS, the student is not required
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to do so. Doe v. Noem, 2025 WL 1141279, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2025). If a
student seeks reinstatement or on its own accord, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) may consider reinstating a student who
demonstrates, among other things, that he “has not been out of [valid F-1] status
for more than 5 months at the time of filing the request for reinstatement” or that
“the failure to file within the 5 month period was the result of exceptional
circumstances and that the student filed the request for reinstatement as promptly
as possible under these exceptional circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(i)(A).
If USCIS does not reinstate the student’s status, the student may not appeal that
decision. Id. § 214.2(f)(16)(ii).
II. 	The Present Dispute
As the Court and parties are aware, this case arises out of ICE’s March 2025
Student Criminal Alien Initiative (“SCAI”), wherein ICE terminated thousands of
SEVIS records for foreign university students across the United States following
the agency’s National Crime Information Center’s (“NCIC”) records search.
Plaintiffs John Roe and Jane Doe (“Plaintiffs”) are full-time international
students currently enrolled in graduate programs at Montana State University
(“MSU”) in Bozeman, Montana. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2.) Roe, a citizen of Iran, received an F-
1 visa to study in the United States on July 26, 2016, and Doe, a citizen of Turkey,
first arrived in the United States on an F-1 visa in 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 27.)
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On April 10, 2025, Plaintiffs received an email from MSU informing them
that their SEVIS record had been terminated. (Docs. 4 ¶ 17; 5 ¶ 16.) According to
the email, Plaintiffs’ SEVIS record indicated the following: “Individual identified
in criminal records check and/or has had their VISA revoked. SEVIS record has
been terminated.” (Docs. 6-2 at 2; 6-3 at 2.) The email further provided that
“international students with a terminated status are no longer able to remain
enrolled in classes,” lose their employment authorization, and are “expected to
depart the United States immediately. Unlawful presence in the United States
could result in arrest, detention or deportation by federal authorities.” (Id.) Both
Plaintiffs have been charged with misdemeanor violations before the Bozeman
Municipal Court; neither have been convicted of any offense. (See Docs. 18-4 ¶¶ 2,
3–4; 18-5 ¶ 2, 4–6.)
On April 14, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit against Kristi Noem,
in her official capacity as Secretary of DHS, DHS, and Todd Lyons, in his official
capacity as Acting Director of ICE, alleging that Defendants unlawfully terminated
their SEVIS records. (Doc. 1 ¶ 15.) Also on April 14, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction.
(Doc. 2.) On April 15, this Court issued a TRO for a period of 14 days, mandating,
in part, that Defendants restore Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records and not terminate
Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records absent a valid ground as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d).
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(Doc. 11.)
Defendants subsequently restored Plaintiffs’ SEVIS statuses sometime
before April 29, 2025. On April 25, DHS announced a “new policy” governing
SEVIS records, and on April 28, the Government filed a document purporting to
set out this new policy. (See Doc. 13-1.) On April 29, this Court held a hearing on
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and orally extended the TRO until
May 13. (Doc. 22.) This Court converted its TRO into a preliminary injunction on
May 13; that preliminary injunction remains in place. (Doc. 24.)
On September 22, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing this
Court no longer has jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ claims are moot. (Doc. 33.)
This Motion to Dismiss follows several similar motions filed in SEVIS-related
matters around the country. See, e.g., Vemula v. Noem, 1:25-cv-04561 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 25, 2025); Student 1 v. Noem, 3:25-cv-02871 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2025);
Ariwoola v. Noem, 3:25-cv-03313 (D.S.C. Apr. 18, 2025); Castellanos v. Noem,
1:25-cv-00080 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2025); B.K. v. Noem, 1:25-cv-00419 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 14, 2025); Patel v. Lyons, 1:25-cv-1096 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2025). The
Court held a hearing on the Motion on December 2, 2025 (Doc. 40), and the matter
is ripe for ruling.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian
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Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The courts are presumed to “lack
jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.”
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3 (2006). The burden of
establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction “rests upon the party
asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. “Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional
attacks can be either facial or factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.
2000). “The district court resolves a facial attack[] as it would a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the court determines whether the
allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite
v. Crane., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). “A ‘factual’ attack, by contrast,
contests the truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, usually by introducing
evidence outside the pleadings.” Id.
“At all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must maintain a personal interest in the
dispute. The doctrine of standing generally assesses whether that interest exists at
the outset, while the doctrine of mootness considers whether it exists throughout
the proceedings.” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279 282 (2021). “To
demonstrate standing, the plaintiff must not only establish an injury that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct but must also seek a remedy that redresses that
injury. And if in the course of litigation a court finds that it can no longer provide a
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plaintiff with any effectual relief, the case generally is moot.” Id. In short,
“[m]ootness demands that there be something about the case that remains alive,
present, real, and immediate so that a federal court can provide redress in some
palpable way.” Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2018). A
plaintiff’s “personal stake in the action” is eliminated when there is no “persisting
redressable injury.” NAGE, Inc. v. Yellen, 120 F.4th 904, 911 (1st Cir. 2024).
Claims “based on . . . past injuries” can become moot when circumstances change.
Id.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue this case is moot because Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records have
been retroactively reactivated. (Doc. 33 at 21–22 (citing Vertex Tower Assets, LLC
v. Town of Wakefield, 771 F. Supp. 3d 80, 89 (D.N.H. 2025) (claims resolved by
defendant during pendency of lawsuit deemed moot)).) Defendants further assert
that ICE has changed its SEVIS record policy and will not terminate student
records for the same NCIC hit that resulted in the previous terminations. (Doc. 33
at 29 (citing Doc. 33-6 ¶ 11).) Plaintiffs counter that the doctrine of voluntary
cessation precludes a finding of mootness. (Doc. 34 at 14.) The Court agrees with
Plaintiffs.
I. 	Doctrine of Voluntary Cessation
“A case becomes moot . . . when the issues presented are no longer live or
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the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Am. Diabetes Ass’n
v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 938 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019). However,
“[i]t is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice
does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the
practice.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 189 (2000). “But voluntary cessation can yield mootness if a ‘stringent’
standard is met: ‘A case might become moot if subsequent events made it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.’” Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189). “[A] policy change not reflected in
statutory changes or even in changes in ordinances or regulations will not
necessarily render a case moot, but it may do so in certain circumstances.” Id. at
971.
Though the Ninth Circuit has “not set forth a definitive test for determining
whether a voluntary cessation” reflected through policy change renders a case
moot, it has enumerated several factors that indicate mootness is more likely. Id. at
972. These factors include whether:
(1) the policy change is evidenced by language that is broad in
scope and unequivocal in tone;
(2) the policy change fully addresses all of the objectionable
measures that [the Government] officials took against the
plaintiffs in th[e] case;
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(3) th[e] case [in question] was the catalyst for the agency’s
adoption of the new policy;
(4) the policy has been in place for a long time; and
(5) since [the policy’s] implementation[,] the agency’s officials
have not engaged in conduct similar to that challenged by the
plaintiff.
Id. The Court is “less inclined to find mootness where the new policy
could be easily abandoned or altered in the future.” Id.
Here, the Government argues that (1) its reinstatement of Plaintiffs’ SEVIS
records moots Plaintiffs’ request for relief, (2) ICE has agreed not to terminate
SEVIS records again for the same NCIC hit, and (3) ICE has issued a new policy
guiding SEVIS terminations. (Doc. 33 at 8, 29.) Defendants conclude that, as a
result, “ICE has shown that the challenged behavior cannot reasonably be expected
to occur.” (Id. at 30.)
The new SEVIS policy is outlined in a document entitled “Broadcast
Message,” effective on or around April 26, 2025, and has been filed with the Court
as “SEVP Policy.” (Doc. 33-7.) The Government also provides two declarations in
support of this new policy: a May 2025 declaration issued by Andrew Watson (the
“Watson Declaration”), the Senior Official within the National Security Division
(“NSD”) for Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) (Doc. 33-4), and a July
2025 declaration issued by Akil Baldwin (the “Baldwin Declaration”), the Acting
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Assistant Director for the National Security Division of HSI (Doc. 33-6). (Doc. 33
at 21.)
The Watson Declaration states that “ICE has no plans under its new SEVIS
policy to re-terminate the plaintiff(s) [sic] SEVIS record based solely on the NCIC
record that led to its initial termination.” (Doc. 33-4 ¶ 7.) The Baldwin Declaration
attests that “[c]onsistent with its new SEVIS policy, ICE will not re-terminate
SEVIS records based solely on the NCIC record that led to the initial termination
or solely on any related visa revocation that is effective upon departure.” (Doc. 33-
6 ¶ 11.) The Government’s reliance on these three documents, however, fails to
overcome their “heavy burden” of persuading this Court that the challenged
conduct cannot easily be repeated. See Rosebrock, 745 F.3d at 971 (“The party
asserting mootness bears a “heavy burden[]”). The Court reaches this conclusion
after consideration of the five Rosebrock factors.
The first Rosebrock factor—whether the policy change is “broad in scope
and unequivocal in tone”— weighs against a finding of mootness. As an initial
concern, it is unclear whether the Broadcast Message does, in fact, reflect DHS
“policy.” The Broadcast Message first provides that,
SEVP can terminate records for a variety of reasons, including,
but not limited to the following reasons:
- 	Exceeded Unemployment Time
- 	Failure to Comply with I-515A
- 	Failure to Repay the I-901 Fee Chargeback
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- 	Failure to Report While on OPT
- 	No Show
- 	School Withdrawn
- 	Violation of Change of Status Requirements
- 	Change of Status approved
- 	Evidence of a Failure to Comply with the Terms of Nonimmigrant Status
Exists
- 	U.S. Department of State Visa Revocation (Effective Immediately)
(Doc. 33-7 at 1.) The Broadcast Message continues that “[w]hen SEVP has
objective evidence that a nonimmigrant visa holder is no longer complying with
the terms of their nonimmigrant status for any reason, then the SEVIS record may
be terminated on that basis.” (Id. at 2.) Notably, however, the Broadcast Message
concludes with an express disclaimer: “this message is not a substitute for
applicable legal requirements nor is it a final action by SEVP. It is not intended to
be relied upon or enforceable by any law.” (Id.)
Moreover, to the extent the Broadcast Message does represent DHS policy,
it is not evident that this policy is “new.” As detailed above, the Broadcast
Message still permits SEVP to terminate records for reasons other than those listed
above—including, for example, an NCIC hit. Indeed, the Broadcast Message fails
to say anything about the core of this case: that these Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records
were terminated based upon alleged criminal conduct for which there was no
conviction and no possibility of jail time beyond one year.
Defendants rely upon the Baldwin and Watson Declarations to overcome
this apparent gap in the Broadcast Message. However, while the Government is
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entitled to a “presumption of legitimacy [in its] official conduct,” see National
Archives and Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174–75 (2004),
these Declarations fail to assuage the Court of its concerns. The Baldwin
Declaration attests that “[c]onsistent with its new SEVIS policy, ICE will not re-
terminate SEVIS records based solely on the NCIC record that led to the initial
termination[.]” (Doc. 33-6 ¶ 11.) Yet as discussed, the record is unclear as to what
this “new policy” entails or whether it protects Plaintiffs from future terminations
based upon an NCIC hit. Moreover, the Baldwin and Watson Declarations are
internally inconsistent, suggesting that not even the authors know what is intended:
is it that the Government has “no plans” to terminate records on the basis of an
NCIC hit, as Watson attests, or is it that the new policy precludes termination
based solely on an NCIC hit, as Baldwin asserts? Such hedging and narrow
language “falls short of demonstrating that [Defendants] cannot reasonably be
expected to do again in the future what [they are] alleged to have done in the past.”
FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 242 (2024). In short, if this policy is in fact new, it
does not unequivocally “prohibit the Government from re-terminating Plaintiff[’s]
SEVIS record[s] on the same, or a similar, improper basis.” Zhou v. Lyons, Dkt. 34
at 10, 2:25-cv-02994-CV (C.D. Cal. November 6, 2025).
The second Rosebrock factor—whether the policy fully addresses the
objectionable measures taken against Plaintiffs—weighs against Defendants for
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largely the same reasons. Although ICE has reactivated Plaintiffs’ SEVIS records,
it is simply not clear what DHS’s new policy is and, consequently, whether that
new policy fully addresses the issues presented in this case. As to the third factor—
whether this matter was the catalyst for the agency’s change—the record strongly
suggests that this is the case.
With respect to the fourth factor, although several months have passed since
the Government announced its new policy via the Broadcast Message and
supporting Declarations, the Court finds that any new policy “could be easily
abandoned or altered in the future.” A.O. v. Cuccinelli, 457 F. Supp. 3d 777, 788
(N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Rosebrock, 745 F.3d at 972). Indeed, the Broadcast
Message is, by its own terms, explicitly temporary. (See Doc. 33-7 at 2) (“This
Broadcast Message is not a substitute for applicable legal requirements, nor is it
itself a rule or final action by SEVP.”). However, because it appears Defendants
have not re-engaged in the specific conduct challenged here, the final factor weighs
in favor of the Government.1
On balance, the Court finds that the Rosebrook factors weigh against a
1 The Court notes, however, that the Government has continued to enact policies
targeting international students studying in the United States. For instance, on May
22, Secretary Noem issued a letter to Harvard University decertifying the
university’s SEVP status, thereby prohibiting the school from enrolling any
students with F- or J- nonimmigrant status. See Letter from Kristi Noem, Secretary
of Homeland Security, to Harvard University (May 22, 2025).
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finding of mootness. It is simply not “absolutely clear” that the challenged conduct
will not recur. See Rosebrock, 745 F.3d at 971 (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528
U.S. at 189). Indeed, as this Court observed in its May 13, 2025, Order,
“Defendants’ approach to these particular issues presents an ever-changing
landscape.” (Doc. 24 at 8.) That observation remains unchanged. Because this case
continues to present a live case or controversy, the Court need not address
Defendants’ arguments with respect to forward-looking declaratory or injunctive
relief.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32) is
DENIED.
DATED this 26th day of January, 2026.
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