USA v. Punch

2:25-cr-00010Mtd24.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BUTTE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHAWN MICHAEL SCHOLLER,
Defendant.
CR 25–10–BU–DLC–7
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Shawn Michael Scholler’s
Motion to Suppress (Doc. 218) and Motion in Limine (Doc. 215). The Court held a
hearing on the Motions on October 28, 2025. (Doc. 278.) For the reasons herein,
the Motion to Suppress will be denied, and the Motion in Limine will be denied
with leave to refile.
B ACKGROUND
In October 2023, the Southwest Montana Drug Task Force (“SWMDTF”)
began investigating a criminal drug conspiracy operating in Montana, which later
came to be known as the Punch drug trafficking organization (“DTO”). (Doc. 219-
1 at 2.) The DTO was suspected of sending packages containing fentanyl pills
through the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) from Arizona to Montana and
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various other states. (Id.) During the course of the investigation, over 60 packages
were ultimately attributed to the DTO. (Id.)
On April 4, 2024, the United States Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”),
working in conjunction with SWMDTF, identified a package sent from Tempe,
Arizona to an address in Butte, Montana, using Priority Mail Express (2-day
shipping) and paid for using cash. (Id.) The address belonged to Scholler’s mother,
Christine Daniels. (Id.) The package was addressed to a Nathan Daniels and was
sent from a seemingly fictitious sender. (Id.; 219-11 at 30.) The listed phone
number was (000)000-0000. (Doc. 219-1 at 2.) Prior to delivery, an unknown
person allegedly called USPS and specifically requested that the package in
question not be delivered to Christine’s address, but to a community mailbox
located elsewhere in the apartment complex. (Id. at 3.) Law enforcement
conducted a controlled delivery to the Butte address on April 5, 2024. (Id.) Law
enforcement encountered Christine when conducting the controlled delivery. (Id.)
Christine showed law enforcement text messages between her and Scholler in
which he claimed the package was for a friend of his. (Id.)
Scholler subsequently arrived at his mother’s house to retrieve the package.
(Id.) Upon arrival, Scholler encountered law enforcement. (Id.) Scholler was
interviewed and denied any knowledge of the contents of the package, claiming
that he was picking up the package on behalf of a friend. (Id.) Law enforcement
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detained Scholler, discovered drug paraphernalia on his person, seized Scholler’s
phone, and applied for a warrant to search both the phone and the USPS package.
(Id.) Law enforcement ultimately discovered the package contained 299 pills
containing fentanyl. (Doc. 219-5 at 3.)
Scholler was indicted on April 23, 2025, and was charged with one count of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 851 (Count I), and possession with intent to distribute
fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 851 (Count II). (Doc. 22.) Scholler
now moves to suppress the evidence gathered from the package and from his
phone, arguing the warrants authorizing the searches were not supported by
probable cause. (Doc. 218 at 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. Searches without a warrant are per
se unreasonable unless an exception applies. United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961,
971 (9th Cir. 2021). “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,
and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand,
the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (quoting
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Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). To be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, “a search warrant must not be overbroad; its breadth must be
limited to the scope of the probable cause on which the warrant was based.” Blight
v. City Manteca, 944 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). A search
warrant affidavit demonstrates probable cause when, “under the totality of the
circumstances, it reveals a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Celestine, 324 F.3d 1095,
1102 (9th Cir. 2003). Only a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found
is needed, not certainty. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238 (1983).
D ISCUSSION
I. 	Fourth Amendment Standing
A person may challenge the validity of a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment only if the person possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
places searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). “The burden of proof
is on the defendant to demonstrate that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005). To demonstrate a
“legitimate expectation of privacy,” a person must show that he or she has an
actual subjective expectation of privacy in the invaded space that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., Concurring). “Letters and other sealed packages are in the
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general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of
privacy[.]” United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). Both the named
sender and addressees of sealed letters and packages may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the package or letter’s contents, even while in transit. See
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 n.12 (1980).
Whether Fourth Amendment protections extend to packages sent by a
fictitious sender or received by a fictitious addressee, however, presents a split
amongst the circuit courts of appeal. United States v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055, 1064
(9th Cir. 2010) (per curium) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (observing an
“intra- and inter-circuit split regarding aliases, particularly criminal aliases” used in
lieu of an individual’s legal name). The Ninth Circuit has yet to render an opinion
on the use of fictitious names when sending or receiving mail.
Of the circuit courts of appeal that have addressed this issue, six out of seven
hold that a defendant generally does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in mail when they are neither the listed sender nor the addressee. United States v.
Stokes, 829 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Givens, 733 F.2d 339, 342
(4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rose, 3 F.4th 722, 728 (4th Cir. 2021), cert.
denied, No. 21-6186, 2022 WL 1131413 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2022); United States v.
Daniel, 982 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843,
846 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 916, 920 n.2 (8th Cir.
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1984); United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1994).
Several circuits, however, recognize a so-called alias exception, wherein
“[i]ndividuals may assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages
addressed to them under fictious names” so long as they demonstrate the fictious
name is an established alias. Rose, 3 F.4th at 728 (citing United States v.
Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 834 (4th Cir. 2013); see also United States v.
Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1303 n.11 (5th Cir.1992) (drawing a distinction between
packages addressed to the “alter ego” of a defendant, and those addressed to
individuals other than the defendant). The Fourth Circuit, for example, has twice
held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a package not
addressed to him or his alter ego, despite being the intended recipient of the
package. See Givens, 733 F.2d at 342; Rose, 3 F.4th at 722. Indeed, “[t]he majority
consensus of courts of appeal is that individuals have standing when the parcel is
addressed to their alias rather than a real person.” United States v. Coma, 2024 WL
4164770, at *4 (D. Alaska March 7, 2024) (collecting cases).
Conversely, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits recognize that a defendant may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in packages addressed to them under a
fictitious name. See United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 454, 457–58 (7th Cir. 2003). In Villarreal, the
court found this expectation of privacy existed even where the fictitious name was
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not a known alias of the defendant. 963 F.2d at 774. However, the Fifth Circuit is
split, and the court has also questioned whether an alias used solely for a criminal
purpose confers Fourth Amendment privacy rights. See Daniel, 982 F.2d at 149 (a
defendant does not have standing where an alias was used to protect defendant in
the course of a criminal scheme).
More recently, the First and Fourth Circuits have recognized that a
defendant may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in mail where they are
neither the listed sender nor recipient, at least absent some other indicia of
connection to or control over the package in question. Stokes, 829 F.3d at 52
(noting that courts “have been reluctant to find that a defendant holds a reasonable
expectation of privacy in mail where he is listed as neither the sender nor the
recipient, at least absent some showing by the defendant of a connection.”).
(emphasis added); Rose, 3 F.4th at 728 (reasoning that “[w]hen a sealed package is
addressed to a party other than the intended recipient, [] that recipient does not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the package absent other indicia of
ownership, possession, or control existing at the time of the search.”). Specifically,
in Rose, the Fourth Circuit found that nothing about the packages, including the
named sender and addressee, the address, or listed phone number “signaled in an
objective sense that [defendant] had a protected interest in the packages.” 3 F.4th at
729. The court also noted that the package was addressed to a deceased individual
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lacking any established connection to defendant, and at the time of the search,
defendant had not taken possession of the package. Id.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to definitively address the
question of whether a defendant maintains an expectation of privacy when using an
alias or an otherwise fictitious name. The Ninth Circuit has, however, briefly
addressed a variation of this issue in a 2019 unpublished decision, United States v.
Johnson, 778 Fed. Appx. 474, 475 (9th Cir. 2019). There, the court found the
defendant lacked standing to challenge a package search because he (1) was not the
sender or addressee of the package, (2) was not on the lease for the listed address,
and (3) did not claim the contents of the package as belonging to him. Johnson,
778 Fed. Appx. at 475. The Ninth Circuit concluded the defendant had failed to
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package that society would
recognize as objectively reasonable. Id. Though Johnson is not binding upon this
Court, its reasoning is nonetheless persuasive and follows the trend of the First and
Fourth Circuits—as well as at least one district court within the Ninth Circuit—
who look to both the listed addressee as well as other indicia of control or
possession over the package, including whether the listed name is an alias. See,
e.g., Rose, 3 F.4th at 728; United States v. Morta, 2022 WL 1447021, at *8–10. (D.
Guam May 9, 2022) (applying an “other indicia” approach to find that defendant
lacks standing to challenge search of parcel). The Court therefore respectfully
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declines to follow the approach articulated by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in
Villarreal and Pitts.
With the above standard in mind, the Court now turns to the parties’
arguments. Relying on Johnson, the United States argues that Scholler has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the package and therefore lacks standing to
challenge the search. (Doc. 231 at 8.) The Court agrees. As in Johnson, Scholler
was neither the sender nor the addressee of the package, nor was he on the lease for
the listed address. Like Johnson, Scholler never claimed ownership over the
package; rather, he consistently maintained—both in text messages to his mother
and to law enforcement—that he did not know the contents of the package and was
only retrieving it on behalf of a friend. As in Johnson, Scholler has failed to
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Relying on Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, and Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, Scholler
argues that “[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with a desire to remain anonymous
when sending or receiving a package.” (Doc. 233 at 4.) Scholler is correct in that
the Seventh and Fifth Circuits have recognized an individual maintains a
reasonable expectation of privacy in packages addressed to him under fictitious
names, even if that name is not an established alias. However, as discussed above,
because Villareal and Pitts represent a minority opinion in the circuit courts of
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appeal and appear at odds with the direction of the Ninth Circuit, the Court
declines to follow this approach.
Scholler further argues that he used Nathan Daniels as his alias. (Doc. 233 at
4.) Black’s Law Dictionary defines alias as “[a]n assumed or additional name that
a person has or is known by[.]” Alias, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). At
oral argument, counsel for Scholler acknowledged he had not previously used
Nathan Daniels as an alias nor was he known to go by Nathan Daniels; indeed, the
only apparent connection to Scholler is that “Daniels” is his mother’s last name.
(See Doc. 233 at 4–5.) The Court is not convinced that the mere connection to
Scholler’s mother’s surname is sufficient to establish that Nathan Danials is, in
fact, Scholler’s alias. Moreover, Scholler consistently represented—both to his
mother and to law enforcement—that Nathan Daniels was a real person; claiming
an alias now, ostensibly for the sole purpose of challenging the search, is
insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a parcel. See
Pierce, 959 F.2d at 1303 n.11 (drawing a distinction between packages addressed
to the “alter ego” of a defendant, and those addressed to individuals other than the
defendant); see also Lozano, 623 F.3d at 1064 (O’Scannlain, J., specially
concurring) (“I would hold that a defendant does not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in a package not addressed to him, even if it listed his street address and
even if the addressee was his criminal alias.”).
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Finally, Scholler argues that law enforcement understood Scholler to be the
intended recipient, the package was mailed to his mother’s house, he was
expecting and tracking the package, he intended to take possession of the package,
and he arrived at his mother’s house to retrieve the package almost immediately
upon its arrival. (Doc. 233 at 4–5.) The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive.
As an initial matter, the fact that law enforcement may have subjectively
understood the package to be intended for Scholler (Doc. 233 at 5–6) does not
necessarily confer a Fourth Amendment privacy interest; the standard, rather, is
that Scholler must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596
F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, though the package was mailed to
Scholler’s mother’s house, Scholler had not resided there for several months. At
the direction of an unknown caller, the package was redirected for delivery at a
community mailbox. And though Scholler was indeed actively tracking the
package and intended to take control of the package, he nonetheless repeatedly
disclaimed any ownership over it, instead representing that the package belonged
to a friend and that he was unaware of its contents.
As the United States articulated in oral argument, Scholler cannot disclaim
ownership in a parcel and then later challenge its contents under the Fourth
Amendment. As in Givens, although Nathan Daniels is not—at least as far as the
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Court can ascertain—a real person, the fact that Scholler knew he was the intended
recipient does not automatically confer a reasonable expectation of privacy over a
parcel not addressed to him or his alias. See Givens, 733 F.2d at 341–42.
Therefore, the Court finds that Scholler does not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the package and thus has no standing to challenge to the search.
II. 	Motion in Limine
Defendant seeks an order precluding admission of irrelevant, confusing, and
prejudicial material under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Doc. 215.) However,
there is currently no indication in the record that the United States seeks to admit
Rule 404(b) evidence. Therefore, though the Motion will be denied for this reason,
the Defendant may refile his Motion in Limine in the event the United States seeks
to admit Rule 404(b) evidence.
C ONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 218) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 215)
is DENIED with leave to refile in the event the United States files a notice of intent
to raise Rule 404(b) evidence.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because this Order quotes and cites from
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material filed under seal, this Order shall remain sealed for 28 days. The Order will
be unsealed on December 22, 2025, unless, on or before December 22, 2025, either
party (1) objects to the unsealing, and (2) provides proposed redactions to the
Order so that it may be filed publicly.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial in this matter will be reset following
the Court’s ruling on co-Defendant D’Andre Dontae Glass’s Motion to Suppress.
A hearing on that Motion is currently set for December 1, 2025.
DATED this 24th day of November, 2025.
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