USA v. Ditonno et al

1:25-cr-00006Mtd10.02.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 1 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 2 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 3 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 4 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 5 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 6 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 7 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 8 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 9 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 10 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 11 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 12 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 13 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 14 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 15 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 16 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 17 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 18 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 19 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 20 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 21 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 22 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 23 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 24 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 25 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 26 of 27
Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document 67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 27 of 27

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 1 of 27

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

BILLINGS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CR 25-06-BLG-SPW

Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO
vs. SUPPRESS AND DISMISS
INDICTMENT

RYAN TAYLOR DITONNO and
BRITNI DENAE GRIGGS,

Defendants.

Before the Court are Defendant Ryan Taylor Ditonno’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence and Dismiss Indictment (Doc. 41) and Defendant Britni Denae Griggs’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 44). Both Defendants seek to suppress all evidence
obtained as a result of a traffic stop on July 9, 2024, and to dismiss the Indictment
(Doc. 2), asserting that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. (See Docs. 42, 45). Ditonno contends that the initial traffic stop lacked
reasonable suspicion, that the stop was unlawfully prolonged, and that the
subsequent searches of the vehicle and storage unit were improper as probationary
searches or searches incident to arrest. Griggs joins in Ditonno’s arguments and
additionally asserts that her consent to search was coerced. The Government

opposes the Motions. (Doc. 51).

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 2 of 27

The Court held a hearing on January 23, 2026, at which three law enforcement
witnesses testified. The Court finds no material facts in dispute based on the parties’
briefing, the witnesses’ testimony, and related video footage.

For the following reasons, the Court denies both Motions.

L Background

On July 9, 2024, a confidential source told law enforcement that “Ryan” and
“Britni” were living in and selling drugs from a storage unit—possibly First
Interstate Storage—near Honda & Marine off Goodman Drive in Billings. (Doc.
42-1 at 1; Doc. 42-2 at 1). The source stated they were driving an older Ford F-150,
“believed to be tan in color.” (Doc. 42-1 at 1). The source also provided telephone
numbers for both individuals, and officers confirmed the numbers belonged to Ryan
Ditonno and Britni Griggs. (/d.).

Billings Police Department (“BPD”) Detective Steve Hallam (“Hallam”)
discovered that Ditonno was on parole and had an active $500 Billings Municipal
Court warrant for traffic violations. (Doc. 42-2 at 1). Hallam went to First Interstate
Storage at 2145 Goodman Lane to look for Ditonno or Griggs and to locate the
“tan/gold” pickup truck. (Jd.). The storage company confirmed that neither
individual rented a unit there. (/d.). Hallam then noted another storage facility—

My Place Storage—across the street. (/d.). While at First Interstate Storage, he

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 3 of 27

observed an older F-150 exiting My Place Storage. (/d.). He saw two occupants
and noted the driver was female but could not identify either person. (/d.).

Hallam followed the vehicle and asked BPD Officer James Catlin (“Catlin”)
to run the license plate. (Doc. 42-3 at 1). The temporary plate returned as “inactive,”
prompting BPD Officer Travis Fjetland (“Fjetland”) to initiate a traffic stop. (Id.;
Doc. 42-1 at 1). After stopping the truck, Fjetland advised the female driver that the
stop was due to the inactive plate and asked both occupants to identify themselves.
(Doc. 43, Ex. 505 at 0:21-1:04 [hereinafter Ex. 505]). The driver identified herself
as Britni Griggs. (/d. at 0:55-0:57). The male passenger falsely identified himself
as “James from Oklahoma.” (/d. at 1:04-06).

While Fjetland spoke with Griggs, Hallam approached the passenger side.
(Doc. 43, Ex. 506 at 1:10-1:30 [hereinafter Ex. 506]). Fjetland signaled that the
vehicle matched the source’s description and informed Hallam that the passenger
had provided a false name. (/d. at 1:10-1:22; Doc. 42-2 at 1). Hallam testified that
he immediately recognized Ditonno from previous interactions. Within two minutes
of the stop, Hallam ordered Ditonno out of the vehicle, handcuffed him, advised him
of his Miranda rights, and placed him under arrest. (Ex. 506 at 1:22-2:40).

Ditonno invoked his right to counsel. (/d. at 2:24-27). During a search
incident to arrest, Hallam found a small amount of methamphetamine, a digital scale,

knives, and cash in Ditonno’s pockets. (Jd. at 2:30-4:05; Doc. 42-2 at 1). Hallam

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 4 of 27

informed Ditonno that he was being arrested on the municipal warrant and for
absconding probation. (Ex. 506 at 4:55-5:03).

While Hallam searched Ditonno, Fjetland continued speaking with Griggs.
(Ex. 505 at 2:26-5:40). Griggs stated the truck did not belong to her or to Ditonno
and that she had been using it for about a week. (/d. at 2:37-2:51). Fjetland asked
her to exit the vehicle and read her Miranda rights. (Id. at 3:04-4:12).

When asked about drugs in the vehicle, Griggs initially hesitated but then
admitted she had some “personal stuff.” (Jd. at 4:30-35). She voluntarily retrieved
her backpack, handed it to officers, and consented to its search, including providing
the combination to a locked box inside. (/d. at 5:05-6:45).

Griggs stated that she had come from her storage unit. (/d. at 7:32-51).
Hallam confronted her with the source’s information and suggested there could be
leniency if she was truthful. (/d. at 8:05-9:04). She admitted there were a couple of
ounces of methamphetamine in the storage unit but was vague about its exact
location and the extent of her access. (/d. at 9:29-58). After Hallam pressed her,
she provided the unit number and described where she last saw the drugs. (Jd. at
9:55-10:56).

Fjetland asked for consent to search the entire truck. (/d. at 11:03-10). Griggs
began crying, saying she had never experienced anything like this. (Ex. 506 at

11:01-17). Hallam moved her to his vehicle, telling her she was not under arrest but

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 5 of 27

was being separated from Ditonno and placed somewhere cooler. (Jd. at 11:20-
12:15). He added that he would leave the door open for her. (/d. at 11:58—12:01).
She continued to cry. (Jd. at 12:12-58). Hallam again confronted her with
information about their drug trafficking, and she acknowledged picking up
individuals from the bus station. (/d. at 12:52-13:22).

Griggs then described the most recent drug delivery and confirmed they
expected five pounds. (/d. at 15:15-17:19). She continued answering questions
about their trafficking activities, including that methamphetamine was currently
stored in the unit. (/d. at 17:20—22:03). She provided the gate code, admitted she
had a key to the unit, and estimated there was a “pound or two left.” (/d. at 22:11-
23:28). When asked if she would give written consent to search the unit, she agreed
and ultimately signed written consent forms for both the unit and the vehicle. (/d. at
25:03-12; Doc. 42-1 at 2; Doc. 42-2 at 2).

Ditonno later requested to speak with Hallam. (Ex. 505 at 25:36-40). Hallam
reminded him that he had invoked his right to remain silent and that they would not
discuss the drug investigation. (Ex. 506 at 26:50-27:03). Ditonno asked to speak
privately and waived his right to counsel. (/d. at 27:03-17).

Hallam confronted him with the trafficking information. (/d. at 28:26-29:42).
Ditonno asked to hug Griggs, and Hallam responded that he first wanted to know

what was in the storage unit. (/d. at 29:41-48). Ditonno denied knowing what was

Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document67 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 6of27

in the unit, and then stated, “The blues are coming in from Denver. . . . You know
me from the past, I sell dope. . . . I don’t sell blues.” (/d. at 29:49-31:45). He
admitted to receiving six pounds of methamphetamine the previous week and five
pounds during the prior shipment. (/d. at 31:56-32:22). He again conditioned
further cooperation on being allowed to hug Griggs. (/d. at 32:55-33:05). He
estimated that one to two pounds remained, possibly in the storage unit. (Jd. at
33:11-41).

After Griggs and Ditonno embraced, the officers discussed the upcoming
search of the storage unit. (/d. at 34:15-35:30). Hallam then explained to Ditonno
that he retained some degree of an expectation of privacy in his belongings inside
the unit. (/d. at 35:31-37:02). Ditonno verbally consented to a search of his
belongings in the unit but then invoked his right to counsel rather than sign a written
consent form. (/d. at 37:02—25).

Following Griggs’s consent to search the vehicle, BPD Officers Michael
Beechie (“Beechie”’) and Catlin conducted the search. (Doc. 42-3 at 1; Doc. 42-4 at
1-2). They found a locked safe, which Griggs unlocked, containing over $7,000
cash. (Doc. 42-4 at 1; Doc. 42-1 at 2). They also found a locked soft-sided case on
the passenger floorboard. (Doc. 42-4 at 1). Hallam cut it open in front of Ditonno,
discovering approximately half a pound of methamphetamine, several fentanyl pills,

and drug paraphernalia. (Ex. 505 at 43:52-44:12; Doc. 42-1 at 2). Both Griggs and

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 7 of 27

Ditonno denied ownership of the case. (Ex. 505 at 40:44-43:30, 43:42-47).
Ditonno was transported to jail based on the probation violation and the outstanding
warrant. (Ex. 506 at 44:30-46:03; Doc. 42-2 at 2).

Hallam, Griggs, and her dog then traveled to the storage unit. (Ex. 506 at
50:33-56:20). Griggs provided the gate and door codes. (Jd. at 56:21-57:18). The
search revealed approximately two pounds of methamphetamine in a metal tool
chest. (Doc. 42-1 at 2). After the search, officers returned her to her vehicle, and
she “was free to go.” (/d.).

On January 16, 2025, a grand jury returned a two-count Indictment charging
Ditonno and Griggs with (1) Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute and
to Distribute Controlled Substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and (2)
Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Il. Legal Standard

A. Motion to Suppress

A defendant may challenge the admissibility of evidence prior to trial under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C), which governs motions to suppress
evidence. The foundation for such challenges lies in the Fourth Amendment, which
guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 8 of 27

“In order to effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, [the United States Supreme] Court .. . conferred
upon defendants in federal prosecutions the right, upon motion and proof, to have
excluded from trial evidence which had been secured by means of an unlawful search
and seizure.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968) (citing Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).

When law enforcement violates a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, the
exclusionary rule mandates that “all evidence seized as a result of the [violation]
must be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Morales, 252
F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001). A defendant has the ultimate burden of proof on a
Fourth Amendment motion to suppress. United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196,
1199 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to raise “any
defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the
merits” through a pretrial motion. A pretrial motion is appropriate when it raises a
legal question rather than a factual dispute. United States v. Shortt Acct. Corp., 785
F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986). When a motion “raises factual questions associated

with the validity of the defense, the district court cannot make those determinations”

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 9 of 27

before trial. United States v. Schafer, 625 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Shortt
Acct. Corp., 785 F.2d at 1452).

Rule 12(b)(1) allows dismissal of an indictment prior to trial when undisputed
facts demonstrate that the government cannot prove an essential element of the
offense. United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 855 n.25 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1994)).

III. Discussion

The Court first concludes that reasonable suspicion supported the initial traffic
stop based on the inactive license plate. It then considers the duration of the
encounter and determines that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged because it
immediately evolved into a drug investigation. Finally, the Court evaluates the
circumstances of Griggs’s consent and finds that her consent was voluntarily given.

A. Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stop

First, law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial traffic
stop. Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs “when [an] officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). A traffic stop is a seizure, but

99 66

it is “a relatively brief encounter,” “more analogous to a... Terry stop than to a
formal arrest.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (citation

modified).

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 10 of 27

An officer may initiate an investigatory stop of a vehicle when reasonable
suspicion exists, supported by “specific, articulable facts which, together with
objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular
person detained is engaged in [a traffic-code violation].” United States v. Lopez-
Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Michael R., 90
F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1996)). When an officer has reasonable suspicion that an
individual has violated the traffic code, the stop is “reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment [and] the evidence thereby discovered admissible.” United States v.
Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996)).

The reasonable-suspicion inquiry is objective. “[I]t does not turn either on the
subjective thought processes of the officer or on whether the officer is truthful about
the reason for the stop.” United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th
Cir. 2016). Thus, if objective facts establish reasonable suspicion, the stop is lawful
“even if the officer made the stop only because he wished to investigate a more
serious offense.” Jd. (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13). Likewise, “a traffic-
violation arrest will not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was a mere pretext for
a narcotics search.” Arkansas vy. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (citation

modified) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13).

10

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 11 of 27

Here, law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of the
vehicle driven by Griggs. Hallam observed a Ford F-150 exiting the My Storage
facility with a temporary Montana license plate. (Doc. 42-2 at 1). A Criminal Justice
Information Network (CJIN) check revealed that the plate was inactive.' (Doc. 42-
1 at 1). Montana law requires that vehicles have “properly registered” license plates
“conspicuously displayed” while operating within the state. Mont. Code Ann.
§ 61-3-301(1)(a) (2023). A violation of this requirement constitutes a misdemeanor.
Id. § 61-3-601.

Fjetland initiated the stop based on the inactive plate. (Doc. 42-1 at 1). The
officers’ observation of the plate and their confirmation that it was inactive—in
violation of Montana law—provided the specific, articulable facts necessary to
establish reasonable suspicion. Regardless of any subjective investigative motives
the officers may have had, including interest in potential drug activity, the traffic-

code violation supplied a lawful basis for the stop.”

' Relying on the dispatch log for the traffic stop (Doc. 42-6), Ditonno contends that “t]he
temporary plate was not run until after the stop.” (Doc. 56 at 4-5). However, the officers testified
that they ran the plate before initiating the stop and relied on that information as the basis for the
stop. Fjetland explained that they can run a CJIN check directly from their in-car computer without
contacting dispatch, and that doing so would not generate a contemporaneous dispatch entry.

* The parties devote substantial argument to whether the confidential source supplied reasonable
suspicion for the stop. Courts evaluate the “indicia of reliability” of a confidential source when an
investigatory stop is premised on the source’s information. United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d
899, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, however, the Court need not decide whether the source’s
information was sufficiently reliable, because the vehicle’s traffic-code violation independently
provided a clear and adequate basis for the stop. Any discrepancies between the source’s
information and the encounter—such as the vehicle’s color—are therefore immaterial.

11

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 12 of 27

B. Prolonging the Stop

Next, the traffic stop could not have been unlawfully prolonged. For Ditonno,
the stop transitioned immediately into an arrest-based encounter. As soon as officers
discovered drugs on his person, the encounter became a drug investigation for both
occupants,

A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and “must be ‘justified
at its inception, and . . . reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.’” Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev.,
Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 682 (1985)). “When the police pull someone over for a traffic violation,
the officer can obviously investigate that traffic infraction.” United States v.
Ramirez, 98 F.4th 1141, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354).
An officer may carry out the stop’s mission, including “ordinary inquiries incident
to the traffic stop.” United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). These inquiries include “checking
the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the
driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id.
(quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 349). |

Officers may also order the driver or passengers to exit the vehicle, request

identification, and ask questions about travel without exceeding the scope of the

12

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 13 of 27

stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110
(1977)); United States v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005). Each of
these duties share the same purpose as traffic enforcement itself: “ensuring that
vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Landeros, 913 F.3d at
868 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 349)..

A stop “becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at 350-51 (citation modified) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
407 (2005)). However, a traffic stop may be lawfully extended when it evolves into
an arrest or when officers develop reasonable suspicion of an independent offense.

First, when an officer knows before initiating a stop that a passenger has an
outstanding warrant, that warrant provides an independent and sufficient basis for
arrest once the officer encounters that passenger. See Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633,
640 (9th Cir. 2005). An arrest pursuant to a warrant satisfies the Fourth Amendment
so long as the officer has “a good faith, reasonable belief that the arrestee was the
subject of the warrant.” Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th
Cir. 2014).

Once a lawful arrest occurs, the Rodriguez traffic-stop analysis no longer
governs the officer’s conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, No. 4:17-CR-033,

2017 WL 3723641, at *2 (D. Idaho Aug. 29, 2017) (holding that once the defendant

13

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 14 of 27

was arrested, “the traffic stop was transformed into an arrest situation and Rodriguez
no longer applies”); United States v. Wright, No. 2:21-cr-00024-APG, 2023 WL
6121848, at *6 n.2 (D. Nev. Aug. 15, 2023) (“Once [the defendant] was under arrest,
the stop was no longer a Terry stop and thus, officers could not have prolonged the
stop.”). After the stop transitions into an arrest, the Fourth Amendment does not
require officers to issue a citation—or even mention the traffic infraction—for the
encounter to remain lawful. See United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 717 (9th Cir.
2005).

Second, officers may lawfully extend a traffic stop “to conduct an
investigation into matters other than the original traffic violation” when they develop
“reasonable suspicion of an independent offense.” Landeros, 913 F.3d at 867.

Here, the traffic stop was not prolonged; it shifted almost immediately into a
drug investigation. Hallam knew before the stop that Ditonno had an outstanding
warrant. (Doc. 42-2 at 1; see also Doc. 42 at 15 (“Discovery demonstrates the
Officers knew [Ditonno] had a $500 municipal court warrant.”)). Based on his prior
interactions with Ditonno and information from the confidential source, Hallam had
a good faith, reasonable belief that Ditonno was the passenger as soon as he reached
the window. Once he recognized Ditonno—which he testified occurred immediately
upon reaching the window—he had independent legal authority to arrest him. At

that point, the Fourth Amendment permitted Hallam to detain Ditonno for the arrest

14

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 15 of 27

and conduct a search incident to that arrest.> That arrest, supported by the warrant,
terminated the traffic-stop mission as to Ditonno.

As for Griggs, Fjetland initially performed routine traffic-stop tasks: he
explained the reason for the stop, requested her license, registration, and insurance,
and asked both occupants to identify themselves. (Ex. 505 at 0:25-1:28). While
Griggs was still searching for her license, Ditonno was searched incident to arrest
and found with methamphetamine and paraphernalia. (Ex. 506 at 1:40-2:55). At
that point, although the drugs found on Ditonno may not have established probable
cause to arrest Griggs, they certainly supplied officers with reasonable suspicion of
an independent drug offense involving both occupants.

Fjetland then asked Griggs to exit the vehicle, conducted a pat-down, and read
her Miranda rights. (Ex. 505 at 3:05-4:11). After a few questions about the drugs,
Griggs quickly volunteered to surrender the amount she possessed for personal use.
(Id. at 4:14-5:10).

Because the encounter ceased to be a traffic stop and became a drug
investigation for both defendants, Rodriguez no longer applies. The stop therefore

could not have been unlawfully prolonged.

> Under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, once a lawful arrest has
been made, officers may search both the arrestee and the area within the arrestee’s immediate
control—meaning “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Ditonno concedes that
“[f}risking [his] person upon his arrest is reasonable for officer safety.” (Doc. 42 at 19).

15

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 16 of 27

C. Consent to Search Vehicle and Storage Unit

Finally, the searches of the vehicle and storage unit were valid under the
consent exception to the warrant requirement.’ Ditonno errs in asserting that the
encounter violated the Fourth Amendment because officers “could have stopped and
applied for a search warrant of the Ford and storage unit based on what they had
found upon [his] arrest.” (Doc. 42 at 17). When a valid exception to the warrant
requirement applies, officers are not obligated to suspend their investigation to
obtain a warrant; consent provided a lawful basis for the searches here.

A warrantless search is unconstitutional “unless the government demonstrates
that it can ‘fall within certain established and well-defined exceptions to the warrant
clause.” United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir.
1988) (quoting United States v. Perdomo, 800 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Consent constitutes one such exception: “a [warrantless] search conducted pursuant
to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 222 (1973).

A person waives Fourth Amendment protections only when they give consent

voluntarily, free from express or implied duress or coercion. /d. at 248. The validity

4 Because the Court concludes that the searches of the vehicle and storage unit were valid under
the consent exception to the warrant requirement, it need not reach the parties’ disputes regarding
the applicability of the automobile exception, the validity of the vehicle search as a probationary
search, or whether the vehicle search qualified as a proper search incident to arrest.

16

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 17 of 27

of consent is judged objectively. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991). The
government bears the burden of proving that consent was “freely and voluntarily
given.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 US.
543, 548 (1968)).

Voluntariness is determined “based on the totality of circumstances
surrounding the giving of consent.” United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 740 (9th
Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors to be considered in
determining whether consent was voluntary:

(1) whether the defendant was in custody; (2) whether the arresting

officers had their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings were

given; (4) whether the defendant was notified that she had a right not to
consent; and (5) whether the defendant had been told a search warrant

could be obtained.

United States v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 1989)). None of these factors is dispositive:
“(t]he fact that some of these factors are not established does not automatically mean
that consent was not voluntary.” Castillo, 866 F.2d at 1082. They serve as

guideposts, “not [as] a mechanized formula to resolve the voluntariness inquiry.”

United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir. 2004).

17

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 18 of 27

A review of these factors supports the conclusion that Griggs voluntarily

consented to the searches.>
Il. In Custody

As for the first factor, “a seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer, by
physical force or show of authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen.”
United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). A person’s liberty is restrained when,
considering all the circumstances of the encounter, the officer’s conduct “would
have communicated to a reasonable person that [she] was not at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about [her] business.” Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437).

Custody, however, is not synonymous with a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Custody requires “a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322

(1994) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). A traffic stop

> Griggs had authority to consent to the searches of both the vehicle and the storage unit. See
United States v. Childs, 944 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1991) (a person with joint access or control
over property has authority to consent to a search). Ditonno’s claim that he was never asked for
consent is contradicted by the record. (See Doc. 42 at 2, 8). Hallam advised him that he retained
some expectation of privacy in his belongings inside the unit, and Ditonno verbally consented to
a search of those items before invoking his right to counsel rather than signing a written form. (Ex.
506 at 35:31-37:25). Aside from his inaccurate assertion, Ditonno does not challenge the validity
of his own consent or argue that his consent was required. Instead, he adopts Griggs’s argument
that her consent was coerced. (Doc. 42 at 8 n.3). Therefore, the Court does not analyze the
voluntariness or necessity of Ditonno’s consent.

18

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 19 of 27

is a limited intrusion on personal liberty that does not rise to the level of a formal
arrest. United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2023). Although a
traffic stop or Terry stop can escalate into a custodial situation, “the temporary and
relatively nonthreatening” nature of such a detention does not, by itself, amount to
custody. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 510 (2012) (citation omitted).

The Ninth Circuit considers several factors when determining whether a
person is in custody:

(1) the number of officers; (2) whether weapons were displayed;

(3) whether the encounter occurred in a public or non-public setting;

(4) whether the officer’s officious or authoritative manner would imply

that compliance would be compelled; and (5) whether the officers

advised the detainee of [her] right to terminate the encounter.
United States v. Brown, 563 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004)). Being in custody “does not itself
negate voluntariness” for purposes of consent to search. Alfonso, 759 F.2d at 741.

In Brown, 563 F.3d at 415, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was not
in custody even though she and her codefendant “were admittedly approached by
five or six officers with guns drawn—and were both ordered to the ground,
handcuffed, and patted down for weapons.” The court emphasized that the
encounter occurred in public, that officers holstered their weapons once the

defendants were secured, and “that the officers treated [the two defendants] very

differently.” Jd. One defendant “was arrested, placed in a squad car, and driven to

19

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 20 of 27

... [jJail,” while the other was told she was not under arrest, was released from her
handcuffs, was allowed to travel alone, and was specifically asked for consent before
each search. Jd. at 415-16.

Considering the totality of the circumstances here, Griggs was not in custody.
Griggs argues that she “was in custody from the second she was made to step out of
[the] truck” because a reasonable person in her position “would not feel free to get
up and walk away from . . . Hallam.” (Doc. 57 at 4-5). This argument conflates
seizure with custody. Griggs was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
when Fijetland initiated the traffic stop, but that does not mean she was in custody
for purposes of evaluating the voluntariness of her consent. While Ditonno’s
encounter escalated into custody, Griggs’s did not.

The temporary and nonthreatening nature of Griggs’s detention, along with
the surrounding circumstances, weighs against a finding of custody. Fjetland
initially asked Griggs to step out of the vehicle for “a conversation.” (Ex. 505 at
13:05—09). Within minutes of the stop, Griggs was advised of her Miranda rights,
admitted to possessing drugs for personal use, and volunteered to retrieve them. (/d.
at 13:40-15:15). Except for one moment when Hallam raised his voice while asking
where the drugs were located in the storage unit (Jd. at 19:55-20:33), officers

maintained a conversational tone. They allowed her to retrieve a drink from her

20

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 21 of 27

cooler, tend to her dog throughout the interaction, and walk back to the truck alone
after hugging Ditonno.

When she accompanied Hallam to his vehicle, he reiterated that she was not
under arrest, asked her to sit inside to cool down, and left the door open. (Ex. 506
at 11:53-12:00). He later apologized for raising his voice. (Jd. at 12:24—12:55).
She appeared to understand and immediately resumed answering questions. (Id.).
When officers permitted Griggs to search for the storage-unit key in the truck, they
joked with her not to pull out a knife, and she laughed. (/d. at 17:02-12). The
interaction was largely cordial.

The only point at which her freedom of movement was meaningfully
restricted was during the short drive to the storage unit, when she sat in the back of
Hallam’s vehicle with her dog. (/d. at 49:55-57:18). Hallam did not take her phone
until he saw her texting. (/d. at 51:30-51:55). His request was reasonable given
officer-safety and evidence-preservation concerns, and he told her he would “give it
right back.” (/d. at 51:54—56). Otherwise, Griggs was never formally arrested,
handcuffed, or physically restrained.

Although several officers were present, Griggs primarily interacted with
Hallam and Fjetland, and usually with only one officer at a time. Officers were
armed but never drew or displayed their weapons. The encounter occurred on a

public roadway with passing traffic, not in a police-dominated environment.

21

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 22 of 27

Officers advised her of her right not to answer questions and her right to refuse
consent, and she chose to cooperate. She was never threatened with arrest if she
declined. At the end of the encounter, law enforcement did not arrest Griggs and
allowed her to drive the truck away. (Doc. 42-1 at 2).

As in Brown, the officers’ markedly different treatment of Ditonno reinforces
that Griggs was not in custody. Griggs herself notes that there were “[flour different
officers for two occupants, one who was summarily hand[]cuffed and immobilized
immediately.” (Doc. 57 at 5). That distinction underscores that Ditonno—not
Griggs—was the individual in custody.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding that Griggs’s consent was
voluntary.

2. Guns Drawn

Use of firearms by police prior to obtaining consent can create a coercive
environment that renders consent involuntary. United States v. Perez, 644 F.2d
1299, 1303 (1981). As reflected in the body-worn camera videos—and as Griggs
acknowledges (Doc. 57 at 7)—officers did not draw their weapons at any point
during their interaction with Griggs or Ditonno. This factor therefore weighs in

favor of voluntariness.

// 1
///

22

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67 Filed 02/10/26 Page 23 of 27

3. Miranda Warnings

The advisal of Miranda rights weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness.
See Perez, 644 F.2d at 1303. As shown in the video, Fjetland provided Griggs with
Miranda warnings after she stepped out of the vehicle. (Ex. 505 at 3:39-4:10). He
began by stating, “Alright so here’s the deal, I’m going to read you your rights under
Miranda . . . and then I’ll let you decide if you want to speak to me about what’s
actually happening here, okay?” (Jd. at 3:39-47). Griggs responded, “Okay.” (Id.
at 3:46-47). Fjetland then explained her right to remain silent and her right to an
attorney. (Jd. at 3:47-4:00). As he did so, he periodically asked, “Okay?” and
Griggs responded affirmatively—nodding and saying “mm-hmm” or “okay.” (/d.).

Fjetland further advised, “You can decide at any time to not answer any
questions or make any statements towards me.” (Jd. at 4:00-06). He then asked,
“Does all that make sense to you?” (ld. at 4:06-08). The video shows Griggs
nodding and appearing to say “yeah.” (/d. at 4:08-09). He followed up by asking,
“that being said, I have some questions, will you answer them?” (id. at 4:09-11).
Again, Griggs appears to nod and say “yeah.” (/d. 4:11—12).

Griggs does not dispute that she received Miranda warnings but argues that
her waiver was coerced because Fjetland “glossed right over” asking her to waive
her rights. (Doc. 57 at 6-7). The Court disagrees. Fjetland expressly told Griggs

she could decide whether to speak with him, then read her rights, confirmed she

23

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 24 of 27

understood them, and only then asked whether she would answer questions. Griggs
voluntarily agreed to speak, never invoked her right to counsel, and did not attempt
to terminate the questioning. She continued to cooperate throughout the encounter.
Nothing in the video suggests coercion.

Griggs was properly advised of her Miranda rights and voluntarily waived
them by choosing to speak with Fjetland. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of
finding that her consent was voluntary.

4. Notice of Right to Refuse Consent

Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is “highly relevant” to determining
whether consent is valid. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1980).
Officers are not required to inform an individual of that right, though doing so
weighs in favor of voluntariness. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206
(2002). A signed written consent form may also serve as evidence of voluntary
consent when considered with the surrounding circumstances. See United States v.
Medina-Gallegos, 162 F. App’x 768, 769 (9th Cir. 2006).

Griggs contends that this factor does not support voluntariness because
officers allegedly “threaten[ed] and coerc[ed] [her] throughout the interaction.”
(Doc. 57 at 8). The Court disagrees. The body-worn camera footage does not show
coercive conduct. Instead, the video demonstrates that Griggs was expressly

advised—both verbally and in writing—of her right to refuse consent. (Ex. 505 at

24

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 25 of 27

30:29-31:09). She reviewed and signed a written consent form that clearly outlined
that right. (/d.). After explaining the form, Fjetland allowed Griggs time to read it
at her own pace before signing. (/d. at 30:29-43:10). Nothing in the video suggests
that Griggs was confused about the form or about Fjetland’s statements regarding
her ability to decline consent.

Because Griggs was advised that she could refuse consent, this factor weighs
in favor of finding her consent voluntary.

5. Notice that a Search Warrant Could be Obtained

An officer’s statement that a search warrant could be obtained is the final
factor that weighs against a finding of voluntariness. Chan-Jiminez, 125 F.3d at
1327. The weight of this factor “depends on the particular circumstances of the case
and thus hinges on whether a suspect is informed about the possibility of a search
warrant in a threatening manner.” United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1112
(9th Cir. 2000). It weighs against voluntariness when officers threaten to obtain a
warrant in a way that suggests “withholding of consent would ultimately be futile.”
United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).

Griggs argues that even though “[l]aw enforcement may not have used the

999

specific words ‘I can get a search warrant,’” they nevertheless conveyed a warrant
threat through other statements and actions. (Doc. 57 at 8-9). She points to

Hallam’s comment that they were going to search the storage unit, Hallam’s cutting

25

Case 1:25-cr-O0006-SPW Document67_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 26 of 27

into a lockbox in Ditonno’s presence, and Fjetland’s statement that they “got one
coming,” which she asserts was loud enough for both Ditonno and Griggs to hear.
(id.).

The Government asserts that “the video clearly indicates . . . [that] law
enforcement did not threaten that a warrant could be obtained.” (Doc. 51 at 22).
The Court agrees. Griggs’s argument rests on speculation about how officers’
statements might have been interpreted, but the body-worn camera footage contains
no express or implied threat that a warrant could be obtained if consent were
withheld. None of the cited statements conveyed that a refusal would be futile or
that a warrant was imminent. Thus, this final factor weighs in favor of voluntariness.

Considering that all factors weigh in favor of voluntariness, and viewing the
encounter under the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that Griggs’s
consent was voluntary. The interaction between Griggs and law enforcement was
cordial and reflects no coercive conduct. She not only provided verbal consent but
also signed a written waiver. Accordingly, the searches of the vehicle and storage
unit were voluntary.

IV. Conclusion

Because the Court concludes that the initial stop, the prolongation of the stop,

and the searches of both the vehicle and the storage unit complied with the Fourth

Amendment, suppression is unwarranted and the Indictment will not be dismissed.

26

Case 1:25-cr-00006-SPW Document67 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 27 of 27

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Defendant Ryan Taylor Ditonno’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and
Dismiss Indictment (Doc. 41) is DENIED.

(2) Defendant Britni Denae Griggs’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 44) is

DENIED.

DATED this /@Q_ day of February, j

SUSAN P. WATTERS

United States District Judge

2]

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.