1:22-cv-00058•Mittelstaed et al v. State of Montana Child and Family Services Division et al
Mittelstaed et al v. State of Montana Child and Family Services Division et al
1:22-cv-00058Mtd19.12.2025
Gesamter Gesetzestext
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA BILLINGS DIVISION Plaintiff Elisa May Mittelstaed (“Plaintiff”) brings this action on behalf of herself and her minor children MJP, RSP, and CMS against the State of Montana Child and Family Services Division, Ashlee Walker, Debran Anderson, and Brittney Anderson (collectively “State Defendants”) and Ashley Kiefer.1 Plaintiff alleges State Defendants improperly and unreasonably seized her children, 1 Defendant Ashley Kiefer (“Keifer”) was named as a Defendant for the first time in the Third Amended Complaint. She was named in two claims, Count 3 Negligence, and Count 5 Defamation. (Doc. 80 at ¶¶ 299, 306-312.) Plaintiff subsequently agreed to the dismissal of Count 5. (Docs. 82 at 2; 94 at 3; 96 at 2.) It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to pursue the claim in Count 3 against Kiefer. It does not appear Keifer has been served with the Third Amended Complaint, and to date, she has not appeared in this action, nor has default been entered against her. In light of the Court’s finding that Plaintiff’s state law claims are time barred, however, it appears the remaining claim against Kiefer would likewise be time barred. ELISA MAY MITTELSTAED, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. STATE OF MONTANA CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION, et al., Defendants. CV 22-58-BLG-SPW-TJC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 1 of 17
2 compelled her to submit to drug testing, and improperly disclosed her personal information. Presently before the Court are the State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 101), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 104). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for the Court’s review. For the following reasons, the Court recommends that State Defendants’ motion be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion be DENIED as moot. I. BACKGROUND2 Plaintiff has three children, RSP, MJP, and CMS. Two of the children, RSP and MJP share a biological father, Jason Puzio (“Puzio”). On November 2, 2018, the Child and Family Services Division (“CFSD”) received a report through the Montana Family Safety Information System (“MFSIS”) regarding Plaintiff Elisa Mittelstaed, alleging Plaintiff had exposed the children to an unreasonable physical or psychological risk of harm due to suspected drug use. Plaintiff disputes the report had any factual basis. The report was assigned to CFSD Child Protection Specialist Debran Anderson (“Debran”3). On November 5, 2018, Debran contacted Plaintiff at her 2 The background facts set forth here are relevant to the Court’s determination of the pending motions for summary judgment and are taken from the parties’ submissions and are undisputed except where indicated. 3 Because there are two Defendants with the last name Anderson, the Court will refer to Debran Anderson by her first name. Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 2 of 17
3 home. Plaintiff invited Debran into the home to have a conversation regarding CFSD’s investigation. Based on the allegations of drug use in the MFSIS report, Debran asked Plaintiff if she would be willing to take a drug test. The parties disagree whether Plaintiff agreed, or was compelled, to take the test. But ultimately Plaintiff submitted to a drug test on November 6, 2018. The November 6, 2018 drug test indicated positive for methamphetamine. Plaintiff does not dispute the test result, but disputes the accuracy of the test. Plaintiff learned of the positive test result on November 7, 2018. She alleged it was a false positive, that she had never used methamphetamine, and that the test was positive because she had been taking Adderall. Plaintiff did not have a prescription for Adderall, but she was taking “small round, orange tablets” she obtained from her sister, who was buying them from a third-party dealer. That same day, November 7, 2018, Debran recommended that Plaintiff’s children be placed in an out-of-home temporary protective custody plan (“Safety Plan”). The Safety Plan stated “Elisa was found to be under the influence of methamphetamine while caring for her three children. This placed all three children in substantial risk resulting in the use of a protection plan.” State Defendants assert Plaintiff agreed to a drug patch and chemical dependency evaluation as part of the Safety Plan. Plaintiff signed the Safety Plan on November Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 3 of 17
4 7, 2018. Plaintiff asserts she did not know the document was a Safety Plan, and that Debran told her drug testing was required. Under the Safety Plan, Plaintiff’s children were placed with Plaintiff’s mother and father. The Safety Plan began on November 7, 2018 and ended on December 7, 2018. On November 20, 2018, Plaintiff attended an appointment with Niel Friedel to have a chemical dependency evaluation and to have a drug patch applied. During the appointment an oral swab “dragger” drug test was conducted. The result of the dragger test indicated Plaintiff was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Plaintiff disputes that she was taking methamphetamine or amphetamines. On December 4, 2018, the drug patch was removed. State Defendants assert Plaintiff removed the patch, but Plaintiff states her doctor removed it. Thereafter, Debran requested Plaintiff comply with daily urinalysis exams. Plaintiff agreed to daily tests, and Debran sent a referral to Community Solutions for Plaintiff’s testing. Plaintiff did not show up for her daily urinalysis tests on December 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10. On December 10, 2028, the Montana Department of Health and Human Services (“DPHHS”) and Debran began formal neglect proceedings. DPHHS requested the County Attorney petition for Emergency Protective Services on Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 4 of 17
5 December 18, 2018. The Petition was supported by an affidavit from Debran, which recounted her investigation and Plaintiff’s behavior. On December 19, 2018, the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granted the Petition, and set a show cause hearing for January 3, 2019. State Defendants assert the order granting the State temporary custody, along with the Petition and Debran’s affidavit, were served on Plaintiff by an officer with the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Department on December 22, 2018. Plaintiff asserts the deputy served the Petition, but not Debran’s affidavit. On January 3, 2019, Plaintiff appeared at the first court hearing held in the child neglect proceedings. Plaintiff was represented by attorney David Duke throughout the proceedings. Debran ceased all involvement with Plaintiff’s case on January 3, 2019, and Plaintiff had no further interaction with Debran following her first court appearance. Thereafter, Defendants Brittany Anderson (“Anderson”) and Ashlee Walker (“Walker”) took over management of Plaintiff’s case. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff tested positive for methamphetamine on January 4, 2019. State Defendants assert she tested positive for methamphetamine; Plaintiff argues she tested negative on that date. Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 5 of 17
6 On January 24, 2019, Plaintiff received Facebook messages indicating that Alyssa Kiefer (“Kiefer”) was posting online about Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff believed that Walker improperly shared information regarding her case with Kiefer in January 2019. On February 28, 2019, RSP and MJP were placed in the custody of their biological father, Puzio. Plaintiff does not dispute that Puzio assumed custody of the children, but alleges they were harmed by Puzio and his live-in girlfriend. State Defendants contend the final drug test Plaintiff was scheduled to attend was on May 9, 2019, but she did not show up for the test. Plaintiff asserts she was never informed she was supposed to have a drug test on May 9, 2019. Nevertheless, the dependency and neglect proceeding involving Plaintiff’s children was dismissed on May 9, 2019, and Plaintiff’s children were returned to her care. Plaintiff had no contact with Anderson or Walker following the dismissal of the child neglect proceedings. Plaintiff asserts that after the child neglect proceedings concluded, she reached out to “a lot of people” trying to get information about her case. She contends that she filled out a request for release of records on at least four occasions seeking her case file. She states DPHHS denied her request on every occasion. Plaintiff states that on March 6, 2021, she requested assistance from the Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 6 of 17
7 Montana Justice Division of Criminal Investigation Child and Family Ombudsman Marci Buckles (“Buckles”). Plaintiff asserts that based on her interviews with Buckles, she deduced that DPHHS had violated her rights and performed negligent acts, and she therefore decided to file a tort claim with the state. Plaintiff states she served the State of Montana Risk Management and Tort Defense Division by mailing notice of her claim via certified mail on September 10, 2021. On September 30, 2021, Buckles delivered a report on Plaintiff’s case, reportedly faulting DPHHS’s handing of the case in numerous ways. Plaintiff contends she never saw any of the documents in her case file until after Buckles completed her report on September 30, 2021. Plaintiff filed this action on June 13, 2022. (Doc. 2.) II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 7 of 17
8 material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When making this determination, the Court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. III. STATE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT State Defendants argue all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and therefore, they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff counters that her claims are not time-barred under the doctrine of equitable tolling. A. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim “[A]ll § 1983 suits must be brought within a State’s statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.” Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 174 (2022). Under Montana law, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204(1); Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015). Although federal courts borrow the statue of limitations for § 1983 claims from the forum state, “[f]ederal law determines when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run for a § 1983 claim.” Belanus, 796 F.3d at 1025. See also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (“[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”) (emphasis in original). Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 8 of 17
9 A federal claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is basis of the claim. Belanus, 796 F.3d at 1025. Thus, a federal claim “ordinarily accrues on the date of the injury.” Id. “The cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable. Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run only after a plaintiff became satisfied that he had been harmed enough, placing the supposed statute of repose in the sole hands of the party seeking relief.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, all of the events giving rise to this litigation occurred between November 5, 2018, when Debran first contacted Plaintiff, and May 9, 2019, when the child neglect proceedings were dismissed, and Plaintiff’s children were returned to her care. It is evident from the undisputed facts that Plaintiff was aware of the alleged events as they transpired, and thus, fully aware of her injury. For example, the bases of Plaintiff’s claims against Debran are that she coerced Plaintiff to submit to a warrantless drug test on November 6, 2018, and unlawfully removed Plaintiff’s children from her home on November 7, 2018. Plaintiff’s claims against Anderson and Walker are based on the drug testing she was required to undergo during the pendency of the child neglect proceedings between January and May 2019, alleged disclosure of her personal information and online harassment in late January 2019, and the placement of her children with Puzio on Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 9 of 17
10 February 28, 2019. It is undisputed that Plaintiff had no interaction with Debran after January 3, 2019, or with Anderson and Walker following the May 9, 2019 dismissal of the child neglect proceedings. Therefore, the latest date on which Plaintiff’s injuries could have occurred was May 9, 2019. Plaintiff’s original Complaint was lodged on June 13, 2022, over three years after the latest date that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim accrued. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is timed barred unless equitable tolling applies. Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to equitable tolling. She asserts that after the proceedings against her were concluded, the State repeatedly refused to provide her with the DPHHS file. Plaintiff argues the State’s conduct prevented her from knowing the nature of her claim, despite her best efforts to get the information from DPHHS. She asserts she did not become aware of the grounds for her lawsuit until she received Buckles’ report on September 30, 2021. Where federal law borrows the state statute of limitations, federal law also borrows the forum state’s tolling rules. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1999). Under Montana law, equitable tolling “arrests the running of the limitations period after a claim has accrued, allowing ‘in limited circumstances for an action to be pursued despite the failure to comply with relevant statutory filing deadlines.’” Schoof v. Nesbit, 316 P.3d 831, 839-40 (Mont. 2014) (citing Lozeau v. GEICO Indem. Co., 207 P.3d 316, 323 (Mont. Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 10 of 17
11 2009)). The Montana Supreme Court has cautioned, however, “that the doctrine of equitable tolling has been applied only sparingly,” and warned “against application of it to ‘what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.’” Weidow v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 246 P.3d 704, 709 (Mont. 2010). The Montana Supreme Court has adopted federal case law holding that equitable tolling may extend a statute of limitations “in rare and exceptional circumstances,” where the defendant “is responsible for concealing the existence of plaintiff’s cause of action.” Schoof, 316 P.3d at 841 (citing Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) and Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 2004)). The court explained that although such “conduct is ‘often itself fraudulent,’ equitable tolling for this purpose does not require that the defendant’s conduct rise to the level of fraud, or even be intentional, but only that the nature of the defendant’s actions has concealed from the plaintiff the existence of the claim.” Id. The court concluded that equitable tolling based on a defendant’s concealment of a claim “is only available when the plaintiff is actually prevented from filing on time” despite the exercise of diligence by the plaintiff. Id. at 840-41. In Schoof, for example, a resident of Custer County filed an action to challenge a decision made by the Custer County Commissioners during a closed meeting, which permitted elected county officials to receive cash payments in lieu Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 11 of 17
12 of county contributions on their behalf to a group health insurance program. Schoof, 316 P.3d at 833. According to the plaintiff, neither he nor the public were advised of the decision until a Deputy County Attorney revealed it during a public meeting several years later. Id. As a result, the action was filed over four years after the contested decision was made by the County Commissioners. Id. The district court found the action was time barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 838-39. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed, finding the complaint was timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. Id. at 840-41. The court stated equitable tolling applied “because despite [plaintiff’s] diligent scrutiny of the Commissioners’ actions, neither he nor the public learned or could have learned about the ‘cash in lieu’ policy until four years after it had been adopted, at which time he promptly filed suit.” Id. at 840. Here, in contrast, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff knew or had reason to know the factual basis for her claims well before Buckles’ September 2021 report. Plaintiff alleges Debran required her to take a drug test on November 6, 2018, and she admits knowing her children were removed on November 7, 2018, after the drug test indicated positive for methamphetamine. (Doc. 108 at ¶¶ 12- 17.) Moreover, Plaintiff testified that she knew the November 6, 2018 test indicated she was positive for methamphetamine, but she didn’t agree with the result. (Doc. 108-1 at 2.) Thus, even if Plaintiff did not receive Debran’s affidavit Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 12 of 17
13 until September 2021, the undisputed facts demonstrate Plaintiff knew her children were removed from her custody and that she was being required to undergo drug testing due to the allegations of methamphetamine use, which Plaintiff denied from the beginning. (Doc. 108 at ¶¶13-14, 18, 25-16.) The undisputed facts also show Plaintiff was aware of the alleged improper actions on the part of Anderson and Walker while they were occurring. Plaintiff admits that she received Facebook messages relating to her case on January 24, 2019, and that at the time she believed Walker was improperly disclosing information about her case. (Doc. 108 at ¶¶ 41-42.) Plaintiff was also aware that her children RSP and MJP were placed with Puzio during the child neglect proceedings. (Id. at ¶43.) Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that Buckles’ report revealed her injuries. Rather, it is clear Plaintiff knew the facts that form the crux of her claims by no later than May 9, 2019. Further, assuming State Defendants refused to provide Plaintiff with her DPHHS file as she asserts, Plaintiff has not shown how that prevented her from timely filing suit. Courts have held in similar circumstances that lack of access to records does not warrant equitable tolling where, as here, the plaintiff was aware of the facts of the injury. See e.g. Belanus, 796 F.3d at 1027 (holding that “because Belanus knew of the searches when they occurred (or shortly thereafter), and that they might be warrantless, the defendants’ alleged failures to respond to his written Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 13 of 17
14 inquires, even if wrongful, do not provide a viable basis for equitable tolling under Montana law”); Johnson v. Knowles, 116 Fed. Appx. 822, *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2004) (rejecting equitable tolling where a habeas petitioner knew the factual basis for his claims, and explaining that “[a]lthough he may have needed the documents to supplement his claims, the prosecutor’s refusal to provide them did not prevent him from formulating his claims and petitioning the court.”); Caban v. City of Newark, 2018 WL 2427124, *4 (D. N.J. May 30, 2018) (stating that although the plaintiff gained more knowledge of pertinent facts after he received copies of full police reports, the circumstances did not appear to justify the application of equitable tolling for his false arrest claim where he knew when he was arrested and when he was released with the charges dropped); Mooney v. Emory Univ., 2024 WL 6083390, *8 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2014) (finding equitable tolling did not apply where the plaintiff alleged ample facts to support a charge of discrimination prior to when he received a final investigative report). Finally, Plaintiff fails to specify any facts disclosed by the Buckles report that form the basis for any of her claims. She generally maintains that “the DCI Ombudsman report first made her aware that she had bases for claims against the state” (Doc. 107 at 3); that the report “delineated all the violations committed by DPHHS in handling [Plaintiff’s] situation” (id. at 2); and the report was “very Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 14 of 17
15 critical of DPHHS” (id. at 4). Yet she does not assert that the report revealed any previously unknown fact or injury that precluded her from bringing her claims. Accordingly, the Court finds the undisputed facts demonstrate Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is time barred, and Plaintiff has not established that equitable tolling applies. State Defendants are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. B. State Law Claims In addition to her §1983 claim, Plaintiff asserts state law claims for violation of her Montana constitutional rights, negligence, infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of process. All of Plaintiff’s state law claims are also subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204(1); Nelson v. Nelson, 50 P.3d 139, 142 (Mont. 2002). Under Montana law, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins “when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-102(1)-(2). “Lack of knowledge of the claim or cause of action, or of its accrual, by the party to whom it has accrued does not postpone the beginning of the period of limitation.” Mont. Code. Ann. § 27-2- 102(2). Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 15 of 17
16 For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s state law claims accrued by May 9, 2019 at the latest. The statute of limitations therefore, expired on May 9, 2022. Because Plaintiff’s original Complaint was not lodged until June 13, 2022, Plaintiff’s state law claims are untimely. Further, as the Court has already determined, the undisputed facts demonstrate equitable tolling does not apply. Accordingly, State Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims. IV. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to Counts 3 and 6 of her Third Amended Complaint, which assert claims for negligence and abuse of process, respectively. (Doc. 104.) The basis for Plaintiff’s motion is that she has identified a liability expert whose testimony has not been rebutted by State Defendants. Plaintiff notes that State Defendants provided a rebuttal liability expert disclosure, but Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the rebuttal expert’s disclosure on the grounds that it was not timely served. Since the filing of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, however, this Court found that State Defendants’ rebuttal expert had been timely disclosed. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the testimony of State Defendants’ rebuttal expert on that basis was denied, leaving the determination of the admissibility of the testimony to Judge Watters, as the trial judge. (Doc. 120.) Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 16 of 17
17 Additionally, because the Court finds Plaintiff’s remaining claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court, therefore, recommends the motion be denied as moot. V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 1. The State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 101) be GRANTED; and 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 105) be DENIED as moot. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of the Findings and Recommendations of United States Magistrate Judge upon the parties. The parties are advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, any objections to the findings and recommendations must be filed with the Clerk of Court and copies served on opposing counsel within fourteen (14) days after service hereof, or objection is waived. D. Mont. L.R. 72.3. DATED this 19th day of December 2025. _______________________________ TIMOTHY J. CAVAN United States Magistrate Judge Case 1:22-cv-00058-SPW Document 123 Filed 12/19/25 Page 17 of 17
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