Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BERSAI AJTUN OCHOA, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 6:26-cv-03627-MDH
)
JASON JOHNSON, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) for twenty-
four days. Pending is his Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in which he argues federal
statutes and the Due Process Clause require that he be released or granted a hearing. The Court
agrees with Petitioner’s constitutional arguments, and on that basis, it concludes the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Bersai Ajtun Ochoa is a citizen of Guatemala who has resided in the United States since
approximately 2006. During that time, he has built a home and a family here, having four children
who are United States citizens. On September 14, 2026, Mr. Ajtun Ochoa was taken away from
that home and family when he was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
He was then transported to Greene County Jail in Springfield, Missouri, where he remains today.
He has now been detained for nearly one month. He has not been afforded the opportunity
to appear before an Immigration Judge at an individualized bond hearing. Now, he has filed this
writ seeking release, or at a minimum, any process at all. The matter has been fully briefed by
Case 6:26-cv-03627-MDH Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 1 of 7

2
each party. Petitioner bases the writ on statutory and constitutional grounds under the Fifth
Amendment.
While the statutory grounds upon which Petitioner relies has, for the past twenty-nine years
and five presidential administrations, been interpreted to mean that he was entitled to a bond
hearing during his removal proceedings, the new presidential administration has adopted a novel
interpretation of that statutory scheme.
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit recently agreed with this administration’s
interpretation. This Court is therefore bound by the panel’s interpretation of the statutory scheme.1
So, given this change in long standing statutory interpretation, this Court is left to analyze the writ
on constitutional grounds.
While the above facts make it apparent to the Court that no process has been afforded to
Petitioner and that he has been deprived of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, courts have
typically relied on a more detailed and contextualized analysis, and the Court will do so below.
DISCUSSION
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. First, Bersai Ajtun Ochoa is a person—a person whose liberties were
stripped by government action. What is left for this Court to decide is whether he received due
process of law in those actions. Respondents claim the process Petitioner has already received—
none—satisfies his due process rights.
1 The Court notes a circuit split over the interpretation of the mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). In the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, habeas petitioners challenging detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) face
a statutory bar to bond hearings. In the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, petitioners can still seek bond hearings under § 1226(a), and habeas claims may succeed if detention is shown
to be without a bond hearing. The Supreme Court of the United States recently granted certiorari on this issue in
Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, Case No. 26-104, 2026 WL 2942994 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2026).
Case 6:26-cv-03627-MDH Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 2 of 7

3
Respondents claim Petitioner is treated as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C.
section 1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore he is entitled to no process beyond the issuance of a Notice
to Appear. They contend they can detain him for an indefinite period of time without any
opportunity for a hearing. Respondents rely heavily on Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103 (2020) and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). However, these cases recognize
limited procedural rights in the admission context, not the detention context, and are factually
distinct from the case at hand.
The petitioner in Thuraissigiam did not seek release from custody; he sought additional
review of his asylum claim. The Court expressly noted that “the legality of his detention is not in
question.” Id. at 122. Petitioner here does not ask this Court to admit him or to alter his
immigration status, so the only holding in Thuraissigiam is inapposite. Here, Petitioner seeks only
what due process requires: an opportunity to have his custody reviewed.
The facts in Thuraissigiam are distinct from the facts of the present case. The petitioner
there was apprehended “25 yards” inside the United States, effectively at the border. Id. at 139.
By contrast, Mr. Ajtun Ochoa has lived in the United States for two decades.
These distinctions are dispositive and Thuraissigiam is inapposite. A lengthy discussion
of the plenary power to control which individuals outside the United States may be permitted to
enter is not the relevant question here. The issue here is whether the United States can suddenly
and indefinitely detain a person who has lived here for twenty years without prior notice and with
zero review or oversight.
The Court in Demore did not discuss detention of all noncitizens. Instead, it explicitly
discussed “detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens” who had
committed serious crimes. Id. at 518. It found that mandatory detention under section 1226(c)
Case 6:26-cv-03627-MDH Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 3 of 7

4
was constitutionally permissible for the specific subset of people Congress listed including
aggravated felons who had already had their due process rights during their criminal proceedings.
Id. at 510. The Demore Court did not rule out constitutional challenges for people like Petitioner
who have no criminal convictions or other factors which mandate classification under section
1226(c). Demore does not preclude Petitioner’s due process claim.
Due Process Analysis
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001). Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333 (1976).
The Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s due process rights are
limited to none at all. Under Mathews, Due Process is “flexible” and:
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added).
Private Interest
Undoubtedly, the private interest at stake here “is the most elemental of liberty interests—
the interest in being free from physical detention[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
Case 6:26-cv-03627-MDH Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 4 of 7

5
Petitioner has been held in a county jail—in conditions indistinguishable from criminal
incarceration—since September 14, 2026. He is unable to return to his family and the life he has
created over the last twenty years. Every day that passes under this unlawful detention is a day
that cannot be recovered. See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (first
Mathews factor strongly satisfied where petitioner was “locked up in jail” and “could not maintain
employment or see his family or friends or others outside normal visiting hours”).
Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
After the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on interpretation of the statutory arguments in this case, the
court in Alfonzo-Mujiuca v. Thompson, Case No. SA-26-CA-00457-XR (W.D. Tx. 03/13/2026),
found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioners’ rights in these cases is high. The court
found:
Our immigration law has long recognized that noncitizens have an interest in an
individualized hearing prior to detention in connection with immigration
proceedings. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. And the Supreme Court has required
individualized hearings for deprivations of interests less fundamental than
Petitioner’s interest in freedom from detention. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 268 (1970) (requiring an individualized hearing prior to the termination of
welfare benefits). Here, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s rights
is high. Without an individualized hearing, there is substantial risk that noncitizens
with a substantial presence in the United States who pose neither flight risk nor
danger to the community will be detained. An individualized assessment before an
immigration judge substantially reduces this risk. Cf. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531–32
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning that “due process requires individualized
procedures to ensure there is at least some merit to the” charge and detention). An
individualized analysis ensures the purpose of detention is not punitive.
Alfonzo-Mujiuca at 23.
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews at 333. Petitioner’s continued detention
without an opportunity to be heard is the type of erroneous deprivation Mathews intends to stop.
Case 6:26-cv-03627-MDH Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 5 of 7

6
The basis for his detention requires, and deserves, a hearing. Nothing in the record shows
Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk. He has lived in the United States for over twenty years,
and nothing in the record shows he has any criminal convictions.
Balancing of Interests
The final factor directs the Court to weigh the private interests at stake and the risk of
erroneous deprivation of those interests against Respondents’ interests in persisting with the
regulation, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of an additional or substitute procedural
requirement. Mathews at 335. The Government identifies no interest in detaining Petitioner based
on danger, flight risk, or obstruction of removal. A bond hearing would not undermine immigration
enforcement; it would ensure that detention is exercised lawfully and in accordance with the
Constitution. Here, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without due process is
minimal.
In sum, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, and the Court finds that his
continued detention violates due process.
Immigration courts have concluded there is no jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing. DHS
provides no alternative mechanism for individualized custody review. Petitioner has no forum,
administrative or judicial, through which he may seek release based on his circumstances. This is
not minimal process. It is zero process. Respondents’ position, that no such process is required,
cannot be reconciled with the Fifth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes Petitioner’s right to procedural due process has been violated.
Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED as follows.
Case 6:26-cv-03627-MDH Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 6 of 7

7
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody.
2. Respondents shall make accommodations available for Petitioner until such time as
arrangements can be made for him to be returned to the location of arrest or other location
agreed by the parties.
3. Petitioner shall promptly report to the Court any failure to comply with this Order by
Respondent.
4. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from relocating Petitioner
outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 8, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 6:26-cv-03627-MDH Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 7 of 7