Halterman v. Ervin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHAVONNE HALTERMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RYAN ERVIN, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 6:25-cv-03101-RK
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 37.) The motion is
fully briefed. (Docs. 39, 52, 53.) After careful consideration and for the reasons explained below,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Background and Procedural Posture
This pro se civil rights case arises out of an incident on April 29, 2023, which began when the
Pulaski County Sheriff’s Department responded to a phone call placed by Plaintiff Shavonne
Halterman requesting protection from “intruders” at her residence and resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest.
I. Procedural Posture
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit against Pulaski County, Lieutenant Brett
Parrott, Deputy Ryan Ervin, and Deputy Lee Geiger, asserting twelve counts arising from the
incident on April 29, 2023. (See generally Doc. 4.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July
15, 2025. (Doc. 7.) While the motion to dismiss was still pending, and four months before fact
and expert discovery was then set to close,1 Defendants filed the instant motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 37.) After Defendants filed the motion for summary judgment, the Court ruled
on Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. 49.)
1 The Court entered a Scheduling Order on August 25, 2025, which made fact and expert discovery
due on April 29, 2026. (Doc. 23.) On April 2, 2026, the Court entered an Amended Scheduling Order,
under which discovery is not due until September 25, 2026. (Doc. 58.)
Pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may defer considering a
motion for summary judgment or allow time to take discovery if “a non-movant shows by affidavit or
declaration that . . . it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” However, Plaintiff has not
filed such an affidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d).
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As a result of the motion-to-dismiss Order, the only remaining claim is part of Count 1,
asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment based
on Plaintiff being taken to the ground while in handcuffs. (Doc. 49 at 30.) This claim currently
remains pending against Deputies Ervin and Geiger (for their alleged direct use of force) and
Lieutenant Parrott (on a theory of failure to intervene) in their individual capacities. (Id. at 30
n.32.)2 Defendants move for summary judgment on Count 1 arguing that Plaintiff has not followed
the Local Rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in contesting summary judgment and that
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
II. Non-Compliance with Local Rule 56.1
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1(b)
when filing her suggestions in opposition to summary judgment. Local Rule 56.1 sets out the
manner in which a motion for summary judgment and opposing suggestions should be filed in this
Court, as follows:
(a) Supporting Suggestions. A party moving for summary judgment must begin
its supporting suggestions with a concise statement of uncontroverted material
facts. Each fact must be set forth in a separately numbered paragraph and supported
in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
(b) Opposing Suggestions.
1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must begin its
opposing suggestions by admitting or controverting each separately
numbered paragraph in the movant’s statement of facts. If the opposing
party controverts a given fact, it must properly support its denial in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Unless specifically controverted by
the opposing party, all facts set forth in the statement of the movant are
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment.
2. If the opposing party relies on any facts not contained in the movant’s
suggestions, the party must add a concise listing of material facts. Each fact
in dispute must be set forth in a separately numbered paragraph and properly
supported in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Local Rule 56.1 (emphasis added).
In turn, Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “[a] party asserting
that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by[] citing to particular parts of
materials in the record.” “These requirements help to ‘distill to a manageable volume the matters
2 No claims against Pulaski County, Missouri, survived the motion-to-dismiss stage, and the Court
therefore dismissed Pulaski County as a Defendant. (Doc. 49 at 30 n.32.)
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that must be reviewed by a court undertaking to decide whether a genuine issue of fact exists for
trial.’” Nelson v. S. Poverty L. Ctr., 513 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1106 (W.D. Mo. 2021) (quoting Jones
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 461 F.3d 982, 990 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding district court did not abuse
its discretion by determining Jones’ statement of uncontroverted facts and response to UPS’s
controverted facts violated Local Rule 56.1, disregarding Jones’ statement of facts, and admitting
UPS’s statement of uncontroverted facts)).
Plaintiff failed to properly respond to Defendants’ statement of uncontroverted material
facts. Defendants’ suggestions in support of summary judgment include nine separately numbered
paragraphs of facts and supports those facts with citation to the record. (Doc. 39 at 5-7.) While
Plaintiff attempts to challenge some of Defendants’ facts in her suggestions in opposition, she fails
to cite any particular parts of material in the record as required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules. While “pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro
se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.” Nelson,
513 F. Supp. 3d at 1105 (quoting Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984)) (applying
Rule 56(c) and Local Rule 56.1(b) to pro se plaintiff’s summary judgment opposition and
admitting defendant’s statement of uncontroverted facts).
Accordingly, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court deems admitted Defendants’
statement of uncontroverted material facts to the extent that the facts do not assert legal
conclusions.3 “A party cannot dictate a court’s resolution of a legal issue by labeling it as a
statement of fact and asking the court to deem it admitted.” Atmosphere Hospitality Mgmt., LLC
v. Shiba Invs., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 837, 852 (D.S.D. 2016); see also Carpenters Dist. Council of
Kan. City Pension Fund v. Fry, No. 08-cv-00296-DGK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148891, at *3 n.2
(W.D. Mo. Sept. 18, 2009) (disregarding for purposes of summary judgment “legal conclusion[s]
or argument offered as a statement of fact”).
3 In particular, the Court does not deem admitted Defendants’ statement of “fact” that “[o]n April
29, 2023, any force used related to Shavonne Halterman was reasonable under the circumstances.” (Doc.
39 at 7, ¶ 8.) The Court independently conducts a reasonableness analysis below.
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III. Summary Judgment Background and Facts4
On April 29, 2023, at about 7:43 pm, Plaintiff Shavonne Halterman called the Pulaski
County Sheriff’s Department for protection from multiple “intruders” at her residence.5 In
response to Plaintiff’s call, Deputy Ervin, Deputy Geiger, and Lieutenant Parrott arrived at
Plaintiff’s residence in multiple vehicles, which were parked on the street at the top of the
residence’s driveway. Lieutenant Parrott, Deputy Ervin, and Deputy Geiger were all employed by
Pulaski County, Missouri, and were acting in the course of their respective offices as sheriff
deputies when they responded to Plaintiff’s residence on April 29, 2023. (Doc. 39 at 7, ¶ 9; Docs.
39-4, 39-5, 39-6.) Body cameras worn by Deputy Ervin, Deputy Geiger, and Lieutenant Parrott
recorded the ensuing interaction, which lasted more than an hour and a half.6
Outside Plaintiff’s residence, Deputy Ervin conversed with one of the “intruders,” Bobby
Lee Halterman, who provided personal identification and a deed purportedly indicating his
ownership of the house. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 19:57:15-20, 19:59:20-40.) Mr. Halterman was
attempting to remove his truck from the driveway and retrieve his work items and clothes from
inside the house. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:01:15-27.) Mr. Halterman repeatedly informed Deputy
Ervin that Plaintiff was violent and physical with others. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 19:57:05-12,
20:05:21-40, 20:07:13-20, 20:51:10-15.)
Within thirty minutes of arriving at Plaintiff’s residence, Deputy Ervin gave Mr. Halterman
permission to enter the residence to retrieve his clothes. Plaintiff refused to comply and permit
4 Unless otherwise noted, these facts are taken from the video evidence in the record and
Defendants’ statement of uncontroverted material facts. As discussed below, the facts are viewed “in the
light depicted by the videotape” where it clearly contradicts Plaintiff’s version of events. Leask v. City of
Minneapolis, 172 F.4th 598, 600 (8th Cir. 2026).
5 The “intruders” referenced in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are Bobby Lee Halterman and three
younger family members, two women and a man. However, apart from Bobby Lee Halterman, the parties
have not further addressed the identity of these individuals in the summary judgment record.
6 This includes body camera footage of Deputy Ervin, (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A), Deputy Geiger, (Doc. 39-
1, Ex. A1; Doc. 39-2, Ex. A2), and Lieutenant Parrott, (Doc. 33-1, Ex. NN; Doc. 33-2, Ex. OO; Doc. 33-3,
Ex. PP). The Court notes that the body camera footage of Deputy Geiger does not contain audio, and that
there are slight discrepancies in the time-stamps (time of day) among the officers’ footage. Apart from
these points, Plaintiff has not meaningfully contested the accuracy or authenticity of the video evidence,
and the Court considers the body camera footage in resolving the instant motion as incorporated into
Defendants’ statement of uncontroverted material facts. (Doc. 39 at 5-6, ¶¶ 1-3.)
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Mr. Halterman to enter, despite hearing Deputy Ervin give him permission to do so three times.
(Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:12:45-15:23.) The deputies told the other individuals on the scene that only
Mr. Halterman could access the residence. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:15:20-30.) Mr. Halterman did
not enter the house at this time, and Plaintiff went back inside the residence.
Deputies Ervin and Geiger asked whether there were weapons in the house and were
informed by the other individuals on the scene that there were potentially two shotguns and a
crossbow in the house. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:31:20-34.) Shortly thereafter, someone at the scene
requested that the deputies perform a well-being check on a minor child in the residence with
Plaintiff. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:32:15-25.) Lieutenant Parrott and Deputy Ervin knocked on the
front door several times, announced that it was the Sheriff’s Office, and requested that Plaintiff
come to the door; Plaintiff failed to comply with opening the front door for over three minutes.
(Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:36:35-39:45.) Plaintiff eventually opened the front door, and Lieutenant
Parrott gained entry to the house and checked on the minor child. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:39:44-
40:46.)
Lieutenant Parrott then told Plaintiff to find the keys to Mr. Halterman’s truck so he could
get his work clothes out of the truck. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:40:47-52.) Plaintiff provided access
to the truck and then proceeded to deny Mr. Halterman entry to the house because all of his clothes
were purportedly in the truck. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:50:22-32.) Defendants continued to inform
Plaintiff that Mr. Halterman could enter the residence. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:57:33-48 (Lieutenant
Parrott telling Plaintiff, “I’ve already told him he could go in.”).) After the exterior garage door
to the residence was opened,7 (id. at 20:59:33), Mr. Halterman picked up a crowbar and approached
the interior garage door to gain entry to the residence. Plaintiff approached him and then stood in
front of the interior garage door blocking his entry to the residence. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:02:40-
03:37.) Mr. Halterman moved away from the interior garage door. A few seconds later, Plaintiff
also walked away from the interior garage door. (Id.) Lieutenant Parrott again informed Plaintiff
that Mr. Halterman could enter the house. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:03:57-04:12 (“He can go in his
house” and “[h]e has access to his house.”).)
7 It is unclear from the body camera footage who opened the exterior garage door, and the parties
provide no further evidence on this point in the summary judgment record. The Court notes that the exterior
garage door appeared to open automatically, rather than by a person manually pulling up the garage door.
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Mr. Halterman then returned to the interior garage door, picked up the crowbar, and again
attempted to gain entry to the residence. Plaintiff approached the interior garage door where Mr.
Halterman was standing with her hands in front of her. She made contact with Mr. Halterman who
said “[d]on’t touch me, she just . . . .” (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:04:25-28.) At that point, Deputy
Ervin handcuffed Plaintiff and placed her under arrest. While being handcuffed, Plaintiff
attempted to pull her arm away to answer her cell phone and had to be instructed to stop moving.
(Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:04:45-05:10.)
After being handcuffed, Plaintiff was escorted by Deputy Ervin out of the garage and up
the driveway, with Deputy Geiger following shortly behind. (Doc. 39-1, Ex. A1 at 21:06:00-04.)
As Plaintiff passed her Jeep, Deputy Geiger’s body camera video shows Plaintiff attempt to grab
her purse off the hood of the Jeep. (Doc. 39-1, Ex. A1 at 21:06:05-10.) Deputy Ervin directed
Plaintiff to “stop walking away from me,” and Plaintiff yelled for her neighbor to come help her.
(Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:05:19-25.) Plaintiff and Deputies Ervin and Geiger then continued to walk
up the driveway toward the police vehicles. (Doc. 39-1, Ex. A1 at 21:06:25-34.)
As Plaintiff was being escorted in handcuffs to the police vehicles by Deputy Ervin, she
held keys in her hands. As they approached the police vehicles, Deputy Geiger shined a flashlight
on Plaintiff’s hands. (Doc. 39-1, Ex. A1 at 21:06:35-40.) Plaintiff jerked away from Deputy
Geiger as he reached for the keys in her hands and instructed her twice to “let go of the keys.”
(Doc. 39-1, Ex. A1 at 21:06:38-43; Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:05:48-51.) Plaintiff did not let go of the
keys but again yelled for her neighbor to help her. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:05:52-54.) Then, Plaintiff
fell to the ground and appears to have lost consciousness.8 (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:05:55-6:05.)
Plaintiff alleges that she was taken to the ground in a takedown maneuver where Deputies Ervin
and Geiger “placed their feet above the Plaintiff’s feet and on the Plaintiff’s shins to trip the
8 This fact remains controverted. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence in
the summary judgment record supporting her claim that she lost consciousness. However, the video
evidence does not blatantly contradict Plaintiff’s claim that she lost consciousness. After Plaintiff falls, the
video shows that her eyes are closed and she is unresponsive to the deputies turning her over. Additionally,
one of the deputies says, “I think she just knocked herself out,” upon seeing Plaintiff on the ground. (Doc.
9-1, Ex. A at 21:05:55-6:05.) This is sufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff lost
consciousness. Regardless, whether Plaintiff lost consciousness does not change the Court’s decision
herein.
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Plaintiff,” and “used their knees to push into the Plaintiff’s calves.” (Doc. 4 at ¶ 21.)9 When
Plaintiff was able to be moved, the deputies assisted her to a standing position and placed her in a
police vehicle. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:07:02-39.)
Further facts are set forth below as necessary.
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a movant is entitled to
summary judgment if the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In this context, a fact is material if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is genuine if “a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In applying this standard, the Court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may be
reasonably drawn from the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587-88 (1986); Recio v. Creighton Univ., 521 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 2008). “An ‘adverse
party may not rely merely on allegations or denials, but must set out specific facts—by affidavits
or other evidence—showing [a] genuine issue for trial.’” Nelson, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 1104
(quoting Tweeton v. Frandrup, 287 F. App’x 541, 541 (8th Cir. 2008), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
“[I]f there is a video of the evidence in question that clearly contradicts the nonmovant’s
version of evidence, we view the facts ‘in the light depicted by the videotape.’” Leask v. City of
Minneapolis, 172 F.4th 598, 600 (8th Cir. 2026) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381
(2007)). Moreover, the Court “do[es] not accept unreasonable inferences or sheer speculation of
fact.” Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit has
9 This fact remains unsupported by evidence in the record as to either parties’ version of events.
The video does not blatantly contradict Plaintiff’s allegations as to how she ended up on the ground (i.e.,
that the deputies engaged in a takedown or tripping maneuver). Plaintiff’s and Deputies Ervin’s and
Geiger’s feet and legs are not clearly visible in the body camera footage at the time Plaintiff falls to the
ground. Thus, the proof of the means by which Plaintiff was taken to the ground would be conflicting
testimony of Plaintiff and Defendants. However, no deposition testimony was submitted in the summary
judgment record. The Court resolves the summary judgment motion drawing this fact in Plaintiff’s favor,
i.e., that a takedown occurred. The Court’s decision herein would be the same if the deputies did not
purposefully trip Plaintiff or use a takedown maneuver.
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rejected the argument that “to the extent that [a] video is unclear, this ambiguity creates a genuine
issue of material fact that must be interpreted” in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id.
Discussion
Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim is Count 1, a § 1983 claim asserting a Fourth Amendment
violation for excessive force based on Plaintiff being taken to the ground while in handcuffs.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s remaining excessive
force claim.
“Every section 1983 action has two key elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States (2) by a person acting under color of state law.”
Yassin v. Weyker, 39 F.4th 1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
it is uncontroverted that Defendants were acting under color of state law during the interaction
with Plaintiff on April 29, 2023. Thus, the remainder of the Court’s analysis focuses on whether
there was a violation of constitutional right and whether Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.
Section § 1983 claims asserting use of excessive force are analyzed “under the Fourth
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness standard,’ assessing whether [Defendants’] actions were
‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Cameron v.
City of Des Moines, 168 F.4th 522, 527 (8th Cir. 2026) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395 (1989)). “Courts consider the totality of the circumstances, which includes ‘the severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or
others, and whether the suspect is actively fleeing or resisting arrest.’” Rogers v. King, 885 F.3d
1118, 1121 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Loch v. City of Litchfield, 689 F.3d 961, 965 (8th Cir. 2012)).
Defendants have invoked qualified immunity. “[Q]ualified immunity is a “two-step
inquiry, asking if: ‘(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate
the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the
time of the deprivation.’” Just v. City of St. Louis, 7 F.4th 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bell
v. Neukirch, 979 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2020)). A failure of proof at either step is dispositive.
See Howard v. Kan. City Police Dep’t, 570 F.3d 984, 987-88 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (recognizing the court’s discretion in deciding “which of the
two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first”). The Supreme Court
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has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible
stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
I. Plaintiff Has Not Met Her Burden to Contest Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff does not address Defendants’ qualified immunity argument in her suggestions in
opposition to summary judgment. (See generally Doc. 52.) Thus, Defendants argue that they are
entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof and did not cite
any cases which would support her position or any that are contrary to Defendants’ cases and
positions as to qualified immunity.
As to the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity test, “the plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating that the law confirming [her] constitutional right was clearly established”
at the time of the deprivation. Carter v. Ludwick, 139 F.4th 982, 990 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Hanson v. Best, 915 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2019)). “This inquiry does not require ‘a case directly
on point, but existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.’”
Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The Eighth Circuit has further
explained that this requires the plaintiff to
either (1) “point to existing circuit precedent that involves sufficiently similar facts
to squarely govern the officer’s actions such that the officer had notice that his
specific use of force was unlawful”; (2) “present a robust consensus of cases of
persuasive authority doing the same”; or (3) “demonstrate that a general
constitutional rule applied with obvious clarity to the facts at issue.”
Cameron, 168 F.4th at 527-28 (quoting Boudoin v. Harsson, 962 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2020)).
Plaintiff failed to carry her burden to demonstrate that Defendants violated a clearly
established constitutional right because she did not make any arguments regarding qualified
immunity and she did not cite any caselaw that demonstrates that Defendants violated a clearly
established constitutional right (either through existing circuit precedent, a consensus of persuasive
authority, or a general constitutional rule).10 See Smith v. City of Minneapolis, 754 F.3d 541, 548
(8th Cir. 2014) (“Ms. Smith has not cited any case, much less any case that could cast the
‘constitutional question beyond debate,’ such that any of the five officers would be on notice that
his actions . . . violated Smith’s constitutional right . . . .” (internal citation omitted)) (granting
10 More generally, Plaintiff fails to cite a single legal authority throughout her suggestions in
opposition to summary judgment. (Doc. 52.)
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qualified immunity). Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s remaining
§ 1983 excessive force claim, and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
II. Deputy Ervin and Deputy Geiger – Direct Force Taking Plaintiff to the Ground
Even if the Court overlooked Plaintiff’s failure to present any argument challenging
qualified immunity or caselaw showing a clearly established constitutional right, the Court also
finds that Deputy Ervin and Deputy Geiger are entitled to qualified immunity on the merits because
they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right under the circumstances.
Plaintiff claims that Deputy Ervin and Deputy Geiger used excessive force by taking
Plaintiff to the ground while handcuffed.11 As previously discussed, the Court analyzes this claim
“under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard,” including “the severity of the
crime at issue, whether [Plaintiff] pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
and whether [s]he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Cameron,
168 F.4th at 527, 529 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-96) (quotation modified). Reasonableness
is “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the force was
applied.” Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 2011). Because the Defendants
have invoked qualified immunity, Plaintiff “must show not only that [they] violated a
constitutional right, but that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.”
Cameron, 168 F.4th at 527 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232).
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court accepted as true all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations and addressed Defendants’ qualified immunity argument assuming that Plaintiff “was
handcuffed and not resisting the deputies” at the time she was taken to the ground. (Doc. 49 at
18.) In other words, the Court proceeded assuming Plaintiff was compliant at the time, as indicated
by her pleadings and arguments.12 As a result, the Court followed a line of cases which indicate
11 Plaintiff also alleged the use of excessive force by tight handcuffing and pushing Plaintiff into
the handle of her Jeep. The Court previously granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to these alleged
uses of force. (Doc. 49 at 15-18.)
12 In so doing, the Court noted that the video evidence did not blatantly contradict Plaintiff’s theory
of events regarding whether she was taken to the ground purposefully. However, the video evidence does
show that Plaintiff did not let go of the keys in the seconds between being directed to do so and Plaintiff
ending up on the ground. Plaintiff has not presented any further evidence on this matter, such as any
attempts to comply when directed to let go of the keys. Thus, at the summary judgment phase, Plaintiff has
not presented any credible evidence of compliance at the time she was taken to the ground.
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that when a person is subdued and restrained in handcuffs a “gratuitous and completely
unnecessary act of violence” is unreasonable. (Id. at 19 (quoting Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761
F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2014).) See also Burnikel v. Fong, 886 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2018)
(“Accordingly, a reasonable officer would have understood that purposefully dropping Burnikel
face-first onto the concrete after he had been subdued and handcuffed would violate clearly
established law.”). Blazek, and other cases like it, however, in large part turn on the fact that the
use of force occurred while the individual was already restrained and was being compliant. Blazek,
760 F.2d at 925; Burnikel, 886 F.3d at 712; see also Henderson, 439 F.3d at 503.
At the summary-judgment stage, the Court cannot accept as true Plaintiff’s pleadings and
arguments which have not been supported by citation to evidence in the record. Defendants carried
their burden to support the motion for summary judgment. Defendants’ statement of
uncontroverted facts sets forth that Plaintiff held keys in her hands as she was being escorted to
the police vehicle. “[A] reasonable officer could have construed keys as a weapon, especially
when dealing with a person accused of violent behavior.” Robles v. Ciarletta, 797 F. App’x 821,
827 (5th Cir. 2019). Then, when Deputy Geiger reached for the keys in Plaintiff’s hands, she
jerked away from him rather than letting go of the keys.13 These facts, deemed admitted above,
establish that Plaintiff was not compliant with the deputies at the time she was taken to the ground.
A non-compliant individual holding keys, which are reasonably construed as a weapon by law
enforcement, could lead a reasonable officer to believe Plaintiff was dangerous to others under the
circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (considering whether individual poses a threat to officers
or others in determining reasonableness)
Upon further review of the video evidence, it also supports the deputies’ version of events
(i.e., that Plaintiff was not compliant at the time she was taken to the ground).14 Deputy Geiger
13 The Court accepts as true Defendants’ statement of uncontroverted facts that Plaintiff jerked away
from Deputy Geiger. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff, without proper evidentiary support, argues
that she did not jerk away from Deputy Geiger. Plaintiff does admit that the interaction created the
“illusion” that she jerked away from him. Kohorst v. Smith, 968 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2020) (“An officer
is entitled to the use of force where a suspect at least appears to be resisting.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Thus, even considering Plaintiff’s unsupported version of events, the takedown would be
reasonable given the appearance of resistance.
14 Even if the video did not corroborate the deputies’ version of events, at best for Plaintiff it is
ambiguous or unclear as to Plaintiff’s compliance. Where a defendant has presented evidence in support
of summary judgment, the Eighth Circuit has rejected the argument that “to the extent that the video is
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directed Plaintiff to let go of the keys in her hand twice, and she did not let go. When Deputy
Geiger reached out to take the keys from Plaintiff, she appears to jerk away from him. (Doc. 39-
1, Ex. A1 at 21:06:38-43; Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:05:48-51.) Moreover, Plaintiff begins calling for
her neighbor to come and help her. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:05:52-54.) Admittedly, and as
recognized in the motion-to-dismiss Order, the time between Deputy Geiger telling Plaintiff to let
go of the keys and Plaintiff being taken to the ground is short (less than 10 seconds).
However, Plaintiff in contesting summary judgment has presented no credible evidence
that she was being compliant at the time she was taken to the ground. See Crossley v. Georgia-
Pac. Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004) (“In resisting a properly supported motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff has an affirmative burden to designate specific facts creating a
triable controversy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). While Plaintiff (without citation to
evidence) alleges that she “tried to give the officers her keys in the garage,” she makes no attempt
to controvert the fact that she was still holding the keys while being escorted to the police vehicle.
(Doc. 52 at 6.) Nor does she argue that she let go of the keys when directed to do so twice.15 She
also does not contest that the ensuing interaction when Deputy Geiger reached for the keys at least
created an “illusion” that she was pulling away from the deputies, see Kohorst, 968 F.3d at 876,
and she does not contest that instead of letting go of the keys she began to yell for her neighbor to
help her.
In addition to Plaintiff’s non-compliance, consideration of other circumstances
surrounding the use of force is warranted. Defendants were called to the scene by Plaintiff and
unclear, this ambiguity creates a genuine issue of material fact” to be resolved in a plaintiff’s favor. Mann,
497 F.3d at 827. In Mann, the court affirmed summary judgment where defendants presented evidence of
their version of events and Plaintiff relied on a “dark and often unintelligible video” paired with a
“speculative and wishful recitation of events” that was not supported by any evidence in the record.
Applying Mann to this case, Defendants have properly supported the motion for summary judgment and
established Plaintiff was holding keys and jerked away from Deputy Geiger when he tried to take them.
Thus, Plaintiff cannot rely solely on an ambiguous or unclear video to create a genuine issue of material
fact. Regardless, the Court finds that the video is not unclear as to this point—it shows that Plaintiff did
not let go of the keys as requested and began yelling for help rather than complying.
15 Plaintiff did not present any evidence in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Though she vaguely references evidence previously filed in the case, presumably related to prior
filings or motions, “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in
search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” Crossley, 355 F.3d at 1114.
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engaged in a tense hour-and-a-half interaction with Plaintiff, Mr. Halterman, and three other
individuals. During that time, Plaintiff repeatedly disregarded directives from law enforcement.
For example, Plaintiff refused to permit Mr. Halterman to enter the residence, despite hearing
Defendants give him permission to do so multiple times. (See, e.g., Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:12:45-
15:20.) While being handcuffed, Plaintiff attempted to pull her arm away to answer her cell phone
and had to be instructed to stop moving. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:04:45-05:10.) And as Plaintiff
was escorted in handcuffs past her Jeep, Deputy Geiger’s body camera video shows Plaintiff
attempted to grab her purse off the hood of the Jeep. (Doc. 39-1, Ex. A1 at 21:06:05-10.) This
led to Deputy Ervin directing Plaintiff to “stop walking away from me,” and Plaintiff yelling for
her neighbor to come help her for the first time. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:05:19-25.)
Defendants also heard Mr. Halterman repeatedly advise that Plaintiff was physical and
violent. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 19:57:05-12, 20:05:21-40, 20:07:15-20, 20:51:10-15.) Deputies Ervin
and Geiger asked whether there were weapons in the house and were informed that there were
potentially two shotguns and a crossbow in the house. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:31:20-34.)
Defendants were also asked to conduct a well-being check on a minor child in the residence with
Plaintiff. (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 20:32:15-25.) When Defendants attempted to conduct the well-being
check, Plaintiff failed to comply with opening the front door for over three minutes. (Doc. 9-1,
Ex. A at 20:36:35-39:45.)
Additionally, Defendants observed Plaintiff reaching out and touching Bobby Lee
Halterman immediately preceding her arrest. Plaintiff quickly approached the interior garage door
where Mr. Halterman was standing with her hands in front of her. She made contact with Mr.
Halterman who said “[d]on’t touch me, she just . . . .” (Doc. 9-1, Ex. A at 21:04:25-28.) At that
point, Deputy Ervin handcuffed Plaintiff and placed her under arrest. As found in the Court’s
motion-to-dismiss Order, the video evidence establishes probable cause that Plaintiff knowingly
caused physical contact with Mr. Halterman knowing he would find that contact offensive. See
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 565.076.1(5) (domestic assault in the fourth degree), 565.056.1(6) (assault in
the fourth degree).16 As previously discussed, the severity of the crime at issue is a consideration
for determining reasonableness. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396
16 (See also Doc. 39 at 6, ¶ 4 (“[I]mmediately before she was arrested, Shavonne Halterman
physically contacted Bobby Lee Halterman.”); id. at ¶ 5 (“Shavonne Halterman knew Bobby Lee Halterman
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Ultimately, Plaintiff’s non-compliance—in combination with the other circumstances
known to Defendants at the time of the use of force—remove this case from the realm of clearly
established caselaw concluding that gratuitous force against a compliant handcuffed individual is
excessive. Caselaw indicates that the use of takedown force is reasonable where a handcuffed
individual is non-compliant with law enforcement. See Womack v. Bradshaw, 49 F. Supp. 3d 624,
634 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (“Here, the proper inquiry is whether federal decisional law as of [the date
of the use of force], clearly established that it was unconstitutional for an arresting officer to use a
takedown maneuver against an arrestee who was resisting despite being placed in handcuffs. The
Court finds that it was not.”); id. at 635 (“Plaintiff fails to direct the court to any authority
suggesting it was unreasonable to use a takedown maneuver against a handcuffed yet resisting
arrestee.”); see also Aikens v. Metz, No. 24-569 (DWF/DTS), 2026 WL 1256973, at *6 (D. Minn.
May 7, 2026) (finding officer entitled to qualified immunity for taking handcuffed arrestee to the
ground where Aikens did not “show that he was compliant or subdued so as to fall squarely into
the facts of Blazek.”), appeal filed No. 26-2106 (8th Cir.).
The Court need not definitively conclude whether Deputy Ervin’s and Deputy Geiger’s
actions violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force; it is enough
that under the circumstances—where a handcuffed individual is non-compliant, holding keys,
appears to jerk away, and yells for help—there is no clearly established constitutional right to be
free from being taken to the ground. See Womack, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 634-35. Thus, Deputy Ervin
and Deputy Geiger are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s remaining Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim.
III. Lieutenant Parrott – Failure to Intervene
Plaintiff asserts an excessive force claim against Lieutenant Parrott on a failure-to-
intervene theory. “Officers who do not directly use excessive force, but fail to intervene to prevent
the use of excessive force by another officer, may be liable for violating the Fourth Amendment.”
Ortega v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:18-cv-1576-DDN, 2021 WL 3286703, at *14 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 2,
2021) (citing Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 611-12 (8th Cir. 2009)). However, an officer can
only be liable for failure to intervene “where the officer (1) ‘observed or had reason to know that
did not wish to be physically contacted by Shavonne Halterman to the extent such contact would have
knowingly been offensive or provocative.”).)
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excessive force would be or was being used,’ and (2) ‘had both the opportunity and the means to
prevent the harm from occurring.’” Cameron, 168 F.4th at 531 (8th Cir. 2026) (quoting Nance,
586 F.3d at 612).
Summary judgment is warranted on the claim against Lieutenant Parrott (1) because he
was not physically in a position to intervene and (2) because he is entitled to qualified immunity
if the officers who used force are entitled to qualified immunity.17 Here, the video evidence in the
record shows that Lieutenant Parrott was at the bottom of the driveway by the garage when Plaintiff
was taken to the ground, and that he did not have the opportunity to prevent the use of force. (Doc
33-3, Ex. PP at 21:06:36-21:08:26.)18 Plaintiff has not asserted any additional material facts, nor
provided any other evidence which would suggest that Lieutenant Parrott had the opportunity or
the means to prevent the harm from occurring. The time between Deputy Geiger attempting to
take the keys out of Plaintiff’s hand and the use of force which took her to the ground was
insufficient for Lieutenant Parrott to intervene to stop the use of force. Accordingly, Lieutenant
Parrott is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive force claim
premised on failure to intervene.
Additionally, the Court further finds that Lieutenant Parrot is entitled to qualified immunity
as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. “[W]here an officer’s alleged excessive force did not
violate a clearly established right, qualified immunity shields other officers against a claim that
they failed to intervene to prevent that use of force.” Cameron, 168 F.4th at 530; Hollingsworth
v. City of St. Ann, 800 F.3d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that qualified immunity applied to
officer against whom a failure-to-intervene claim was alleged where officer against whom the
accompanying excessive-force claim was alleged was entitled to qualified immunity). Here, the
Court has concluded that Deputy Ervin and Deputy Geiger are entitled to qualified immunity on
17 It makes no difference to the outcome if Lieutenant Parrott was working in a supervisory role.
The analysis would be the same on this failure-to-intervene claim. See Loggins v. Albert, No. 24-1545,
2024 WL 5074756, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 11, 2024) (per curiam) (holding that supervisory officers were
entitled to qualified immunity on the claims related to their failure to intervene in the alleged excessive
force where officers were entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim).
18 The video referenced here shows that Lieutenant Parrott was at the bottom of the driveway
speaking with the other individuals at the time Plaintiff was taken to the ground at the top of the driveway
near the police vehicles. He did not approach the police vehicles until Plaintiff had been returned to her
feet from her position on the ground and was being placed in the police vehicle.
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the remaining excessive force claim for their use of direct force; therefore, Lieutenant Parrott is
entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim based on that same use of
force.
Conclusion
Accordingly, after careful consideration and for the reasons explained above, the Court
ORDERS that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 37), is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: July 29, 2026
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