USA v. Long

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 23-03063-01-CR-S-BCW
)
KEVIN LONG, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 2 for Statute of Limitations.
(Doc. 150.) 	Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment as
barred by the five-year statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C § 3282. Id. at 1. The Government filed
Suggestions in Opposition to the Motion. (Doc. 161.) Defendant filed a Reply in Support of the
Motion. (Doc. 171.) 	This action has been referred to the undersigned to hear and process all
pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment. 	Upon review, it is recommended that the relief
requested by Defendant be denied without prejudice as premature.
I. 	Background
On August 26, 2025, a grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment charging Defendant
in Count 2 for the first time as follows:
On or about November 6, 2019, said date being approximate, in Pulaski County
and elsewhere in the Western District of Missouri, within the special maritime or
territorial jurisdiction on the United States, as defined in Title 18, United States
Code, Section 7(3), that being the Fort Leonard Wood United States Army Military
Installation, the defendant, KEVIN LONG, did knowingly act in a manner that
created a substantial risk to the life and body of Jane Doe, a child less than
seventeen years of age, by engaging in conduct causing physical injury to Jane
Doe’s body, such actions resulting in Jane Doe’s death, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 13 and Section 568.045 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri.
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(Doc. 84.)
The parties agree that Defendant was charged by the Superseding Indictment on August
26, 2025, over five years and nine months after the date of the alleged offense. The parties also
agree that the federal statutes of limitation apply to state crimes charged via the Assimilated Crimes
Act (“ACA”), 18 U.S.C. § 13. 	See United States v. Aguilar, No. 17-CR-00541-JCS, 2018 WL
4181959 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2018) (holding the federal statutes of limitations apply to charges
under the ACA).
The parties disagree, however, as to what federal statute of limitations applies to Count 2.
Defendant contends that Count 2 is barred by the general five-year statute of limitations for non-
capital offenses set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3282. (Doc. 150 at 2.) 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) provides,
[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted,
tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been
committed.
The Government counters that because Count 2 involves the physical abuse of a child under the
age of 18 years, an exception to the general statute of limitations applies. 	Specifically, the
Government argues that Count 2 is subject to the ten-year statute of limitations for offenses against
children found in 18 U.S.C. § 3283. (Doc. 161 at 2.) 18 U.S.C. § 3283 states,
[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense
involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18
years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child, or for ten years
after the offense, whichever is longer.
II. 	Analysis
Exceptions to the general five-year statute of limitations must be “expressly provided by
law.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3282. 	Defendant argues that although § 3283 provides an exception for an
“offense involving the … physical abuse” of a child, it does not expressly provide an exception
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for endangering the welfare of a child. In addition, Defendant claims that general endangerment
of the welfare of a child under Rev. Stat. Mo. § 564.045 does not amount to physical abuse of a
child under § 3283. See Rev. Stat. Mo. § 564.045.1(1) (“A person commits the offense of
endangering the welfare of a child in the first degree if he [k]nowingly acts in a manner that creates
a substantial risk to the life, body, or health of a child less than seventeen years of age”)
As stated above, § 3283’s ten-year statute of limitations applies to “an offense involving
the … physical abuse ... of a child under the age of 18 years.” To determine whether § 3283 applies
to a charged offense, courts use a fact-specific analysis. See United States v. Tso, 154 F.4th 731,
741 (10th Cir. 2025) (“a case-specific approach must be applied to a § 3283 challenge, with a focus
on the charge(s) brought against the defendant.”); United States v. Maxwell, 118 F.4th 256, 265
(2d Cir. 2024) (“Congress intended courts to apply § 3283 using a case-specific approach.”)
Notably, “§ 3283 has no … restrictive language or legislative history suggesting congressional
intent to limit its application to a specific subset of circumstances. Congress, rather, has evinced
a general intention to ‘cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.’ ”
United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597
F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
Here, the relevant factual evidence is clearly not agreed to by the parties. Accordingly, to
determine whether § 3283 applies to Count 2, the Court must make findings regarding the facts
underlying the charge that Defendant “engag[ed] in conduct causing physical injury to Jane Doe’s
body, such actions resulting in Jane Doe’s death.”
A court should decide a pretrial motion before trial but should defer a ruling if it finds good
cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(d). “Good cause exists and a decision should be deferred if disposing
of the pretrial motion requires making factual determinations that fall within the province of the
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ultimate finder of fact.” United States v. Turner, 842 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
“A motion is capable of pretrial determination ‘if trial of the facts surrounding the commission of
the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity’ of the motion.” Id. at
604-05 (quoting United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 60 (1969)). 	In this matter, the
undersigned finds that good cause exists and as a result a decision should be deferred.
Defendant argues that Count 2 does not qualify for the exception in 18 U.S.C. § 3283 based
on the Government’s allegations against him. (Doc. 150 at 5.) Specifically, Defendant claims the
Government alleges that he placed Jane Doe upstairs to sleep, under circumstances that showed
neglect, leading to her falling down the stairs and qualifying as endangerment under Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 568.045. Id. According to Defendant, this alleged conduct is not direct physical or sexual abuse
of a child and does not fit an exception under 18 U.S.C. § 3283. Id.
In response to the scenario described by Defendant, the Government denies that this is its
theory of how the crime was committed. (Doc. 161 at 5.) As the Eighth Circuit recently stated,
the government is not required to present its case in response to a motion to dismiss,
and dismissal is not justified based on the government's refusal to come forward
with evidence to support its case in the face of a defendant who has presented his
own proof. To warrant dismissal, it must be clear from the parties’ agreed
representations about the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense
that a trial of the general issue would serve no purpose. Unless the prosecution
voluntarily presents the entirety of its evidence in response to a pretrial motion, the
court cannot know the universe of additional facts that will be presented at trial and
whether they will be disputed.
United States v. Grubb, 135 F.4th 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up).
In summary, to determine whether the ten-year statute of limitations of § 3283 applies to
Count 2, the Court must use a fact-specific analysis. This analysis would require making factual
determinations surrounding the commission of the alleged offense before trial, which would invade
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the province of the ultimate finder of fact. As a result, under Rule 12(d), good cause exists to defer
ruling on Defendant’s Motion until trial.
III. 	Recommendations
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 2
for Statute of Limitations be denied without prejudice as premature, because resolving the Motion
before the trial would require a trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense.
This recommendation does not preclude Defendant from reasserting a more thorough and fact-
specific argument regarding the statute of limitations applicable to Count 2 during trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ David P. Rush
DAVID P. RUSH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DATE: February 19, 2026
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