Owens v. Pugsley et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
ROBERT G. OWENS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 25-00806-CV-W-JAM
)
DONALD W. PUGSLEY, et al., 	)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR STRIKE
Before the Court is Defendant Heyl Truck Lines, Inc.’s (“Heyl Truck”) Motion to Dismiss
or Strike Counts II and III of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and Defendant Donald W. Pugsley’s
(“Pugsley”) 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	or 	Strike 	Count 	II 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint, 	both 	with
Memorandums in Support. (Docs. 8, 9, 17, 18) Plaintiff submitted Suggestions in Opposition to
both motions (Docs. 12, 28), to which only Defendant Heyl Truck replied (Doc. 14). 	For the
reasons stated below, both motions will be denied.
I. 	FACTS AND BACKGROUND
On October 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants Heyl Truck and
Pugsley, one of its truck drivers. The facts giving rise to the Complaint involve an accident that
allegedly occurred when the semi-truck driven by Defendant Pugsley collided with the rear of
Plaintiff’s vehicle. 	(Doc. 1, ¶ 16). 	Count I alleges negligence against Defendant Pugsley and
vicarious or respondeat superior liability against Defendant Heyl Truck. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 32-38) Count
II alleges negligence per se against Defendant Pugsley and respondeat superior liability against
Defendant Heyl Truck. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 39-47) Count III, directed only at Heyl Truck, alleges negligent
hiring, training and retention. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 48-58)
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The Complaint alleges that at the time of the accident, Defendant Pugsley was “an agent,
servant, and/or employee of Defendant Heyl Truck for the purposes of liability to the public” (Doc.
1, ¶ 4), he was driving a semi-truck that was “owned, operated, leased, dispatched, supervised,
maintained, monitored, and/or controlled by Defendant Heyl” (Doc. 1, ¶ 12), and he was acting
within the scope and course of his employment (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 5, 13). In their answers, Defendants
admit that Defendant Pugsley was Defendant Heyl Truck’s employee at the time of the incident
and was acting within the course and scope of his employment. (Doc. 6, ¶¶ 4, 5, 13; Doc. 19, ¶¶
4, 5, 13). Defendants also admit that Defendant Heyl Truck operated, dispatched, supervised,
maintained, monitored, and controlled the semi-truck. (Doc. 6, ¶ 12; Doc. 19, ¶ 12). Additionally,
as the basis of their motions to dismiss, both Defendants admit respondeat superior liability. (Doc.
8, ¶ 6; Doc. 9, pp. 2-4; Doc. 17 ¶ 6; Doc. 18, pp. 2-4)
In support of its motion to dismiss or strike, Defendant Heyl Truck argues that because it
has admitted respondeat superior liability, under the McHaffie Rule, it is improper for Plaintiff to
proceed with Counts II and III as they present redundant theories of liability for the same injury
alleged in Count I.1 (Doc. 8, ¶ 6) In opposing Defendant Heyl Truck’s motion, Plaintiff asserts
that he is entitled to bring alternative claims, has properly plead facts sufficient to establish these
claims, and that discovery may uncover facts that provide a reasonable basis for an exception to
the McHaffie Rule. 	(Doc. 12) 	Defendant Heyl Truck replied, countering that admission of
respondeat superior liability renders Counts II and III legally redundant and subjects the defense
to the unfair burden of unnecessary, expansive discovery. (Doc. 14)
In arguing that Count II should be dismissed, Defendant Pugsley’s motion mirrors that of
Defendant Heyl Truck, and asserts that because respondeat superior liability has been admitted
1 Defendant Heyl Truck also asserts Counts II and III are deficient because they “merely create a suspicion of
negligence.” (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 7-8) The Court construes this as an allegation of insufficient pleading.
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and no punitive damages have been alleged, the McHaffie Rule renders alternative theories of
imputed liability redundant and improper. (Doc. 18) Plaintiff opposed that motion, arguing that
Defendant Pugsley does not have the standing to seek dismissal of a claim against another party,
that Plaintiff has properly pled facts for each element, and that Plaintiff is entitled to alternative
theories at this stage of the proceedings. (Doc. 28)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-87
(2009). To survive a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege facts sufficient
to 	“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this
Court “must liberally construe [the] complaint in favor of the plaintiff.” Huggins v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir. 2010). In doing so, the Court will “accept as true
all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and review the complaint to determine
whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding
Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55).
As to Defendants’ requests to strike certain counts from the Complaint, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(f) provides the Court may “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” either on its own or on a motion
made by a party. While striking a party’s pleadings is an extreme and disfavored measure, judges
have broad discretion to do so when appropriate under Rule 12(f). See Stanbury L. Firm v. I.R.S.,
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221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000); BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917
(8th Cir. 2007).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Here, the Court analyzes Defendants’ motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Missouri state law. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Pope, 591 F.3d 992, 998-99 (8th Cir. 2010)
(“In a diversity action, such as this, we use state substantive law to govern our analysis.”) (citing
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)); see also Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. ____ (2026),
2026 WL 135974 (holding that when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure answers the same question
as a state law, the Federal Rule governs in federal court). In interpreting Missouri law, this Court
is “bound by the decisions of the state’s highest court.” Minn. Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp., 472
F.3d 524, 534 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Eichenwald v. Small, 321 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2003)).
“When a state's highest court has not decided an issue, it is up to [the] court to predict how the
state's highest court would resolve that issue.” Minn. Supply Co., 472 F.3d at 534 (quoting
Continental Cas. Co. v. Advance Terrazzo & Tile Co., 462 F.3d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006)). In
making that prediction, the decisions of intermediate state appellate courts are persuasive
authority. Minn. Supply Co., 472 F.3d at 534.
Defendants primarily rely on McHaffie ex rel. McHaffie v. Bunch for the proposition that
it is improper for a plaintiff to proceed under alternative theories of liability once a defendant has
admitted respondeat superior liability. 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995). 	In McHaffie, an injured
plaintiff sued the driver of a truck involved in an accident and the driver’s employer, alleging
negligence against the driver, vicarious liability against the employer, and negligent hiring and
supervision against the employer. Id. at 824. The case reached the Missouri Supreme Court on
appeal following a jury verdict, which allowed the court to evaluate whether the submission of
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multiple theories of liability to the jury had created a redundant or prejudicial record at trial. Id.
at 825. There, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the position that, generally, “once an employer
has admitted respondeat superior liability for a driver's negligence, it is improper to allow a
plaintiff to proceed against the employer on any other theory of imputed liability.” McHaffie, 891
S.W.2d at 826. 	The court reasoned that because an admission of respondeat superior liability
establishes an employer's strict liability, further attempts to prove theories of imputed liability are
redundant and inefficient. Id.; see also Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d
184, 205 (Mo. banc 2014) (finding that the trial court did not err in when refusing to allow the
plaintiff to submit multiple theories of imputed liability to the jury where the defendant had already
admitted agency).
Missouri appellate courts have held that McHaffie limits which claims can be submitted to
the jury and explicitly contemplates exceptions to the general rule that a plaintiff cannot proceed
against an employer on alternate theories of liability after the employer has admitted respondeat
superior liability. See Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.
2013) (“[B]ecause the primary concern in McHaffie was the introduction of extraneous, potentially
prejudicial evidence, we believe that the rule announced in McHaffie does not apply where punitive
damages are claimed against the employer… .”); Bell v. Redjal, 569 S.W.3d 70, 82 (Mo. Ct. App.
E.D. 2019). Federal courts in Missouri have also recognized a punitive damages exception to the
McHaffie Rule. See Kyles v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., No. 15-03193-CV-S-MDH, 2015 WL
6143953, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 19, 2015); Diedrichsen v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, LLC, No.
21-04178-CV-C-MDH, 2022 WL 36901, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 2022). See also Aubuchon v.
Tate Trucking, LLC, No. 24-189-CV-E-HEA, 2024 WL 4285880, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2024)
(compiling cases).
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A. 	Defendant Heyl Truck’s Motion to Dismiss or Strike Counts II and III
While Defendant Heyl Truck has admitted respondeat superior liability, its reliance on
McHaffie at this juncture is misplaced for two reasons.
First, while Defendant Heyl Truck argues that Counts II and III should be dismissed
because they are redundant and will lead to burdensome, unnecessary discovery, this argument
overlooks the federal pleading rules and is premature. Procedurally, Fed R. Civ. P. 8(d) permits a
party to set out alternative claims and state as many separate claims as it has. 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(d)(2); see also Berk, 2026 WL 135974, at *4 (explaining “[b]y design, this system of pleading
makes it relatively easy for plaintiffs to subject defendants to discovery—even for claims that are
likely to fail.”). 	Additionally, the McHaffie Rule does not prohibit a plaintiff from pleading
alternative theories of recovery at the outset of litigation. See Blotter v. Brent Higgins Trucking
Co. Inc., No. 11–05073-CV-SW–RED, Doc. 19, p. 2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2011) (finding at the
initial pleadings stage that “Plaintiffs have plead alternative theories of relief and, thus, are
permitted to proceed on each theory of liability at this point in the litigation.”); Kwiatkowski v.
Teton Transp., Inc., No. 11-1302-CV-W-ODS, 2012 WL 1413154, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 23, 2012)
(denying defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion and holding that McHaffie does not warrant dismissal
of negligent training and supervision claims at the initial pleading stage, even where respondeat
superior liability is admitted); see also, Ershen v. Keep Running Trucking Corp., No. 19-1200-
CV-E-RWS, 	2019 	WL 	13198752, 	at 	*1 	(E.D. 	Mo. 	May 	31, 	2019) 	(“the 	holding
in McHaffie concerns the assessment of fault and submission of evidence at trial and does not
[prevent] plaintiff from pleading alternative theories of recovery under respondeat superior and
negligent hiring, training, and supervision.”). 	Plaintiff is therefore entitled to maintain his
alternative theories of recovery at this stage.
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Second, while McHaffie generally precludes additional negligence claims against an
employer after agency is admitted to prevent the introduction of “potentially inflammatory
evidence” at trial, there is a well-developed exception for cases pleading a claim for punitive
damages. See Wilson 400 S.W.3d at 393 (“[W]e believe that the rule announced in McHaffie does
not apply where punitive damages are claimed against the employer . . . .”); Kyles, 2015 WL
6143953, at *4; Harris v. Decker Truck Line, Inc., No. 12-1589-CV-E-DDN, 2013 WL 1769095,
at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding that an admission of respondeat superior liability does not
mandate dismissal of direct negligence claims, including negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision, when those claims serve as the basis for alleging punitive damages against an
employer). 	Although Plaintiff has not yet pled punitive damages, he argues that it would be
improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 until he has “a reasonable basis in law and fact to do so,” through
discovery. (Doc. 12, pp.7-8) Dismissing Counts II and III at this stage would potentially preclude
Plaintiff from discovering the facts necessary to determine if a basis for alleging punitive damages
exists.
Moreover, Defendant Heyl Truck’s argument that Counts II and III should be dismissed
for failing to allege more than a “suspicion of negligence” is unpersuasive. 	A plaintiff is not
required to provide detailed evidence at the pleading stage, but only enough factual content to state
a plausible claim for relief. 	See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Here, construing the Complaint in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff and accepting as true all facts alleged, Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding negligence per se and negligent hiring and training meet this threshold. Accordingly,
and for the reasons in Section III.C., infra, Defendant Heyl Truck’s motion (Doc. 8) is denied.
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B. 	Defendant Pugsley’s Motion to Dismiss or Strike Count II
Count II of the Complaint alleges negligence per se against Defendant Pugsley, specifically
that he had a statutory duty to follow certain laws (see Doc. 1, ¶ 41), and that his violation of those
laws constitutes a breach of care as a matter of law. Defendant Pugsley’s motion asks the Court
to dismiss, or alternatively, strike, this Count.2 Defendant Pugsley argues that because Defendant
Heyl Truck has admitted respondeat superior liability and no punitive damages have been alleged,
it is improper to allow Plaintiff to proceed against Defendant Heyl Truck on any other theory of
imputed liability. Defendant Pugsley’s motion echoes Defendant Heyl Truck’s motion. The Court
has already addressed Count II as to Defendant Heyl Truck’s same arguments and declines to
entertain Defendant Pugsley’s request for relief as to another defendant. 	Moreover, Defendant
Pugsley’s motion treats Plaintiff’s claim for negligence per se against Defendant Pugsley as a
redundant claim for imputed liability, when in fact it alleges direct liability against him. (Doc. 1,
¶ 41) Vicarious liability is separate and distinct from a plaintiff's right to plead a negligence per
se claim directly against an individual defendant. See McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 827 (noting that
an employer’s vicarious liability is independent of their employee’s direct liability). Accordingly,
and for the reasons in Section III.C., infra, Defendant Pugsley’s motion (Doc. 17) is denied.
C. Defendants’ Requests to Strike
Relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) is an extreme remedy. 	Since Plaintiff is permitted to
plead alternative theories at this stage, Defendants’ alternative requests to strike these counts from
Plaintiff’s Complaint are denied. (Docs. 8, 17) See Sargent v. Justin Time Transp., L.L.C., No.
09-596-CV-E-HEA, 2009 WL 4559222, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2009) (finding that because
McHaffie does not prevent plaintiff from pleading alternative theories of recovery, it would be
2 Defendant Pugsley also asserts Counts II is deficient because it “merely create a suspicion of negligence.” (Doc.
17, ¶ 8) The Court construes this as an allegation of insufficient pleading.
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premature to strike alternative theory of recovery at outset of case).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
After careful consideration and for the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motions (Doc.
8, 17) are denied.
/s/ Jill A. Morris
JILL A. MORRIS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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