Harris v. Rector et al

STEPHAN HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:25-cv-01552-PLC
SGT. UNKNOWN RECTOR et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)	Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Stephan Harris, a self-represented prisoner, brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Sergeant Unknown Rector, Officer Unknown Wieble, and Warden Richard Adams,
for alleged use of excessive force and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. (ECF
No. 1). He moves for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 4) and leave to proceed in for ma pauper is
(ECF No 2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Harris ' s informa pauperis motion,
assesses an initial partial filing fee of $1.75 , and directs service of the complaint on Rector in his
individual capacity. The Court dismisses all remaining claims and denies, without prejudice,
Harris's motion for appointment of counsel.
I. 	Filing Fee
Congress mandates that federal courts collect a filing fee from a party instituting any civil
action, suit, or proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 1914. Courts may waive this fee for individuals who
demonstrate an inability to pay. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l). When a court grants such a waiver, the
plaintiff may proceed in forma pauper is.
To obtain informa pauperis status, a prisoner litigant must file an affidavit demonstrating
his inability to pay. 28 U.S .C. § 1915(a)(l). In addition to the standard informap auperis affidavit,
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a prisoner must provide a certified copy of his inmate account statement for the "6-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).
If the prisoner litigant lacks sufficient funds, the Court assesses an initial partial filing fee
equal to 20 percent of the higher of the average monthly deposits or the average monthly balance
in the prisoner litigant's account. 28 U.S .C. § 1915(b)(l). After that, the prisoner litigant must
make monthly payments equal to 20 percent of the previous month ' s income until the prisoner
litigant pays the fee in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). "The agency having custody of the prisoner
shall forward payments from the prisoner' s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount
in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid." Id.
In support of his motion to proceed in forma paup er is, Harris submitted a certified inmate
account statement for the period from April 10 , 2025 through September 10 , 2025 . (ECF No. 3).
The statement reflects an average account balance of $8.30 and an average deposit of $8.75.
Therefore, the Court assesses an initial partial filing fee of $1.75 , representing 20 percent of
Harris ' s average deposit.
II. 	Background
Harris is an inmate at the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center in Bonne
Terre, Missouri. (ECF No. 1 at 2). He alleges that on December 29, 2023 , correctional officers
tried to place him in cell 109 of the disciplinary unit. Id. at 3. Before they could do so, an inmate
already residing in the cell declared Harris an enemy. Id. Harris told the officers that he wanted to
return to the holding bench until staff could assign him to another cell. Id. In response, Sergeant
Rector and Officer Wieble forced him to the ground, and Rector bent his fingers in an attempt "to
taunt plaintiff into resisting. " Id.
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Wieble and Rector eventually placed Harris on a metal bench and gave him an enemy
waiver to sign so he could occupy cell 109. Id. at 5. 	Harris does not state whether he signed the
waiver but alleges that Wieble and Rector eventually put him in a different cell " to ruff [him] up "
outside the view of the surveillance cameras. Id. The officers left Harris on the bench without
access to the bathroom or drinking water. Id. After "what seem[ ed] like an hour," Wieble and
Rector summoned medical staff to evaluate Harris. Id. Later that week, an x-ray revealed that
Harris had a broken thumb. Id.
III. 	Discussion
Harris alleges excessive use of force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs. Id. He seeks $3 .5 million in damages. Id. at 6.
A. 	Official-capacity claims
A suit against a state employee in his official capacity is merely a suit against the state
itself. Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp. , 172 F.3d 531 , 535 (8th Cir. 1999). Absent a waiver, the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary relief against a state or its officials acting in their
official capacities. Morstad v. Dep 't of Corr. & Rehab., 147 F.3d 741 , 744 (8th Cir. 1998). The
Court therefore dismisses Harris's official-capacity claims with prejudice because the defendants
are immune from the relief sought. See 28 U.S .C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
B. 	Warden Adams
Harris sues Warden Adams in his individual capacity because he failed "to stop the practice
of abusing inmates whom are in solitary confinement." (ECF No. 1 at 5).
Under § 1983, courts cannot hold supervisors liable based solely on their subordinates'
actions. Boyd v. Knox, 4 7 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Liability arises only
when the supervisor directly participates in the constitutional violation or is deliberately indifferent
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to a known pattern of unconstitutional conduct. Id. Harris does not allege that Adams personally
took part in the December 29 incident, authorized the use of force, or was otherwise aware in
advance of any risk to Harris. Therefore, the Court dismisses Harris ' s individual-capacity claims
against Adams for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. S ee 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. 	Sergeant Rector
Harris also sues Sergeant Rector in his individual capacity. He claims that Rector forced
him to the ground, bent his fingers, and taunted him to provoke resistance. (ECF No. 1 at 3- 5).
Harris further alleges that Rector left him on a metal bench for an extended period of time and
delayed access to medical staff. Id. at 5.
To state a claim for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must plausibly
allege that an official used force not " in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline," but
"maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. " Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 6- 7 (1992). The
core inquiry is the official's intent. Id.
Harris ' s allegations, liberally construed and accepted as true, support an inference that
Rector acted maliciously with intent to cause harm and not merely to maintain or restore discipline.
Although Rector may ultimately establish a legitimate basis for his actions, Harris ' s excessive-
force allegations are sufficient to survive initial screening under § 1915(e)(2).
Harris also brings a deliberate indifference claim against Rector. A deliberate indifference
claim has two components. First, a plaintiff must establish that he suffered from an objectively
serious medical need. Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2014). "A serious
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is
so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor' s attention."
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Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Second, he must show that the defendant actually knew of but disregarded the serious
medical need. Jackson , 756 F.3d at 	1065. This requires "a highly culpable state of mind
approaching actual intent." Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2017).
At this early stage, Harris's allegations against Rector plausibly satis fy both prongs.
According to Harris, Rector forced him to the ground, bent his fingers back despite being
restrained, and subsequently left him alone on a bench without medical care. These allegations
permit an inference that Rector knew he injured Harri s' s thumb and yet disregarded the need for
medical attention.
For these reasons, Harris may proceed on his individual-capacity claims against Sergeant
Rector.
D. 	Officer Wieble
Finally, Harris brings individual-capacity claims against Officer Wieble. He states that
Wieble helped force him to the ground and placed him on the metal bench. (ECF No. 1 at 3-5) .
However, unlike Rector, Harris does not assert that Wieble took additional actions like bending
his fingers and taunting him. To prevail under§ 1983 , a plaintiff must establish each defendant's
personal involvement in the alleged violation. White v. Jackson , 865 F.3d 1064, 1081 (8th Cir.
2017).
Even liberally construed, Harris ' s allegations do not plausibly suggest that Wieble acted
with the malicious and sadistic intent required for an excessive-force claim. S ee Hudson , 503 U.S .
at 6- 7. Similarly, the complaint fails to allege facts suggesting th at Wieble was personally aware
of Harris's medical need. Accordingl y, the Court dismisses Harris ' s individual-capacity claims
against Wieble. Se e 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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IV. 	Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Separately, the Court considers Harris ' s motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 4).
Civil litigants do not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. Watson v. Moss ,
619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980); Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating
that " [a] pro se litigant has no statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil
case" ). Rather, a district court may appoint counsel in a civil case if the court is "convinced that
an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim ... and where the nature of the litigation is
such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the assistance of counsel." Pallerson v.
Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018). When determining whether to appoint counsel for an
indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors such as the complexity of the case, the ability
of the pro se litigant to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting testimony, and the ability
of the prose litigant to present his claim. Phillips v. Jasper Cly. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir.
2006).
Having considered these factors , the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not
warranted at this time. Harris has demonstrated up to this point that he can adequately present his
claims to the Court. Additionally, neither the factual nor the legal issues in this case appear to be
complex. The Court may entertain future motions for appointment of counsel as the case
progresses.
V. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Harris ' s informa pauperis motion, assesses an
initial partial filing fee of $1.75 , and directs service of the complaint on Rector in his individual
capacity. The Court dismisses all remaining claims and denies Harris ' s motion for appointment of
counsel without prejudice.
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Harris's motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis
(ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Harris shall pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.75
within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. Harris shall make his remittance pa yable to
"C lerk, United States District Court," and include his name, prison registration number, case
number, and a statement that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall effectuate service on
Defendant Sergeant Unknown Rector in his individual capacity pursuant to the Service Agreement
between the Court and the Missouri Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Harris's remaining claims are DISMISSED. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Harris ' s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No.
4) is DENIED without prejudice.
A separate Order of Partial Dismissal accompanies this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 5 th day of November 2025.
JO~ 	•
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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