Hawkins v. State of Missouri Governor's Office et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SHALLON HAWKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 4:25-cv-00728-HEA
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is self-represented Plaintiff Shallon Hawkins’s Application
to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees and Costs. Based on Plaintiff’s
financial information, the Court grants the application and assesses an initial partial
filing fee of $3.53. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the following reasons, the
Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Initial Partial Filing Fee
A prisoner bringing a civil action is required to pay the full amount of the
filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison
account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an
initial partial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in
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the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account
for the prior six-month period. 	After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the
prisoner must make monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month’s income
credited to the prisoner’s account. Id. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of
the prisoner will forward the monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the
amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has submitted an inmate account statement for the time period
October 14, 2024 to April 14, 2025. 	Based on this statement, Plaintiff’s average
monthly deposit is $17.61. The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $3.53,
which is 20% of his average monthly deposit.
Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint
filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a
plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. at 678.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
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common sense.” 	Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but
not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th
Cir. 2016).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court
must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. 	Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is
discernible . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that
permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.”
Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364
F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). But even pro se complaints must “allege facts, which
if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286
(8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would
have formed a stronger complaint”).
The Complaint
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional
Center (ERDCC), brings this action against the State of Missouri Governor’s Office;
State of Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC); Anne Precythe (Director,
MDOC); David Vandergriff (Deputy Warden, ERDCC); Ted Theader Eaton (FUM,
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ERDCC); 	Mark 	Wilson 	(Caseworker, 	ERDCC); 	Sarah 	Miller 	(Caseworker,
ERDCC); Joes Martinez (“Investigator or Jailhouse Snitch”) and D.G. (“Investigator
or Jailhouse Snitch a/k/a Jelly Roll”).
Plaintiff alleges he was denied access to the courts and counsel because he
was denied a phone call to his attorney while he was in administrative segregation
awaiting assignment to protective custody. 	He states that on October 8, 2020, he
asked to make a telephone call to his attorney. Jail officials stated that “[l]egal calls
have to be set up by the lawyers.” Doc. 1-1 at 19. Plaintiff wanted to call his attorney
because he wanted to file his own brief in his state post-conviction action “because
[he] did not like what [his attorney] turned in and it was missing issues.” Id. at 29.
He states not being able to call his attorney “prevented [him] from obtaining
favorable decisions from the court on my appeals.” Id. 1-1 at 32.
Attached to his complaint is the letter from his Missouri State Public Defender
that precipitated Plaintiff’s desire to call. 	In the letter, dated October 13, 2020,
Plaintiff’s attorney discussed Plaintiff’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of his Rule
29.15 post-conviction motion. Plaintiff’s attorney included with the letter the brief
that he had already filed with the Missouri Court of Appeals. Doc. 1-1 at 21-22.
In several unrelated allegations, Plaintiff states that correctional officers at
ERDCC have inmates call him “their baby” and “b***h” because they know he
suffered sexual abuse as a child. He also alleges he is celled with child molesters.
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Finally, he states his incarceration has prevented him from his desire to “build,
operate and sell an idea that is not patented and run my own business.” Doc. 1 at 5.
He also accuses a fellow inmate of stealing songs he had written and playing these
songs on the radio after the inmate’s release. 	Doc. 5 at 31. 	He attaches to his
complaint pages from MDOC’s policy manual, including its telephone policies.
Doc. 1-1 at 2.
For relief, he seeks $500 million and “other accommodations I would have
had if not incarcerated,” or an unconditional pardon. 	Doc. 1 at 6. 	He lists these
“other accommodations” in two pages of bullet points, and includes items such as
washers and dryers, walnut trees, hot tubs, and gardening tools. Doc. 1-1 at 27-28;
Doc. 5 at 33-35.
Discussion
“To prove a violation of the right of meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner
must establish [that] the state has not provided an opportunity to litigate a claim
challenging the prisoner’s sentence or conditions of confinement in a court of law,
which resulted in actual injury, that is, the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably
meritorious underlying legal claim.” 	Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th
Cir. 2008). 	In order to prove actual injury, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a
nonfrivolous legal claim has been frustrated or is being impeded. White v. Kautzky,
494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2007). 	A prison system does not run afoul of the
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constitution as long as there is no actual harm to an inmate’s access rights. Bear v.
Kautzky, 305 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d
427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that in order for an inmate to assert a successful
claim of denial of meaningful access to the courts, he must demonstrate that he has
suffered prejudice).
Plaintiff’s allegations are not entirely clear, but he appears to argue that the
ERDCC staff did not allow him to contact his attorney regarding a Rule 29.15 post-
conviction brief that his attorney had already prepared and filed. He suggests that
because he did not talk to his attorney, his arguments were not included in his
appellate brief in support of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion. He states that
had these arguments been included in his state court appellate brief, they would not
have been considered procedurally defaulted in his later-filed § 2254 federal habeas
petition. See Doc. 5 at 18.
Plaintiff’s claims fail because he cannot plausibly allege Defendants hindered
a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal claim. 	In particular, his
allegations that if he had talked to his attorney, his arguments would have been
included in his Rule 29.15 post-conviction appellate brief are purely speculative.
Plaintiff’s attorney had already filed his appellate brief. 	There is no way to know
whether Plaintiff’s attorney would have moved to amend his appellate brief based
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on Plaintiff’s arguments.1 Additionally, Defendants did not prevent Plaintiff from
communicating with his attorney through the mail, which satisfies Plaintiff’s right
to access the courts. See, e.g., Lamp v. Iowa, 122 F.3d 1100, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1997)
(finding Plaintiff’s ability to communicate with attorney through mail during post-
conviction motion process satisfied his right of access to the courts).
Additionally, Plaintiff could have still raised these allegedly defaulted claims
in his § 2254 brief even if they did not appear in his Rule 29.15 appellate brief. An
exception to the doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard in
a § 2254 petition is “cause and prejudice.” 	See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 10
(2012). 	“[A] prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing
cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.” 	Id. 	Thus, the
district court hearing Plaintiff’s § 2254 petition could excuse the default if Plaintiff
established a cause to excuse the procedural default.
But Plaintiff did not allege in his § 2254 petition that his claims were defaulted
because he was unable to call his attorney on October 8, 2020. Rather, he alleged
his claims were defaulted because his attorney “refused to consider raising any
additional claims.” Hawkins v. Vandergriff, No. 4:22-cv-167-GAF (W.D. Mo. filed
1 In his § 2254 petition, Plaintiff alleges his arguments were not included in his 29.15 appellate
brief because counsel refused to raise the issues. See Hawkins v. Vandergriff, No. 4:22-cv-167-
GAF (W.D. Mo. filed May 19, 2022) at Doc. 17.
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Feb. 22, 2022) at Doc. 17 at 2.2 As the Western District Court of Missouri stated in
denying Plaintiff’s § 2254 petition, “[h]ere, Petitioner argues ‘ignorance of the law’
for failing to fully develop his meritorious issues on direct appeal and in his 29.15
motion, and claims that counsel refused to raise the issues.” Id. Doc. 25 at 10.
Because Plaintiff has not pointed to any nonfrivolous underlying legal claim
that was hindered by his inability to make a telephone call to his attorney on October
8, 2020, the Court finds he cannot state a plausible claim of unconstitutional denial
of access to the courts. For this reason, the Court will dismiss his claims on initial
review for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To the extent Plaintiff argues that prison staff harassed him by encouraging
fellow inmates to call him names, this too is insufficient to state a constitutional
claim. The Eighth Circuit has consistently found that name-calling and harassment
are not actionable under § 1983. 	See 	McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.3d 433, 434 (8th
Cir. 1993); see also Blades v. Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2002) (no
constitutional 	violation 	for 	“thoroughly 	offensive” 	and 	“racially 	derogatory
language”).
Accordingly,
2 The Court takes judicial notice of public records and judicial opinions. See Zerger & Mauer
LLP v. City of Greenwood, 751 F.3d 928, 935 n.7 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “federal courts
may sua sponte take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if they relate directly to the
matters at issue”).
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in district
court without prepaying fees and costs is GRANTED. [Doc. 2]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of
$3.53 within 30 days of the date of this Order. 	Plaintiff is instructed to make his
remittance payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it:
(1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that
the remittance is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions are DENIED
as moot. [Docs. 4-5, 6, and 8-10]
An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Opinion, Memorandum and
Order.
Dated this 13 th day of January, 2026.
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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