Graves v. Missouri Department of Corrections et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
HOLDEN GRAVES,
Plaintiff,
v.
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 4:24-CV-01693-JMD
MEMORADUM AND ORDER
Holden Graves, an inmate, sued the Missouri Department of Corrections, Centurion
of Missouri and eight of their employees, three correctional officers, and the warden of the
prison where Graves was housed. 	He asserts state and federal claims about prison
conditions. 	But he admits he has not exhausted his administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act. That is fatal. The Court GRANTS the defendants’ motions to
dismiss. ECF 39, 41, 53, 65, 94, 107.
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible where “the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” 	Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation
Case: 4:24-cv-01693-JMD Doc. #: 135 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 1 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts all factual allegations
in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Healy
v. Fox, 46 F.4th 739, 743 (8th Cir. 2022). 	But the Court is not bound by legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Factual Background
Graves alleges that, because of hallucinations, he jumped from a balcony within a
Missouri state prison facility on March 11, 2024, and experienced serious injuries. ECF 36
at 6. 	He alleges medical neglect, including significant and unnecessary delays before
receiving medical attention.
Corrections officials then transferred Graves to another facility.1 There, he began the
internal grievance process by submitting an “Informal Resolution Request” required by
Missouri’s grievance process. ECF 36 at 17. He says that he has been informed that at least
seven staff members were fired because of the incident and that an internal investigation
continues. ECF 36 at 17. But he otherwise says he has “yet to receive an update.” Id.
Graves does not disagree that the grievance process includes three steps. A litigant
must first submit an Informal Resolution Request within 15 calendar days of an incident.
Missouri Department of Corrections Offender Rulebook at 62 (2019).2 Prisoners are supposed
to receive a response within 40 calendar days. 	Id. 	The next step is filing an Offender
1 Graves’ complaint says he was transferred to the Farmington Correctional Center
around December 5, 2023. ECF 36 at 17. But that date was before the March 2024 injuries,
and he elsewhere says the transfer occurred after those injuries. ECF 109 at 11.
2 https://doc.mo.gov/sites/doc/files/media/pdf/2020/03/Offender_Rulebook_REVISED_201
9.pdf
Case: 4:24-cv-01693-JMD Doc. #: 135 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 2 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Grievance form. Id. The third and final stage is an administrative appeal. Id. At each stage,
inmates may proceed to the next stage if they have not received a response within the allotted
time frame. Id.
Graves alleges that he completed the first part of the three-step process, but he
concedes he never completed the second or third. ECF 36 at 17; ECF 47 at 1. Instead, he
sued, asserting three claims under state law and three claims under federal law against 14
defendants. 	All defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See Porter v. Sturm, 781
F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2015) (describing exhaustion as an affirmative defense). 	They say
Graves’ failure to exhaust is evident from the face of the complaint.
Analysis
Prisoners must exhaust internal grievance procedures before suing about prison
conditions. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which the parties agree applies, “[n]o
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a). This
means exhausting the internal grievance procedures created by the prison because “it is the
prison’s requirements, and not the [Act], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
Courts can grant motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust. Although exhaustion is an
affirmative defense, “a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies if it is plain on the face of the complaint that a grievance procedure has not been
exhausted.” 	Davis v. Torshein, No. 1:22-cv-00080-SEP, 2022 WL 4299780, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Case: 4:24-cv-01693-JMD Doc. #: 135 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 3 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Sept. 19, 2022) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215–16), aff'd, No. 22-3112, 2022 WL 19408218 (8th
Cir. Nov. 28, 2022).
Graves admits that he did not exhaust the Missouri Department of Corrections’
grievance process. ECF 36 at 17; ECF 47 at 1. Graves asserts that he completed only the
first step, and he makes no contention that he satisfied the other two. But, as Graves does
not dispute, the Missouri Department of Corrections has a three-step grievance process. That
is a problem for Graves because exhaustion is “mandatory” under the Act; “unexhausted
claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. Judges lack discretion to deviate
from this mandate. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638–39 (2016).
So Graves tries to evade exhaustion by arguing that steps two and three of the
grievance process were unavailable. 	An inmate is required to exhaust only “available”
options—those “grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the
action complained of.’” Id. at 642 (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)).
But Graves fails to plead unavailability sufficiently. 	Case law recognizes three
circumstances where an “administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not
capable of use to obtain relief”: (1) when the procedure “operates as a simple dead end”; (2)
when the scheme is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use”; and
(3) “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process
through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44. Graves
pleads none of these. 	He argues that the grievance process was unavailable because he
allegedly never received a “meaningful[ ]” or “substantive” response to his informal resolution
request. 	ECF 97 at 10; ECF 47 at 1. 	But he includes no allegation that the defendants’
supposed failure to respond prevented Graves from continuing to the next step of the process.
Case: 4:24-cv-01693-JMD Doc. #: 135 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 4 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
Contra Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 698 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Foulk’s testimony further
indicates, however, that [the corrections department’s] failure to respond to his IRR
precluded him from filing a grievance . . . .”). And the Department of Corrections manual—
which Graves indirectly embraces in his complaint by citing the “Informal Resolution
Request” he filed, ECF 36 at 17—is clear that a prisoner “may proceed to the grievance stage”
“[i]f you have not received a response” to an “informal resolution request.” Offender Rulebook
at 62.3 Graves submitted his informal resolution request in April 2024. By mid-June—well
before he sued in November 2024—Graves had the ability to move to the second step and
submit an Offender Grievance form. 	Graves cannot go to federal court before giving the
prison a “fair opportunity to consider the grievance.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–95
(2006).
Comity interests caution federal courts against premature interference with state
prisons. “It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one
that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the
administration of its prisons.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–92 (1973). Because
prison officials have not first addressed Graves’ grievance, there is no “useful record for
subsequent judicial consideration.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89 (citation omitted). Graves must
exhaust his claim using the prison’s process before suing in federal court.
3 Although the complaint does not expressly cite the manual by name, the complaint’s
reference to the “Informal Resolution Request (IRR)” in the manual is an apparent reference
to the manual. In response to that reference, the defendants noted the three-part process in
the manual, which Graves never disputes. 	The manual is also publicly available on the
website for the Missouri Department of Corrections, supra n.2, and subject to judicial notice,
Missourians for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr, 830 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2016) (taking
judicial notice of government websites).
Case: 4:24-cv-01693-JMD Doc. #: 135 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 5 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Graves also argues that his transfer to another facility along with his severe physical
injuries impeded his ability to submit a claim. ECF 47 at 1; ECF 97 at 10; ECF 109 at 11.
But he submitted the informal resolution request after his transfer. ECF 36 at 17. And he
includes no sufficient factual allegations to back up his contention that his injuries precluded
following the process. The cases he cites do not excuse exhaustion because of a transfer or
physical incapacitation. See Foulk, 262 F.3d at 698 (excusing exhaustion because testimony
suggested that the prison’s failure to respond was an effective dead end); Miller v. Norris,
247 F.3d 736, 738, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (accepting a prisoner’s allegation that corrections
officials “prevented him from exhausting”).
Exhaustion is required for all claims under 1983 or “any other federal law.” Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). To the extent the Court retains jurisdiction over the state
law claims alleged here, and having considered the “four factors enumerated in the federal
supplemental-jurisdiction statute,” Wong v. Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 820 F.3d 922, 933
(8th Cir. 2016), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 	A district court
“ordinarily should” decline supplemental jurisdiction when it has “dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22,
32 (2025).
Case: 4:24-cv-01693-JMD Doc. #: 135 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 6 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’ motions to dismiss, ECF 39, ECF
41, ECF 53, ECF 65, ECF 94, and ECF 107 are granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to
close this case. A separate order of dismissal will accompany this memorandum and order.
Dated this 23rd day of January, 2026
__________________________________
JOSHUA M. DIVINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:24-cv-01693-JMD Doc. #: 135 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 7 of 7 PageID #:
<pageID>