Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DAVID HICKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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No. 4:24 CV 1453 RWS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff David Hicks brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision denying his application for
disability benefits under the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (SSDI),
Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and for benefits under the
Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI), Title XVI of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. For the reasons set forth below, I will affirm the
decision of the Commissioner.
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano should be substituted for Martin O’Malley as the defendant in this suit.
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Procedural History
Plaintiff David Hicks was born on April 14, 1986. (Tr. 499.) He is currently
39 years old. Hicks completed high school. (Tr. 575.) The alleged onset date of
his disability is September 1, 2019. (Tr. 501.) In the several years before he
applied for disability benefits, Hicks worked as a laborer, cashier/assistant
manager, and dishwasher. (Tr. 862, 872.) His final employment, lasting for two
years, was that of a laborer through a temp agency. (Tr. 872.) That position ended
in December 2018. (Tr. 576, 872.)
On December 19, 2016, Hicks protectively filed a Title II application for a
period of disability and disability insurance and a Title XVI application for
supplemental security income. (Tr. 499.) He alleged his disability began on
September 1, 2019. (Tr. 499, 850) Hicks’s applications were initially denied on
May 27, 2020. (Tr. 635.) The applications were denied again upon reconsideration
on December 21, 2020. (Tr. 660.) On February 12, 2021, Hicks filed a request for
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 706-707.) The ALJ held
an in-person hearing on September 8, 2023, in Creve Coeur, Missouri. (Tr. 570-
598, 599-605). An impartial vocational expert (VE) participated via telephone.
In his Disability Report, completed on March 24, 2020, Hicks asserted the
following conditions that limit his ability to work: degenerative changes in both
shoulders; cervical spine pain; scoliosis; low back pain; degenerative hip changes;
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headaches; hand pain; bipolar; ADHD; and anxiety. (Tr. 854.) In his Function
Reports, completed on December 14, 2019 and July 3, 2020, Hicks asserted that
the following conditions, among others, limit his ability to work: he sleeps 1-2
hours at most because of his pain; he has numbness and tingling in his arms and
legs; he has difficulty doing household chores like cooking and cleaning because of
his pain and mental health issues; he suffers from body aches and dizziness; he can
only walk for 20 minutes before needing to stop and rest; he does not handle stress
well; he has trouble focusing, moodiness, and depression because of his ADHD
and bipolar disorder; and he sometimes needs to be reminded to do paperwork.
(Tr. 834-849, 897-911.).
At the hearing before the ALJ, Hicks’s counsel stated that Hicks’s
impairments include a combination of anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder,
along with migraines, cervical degeneration, cervical radiculopathy, and bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome. His counsel further noted that Hicks had left shoulder
surgery in October 2020, was going to see a doctor for his right shoulder, and had
ongoing issues after a right ankle fracture in September 2022. (Tr. 573.) Hicks
testified that his difficulty with his hands keep him from working. (Tr. 577.) He
testified that he could have something in his hands and it will drop on its own, and
he will not realize that he dropped it. (Id.) He also testified that he trips a lot
because his bones have deteriorated, his hips are “not all the way in place,” he has
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a lot of back problems and neck problems, he has migraines, he has asthma, he
sometimes needs to be reminded to bathe and take his medications, he wears
braces on his wrists, he uses a walking stick, and he has mental health issues,
including depression. (Tr. 578-579, 581, 588) When asked by the ALJ about his
medications, Hicks testified that he was “doing good” with the medication for his
depression. (Tr. 578.) He testified that he had both carpal tunnels released, and
that his hands were healing, but that he could “not really put pressure down” on his
palms because of the pain. (Id.)
On September 21, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Hicks was
not disabled and that he could perform a reduced range of light-duty, unskilled
occupations. (Tr. 513.) On September 17, 2024, the Appeals Council denied
Hicks’s request for review. (Tr. 1.) The ALJ’s decision is now the final decision of
the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g).
In this action for judicial review, Hicks contends that the ALJ erred in failing
to analyze the supportability and consistency of medical opinions as required by 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520C. (ECF # 20 at 3.) Hicks asserts that the ALJ erred in relying
on outdated, non-examining state agency opinions, the ALJ failed to properly
evaluate the credibility of Hicks’s subjective complaints, and the ALJ’s RFC
determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 4-12.) Hicks now
requests that I reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and award benefits, or, in
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the alternative, that I reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand for further
evaluation. (Id. at 12.) For the reasons that follow, I will deny Hicks’s request.
Medical Records and Other Evidence Before the ALJ
With respect to the medical records and other evidence of record, I have
considered Hicks’s Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (ECF # 20-1) and
the Commissioner’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Uncontroverted Material
Facts (ECF # 27-1). Additional facts will be discussed as needed to address the
parties’ arguments.
Discussion
A. Legal Standard
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, a
plaintiff must prove that she is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211,
1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552,
555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual will be declared disabled “only
if [her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
[she] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
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education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a
five-step evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The Commissioner begins by deciding whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA).2 If not, the disability
analysis proceeds to the second step. In this step the Commissioner decides
whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments,
meaning that which significantly limits his ability to do basic work activities. If
the claimant’s impairment(s) is not severe, then she is not disabled and the analysis
ends. If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner then proceeds to
the third step and determines whether claimant’s impairment(s) meets or equals
one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If
claimant’s impairment(s) is equivalent to one of the listed impairments, she is
conclusively disabled. If the impairment is not equivalent to a listed impairment,
then the Commissioner proceeds to the fourth step to determine whether the
2 “Substantial gainful activity (SGA) is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful. ‘Substantial
work activity’ is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities (20 CFR 404.1572(a) and
416.972(a)). ‘Gainful work activity’ is work that is usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized
(20 CFR 404.1572(b) and 416.972(b)). Generally, if an individual has earnings from employment or self-
employment above a specific level set out in the regulations, it is presumed that he has demonstrated the ability to
engage in SGA (20 CFR 404.1574, 404.1575, 416.974, and 416.975). If an individual engages in SGA, he is not
disabled regardless of how severe his physical or mental impairments are and regardless of his age, education, and
work experience.” (Tr. 500.)
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claimant can perform her past relevant work.3 If so, the claimant is not disabled.
If not, at the last step the Commissioner evaluates various factors to determine
whether the claimant is capable of performing any other work in the economy. If
not, the claimant is declared disabled and becomes entitled to disability benefits.
I must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002).
Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable
person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240
F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). “[Substantial evidence] means – and means only
– such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (cleaned up).
Determining whether there is substantial evidence requires scrutinizing analysis.
Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007).
I must consider evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision as well
as any evidence that fairly detracts from the decision. McNamara v. Astrue, 590
F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010). If, after reviewing the entire record, it is possible to
draw two inconsistent positions and the Commissioner has adopted one of those
3 “The term past relevant work means work performed (either as the claimant actually performed it or as it is
generally performed in the national economy) within the last 15 years or 15 years prior to the date that disability
must be established. In addition, the work must have lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do the job and
have been SGA (20 CFR 404.1560(b), 404.1565, 416.960(b), and 416.965).” (Tr. 501.)
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positions, I must affirm the Commissioner’s decision. Anderson v. Astrue, 696
F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2012). I may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision
merely because substantial evidence could also support a contrary outcome.
McNamara, 590 F.3d at 610.
When evaluating medical opinions and prior administrative medical
findings, the ALJ will consider various factors, the “most important factors” being
supportability and consistency. 20 CFR § 404.1520c(a). The ALJ must “articulate
in his determination or decision how persuasive he find[s] all of the medical
opinions and all of the prior administrative medical findings in your case record.”
Id. at § 404.1520c(b).
When evaluating evidence of pain or other subjective complaints, the ALJ is
never free to ignore the subjective testimony of the claimant, even if it is
uncorroborated by objective medical evidence. Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d
1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ may, however, disbelieve a claimant’s
subjective complaints when they are inconsistent with the record as a whole. See
e.g., Battles v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 1990). In considering the
subjective complaints, the ALJ is required to consider the factors set out by Polaski
v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), which include:
[The] claimant’s prior work record, and observations by third
parties and treating and examining physicians relating to such
matters as: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration,
frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and
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aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of
medication; and (5) functional restrictions.
Id. at 1322.4 When an ALJ explicitly finds that the claimant’s testimony is not
credible and gives good reasons for the findings, the court will usually defer to the
ALJ’s finding. Casey v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 696 (8th Cir. 2007). However, the
ALJ retains the responsibility of developing a full and fair record in the non-
adversarial administrative proceeding. Hildebrand v. Barnhart, 302 F.3d 836, 838
(8th Cir. 2002).
B. ALJ’s Decision
In her written decision, the ALJ found that Hicks had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since September 1, 2019, the alleged onset of his disability. (Tr.
501.) The ALJ found that Hicks had the following severe impairments: residuals
of left shoulder superior labrum; anterior to posterior (SLAP) repair; lumbar
radiculopathy and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; residuals right ankle fracture;
intermittent asthma; bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder; anxiety; and
history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). (Tr. 502.) The ALJ
determined that Hicks’s impairments or combination of impairments did not meet
4 This was once referred to as a credibility determination, but the agency has now eliminated use of the term
“credibility” to clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character.
However, the analysis remains largely the same, so the Court’s use of the term credibility refers to the ALJ’s
evaluation of whether a claimant’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are
consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record.” See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at
*8 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3); Lawrence v. Saul, 970 F.3d 989, 995 n.6 (8th Cir.
2020) (noting that SSR 16-3p “largely changes terminology rather than the substantive analysis to be applied” when
evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints).
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or medically equal a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (Tr. 502.) The ALJ found Hicks to have the residual functional capacity (RFC)
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(b) with the following
limitations:
[h]e can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; should avoid climbing ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally crawl; frequently handle and finger with
bilateral upper extremities; avoid exposure to concentrated fumes, odors, gases,
dust, and poor ventilation; occasionally lift overhead with the bilateral upper
extremities; is able to complete simple, routine tasks with minimal changes in job
duties and setting; should avoid fast-paced production work, for example avoid
work that requires hourly quotas; and he is able to occasionally interact with
supervisors, co-workers, and the general public.
(Tr. 506.) 	The ALJ determined that Hicks is unable to perform any past relevant
work. (Tr. 512). The ALJ consulted a vocational expert (VE) to assess whether
jobs within Hicks’s RFC existed in significant numbers in the national economy.
(Tr. 513.) The VE identified the jobs of merchandise marker (136,791 positions);
routing clerk (117,393 positions); and mail clerk (11,324 positions). (Tr. 513.) As
a result, the ALJ found that Hicks was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act from September 1, 2019, through the date of the ALJ’s
decision. (Id.)
C. Hicks’s Objections to the ALJ’s Decision
Hicks contends that the ALJ failed to analyze the supportability and consistency
of medical opinions as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520C. He asserts that the ALJ
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deemed the opinions of non-examining state agency physicians “persuasive”
without evaluating whether those opinions were supported by relevant objective
evidence or were consistent with the entirety of the medical record. He further
argues that the ALJ disregarded Hicks’s subjective complaints of pain. Finally, he
claims that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ properly analyzed the supportability and consistency of medical
opinions.
Because Hicks filed his applications for DIB and SSI after March 27, 2017, new
regulations required the ALJ to evaluate each medical opinion and prior
administrative medical finding and (1) articulate her consideration of its
persuasiveness, (2) articulate her consideration of the supportability factor, and (3)
articulate her consideration of the consistency factor. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b).
Regarding the supportability factor, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more
persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings will be.”
See, e.g., H.D. by Maslo v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-CV-01532-SRC, 2022 WL 2904143
(E.D. Mo. July 22, 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(1)). In evaluating
consistency, “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
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medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical findings will be.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(2)).
On May 27, 2020, state agency medical consultant Donna McCall, D.O.,
reviewed all of the available evidence regarding Hicks’s condition and prepared a
physical residual functional capacity assessment. Dr. McCall determined that
Hicks had the ability to “lift, carry, push or pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; sit
for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and occasionally crawl and climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds.” (Tr. 511, 630-632.) Dr. McCall concluded that Hicks’s
“condition is not severe enough to keep [him] from working.” (Tr. 635.) On
December 18, 2020, Dr. Harry Cole, M.D., affirmed Dr. McCall’s assessment. (Tr.
654.) The ALJ found the assessments of Drs. McCall and Cole persuasive
because:
while they are non-examining and have treatment relationship with the
claimant, they are familiar with Social Security rules and regulations, and their
conclusions are both well supported by a detailed narrative analysis
encompassing all evidence available at the time of their review and consistent
with the claimant’s positive findings and clinical signs.
(Tr. 511.)
Hicks argues that the ALJ did not consider whether Drs. McCall and Cole’s
opinions were based on “objective imaging, physical exam findings, or
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longitudinal treatment data” (ECF # 20 at 3). In support of his position, Hicks cites
the following medical evidence:
• 	Left shoulder MRI findings from February 24, 2020 showing
moderate supraspinatus tendinosis with interstitial tearing, labral
tearing, and chondral-labral separation (Tr. 1028);
• 	EMG testing on July 27, 2020, which confirmed left C5-6
radiculopathy and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (Tr. 1308);
• 	Cervical spine MRI from June 25, 2020 showing multi-level
degenerative changes, moderate to severe left foraminal stenosis at
C3-4, and central canal narrowing at multiple levels (Tr. 1152);
• 	Left shoulder arthroscopic labral repair surgery performed on October
1, 2020 (Tr. 1327-47);
• 	Post-operative evidence of continued left shoulder deficits, including
limited ROM and persistent pain requiring further orthopedic follow-
up (Tr. 2044, 2018-20, 1929-31)
(ECF # 20 at 3-4). When evaluating the supportability factor, the ALJ had Drs.
McCall and Cole’s reports available to her, including the objective medical
evidence that formed the basis of their opinions. (Tr. 511.) Dr. Cole’s assessment
was based on precisely the medical records that Hicks claims were not reviewed by
or accessible to him.5 (Tr. 654.) Dr. Cole’s assessment was also based on post-
operative evidence of “well-healing surgical sites” and “increasing ROM with
ongoing PT” from Hicks’s left shoulder repair follow-ups in October and
December 2020. (Id.) The ALJ acknowledged that Drs. McCall and Cole did not
5 Dr. Cole’s report lists the objective medical evidence upon which he based his assessment, including: the left
shoulder MRI “show[ing] moderate supraspinatus tendinosis with small partial interstitial tear, superior labral
tear…and minimal chondral labral separation posteriorly”; the EMG testing on July 27, 2020 showing “left C5-6
radiculopathy with ongoing denervation” and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; the cervical spine MRI from June 25,
2020 showing “disc bulge at C4-5 flattening the thecal sac” and “[m]oderate foraminal stenosis”; and the October 1,
2020 left shoulder arthroscopy. (Tr. 654.)
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examine Hicks or have a treatment relationship with him. (Id.) But the ALJ
ultimately found their opinions were “both well supported by a detailed narrative
analysis and encompassed all evidence available to them at the time of their
review.” (Id.) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Starman v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-CV-
00035-SRC, 2021 WL 4459729, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2021) (“In articulating
how they considered the supportability factor, ALJs may note…that the physician
did not consider certain evidence, did not examine the claimant, or did not provide
a detailed explanation for the opinion.”). I find that the ALJ properly addressed the
supportability of the state medical consultants’ opinions.
In addition to supportability, Hicks argues that the ALJ failed to analyze
whether the state agency opinions were consistent with the full medical record
(ECF # 20 at 4). Hicks claims that later records show “significant and ongoing
musculoskeletal impairments.”6 Despite Hicks’s assertions, the ALJ articulated
how she addressed the consistency factor. She found Drs. McCall and Cole’s
assessments were “consistent with the claimant’s positive findings and clinical
signs.” (Tr. 511.) The ALJ cites specific evidence in the record where the findings
6 Hicks cites the following evidence to support his position: orthopedic records from March 4, 2021, and April 7,
2021 document decreased triceps strength (3+/5), continued numbness and tingling in the left hand, and pain with
shoulder ROM and ongoing cervical radiculopathy (Tr. 2044-45, 2018-20, 1929-31); MRI arthrogram from April 1,
2024, revealed a partial-thickness tear of the anterior rotator cuff and abnormal superior labrum (Tr. 359), which the
consultants could not have reviewed; right shoulder deficits were documented as late as June 14, 2024, with positive
O’Brien’s and Speed’s tests, pain with impingement, and limited ROM (Tr. 122); cervical MRIs in both 2020 and
2024 show worsening foraminal stenosis, posterior disc osteophyte complexes, and neural impingement—findings
which contradict a light RFC (Tr. 323-33, 1152) (ECF # 20 at 4).
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are consistent with the opinion that Hicks is capable of performing a reduced range
of light work. (see Tr. 511 citing 1028, 1033-34, 1056, 1058, 1063, 1308, 1340,
1355, 1673, 1714, 1840, 2545, 2575, 2590, 2618, 2631.) These records include
evidence of Hicks’s treatment that occurred after Drs. McCall and Cole completed
their consultative assessments. The ALJ was not required to discuss every piece of
evidence that was submitted and considered in her decision. See Black v. Apfel,
143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Although required to develop the record fully
and fairly, an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence submitted. An
ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not
considered.”) (internal citations omitted).
To support his arguments, Hicks cites medical records from treatment that he
received in 2024. Although the ALJ issued her decision in 2023, it appears from
the record that Hicks submitted new evidence to the Appeals Council. (see Tr. 1-
491.) The Appeals Council is required to consider additional evidence submitted
after the ALJ’s decision if it is “(a) new, (b) material, and (c) relates to the period
on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision.” Whitney v. Astrue, 668 F.3d 1004,
1006 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b)). “Evidence submitted to the
Appeals Council is material when it relates to the claimant’s condition for the time
period for which benefits were denied, and not to after-acquired conditions or post-
decision deterioration of a pre-existing condition.” Lucas v. Saul, No. 2:18 CV 45
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CDP, 2019 WL 4221519, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 5, 2019) (citation omitted). After
reviewing the entire record, the Appeals Council denied Hicks’s request for review
and found no basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 1.) Upon careful review
of the additional evidence submitted from 2024, I find the ALJ’s decision is still
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Hicks asserts that the ALJ improperly relied on outdated medical opinions in
finding Drs. McCall and Cole’s assessments persuasive (ECF # 20 at 417). He
argues that because their opinions were rendered in mid and late 2020, they did not
account for “over three years of significant ongoing medical developments.” 7 The
alleged onset date of Hicks’s disability is September 1, 2019. Drs. McCall and
Cole’s assessments in mid and late 2020 were well within the relevant time period,
and the ALJ discussed Hicks’s treatment history leading up to her decision in 2023.
See, e.g., White v. O'Malley, No. 4:23-CV-539-ACL, 2024 WL 4202686, at *6-7
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2024) (“The fact that [the claimant] received additional
treatment following the [medical consultants’ opinions] does not invalidate their
opinions or render their opinions unreliable.”). Moreover, based on Hicks’s
diagnoses and treatment that occurred after the Drs. McCall and Cole’s
7 According to Hicks, the medical developments after 2020 included multiple surgeries, MRIs, steroid injections,
orthopedic consultations, and persistent and progressive neurological findings such as radiculopathy, carpal tunnel
syndrome, and cervical stenosis (ECF # 20 at 5). Notably, the ALJ could not have accounted for the steroid
injections, MRIs, and any other treatment that Hicks received in 2024 because that treatment occurred after the
ALJ’s decision in 2023. (see, e.g., Tr. 154, 214, 219.)
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assessments, the ALJ determined that additional postural and environmental
limitations to Hicks’s RFC were appropriate. (Tr. 508-511). The ALJ noted:
additional reaching, handling, and fingering limitations are included
to accommodate the claimant’s shoulder and recovery from his carpal tunnel
surgery (listing exhibits). Similarly, due to potential breathing difficulties
related to his intermittent asthma, environmental limitations are warranted
(listing exhibits).
(Tr. 511.) The ALJ considered whether new evidence made Drs. McCall and
Cole’s opinions more or less persuasive and adjusted Hicks’s RFC to accommodate
his limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(5). I find that the ALJ did not
improperly rely on outdated medical opinions in determining Hicks’s RFC.
The ALJ properly evaluated Hicks’s credibility concerning his subjective
complaints of pain and physical limitations.
Hicks argues that the ALJ’s assessment of his credibility concerning his
subjective complaints of pain and physical limitations was not supported by
substantial evidence.
To the contrary, the ALJ described in detail Hicks’s subjective complaints
from his Function Reports and his testimony at the hearing. (see Tr. 504-505.) The
ALJ discussed how Hicks’s subjective complaints of pain were inconsistent with
some of his daily activities and articulated how she considered the Polaski factors.
For example, the ALJ acknowledged Hicks’s testimony during the hearing that “his
mind races, he has a hard time focusing and he cannot concentrate.” (Tr. 504.)
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The ALJ then noted, “[h]owever, he reported or testified he takes care of nine dogs,
he completed lengthy function reports, he can follow written and spoken
instructions… examination findings typically indicate [Hicks’s] attention and
concentration are normal and intact.” (Id.) Taking into account such
inconsistencies, the ALJ determined that the record supports, at most, moderate
limitations in this area. (Id.)
When evaluating Hicks’s other impairments, the ALJ considered Hicks’s
subjective complaints, his reports of his daily activities, his reports about whether
medication was alleviating his symptoms, and objective medical evidence. (see Tr.
503-509.) The ALJ was not required to discuss every Polaski factor. See, e.g.,
Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding the ALJ was not required
to discuss “methodically each Polaski consideration, so long as he acknowledged
and examined those considerations before discounting [claimant’s] subjective
complaints.”). Not only did the ALJ consider Hicks’s subjective complaints, but
the RFC was more limiting to accommodate them “to the greatest extent possible
consistent with the objective evidence of record.” (see Tr. 508, 509, 510, 511.)
The ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, Hicks argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record (ECF # 20 at 7-12). He asserts that the ALJ
mischaracterized the record by relying on findings such as “full range of motion,”
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“normal gait,” and “intact sensation” to determine Hicks’s RFC (Id. at 9). He
claims that the ALJ ignored the nature and extent of his treatment and that the ALJ
was required to obtain additional medical source evidence to support the RFC (Id.
at 7, 10). I reviewed all of the evidence in the record and find that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination that Hicks can perform a reduced
range of light work.
On July 16, 2021, Hicks visited a neurosurgeon at the Mercy Clinic for
Spine and Pain Management in St. Louis, MO. He was treated by Dr. Bassam
Hadi, MD. Hicks reported experiencing back pain, neck pain, and left upper
extremity pain, and he reported that he had trouble walking and difficulty with
balancing. Dr. Hadi noted that Hicks “had an MRI of the cervical spine which
does show multilevel mild cervical spondylosis. There is left C3-C4 osteophytic
spur noted. There is some degenerative disc disease at C5-C6. EMG nerve
conduction test did show minor irritation at C5-C6.” (Tr. 1775.) Dr. Hadi’s
assessment was that “Hicks is suffering from spondylosis but without definite
radiculopathy or myelopathy” and that he would “definitely treat this
conservatively.” (Tr. 1776.) Dr. Hadi ordered physical therapy, chiropractic care,
and pain management. (Id.)
On February 16, 2022, Hicks visited the Mercy Clinic for Orthopedic
Surgery and Sports Medicine in Jefferson, MO. He was treated by Dr. Kenneth
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Jeffrey Jenks, D.O., MS. Dr. Jenks performed a left shoulder arthroscopy with
labral repair on Hicks in October 2020. Hicks reported experiencing pain in his
left shoulder and neck. Dr. Jenks noted that Hicks’s “pain did not really seem to be
coming from his shoulder and [Hicks] said the previous labral repair has improved
and [he’s] not having mechanical symptoms.” (Tr. 1756.) Hicks reported that he
had seen two spine surgeons who recommended nonsurgical intervention, and Dr.
Jenks referred Hicks for physical therapy and pain management. (Tr. 1752-1756.)
On August 16, 2023, Hick visited Dr. Jenks for an evaluation of his left hand
following his left carpal tunnel release surgery. He reported pain in his left hand
while doing work and that he occasionally wears a brace. (Tr. 554.) Upon
evaluation, Dr. Jenks found that Hicks’s incision was well-healed with minimal
soft tissue swelling and minimal pillar pain. (Tr. 558.) Dr. Jenks also noted
“flexion extension of all fingers without deficit” and that Hicks’s axillary nerve
sensation was intact C5-C8. (Tr. 558-559.) His “forearm and arm compartments
[were] soft and compressible. AIN, PIN function intact,” and he was “moving all
fingers.” (Tr. 559.) Dr. Jenks recommended “progress[ing] back to activity as
tolerated” and “discontinu[ing] brace” and ordered pain medication. (Id.)
Additionally, Hicks’s medical records consistently show that he presented
with normal or improving range of motion in his lumbar spine, cervical spine,
neck, knees, ankles, and hands, and that he had a steady gait. (see, e.g., Tr. 13, 21,
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29, 38, 149, 288, 1056, 1063, 1623, 1871, 1904, 1905, 1988, 2073, 2450, 2618.)
The ALJ acknowledged that some of Hicks’s musculoskeletal impairments resulted
in a reduced range of motion, warranting “a restriction to light work with
additional postural and environmental limitations.” (Tr. 508.)
In analyzing Hicks’s mental impairments of bipolar disorder, major
depressive disorder, anxiety, and history of ADHD, the ALJ determined that Hicks
had limitations related to “concentration, focus, being around and getting along
with others, [and] personal care.” (Tr. 5019-510.) The ALJ’s RFC limits Hicks to
“simple, routine tasks with limited production expectations, changes in the work
setting, and interactions.” (Tr. 510.) In July 2020, Hicks was evaluated by Thomas
Spencer, Psy.D., and Amie Mertz, L.P.C. (Tr. 1296.) They determined that Hicks
has a mental disability which prevents him from engaging in employment or
gainful activity. (Tr. 1299.) The ALJ found that their opinion was not persuasive
because it was conclusory and inconsistent with Hicks’s employment history and
his medical record as a whole. (Tr. 510-511.) Their report stated that Hicks’s
mental illness “does not appear to have impacted his ability to get employment in
the past.” (Tr. 510, 1299.) Moreover, the ALJ found that although Hicks appeared
to be “disheveled” and “older than his stated age” at his July 2023 psychiatric
appointment, he was overall “alert, pleasant, cooperative, [and] engaged,” and his
memory and attention were found to be “grossly intact.” (Tr. 509.)
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Based on the complete record, I find the ALJ’s decision finding Hicks not
disabled is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ was not required to obtain
additional medical source evidence. See Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779
(8th Cir. 1995) (“An ALJ is permitted to issue a decision without obtaining
additional medical evidence so long as other evidence in the record provides a
sufficient basis for the ALJ’s decision.”)
D. Conclusion
Because I find that the ALJ properly analyzed the supportability and
consistency of medical opinions, considered Hicks’s subjective complaints of pain,
and the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence in the record, I will affirm
the Commissioner’s decision.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security is affirmed.
A separate Judgment is entered herewith.
____________________________________
RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 6 th day of January, 2026.
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