USA v. Troupe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RONALD M. TROUPE,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:24-CR-555-MAL-SPM
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On October 23, 2024, a Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Defendant Ronald
M. Troupe with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm on or about September 28,
2024, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g). ECF No. 2. All pretrial matters in the above-referenced
case were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b). On June 5, 2025, Troupe filed a motion to suppress the firearm seized by police on
September 28, 2024, and any statements he made at the time. ECF No. 32. The United States
responded opposing the motion. ECF Nos. 35.
On July 23, 2025, the undersigned held an evidentiary hearing on Troupe’s motion. The
United States offered testimony of St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Tiarra
McFarland and nine exhibits consisting of digital recordings of a 911 call, police radio traffic,
recorded body camera and dashboard camera video, and documents related to the events of
Troupe’s arrest on September 28, 2024. See Govt. Exhs. 1-9. Counsel for Troupe cross examined
Officer McFarland but otherwise offered no additional witness testimony or evidence. At the
close of the evidentiary hearing the parties were granted time to request a transcript of the
hearing and to file post-hearing briefs. The transcript of the evidentiary hearing was filed on
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August 13, 2025, ECF No. 42, and post hearing briefing was completed on October 31, 2025.
See ECF Nos. 47& 52.
The undersigned has carefully considered all evidence that was offered and admitted at
the evidentiary hearing. The undersigned has also considered the arguments of the parties in
their written submissions. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing and the written
submissions of the parties, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
I. 	FINDINGS OF FACT
On September 28, 2024, at 11:42 A.M., St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
(“SLMPD”) Officers Tiarra McFarland and Rebekah Saito were dispatched to a gas station in the
city of St. Louis in response to a 911 call. See Evid. Hrng. Tr., ECF No. 42 at p. 8-9; see also
Govt. Exhs. 2 & 3. The dispatch advised that an unidentified caller reported that a black male,
occupying a grey truck, who goes by the nickname of “Que”, was harassing a black female,
wearing a dark shirt and blue jeans, on the gas station lot. See ECF No. 42, at p. 10-11; Govt.
Exhs. 2&3. The officers were also informed that the 911 call might be related to a call received
by dispatch the previous day, September 27. Specifically, the officers were told that on the
previous day dispatch received a call from a victim at the same gas station asserting “Que just
punched her in the face and took $30 from her.” See ECF No. 42, at p. 12-14; Govt. Ex. 4.
Officer McFarland was familiar with the gas station referenced by dispatch. ECF No.
42, at p. 21. She testified that the gas station was in a high crime area, and she had been called to
that gas station over a thousand times in response to 911 calls for a variety of criminal activity
including assaults, strong-arm robberies, burglaries, and homicides. ECF No. 42, at p. 21. She
explained that the gas station, which had previously been a Mobil gas station, had been given the
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nickname “Murder Mobil” due to a history of homicides and murders police encountered on that
gas station lot. Id. at p. 22.
Officer McFarland, who was driving separately from Officer Saito, arrived at the gas
station at approximately 11:58AM. See ECF No. 42, at p. 42. As she approached the gas station,
Officer McFarland saw three vehicles on the lot. One of the vehicles she recognized as a car
owned by the gas station manager. Id. at p. 25. The other two vehicles were a light gray/silver
sedan and the defendant’s two-toned gray van. Id. Officer McFarland’s attention was drawn to
the van (instead of the sedan) because of the report from dispatch that the suspect was driving a
gray “truck” and because she was aware that it was not unusual for people to use the word
“truck” to describe larger vehicles such as a van or sports utility vehicles. Id. at p. 19-20 & 25-
26.
As she approached the gas station, Officer McFarland saw two black males, one later
identified as the defendant, walking out of the convenience store of the gas station towards the
van. Id. at p. 23-24. When the men began to enter the van, Officer McFarland radioed Officer
Saito, who was en route, to advise that she was going to conduct a stop to inquire about the
911call. Id. at 26-28; Govt. Exh. 5 (McFarland body camera video footage), 1:04 to 1:06.
Officer McFarland pulled her police vehicle behind the van, activated her lights, and
approached the defendant while he was standing outside the driver’s side door. She asked the
defendant his name and when he responded by saying “I just pulled up from the scrapyard,” she
said, “let me detain you real quick.” Id. at 1:06 to 1:54. Defendant, visibly alarmed, started
asking the officer what he did. Officer Saito, who had arrived and was standing in front of the
van, explained that they were doing an investigation. Id. at 1:54 to 2:02. Officer McFarland
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advised the defendant he was not under arrest but he was being detained so that they could “ask
questions;” she urged him to not resist. Govt. Exh. 5, at 1:54 to 2:02.
Officer McFarland secured defendant’s hands with restraints and asked him to follow
her to her car. Id. at 2:02 to 2:39. As they approached her police vehicle, for officer safety,
Officer McFarland asked the defendant to confirm that he didn’t have anything that would poke
or hurt her; in response, the defendant began insisting that Officer McFarland was going to take
him to jail. Id. at 2:39 to 2:48. See also ECF No. 42, at p. 61-62. Despite Officer McFarland’s
attempts to reassure the defendant that her intention was not to take him to jail, the defendant
insisted that she was going to take him to jail because he was “going to tell [the officer] the truth
about what [he had] on him.” Govt. Exh. 5, at 2:48 to 2:49. Officer McFarland asked the
defendant “what do you have on you?” and he responded by repeatedly saying while sobbing
“please don’t take me to jail baby,” “you’re going to send me to prison.” Id. at 2:50 to 3:46.
During her frisk of the defendant, Officer McFarland seized a gun from his waistband
and handed it to Officer Saito; meanwhile, the defendant continued to sob saying “y’all going to
take me to prison.” Id. Officer McFarland tried to get the defendant to calm down saying “sir,
this is just an investigation right now” and words to that effect. Id. at 3:46 to 4:00. Defendant
continued sobbing, stating they were going to “take [him] to jail for the gun,” “I’m going back to
the penitentiary” and “y’all fittin to put me in jail for the rest of my life” and “I’m going to die in
jail.” Id. at 4:00 to 7:30.
In the interim, other officers took the defendant’s identification and firearm and
performed computer inquiries. See id. at 06:10. Approximately ten minutes into the encounter
Officer Saito returned to Officer McFarland and informed her that the firearm was previously
reported as stolen, and that other officers were still trying to confirm whether the defendant was
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a convicted felon. Govt. Exh. 5, at 10:02 to 10:14. At that point, Officer McFarland asked
Officer Saito if she should “Mirandize now?” and Officer Saito responded by saying, “yes, I
would.” Id. at 10:16. The defendant overheard the two officer’s conversation and said, “I already
know you’re going to read me my rights,” and Officer McFarland confirmed and told the
defendant she was going to advise him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 10:20 to 10:24. In response,
the defendant screamed and ran to the other side of Officer McFarland’s car. Id. at 10:24 to
10:28. She followed him and read the defendant his Miranda rights while he dropped to the
ground, and screamed “no, no, no”, and cried even louder than before, that he was “going to die
in prison.” Id. at 10:37 to 11:23.
After Officer McFarland finished reading the defendant his Miranda rights, a male
officer who had arrived on scene accused the defendant of “acting like a child.” Id. at 11:23 to
14:25. The defendant told the officer “I’m going to prison, man [because of the firearm]” and the
officer replied, “[w]hy would you, what’s wrong with having a gun? It’s the state of Missouri?”
The defendant answered, “I’m a convicted felon.” Id. at 14:25 to 15:04.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Troupe asserts the gun seized by police and any incriminating statements he made should
be suppressed because police obtained them in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Specifically, Troupe asserts Officer McFarland violated the Fourth Amendment by
detaining him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and by exceeding the scope of an
investigatory detention. See ECF No. 32. Troupe contends Officer McFarland also violated the
Fifth Amendment by obtaining statements from him without advising him of his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent. Id.
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A. 	FOURTH AMENDMENT V IOLATIONS
The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable government seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV (“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”). For Fourth Amendment
purposes, a seizure occurs whenever an officer restrains an individual’s liberty by physical force
or a show of authority to which the individual submits. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626
(1991). If unreasonable under the circumstances, such seizures violate the Fourth Amendment.
Based on the foregoing factual findings, Troupe was seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes when Officer McFarland approached him, stated she was going to “detain” him “real
quick,” and placed him in handcuffs. When Troupe asked why he was being detained, the officers
told him they were investigating a call. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-31 (1968), the Supreme
Court held that brief seizures by police that fall short of traditional arrests are lawful if justified by
a reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal activity and if police activities
during the investigatory stop are reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the
stop. See also Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015). “Reasonable suspicion
requires that the officers’ suspicion be based upon particularized objective facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime has
been committed.” United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 658 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal citations
omitted). An “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch” is insufficient. Terry, 392 U.S. at
27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether the requisite degree of suspicion exists, the court must determine
whether the facts collectively establish reasonable suspicion and not whether each fact establishes
reasonable suspicion—the whole picture, i.e., the “totality of the circumstances” must be
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considered. See United States v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Jones,
269 F.3d 919, 927 (8th Cir. 2001). The court may consider any added meaning that certain conduct
might suggest to experienced officers in the field, but the officer’s reasonable suspicion cannot be
“just a mere hunch or based on circumstances which ‘describe a very large category of presumably
innocent [people].’” Jones, 269 F.3d at 927 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 428, 441 (1980)).
1. 	The officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Troupe.
Officer McFarland did not seize Troupe based on an unparticularized suspicion or hunch.
She and her partner, Officer Saito, were dispatched to the gas station to search for and question a
black male named Que who, according to a 911 caller, had been harassing a woman at the gas
station approximately twenty minutes before Officer McFarland arrived. Officer McFarland also
knew police had been dispatched to the same gas station the day before in response to a call from
a female victim accusing the same subject, “Que,” of assaulting and robbing her. The assailant was
reportedly seen in a gray “truck” on both days and had managed to evade police the day before so
presumably was still at large.
When she arrived at the gas station, Officer McFarland saw only three vehicles on the
parking lot—two sedans and Troupe’s van which was gray. Officer McFarland recognized one
of the sedans as a car owned by the gas station manager. She focused on Troupe’s van and not
the other sedan because she knew it was not uncommon for individuals—especially in a hurry or
under stress—to describe a van as a truck. Officer McFarland was also familiar with the gas
station. Not only was Officer McFarland aware that the gas station was in a high crime area, but
based on her experience working in that area, Officer McFarland had responded to other 911
calls to that gas station numerous times for a variety of criminal activity including assaults,
strong-arm robberies, burglaries, and homicides. She explained that the gas station, which had
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previously been a Mobil gas station, had been given the nickname “Murder Mobil” due to a
history of homicides and murders police encountered on that gas station lot.
When she approached the defendant, Officer McFarland activated the lights on her police
vehicle and got out. She did not draw her weapon or raise her voice. Instead, she calmly approached
the defendant and asked him for his name. Although Troupe’s name and identification may have
been sufficient to start to dissipate any suspicion that he was the subject police was looking for,
Troupe did not provide his name. Instead, he immediately began explaining that he had just arrived
at the gas station, had not done anything, etc. At that point, Officer McFarland responded that she
was going to detain him and, together with Officer Saito—the only other officer at the scene—
began attempting to explain that Troupe was not under arrest, and they were trying to investigate
alleged criminal conduct.
Based on the facts known to Officer McFarland at the time, it was reasonable for her to
suspect that Troupe was “Que” and to approach him to either confirm or refute that suspicion. The
facts known to the officer specifically about the assailant in the 911 call and, generally, about the
gas station and surrounding area, also made it reasonable for her to approach any suspect matching
the description from dispatch with extreme caution.
Defendant argues the officers lacked reasonable suspicion because the call was made by
an anonymous and, by implication, unreliable tipster. While a call from an anonymous tipster, in
isolation, may not have been sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, Officer McFarland did
not rely solely on the 911 call. Instead, in deciding to detain Troupe, she relied on the tip and her
own observations once she arrived at the gas station (i.e., back male, present at the gas station in a
large gray vehicle some might describe as a truck, and Defendant’s reluctance to give his name).
Defendant also suggests the officer lacked reasonable suspicion because there were discrepancies
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between his van and the descriptions given to the officers by police dispatch. However, the
discrepancies between the description in the 911 call and Officer McFarland’s observations were
minor and when all of the other circumstances are considered, the officer had sufficient reasonable
suspicion to justify briefly detaining the defendant to further investigate whether he was the
individual who was the subject of two successive 911 calls.
2. 	Police did not exceed the scope of an investigatory detention.
Troupe contends the officers exceeded the scope of an investigatory detention by placing
him in handcuffs and frisking him when the circumstances did not justify the use of handcuffs or
a frisk. Troupe cites the Eighth Circuit’s decision in El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452
(8th Cir. 2011) in support of his position. In El-Ghazzawy, which was a civil rights case brought
under §1983, the Eighth Circuit held that an officer’s handcuffing and frisk of a man suspected of
theft by swindle immediately upon encountering him violated his Fourth Amendment rights
because “there was nothing in the dispatch [to police] to indicate [the suspect] could be armed or
dangerous;” because “the crime [the suspect] was suspected of committing, theft by swindle, was
not a dangerous crime which would cause concern of him being armed and dangerous;” and
because the suspect did not exhibit “erratic or suspicious behavior” during the officer’s arrival on
the scene. Id. at, 457.
Troupe’s reliance on El-Ghazzawy is misplaced because the facts here are readily
distinguishable. Based on the foregoing factual findings, Officer McFarland placed Troupe in
handcuffs one or two minutes after first encountering him. At that point, she knew there had been
back-to-back 911 calls involving assault, robbery and harassment of a female victim at that gas
station, suggesting the assailant she was searching for may be violent. Officer McFarland was also
very familiar with the gas station and the surrounding area and had responded to numerous 911
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calls from that location to investigate violent crimes. Given her familiarity with the area, it would
not be unreasonable for Officer McFarland to assume the assailant may also be armed.
Though not a perfect match, Troupe’s van and Troupe himself, fit within the general
identifiers provided by dispatch and Troupe’s own conduct when Officer McFarland first
approached him only heightened the officer’s suspicion that he was the assailant she was searching
for. Specifically, when Officer McFarland first asked for his name, Troupe repeated the question
and then, without giving his name, stated that he just arrived at the gas station from the scrap yard.
It would not be unreasonable for the officer to be skeptical of Troupe’s statement because, as
Officer McFarland testified, when she first observed Troupe, he and the passenger were walking
from the convenience store of the gas station toward the van—suggesting Troupe had not, as he
stated “just” pulled up. This discrepancy coupled with Troupe’s failure or refusal to give his name
only heightened the officer’s suspicion.
It is well settled that, in conducting an investigatory Terry-type stop, “[o]fficers must ‘use
the least intrusive means of detention and investigation, in terms of scope and duration, that are
reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the Terry stop.’” United States v. Newell, 596 F.3d
876, 879 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-31). Where police exceed the permissible
scope articulated in Terry, the investigatory detention is transformed into an arrest that must be
supported by probable cause. United States v. Aquino, 674 F.3d 918, 924 (8th Cir. 2012). For
example, a Terry stop may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, “if the stop lasts for an
unreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.” Newell, 596 F.3d at 879.
However, it is also well-settled that officers may, without converting an investigatory Terry
stop into an arrest, take any measures that are “reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety
and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hensley,
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469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985)). “[W]hen officers are presented with serious danger in the course of
carrying out an investigative detention, they may brandish weapons or even constrain the suspect
with handcuffs in order to control the scene and protect their safety.” Smith, 648 F.3d at 654
(quoting United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2004)). See also United States v.
Danielson, 728 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (8th Cir.1984) (concluding investigatory detention did not
become an arrest when the officers drew their weapons before approaching the vehicle occupied
by suspected armed bank robbers). In assessing reasonableness in the context of a Terry stop “[t]he
Supreme Court has long recognized an officer’s right to conduct an investigatory stop inherently
includes the right to use some degree of physical force or threat to effect the stop.” El-Ghazzawy,
636 F.3d at 457 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). Based on the factual findings more fully
discussed above, it was objectively reasonable for Officer McFarland to handcuff and frisk the
defendant to protect her safety and maintain the status quo while she conducted her investigation.
Finally, to the extent the officers exceeded the scope of an investigatory stop by conducting
a check on the gun and Troupe’s identification, that expansion was caused by Troupe’s own
conduct. As the foregoing factual findings demonstrate, from the outset of the encounter Officer
McFarland advised Troupe he was not under arrest, and she was investigating a call. She asked
him to follow him to her police vehicle and, as they walked toward her police vehicle, Officer
McFarland asked if Troupe had anything on him that would “stick” or harm her. This question
from Officer McFarland triggered a flood of lamentations from Troupe that lasted for well over
ten minutes. Despite the officer’s attempt to reassure Troupe that sending him to prison for the rest
of his life was not her aim, Troupe engaged in conduct displaying consciousness of guilt: pleading,
wailing, falling on the ground, and insisting he would be taken “to the penitentiary” and would
“die in jail.” Troupe acknowledged he had a gun and Officer McFarland seized it from his
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waistband. This conduct, not surprisingly, caused the officers to shift their focus away from the
initial purpose of the stop—namely, to determine whether Troupe was the assailant in the 911 call.
In other words, there was no Fourth Amendment violation because, considering Troupe’s conduct
and the totality of the circumstances, police had reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity
was afoot when they expanded the initial investigatory stop to run a check of the gun seized from
Troupe and to run a check on Troupe.
B. FIFTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
Troupe contends Officer McFarland violated the Fifth Amendment when she asked him
about what he had on him without advising him of his right to remain silent. ECF No. 32, at p. 14-
16. Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-450,
455 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized that custodial interrogations have the potential to
undermine the privilege conferred by the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination by possibly
exposing a suspect to physical or psychological coercion. To guard against such coercion, the
Court established a prophylactic procedural mechanism that requires a suspect to receive a warning
before any custodial interrogation begins. Id. at 444. Unless suspects are warned of their Fifth
Amendment rights, any pretrial statements elicited from them are inadmissible at trial. Id. at 492.
The protections set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda are triggered only when
a defendant is both in custody and being interrogated. United States v. Hatten, 68 F.3d 257, 261
(8th Cir. 1995). For purposes of the Fifth Amendment, “interrogation” includes words or conduct
that the officer should know are “reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.” United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).
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In this case, Troupe contends he was in custody for purposes of Miranda when, less than
two minutes after she first encountered him, Officer McFarland placed him in handcuffs. ECF No.
32, at p. 14-16. In opposing Troupe’s motion, the United States asserts there was no Fifth
Amendment violation because Troupe was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he made
incriminating statements. ECF No. 35, at p. 13-16. The undersigned need not resolve the parties’
dispute over whether Troupe was in custody under Miranda because, based on the factual findings,
the statements Troupe seeks to suppress fall squarely within the public safety exception to Miranda
articulated by the Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
Under the public safety exception, even if Miranda warnings were not yet given, a suspect's
answer may be admitted into evidence if it was obtained in response to a question asked in
furtherance of public safety and not designed solely to solicit testimonial evidence. Quarles, 467
U.S. at 655–56, 659; see United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 954 n. 13 (8th Cir.1999). The
Eighth Circuit has held that the public safety exception “applies when ‘police officers ask
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 2008)). The public to be protected can include the officers
themselves and, considering “the risk of police officers being injured by the mishandling of
unknown firearms or drug paraphernalia,” there is a sufficient public safety basis for officers to
ask a suspect who has been arrested and secured whether there are weapons or contraband in a car,
apartment, or other place police are about to search. Liddell, 517 F.3d at 1009-10 (defendant’s
statement he knew a gun was in his car fell within the public safety exception where, upon
discovering an unloaded pistol in defendant’s car, the officers asked him if there was anything else
in the car that they needed to know about that could hurt them defendant); see also United States
v. Luker, 395 F.3d 830, 831-32 (8th Cir.2005) (the public safety exception applied when the
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arresting officers, who were aware of the suspect's history of methamphetamine use, asked the
suspect before searching his vehicle whether there was anything in it that was not supposed to be
there or that could hurt them and suspect responded that his shotgun was in the trunk); United
States v. Everman, 528 F.3d 570, 572-73 (8th Cir. 2008) (officers’ pre-Miranda warning
questioning of arrestee about whether he had any weapons on him fell within the public safety
exception to Miranda; rangers acted reasonably where the rangers knew that Everman had an
associate nearby; rangers were in a remote and isolated area with two men with known criminal
records).
In this case, it was objectively reasonable for Officer McFarland to ask Troupe if he had
anything on him that might harm her prior questioning him in or near her patrol car. The video
evidence shows Troupe was significantly taller and larger than Officer McFarland; so even though
he was restrained, it was not unreasonable for Officer McFarland to make sure he was not armed
with anything that might harm her before conducting a one-on-one interview. In addition to
physical differences between Officer McFarland and Troupe, the information known by Officer
McFarland also renders her question to Troupe objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
Specifically, Officer McFarland was responding to a 911 call involving a man who had allegedly
been harassing a woman at the gas station approximately twenty minutes before Officer McFarland
arrived. Officer McFarland also knew police had been dispatched to the same gas station the day
before in response to a call from a female victim accusing the same subject, “Que,” of assaulting
and robbing her. Based on the limited information from dispatch, Officer McFarland had reason
to think Troupe may have been Que and, when she asked Troupe for his name, Troupe did not give
his name, and his conduct only deepened her suspicions. Officer McFarland was also familiar with
the gas station, knew it was in a high crime area, and had responded to other 911 calls at that gas
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station for a variety of violent criminal activity. In sum, Troupe’s motion to suppress statements
should be denied because the question Officer McFarland asked of Troupe was reasonably
prompted by a concern for the public safety, including the officer’s own safety, and, therefore,
falls outside the requirements of Miranda.
For all the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED, that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence
and Statements (ECF No. 32) be DENIED.
The parties are advised that they have fourteen (14) days in which to file written
objections to this report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), unless an
extension of time for good cause is obtained, and that failure to file timely objections may result
in a waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356 (8th Cir.
1990).
Trial in this case will be set by separate order before the Honorable Maria A. Lanahan.
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated January 16, 2026.
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