Phillips v. Stoddard County Circuit Court et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
SANDY PHILLIPS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00151-SNLJ
)
STODDARD COUNTY CIRCUIT 	)
COURT, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Self-represented Plaintiff Sandy Phillips brings this civil action for violations of the Fair
Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Missouri law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Docs.
1, 4]. The matter is now before the Court upon Plaintiff’s two motions for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, or without prepayment of the required filing fees and costs. [Docs. 2, 5].
Because Plaintiff’s first motion was not filed on a federal court form, it will be denied. [Doc. 2
(filed on a Missouri state court form)]. However, based on a review of the financial information
submitted in Plaintiff’s second motion (Doc. 5), the Court will grant the motion and waive the
filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
As Plaintiff is now proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her pleadings
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on such review, the Court will direct Plaintiff to file a second
amended complaint on the Court-provided form in compliance with the instructions set out
below. Furthermore, as there is no court hearing scheduled in this matter, Plaintiff’s motion to
participate in court hearings by telephone (Doc. 7) is premature and will be denied as moot.
Plaintiff’s related motion to file documents under seal in support of her motion to participate by
telephone (Doc. 6) will also be denied as moot. If, and when a hearing is scheduled in this
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matter, Plaintiff can refile her request at that time, and it will be considered by the Court.
Finally, the Court warns Plaintiff that her failure to comply with this Order could result in
dismissal of this action.
Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Along with her case-initiating documents, Plaintiff filed a “Motion and Affidavit in
Support of Request to Proceed As a Poor Person,” on what appears to be a Missouri state court
form. [Doc. 2]. About a month later, while her first motion was still pending, Plaintiff filed an
“Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs.” [Doc. 5]. This
second motion provides detailed financial information, including income, employment, assets,
and expense information, as required by the federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on the
information provided, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee. As such,
Plaintiff’s first motion will be denied, her second motion will be granted, and the filing fee will
be waived. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Initial Review under § 1915
I. 	Plaintiff’s Pleadings
Self-represented Plaintiff Sandy Phillips initiated this action with a “Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Emergency Stay, and Preservation Order,” captioned for filing in the Supreme Court
of Missouri, and a “Petition for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, Constructive
Eviction, Harassment, Retaliation, Slander/Defamation, and Malicious Wiretapping,” captioned
for filing in the Missouri Stoddard County Circuit Court. [Doc. 1 at 1, 5]. Each document
appears to bring distinct legal claims against different named defendants. [Id.] However, about
a month after filing the initial pleadings, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, correctly
captioned for this Court. [Doc. 4 at 1]. As an amended complaint completely replaces the
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original complaint and all supplements,1 this is the pleading that the Court will examine. See
Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025) (“If a plaintiff amends her
complaint, the new pleading ‘supersedes’ the old one: The ‘original pleading no longer performs
any function in the case.’” (citing 6 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure §1476, pp. 636-37 (3d ed. 2010))).
Plaintiff states that her Amended Complaint is brought “to redress disability
discrimination, civil rights violations, and housing violations” under “the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Title II, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), [] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 … [and]
Missouri law.” [Doc. 4 at 1]. Plaintiff alleges that she is a disabled tenant who was denied
meaningful access to court proceedings and subjected to discriminatory treatment. [Id.]
It is unclear who Plaintiff intends as named defendants in this matter, as the case caption
lists different defendants than the information under the Amended Complaint’s ‘Parties’ section.
[Compare id. at 1 (listing defendants as Gill Family Properties, LLC; Chad Gill; Kyle Orf;
Cortney Bass; Kayse Soule; and Butler County Courthouse/Judge Jarrell Bradley) with id. at 3-4
(listing defendants as Gill Family Properties, LLC; Chad Gill; Kyle Orf; Kayse Soule; Cortney
Bass; Gill Group; Judge Jarrell Bradley; and Stoddard County Circuit Court)]. However, it does
appear that named Defendants fit into two categories: Defendants associated with Plaintiff’s
residential rental unit (Gill Family Properties, LLC; Chad Gill; Kyle Orf; Cortney Bass; Kayse
Soule; and Gill Group) and Defendants associated with Plaintiff’s state court lawsuits (Butler
County Courthouse/Judge Jarrell Bradley; Judge Jarrell Bradley; and Stoddard County Circuit
Court).
Similarly, the factual allegations of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint appear to be based on
two separate situations. First, Plaintiff alleges that the dwelling she leased from Defendant Gill
1 Plaintiff filed a supplement along with her case-initiating documents. [See Doc. 3].
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Family Properties, LLC was not maintained in a habitable condition, including issues with
roaches, a nonfunctioning stove, mold, lack of hot water, and broken doors/smoke detectors. [Id.
at 5, 6-7]. According to Plaintiff, she informed Defendant Gill Properties and its agents
(Defendants Gill, Orf, Soule, and Bass) about these conditions but they “willfully refused to
repair or relocate Plaintiff in a timely manner.” [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants
violated the Fair Housing Act when they retaliated against her by “threatening eviction,
removing doors, wiretapping, spreading defamatory statements to other landlords, and denying
relocation or repairs.” [Id. at 5-6]. Second, Plaintiff alleges that her Title II ADA rights were
violated when she was denied “reasonable modifications and telephonic accommodations” by the
Missouri state court system where she was attempting “to bring her housing claims,” and that
this violation denied “her meaningful access to the court system.” [Id. at 4-5, 7].
Based on these two factual situations, the Amended Complaint seeks relief under four
counts: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability/Constructive Eviction; (2) Disability
Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate; (3) Retaliation, Harassment, and Interference; and
(4) Illegal Wiretapping and Invasion of Privacy. [Id. at 8-13]. For relief, Plaintiff requests a
declaratory judgment, an injunction, and money damages. [Id. at 1, 3].
II. 	Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis
if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. When reviewing a
complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well-
pleaded facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and it liberally construes
the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the
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district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits the claim to be
considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir.
2015). However, even self-represented plaintiffs are required to allege facts which, if true, state
a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980);
see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts
or to construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must
demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.”
Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. Id. at 679.
III. 	Discussion
Upon review of the Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Courts finds
multiple legal deficiencies in the pleadings. However, because Plaintiff is self-represented and
she has presented serious allegations to the Court, she will be allowed to amend her pleadings in
accordance with the instructions set forth below. See Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir.
1985) (discussing how a court should give a pro se plaintiff a statement of the complaint’s
deficiencies and a chance to amend the complaint). Plaintiff should consider the following legal
issues in filing her second amended complaint.
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a. 	Unrelated claims cannot be brought together
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Even self-represented litigants are obligated to abide by these Rules. McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Plaintiff can only assert in a single lawsuit, claims
against different defendants that are based on events arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A); Mosely v.
General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (joinder requires that a plaintiff only
assert rights to relief against each named defendant based on claims that arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence). Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
joinder of defendants, and provides:
Persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.
In other words, “Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim
B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). “Unrelated claims
against different defendants belong in different suits.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her housing situation arise out of a different
occurrence or transaction then the allegations regarding her access to the court system. These
claims must be brought in different lawsuits, based on Federal Rule 20. As such, when Plaintiff
files her second amended complaint, she must choose which claims she wishes to pursue in this
legal action, and bring the other, unrelated claims in a different suit. If Plaintiff fails to bring
related claims in her second amended complaint, unrelated claims can be severed and dismissed
under Federal Rule 21.
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b. 	Plaintiff must plead the essential elements of each legal claim
Plaintiff alleges that this action is brought under the ADA, the FHA, § 1983, and various
Missouri state laws. However, in order for her claims to survive initial review, the second
amended complaint must plead the essential elements for each legal cause of action.
First, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, “no qualified individual with
a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also I.Z.M. v. Rosemount-Apple
Valley-Eagan Pub. Schs., 863 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating that Title II of the ADA
prohibits public entities from discrimination based on disability in services, programs, or
activities). In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) she
is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was excluded from participation in or denied
the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise subjected to
discrimination by the entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or other discrimination
was by reason of his disability. See Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir.
2010).
In this case, Plaintiff appears to be raising her ADA Title II claim against either the
Butler County Court or the Stoddard County Circuit Court (or both), as they are public entities.
However, Plaintiff does not plead enough facts for the Court to find that she was excluded from
participating in a court action by reason of her disability. Plaintiff only alleges that she called the
courthouse and spoke with a court clerk to request telephone access to a hearing, but that she
never heard back from the court. [Doc. 4 at 7]. This is not enough to state a Title II ADA claim.
Second, “[t]he Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) prohibits property owners and municipalities
from blocking or impeding the provision of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
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familial status, or national origin.” Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b)). The FHA also prohibits discrimination in housing based on
disability, and retaliation against any person on account of that person exercising or enjoying a
right granted or protected by the FHA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f), 3617. A tenant subjected to
discrimination in violation of the FHA can bring a private cause of action for damages.
Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 3613. However,
the party asserting a housing discrimination claim under the FHA has the initial burden of
proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See Radecki v.
Joura, 114 F.3d 115, 116 (8th Cir. 1997).
As such, if Plaintiff wishes to pursue an FHA retaliation claim here, she must provide
facts indicating that she engaged in a protected activity and defendants’ actions were casually
linked to Plaintiff’s engagement in that activity. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff complains
about the conditions of the apartment that she rented from Defendant Gill Properties, but she
does not complain that any aspect of the apartment did not accommodate her disability. Instead,
she complains about roaches, hot water, broken equipment, mold, and the functioning of the
stove. None of these conditions are related to any alleged disability. If Plaintiff did not engage
in any activity protected by the FHA, then any allegedly retaliatory actions by Defendants are not
prohibited by the FHA.
Third, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was designed to
provide a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
establish: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
(2) that the alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of
state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To that end, only state actors can be held
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liable under § 1983. Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress, 552 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 2008); see also
Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that § 1983 secures
constitutional rights from government infringement, not infringement by private parties).
Most of the named Defendants in this action are not state actors. In her second amended
complaint, Plaintiff must clearly state which defendants she brings her § 1983 claim against and
what constitutional rights were allegedly violated by those defendants. The Court warns Plaintiff
that State courts (like Missouri state circuit courts) are not suable under § 1983 because of state
immunity. See Harris v. Mo. Ct. of Appeals, W.D., 787 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir.1986) (state
courts are not vulnerable to § 1983 suits because they are protected by state immunity under
Eleventh Amendment).2
Finally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims arising from the same case or controversy as a federal claim. In determining
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court must consider judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
To the extent Plaintiff is requesting that this federal court exert supplemental jurisdiction over
any Missouri-law claims, Plaintiff must plead enough facts to support each state claim she seeks
to pursue, and demonstrate that those claims arise from the same case or controversy as her
federal claims.
Motions Regarding Participating in Court Hearing by Telephone
On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Telephonic Hearing & ADA Accommodation
Request to Aid Judicial Efficiency and Avoid Delays” and a “Motion to File Unredacted
2 Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff has filed this action because she wants this Court to review a Missouri state
court decision, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider appeals of state court actions. “The basic theory of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that only the United States Supreme Court has been given jurisdiction to review a
state-court decision, so federal district courts generally lack subject-matter jurisdiction over attempted appeals from
a state-court judgment.” Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sci., 601 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted).
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Documents Under Seal.” [Docs. 6, 7]. In her motion for telephonic hearing, Plaintiff requests
that the Court allow her to appear telephonically for court proceedings, pursuant to Title II of the
ADA and based on a “documented disability” that prevents her from driving. [Doc. 7 at 1].
Plaintiff states that she “previously requested ADA accommodation in state court but was
denied” so she is “now renew[ing] this request before this Honorable Court.” [Id.] In her
motion to file unredacted documents, Plaintiff asks the Court for permission to file certain
documents under seal which relate to her medical disability and treatment, to support her motion
for telephonic hearing. [Doc. 6 at 1].
Plaintiff also attached exhibits to her Amended Complaint which appear to be intended to
support her motion for telephonic hearing. [See Docs. 4-3 (Plaintiff’s rideshare cost to and from
the Court), 4-4 (proposed Notice of Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Telephonic ADA
Accommodation), 4-5 (proposed Notice of Hearing on Plaintiff’s ADA Claim), 4-8 (Social
Security Benefit Verification Letter)]. Finally, Plaintiff filed a supplement and affidavit in
support of the supplement which appear to be intended to support her motion by providing
evidence that Plaintiff is currently undergoing medical and psychiatric treatment and that she has
financial limitations on traveling to Court. [Docs. 9, 10].
As of this date, there are no court hearings currently set for this case. Nor does the Court
anticipate that any proceeding will be scheduled soon. Plaintiff’s proposed Notices for Hearings
do not make any court hearing imminent in this matter. As such, Plaintiff’s motion for
telephonic hearing is premature. Because there is no scheduled court proceeding, this motion
will be denied as moot. In addition, Plaintiff’s motion seeking to file documents under seal in
support of this premature motion will also be denied as moot.
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Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s first motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [Doc. 2] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s second motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis [Doc. 5] is GRANTED and the filing fee is waived. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mail to Plaintiff a blank
copy of the Court’s Civil Complaint form.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order,
Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint on the Court-provided form and in compliance
with the Court’s instructions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon submission of the second amended complaint,
the Court shall again review this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for telephonic hearing and ADA
accommodation [Doc. 7] is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to file unredacted documents under
seal in support of her motion for telephonic hearing [Doc. 6] is DENIED as moot.
Plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with this Order shall result in the dismissal of
this action, without prejudice and without further notice.
Dated this 20th day of February, 2026.
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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