Salinas v. Clark et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
MORENO SALINAS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 1:22-cv-00159-AGF
)
STEPHAN V. CLARK, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 182) to lift the stay
previously imposed as to his claims against Defendant Steven Smith, and for entry of default
judgment against Smith. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s
motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s amended complaint named Smith and fifteen other prison officers
employed at the Missouri Department of Corrections’ Southeast Correctional Center in a
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him
and/or failed to protect him against other officers’ use of excessive force. The case
proceeded to a jury trial beginning on October 14, 2025. At the outset of trial, the parties
stipulated to the dismissal of two Defendants, Darcie Bolin and Brandi Meredith. See ECF
No. 156.
As discussed at length in prior Orders (ECF Nos. 158, 159 & 181), during the trial,
the Court permitted defense counsel to withdraw from representing Smith and directed the
Clerk of Court entered Smith’s default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), after
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Smith refused to appear at trial and repeatedly failed to respond to counsel’s inquiries, the
Court’s Orders, and the Court’s rules over the course of the proceeding. See, e.g., Ackra
Direct Mktg. Corp. v. Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 857 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that entry
of default may be appropriate even after the filing of an answer if the party’s later conduct
includes “willful violations of court rules, contumacious conduct, or intentional delays”)
(citation omitted).
However, the Court deferred consideration of default judgment against Smith in light
of the similarly situated co-Defendants, who had at that time appeared and defended
themselves at trial. See Pfanenstiel Architects, Inc. v. Chouteau Petroleum Co., 978 F.2d
430, 433 (8th Cir. 1992) (“When there are multiple defendants who may be jointly and
severally liable for damages alleged by plaintiff, and some but less than all of those
defendants default, the better practice is for the district court to stay its determination of
damages against the defaulters until plaintiff's claim against the nondefaulters is resolved.”).
The Court stayed Plaintiff’s claims against Smith pending completion of the trial against the
other Defendants and directed Plaintiff to file, within 14 days after resolution of the trial, a
motion to lift the stay as to Smith and a proposal for resolving the claims against Smith, if
appropriate.
The trial concluded on October 17, 2025, and the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on
one or both of his claims as to ten of the thirteen Defendants that participated at trial.
Specifically, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Stephan Clark,
Johnny Clubs, Cole Hansens, Darrel Wilson, Tyler Womack, James Harmon, Bruce
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Hanebrink, David Houtz, Matthew Short, and Aaron Raines, jointly and severally,1 in the
amount of $380,000 in actual damages. The jury also awarded punitive damages in various
amounts against each of these Defendants individually. However, the jury found in favor of
Defendants Vanissia Lemons, Jerry Walls, and George Durrow on Plaintiff’s claims. The
Court entered judgment on the jury verdict on October 20, 2025. See ECF No. 175.
Plaintiff now moves to lift the stay on his claims against Smith and for default
judgment against Smith under Rule 55(b). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a default judgment
against Smith in the total amount of actual damages found by the jury at trial: $380,000.
DISCUSSION
The familiar standard for default judgment is that “the factual allegations of a
complaint (except those relating to the amount of damages) are taken as true, but it remains
for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of
action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law.” See Murray v.
Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, another principle
applies when, as here, default judgment is being considered after a trial has concluded
against similarly situated, non-defaulting defendants. That principle derives from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872), which held:
1 The Court held at trial that joint and several liability would apply in this case
because the damages were not capable of apportionment. See Jackson v. City of St.
Louis, 220 F.3d 894, 897-98 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that in § 1983 cases, “[w]hen a
plaintiff has suffered a single or indivisible injury, the general rule is that each tortfeasor
is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of damages,” that damages can only
be apportioned “where there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm,” and that “whether damages are capable of apportionment
among separate defendants is normally an issue for the court to determine.”) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 4343(1)(b)).
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The true mode of proceeding where a bill makes a joint charge against several
defendants, and one of them makes default, is simply to enter a default and a
formal decree pro confesso against him, and proceed with the cause upon the
answers of the other defendants. The defaulting defendant has merely lost his
standing in court. He will not be entitled to service of notices in the cause, nor
to appear in it in any way. He can adduce no evidence, he cannot be heard at the
final hearing. But if the suit should be decided against the complainant on the
merits, the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike—the defaulter as
well as the others. If it be decided in the complainant’s favor, he will then be
entitled to a final decree against all. But a final decree on the merits against the
defaulting defendant alone, pending the continuance of the cause, would be
incongruous and illegal.
Id. at 554; see also U.S. ex rel. Costner v. United States, 56 F. App’x 287, 288 (8th Cir.
2003) (applying Frow beyond cases involving joint and several liability to any “situations
in which several defendants have closely related defenses”) (citation omitted). Thus, “to
comply with the Frow principle prohibiting inconsistent judgments, we must disregard the
allegations in [the plaintiff’s] complaint that conflict with the jury verdict” and decide
whether those remaining allegations are sufficient to state a claim against the defaulting
defendant. Henry v. Oluwole, 108 F.4th 45, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2024); see also Angelo Iafrate
Const., LLC v. Potashnick Const., Inc., 370 F.3d 715, 722 (8th Cir. 2004) (describing the
need for consistency between judgments for similarly situated co-defendants who litigate
on the merits and those who suffer default judgment).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations that Smith, together with the other Defendants, used
excessive force and failed to protect Plaintiff from other officers’ use of excessive force, all
while acting with deliberate indifference, are well supported by the jury’s verdict against all
but three of Smith’s co-Defendants who participated at trial. See Pfanenstiel Architects, 978
F.2d at 433 (holding that district courts should award consistent damage awards against
defaulting and non-defaulting defendants who are jointly and severally liable). The three
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Defendants found not liable provided clear testimony regarding their lack of involvement in
the events at issue, something which Smith cannot offer. Cutcliff v. Reuter, 791 F.3d 875,
882 (8th Cir. 2015) (“A defaulted claim . . . precludes a party from contesting the facts in the
complaint that establish liability.”).
For the reasons noted above regarding the inability to apportion damages, the Court
also concludes that Smith must be held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of
the actual damages found by the jury.2 See id. at 883 (holding that where the amount of
damages is “readily discernable on the basis of undisputed evidence in the record, it [is] not
an abuse of discretion to award actual damages without an evidentiary hearing”).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to lift stay and for entry of
default judgment against Defendant Steven Smith in the amount of $380,000 is GRANTED.
ECF No. 182.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this
Order on Defendant Steven Smith at the address reflected in the file.
All claims against all parties now having been resolved, a final Judgment shall
accompany this Memorandum and Order.
________________________________
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 3rd day of December, 2025.
2 Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment does not seek punitive damages against
Smith.
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