Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
SUNEE T.,
Petitioner,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,1 Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security;
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
and DAVID EASTERWOOD, Acting
Director, St. Paul Field Office
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-1638 (LMP/DTS)
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Daniel P. Suitor, Daniel P. Suitor, PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner.
Derek Ganzhorn, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents.
On February 25, 2026, Petitioner Sunee T. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging that Respondents (the “Government”) unlawfully revoked his order of supervision
and detained him for the purpose of executing Sunee T.’s final order of removal. See ECF
No. 9 at 2–3. The Court granted Sunee T.’s petition on March 11, 2026, and ordered the
Government to release Sunee T. from custody. Id. at 7. Sunee T. now moves for an award
1 	Markwayne Mullin is substituted in place of former Secretary of Homeland Security
Kristi Noem pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $2,550.00 under the Equal Access to Justice
Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. ECF No. 12; ECF No. 14 at 10.
The EAJA provides that a court shall award fees, costs, and other expenses incurred
by the prevailing party in a civil action against the United States2 “unless the court finds
that 	the 	position 	of 	the 	United 	States 	was 	substantially 	justified 	or 	that 	special
circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 	The “position of the
United States” includes both the underlying agency action and the United States’ litigation
position. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(D). A party seeking an award under the EAJA must apply within
thirty days of the final judgment and: (1) establish that he was the prevailing party and is
eligible to receive an award; (2) detail the amount of the award sought; and (3) allege that
the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). If the
moving party meets his burden, “the burden shifts to the government to prove that it was
substantially justified in asserting its position.” 	Huett v. Brown, 873 F.2d 1153, 1155
(8th Cir. 1989).
The Government does not dispute that Sunee T. was the prevailing party in this case
and does not contest the total fees and costs sought. 	ECF No. 21 at 1. 	Instead, the
Government asserts that its legal position was substantially justified, for two reasons. First,
it reasserts its previous position that it was entitled to detain Sunee T. because Sunee T. had
2 	Under the EAJA, “United States” includes federal agencies and federal officials
acting in their official capacities. 	28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(C). 	Respondents are federal
officials, and Sunee T.’s claims were brought against them in their official capacities, see
ECF No. 1 at 1, so this action was against the “United States” for purposes of the EAJA.
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not been detained for more than 120 days in total, and his detention was therefore
presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). ECF No. 21
at 3–4. But the Government continues to ignore that it needed to follow its own procedures
to have rearrested and re-detained Sunee T. in the first place. See ECF No. 9 at 5–6. That
it failed to do so was unreasonable, and the litigation posture taken by the Government in
defending its actions was likewise not substantially justified. Indeed, the Government had
been repeatedly told the opposite. See id. at 6–7 (collecting cases in which courts held that
“insufficient notices of revocation” entitle a petitioner to habeas relief).
Second, the Government reasserts its previous position that, even if it failed to
follow its own procedures, the appropriate remedy was not to grant Sunee T. habeas relief
but instead to order the Government to redo the process. ECF No. 21 at 4–6. In support,
the Government points to two decisions from the United States District Court for the
Northern 	District 	of Texas—notably 	from 	the 	same 	Judge—which 	agree 	with 	the
Government’s position here. See Nguyen v. Noem, 797 F. Supp. 3d 651 (N.D. Tex. 2025)
(finding that the government did not violate 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) and even if it had, the
error was harmless); Surovtsev v. Noem, 2025 WL 3264479 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2025)
(holding that any error in failing to follow the procedural requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard under 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l) and 241.13.(i)(3) was harmless given
the expanded procedure that Surovtsev has received throughout the pending habeas case).
Because those cases agreed with the Government’s position, the Government alleges that
its position was substantially justified. 	But, again, the Government had been told for
months, by this Court and by Judges in this District (not to mention many others around
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the country), that its position was incorrect and unjustified. See ECF No. 9 at 5–6. That
the Government can point to two non-binding and readily distinguishable decisions in
support of its position does not, in the Court’s view, make its position reasonable. This is
not a case where “courts across the country—and judges within this District—were divided
on the question,” a fact which would constitute “strong evidence that the government’s
position was substantially justified.” 	Kadidiatou D. v. Easterwood, No. 26-cv-1218
(PJS/DLM), 2026 WL 969017, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 10, 2026). Here, the Government has
not met its burden. Moreover, the Court finds that the Government’s conduct and litigation
position was not substantially justified in this case.
Because the Government does not dispute that Sunee T. is eligible to receive an
award as the prevailing party, does not dispute the amount of the award he seeks, and has
not met its burden to show that its conduct and position was substantially justified in
Sunee T.’s case, Sunee T.’s motion is granted.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Sunee 	T.’s 	Motion 	for Attorney’s 	Fees 	and 	Costs 	(ECF 	No. 	12) 	is
GRANTED;
2. 	The Government shall make payment in the amount of $2,550.00 to
Sunee T.’s counsel within 30 days after the date of this Order or within
30 days after appropriations to the Department of Homeland Security are
restored, whichever occurs later; and
3. 	Any checks issued for payment of the award shall be delivered to Sunee T.’s
counsel at the following address:
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Daniel P. Suitor, PLLC
331 Second Avenue South, Suite 400-3099
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Dated: April 30, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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