0:26-cv-01483•Guevara v. Tunheim
Gesamter Gesetzestext
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA Peter Michael Guevara, Plaintiff, v. John R. Tunheim, in his individual and official capacities, Defendant. Case No. 26-cv-1483 (NEB/LIB) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, this matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Docket No. 1]. Plaintiff Peter Michael Guevara, a prisoner, alleges that a judge of the District of Minnesota violated his federal constitutional rights by failing to adequately resolve administrative judicial complaints raised by Plaintiff during the course of criminal proceedings against him in this District. Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, his complaint is subject to preservice review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (“The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”). On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint— (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). CASE 0:26-cv-01483-NEB-LIB Doc. 6 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 5
2 In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2008). Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court may disregard legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). Relief for the alleged constitutional violations is available to Plaintiff, if it is available at all, only pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens concluded that a private right of action is available to individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by federal officials, similar to the right of action available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with respect to state actors. Not every constitutional violation, however, is actionable under Bivens. As a practical matter, a remedy under Bivens is unavailable outside of the three specific contexts in which the Bivens remedy has already been recognized by the Supreme Court. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 101-02 (2020) (“[F]or almost 40 years, we have consistently rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed under Bivens.”); Ahmed v. Weyker, 984 F.3d 564, 567-68 (8th Cir. 2020). In this matter, Plaintiff’s claims do not arise within one of the three contexts—excessive force during arrest, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388; workplace discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the procedural due process of the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); and deliberate indifference to a serious CASE 0:26-cv-01483-NEB-LIB Doc. 6 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 5
3 medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)— in which a Bivens remedy has already been recognized. This, by itself, is basis enough upon which to dismiss this case. Even ignoring this problem, however, there are at least two others. First, Plaintiff’s allegations are entirely conclusory. It is clear from the pleading that Plaintiff believes his judicial- misconduct complaints should have been adjudicated differently by the defendant. Less clear from the pleading, however, is why the adverse adjudication amounted to a constitutional violation. Plaintiff alleges in vague terms that the process by which his complaints were denied amounted to violations of due process and access to the courts but does not allege facts that, if proved true, would establish such a constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation are equally vague. Second, Plaintiff is plainly aware that judicial immunity poses a potential barrier to his seeking relief, see, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (discussing judicial immunity), and he spends a great deal of his pleading attempting to characterize his claims as attacking administrative rather than judicial decisions. But decisions made with respect to judicial- misconduct complaints are protected by the same immunity as decisions made during the course of more ordinary litigation. See In re Doe, 70 F.3d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1995); Kwasnik v. LeBlon, 228 F. App’x 238, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). There are avenues for recourse available to a litigant who believes that a judicial-misconduct complaint has not been adequately addressed. A lawsuit against the judge who reviewed the judicial-misconduct complaint is not among those avenues. For all of these reasons, this action should be dismissed pursuant to § 1915A. Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, he remains responsible for the $350.00 statutory filing fee for this matter, which must be paid in installments over time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Prison officials should CASE 0:26-cv-01483-NEB-LIB Doc. 6 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 5
4 be informed of that financial obligation so that those officials may remit funds to the Court from Plaintiff’s prison trust account as those funds become available. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Based on the representations in Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, [Docket No. 2], this Court concludes that Plaintiff is unable to pay an initial partial filing fee in this matter. The requirement that an initial partial filing fee be paid will therefore be waived. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Because Plaintiff is not being made to pay an initial partial filing fee, he need not submit documentation from which the initial partial filing fee could be calculated. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for an order directing prison officials to provide that documentation may be denied as moot. Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT: 1. This matter be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 2. The application to proceed in forma pauperis of plaintiff Peter Michael Guevara, [Docket No. 2], be GRANTED. 3. Plaintiff’s motion for an order directing the custodial facility to provide financial documentation, [Docket No. 3], be DENIED as moot. 4. Plaintiff be directed to pay the unpaid balance ($350.00) of the statutory filing fee for this action in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), and the Clerk of Court be directed to provide notice of this requirement to the authorities at the institution where Plaintiff is confined. Dated: February 25, 2026 s/Leo I. Brisbois Hon. Leo I. Brisbois United States Magistrate Judge CASE 0:26-cv-01483-NEB-LIB Doc. 6 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 5
5 NOTICE Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c). CASE 0:26-cv-01483-NEB-LIB Doc. 6 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 5
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