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CASE 0:26-cv-01455-ECT-DTS Doc. 8
Filed 02/20/26 Page 1 of 9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Francisco S.,
File No. 26-cv-1455 (ECT/DTS)
Petitioner,
OPINION AND ORDER
V. Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and David Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Claire Glenn, Climate Defense Project, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner Francisco S.
Friedrich A.P. Siekert and David W. Fuller, United States Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood.
Petitioner Francisco S. is a Venezuelan citizen who has "lived in the United States since June 2022," Pet. [ECF No. 1] [ 12, when he entered the country without inspection, see ECF No. 6-2 at 1. "Upon entry into the United States, [Francisco] made a timely claim for asylum, which is currently pending in immigration court." Pet. [13. Francisco "has never received any final order of removal." Id. Francisco "has a work permit." Id. |14.1
1 Respondents have provided Francisco's Notice to Appear and Form I-213, ECF Nos. 6-1, 6-2, but these documents provide conflicting accounts of Francisco's immigration status. Specifically, the Notice to Appear states that when Francisco "entered the United States at or near Eagle Pass, [Texas], on or about June 17, 2022," Francisco was "not then
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

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On December 14, 2025, Francisco was “dropping off an Uber passenger” in St. Paul,
Minnesota, when he was arrested by “masked individuals dressed in black, presumed to be
[Immigration and Customs Enforcement] agents,” as part of “Operation Metro Surge.” Id.
¶¶ 16, 20. 	“The arresting agents did not ask [Francisco] for any identification or
information, nor did they produce a warrant.” 	Id. ¶ 17. 	According to the Petition, the
arresting agents did not “appear to have any reasonable suspicion or probable cause of
criminal activity to justify [Francisco’s] detention.” 	Id. 	The Petition further alleges,
“[u]pon information and belief,” that “after [Francisco’s] arrest, Respondents brought him
to a detention facility within the District of Minnesota.” 	Id. ¶ 18. 	“As of approximately
11:24 A.M. on February 16, 2026, the ICE online detainee locator show[ed] [Francisco’s]
location only as ‘Call ICE For Details,’ without providing any further information.” 	Id.
¶ 19 (including screenshot).
As a preliminary matter, Respondents assert that jurisdiction is lacking because
Francisco was detained in Wisconsin at the time of the Petition’s filing. ECF No. 5 at 1–
3. 	Respondents assert, without citation to any record evidence, that “ICE transferred
[Francisco] to a facility in Superior, Wisconsin,” the day after he was arrested, thus
depriving this Court of jurisdiction over Francisco’s Petition. See id. at 1–2. 	Respondents
maintain that “[t]he judicial district encompassing where [Francisco] is detained is United
admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer.” 	ECF No. 6-2 at 1
(emphasis added). The Form I-213, on the other hand, states that “[o]n 06/17/2022, U.S.
Border Patrol arrested [Francisco] and granted him parole into the United States.” 	ECF
No. 6-1 at 2 (emphasis added). But this same document also states that the “BASIS FOR
ICE CHARGES” is that Francisco is “an alien present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled.” 	Id. at 2–3 (emphasis added). 	I cannot reconcile these conflicting
statements.
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CASE 0:26-cv-01455-ECT-DTS Doc. 8 Filed 02/20/26 Page 3 of 9
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin." Id. at 2 (emphasis added). However, since at least February 19, 2026 (the day after Respondents' answer was filed), the Court's review of the ICE Detainee Locator revealed Francisco's "Current Detention Facility" as the "Sherburne County Facility" in Minnesota:
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Report Crimes: Email or Call 1-866-DHS-2-ICE
Home Who We Are
What We Do
Newsroom
Information Library
Contact ICE
Search Results: 1
FRANSCISCO
Country of Birth : Venezuela
A-Number:
Helpful Info
Status of a Case
Current Detention Facility: SHERBURNE COUNTY FACILITY
* Click on the Detention Facility name to obtain facility contact information
About the Detainee Locator
Brochure
BACK TO SEARCH >
ICE ERO Field Offices
ICE Detention Facilities
See Online Detainee Locator System, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, www.locator.ice.gov/ odls/#/search (last visited Feb. 20, 2026). The Detainee Locator System's placement of Francisco in Sherburne County, Minnesota, on the day after Respondents' answer was filed leads me to question Respondents' undocumented assertion that Francisco "is"-or perhaps ever was-detained in Wisconsin. Accordingly, Respondents' arguments about this Court's lack of jurisdiction over Francisco's petition will be rejected.
Turn to the merits. Francisco challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. [2. He claims he has been wrongly classified as an 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is mandatory) rather than an 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary and who is entitled to a bond hearing). Pet. 11 35-37; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961-62 (D. Minn. 2025) (explaining legal framework). According to Francisco, that misclassification and denial of a bond hearing
3
Related Information
Status : In ICE Custody State: MN

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violate his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. See Pet. ¶¶ 38–54. Francisco seeks
his immediate release in Minnesota, without conditions; that he be released with conditions
to ensure his safety, including advance notice to counsel and the return of his personal
effects; issuance of an order enjoining his transfer from this District during the pendency
of his Petition; that this Court retain jurisdiction to retain any future motion for attorneys’
fees and costs; and “any other and further relief that this Court may deem just and proper.”
See id. at 18–19.
Recognizing that “[t]his case presents similar legal and factual issues to prior habeas
petitions,” Respondents argue that Francisco is subject to mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See ECF No. 5 at 4. This raises an issue of statutory interpretation2
that courts in this District have repeatedly considered and rejected, and it will be rejected
here as well.
Francisco has shown he has been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) rather than
§ 1226(a). 	As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking
admission,” and the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c));
see Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v.
2 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Francisco’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
CASE 0:26-cv-01455-ECT-DTS Doc. 8 Filed 02/20/26 Page 4 of 9

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Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF),
2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-
3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025
WL 3146312, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS),
2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-
4264 (PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing,
two federal courts of appeals have ruled on the question, one reaching and one rejecting
this conclusion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1062
(7th Cir. 2025) (concluding that respondent was not likely to prevail on the merits that
petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)); Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, --- F.4th ---, Nos. 25-20496, 25-40701, 2026 WL 323330, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 6,
2026) 	(finding 	petitioner 	was 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under 	§ 1225(b)(2)).
Francisco has lived in the United States for more than three years, Pet. ¶ 12, and I find his
detention falls under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).3
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
3 	Respondents do not argue that Francisco is subject to mandatory detention pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), or that any other statutory scheme other than that raised in the
Petition would apply to Francisco’s detention. See ECF No. 5.
CASE 0:26-cv-01455-ECT-DTS Doc. 8 Filed 02/20/26 Page 5 of 9

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justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v. 	Scott,
804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025), appeal filed (Nov. 6, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that
absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” Id.
(emphasis in original); accord Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025
WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me. Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025
WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F.
Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest
warrant is issued” and that “[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the
subsequent provisions giving the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the
arrested alien’ are likewise not triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir.
July 11, 2023). 	Francisco alleges that he was arrested without a warrant. See Pet. ¶ 17.
Respondents’ arguments regarding a warrant (or lack thereof) do not establish a
lawful basis for Francisco’s arrest. 	See ECF No. 5 at 13–14. 	(1) Respondents state that
“Respondents did have a warrant for [Francisco’s] arrest, but as noted in the [Form I-213],
they did not have time to obtain a warrant while [Francisco] attempted to flee and resisted
arrest.” Id. at 13 (citing ECF No. 6-1). To the extent Respondents argue that a warrant for
Francisco’s arrest existed, no such warrant has been provided to the Court. Moreover, the
Form I-213 provided with Respondents’ Answer contradicts the existence of a warrant,
stating that Francisco was the subject of a “warrantless arrest.” 	ECF No. 6-1 at 2.
(2) Respondents cite 8 U.S.C. § 1357 for the authority of immigration officers to make
warrantless arrests, but they do not explain which of § 1357’s exceptions to the warrant
requirement would apply to Francisco’s circumstances. 	See ECF No. 5 at 14. 	Based on
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Respondents’ limited argument and the Form I-213’s statements that Francisco fled once
stopped, ECF No. 6-1 at 2, Respondents are perhaps referring to 8 U.S.C. §1357(a)(2).
That provision allows for warrantless arrests “if [the officer] has reason to believe that the
alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is
likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” However, we do not have
sufficient facts to apply that exception. 	The provided Form I-213 states that “[o]n
December 14, 2025, ERO initiated an investigatory vehicle stop on an individual known to
ICE as [Francisco].” 	ECF No. 6-1 at 2. 	Absent any declaration testimony from the
arresting officer, I cannot ascertain how this statement would support the arresting officer’s
reasonable belief that Francisco was in the United States in violation of an immigration
law or regulation prior to his arrest. For instance, there is no indication of the basis for the
“investigatory stop,” such as an officer’s identification of Francisco’s vehicle or person.
The Form I-213 also indicates that officers conducted “[i]mmigration checks,” but the
statement’s chronology indicates that these checks occurred after Francisco was already
arrested. 	See id. 	On these facts and limited argument, I cannot determine that one of
§ 1357 exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. (3) Respondents do not explain how
the cases they cite apply in the face of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which requires “a warrant issued
by the Attorney General” as a predicate to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). 	See
ECF No. 5 at 14 (first citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984); and then
citing Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982)). 	For these reasons, I find
Respondents’ arguments regarding the warrant, or its absence, unpersuasive.
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“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Vedat C. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS), slip op. at 6 (D. Minn. Dec.
19, 2025) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows
Respondents have not identified a valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the
remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings.” Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, 804 F.
Supp. 3d at 264 (“Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section
1226(a), [petitioners’] immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8
(same); Chiliquinga Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see
also Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive
detention. 	The 	typical 	remedy 	for 	such 	detention 	is, 	of 	course, 	release.” 	(citation
modified)).4
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Francisco S.’s Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),
and is instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to the discretionary provisions of
8 U.S.C. § 1226.
4 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Francisco’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
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2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as follows:
a. 	If Petitioner remains detained in Minnesota, Respondents shall release
Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but not later than 48 hours after entry of this
Order.
b. 	If Petitioner has been moved outside of Minnesota, as soon as
practicable, but not later than 72 hours after entry of this Order, Respondents shall return
Petitioner to Minnesota and then release Petitioner from custody.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 20, 2026, at 7:40 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
CASE 0:26-cv-01455-ECT-DTS Doc. 8 Filed 02/20/26 Page 9 of 9