Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
MOUSSA S.,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General;
KRISTI NOEM, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; TODD M. LYONS,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and DAVID
EASTERWOOD, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
Case No. 26‐CV‐1408 (PJS/ECW)
ORDER
Taylor J. Volkman, for petitioner.
David W. Fuller and Friedrich A.P. Siekert, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, for respondents.
This matter is before the Court on the federal respondents’ objection to the
February 24, 2026, Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge Elizabeth
Cowan Wright recommending that petitioner Moussa S.’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus be granted. 1 The Court has conducted a de novo review. See 28 U.S.C.
1Pursuant to this District’s policy in immigration cases, the Court identifies
petitioner only by his first name and last initial.
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§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Based on that review, the Court overrules the objection
and adopts the R&R.
The Court agrees with Judge Wright that United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) violated its own regulations—specifically, 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(2)—when it revoked Moussa’s release because the government has not
established that “changed circumstances” make Moussa’s removal significantly likely to
occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.2 ICE’s proffered “changed circumstance” is
that “ICE is seeking a travel document to effect [Moussa’s] expeditious removal to Ivory
Coast.” ECF No. 6‐3; see also ECF No. 13 at 2, 16–17.3 But although receiving a travel
document is a “changed circumstance” justifying revocation of release under
§ 241.13(i)(2), merely seeking a travel document—without more—is not. E.g., Yee S. v.
2The Court agrees with Judge Laura Provinzino that “[a]lthough [petitioner] has
the ultimate burden of proving entitlement to habeas relief, the regulations at issue in
this case place the burden on ICE to first establish changed circumstances that make
removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future . . . .” Roble v. Bondi,
803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 772 (D. Minn. 2025) (citations omitted).
3The notice of revocation listed two other reasons for the revocation: First, that
Moussa—a citizen of Ivory Coast—violated a condition of his release by failing “to
apply for a travel document to Vietnam,” and second, that “circumstances have
changed such that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” ECF No. 6‐3. The Court agrees with the R&R that the first
proffered reason is “clearly false,” see R&R at 8–9, and the second reason is plainly
insufficient to meet the government’s burden under § 241.13(i)(2), cf. Ban S. v. Bondi, No.
25‐CV‐4750 (PJS/ECW), ECF Nos. 9, 12 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2026) (adopting R&R’s
conclusion that the statement that ICE is “actively working . . . on removal logistics”
was insufficient to establish changed circumstances).
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Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 894, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2025) (finding that ICE failed to properly
determine changed circumstances where a notice stated that “ICE is in the process of
obtaining a travel document” but it did not explain “what the travel document is or
how long it will take to obtain”).
ICE Officer Angela Minner requested a travel document for Moussa on
February 23, 2026—11 days after Moussa’s arrest—and the request remains pending.
Minner Decl. ¶ 3. As explained in the R&R, a request for a travel document made after
re‐detention cannot establish changed circumstances because, under § 241.13(i)(2), ICE
must determine that changed circumstances exist before re‐detaining an alien. See R&R
at 6, 10–11 (citing cases in this District holding that the fact a travel document was
requested after re‐detention cannot retroactively establish changed circumstances).
In its objection, the government relies heavily on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001). But Zadvydas is irrelevant. As Judge Myong J. Joun explained:
This case is not about ICE’s authority to detain in the first
place upon an issuance of a final order of removal as in
Zadvydas. This case is about ICE’s authority to re‐detain
[petitioner] after he was issued a final order of removal,
detained, and subsequently released on an [Order of
Supervision].
Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D. Mass. 2025).
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Because the Court has found that ICE violated its own regulation in re‐detaining
Moussa, the Court need not decide whether ICE also violated the Constitution or a
federal statute (as alleged in Moussa’s petition).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Respondents’ objection [ECF No. 13] is OVERRULED.
2. 	The Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 12] is ADOPTED insofar as it
recommends granting the amended petition for habeas corpus based on
respondents’ violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).
3. 	Petitioner’s amended petition for habeas corpus [ECF No. 7] is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Court:
a. 	ORDERS respondents to release petitioner from custody in
accordance with the conditions previously imposed by 4:00 pm on
March 7, 2026. If petitioner is not in Minnesota, respondents must
first return petitioner to Minnesota.
5. 	The remainder of petitioner’s petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
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Dated: March 5, 2026 	/s/ Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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