Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Moussa S.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director
of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and David Easterwood,
Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-01408 (PJS/ECW)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Moussa S.’s1 Verified Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Amended Petition”) (Dkt. 7). This case has been
referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636 and Local Rule 72.1. For the following reasons, this Court recommends that the
Amended Petition be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner alleges, and Respondents do not dispute, the following facts. Petitioner
is twenty-four years old. (Dkt. 7 at 5.) Petitioner is a citizen of Ivory Coast who has
resided in the United States since March, 2021. (Id. at 1, 5.) An order of removal was
1 	This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in orders and report and recommendations in immigration matters.
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entered against Petitioner in September 2021. (Id. at 5.) While Petitioner was detained
pending removal, a Minnesota couple agreed to serve as his hosts and sponsors. (Dkt. 7-
1 ¶ 2.) Petitioner was released from ICE custody on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”)
on or about December 13, 2021. (Dkt. 7 at 5.) Petitioner then moved to Duluth to live
with the Minnesota couple and has become part of their family. (Dkt. 7-1 ¶ 3.) The
Minnesota couple were appointed as Petitioner’s guardians pursuant to the Minnesota
State Court At Risk Juvenile process. (Id. ¶ 5.)
In August 2022, Petitioner applied for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SJIS”)
and permanent residency. (Dkt. 7 at 5.) His SJIS application was granted on March 2,
2023, and he was granted four years of deferred action. (Id. at 6.) His permanent
residence application remained pending at that time. (Id.)
Since his release from ICE custody in 2021, Petitioner has complied with all terms
of his OSUP and has attended all ICE check-ins. (Id.) During this time, Petitioner has
learned English and obtained a high school diploma. (Id.) Petitioner has a valid work
permit. (Id.)
On February 12, 2026, at around 12:31 p.m., Petitioner appeared for a routine ICE
check-in, accompanied by the Minnesota couple and several friends. (Id. at 6.)
Approximately 60 to 90 minutes after Petitioner arrived, an ICE agent took Petitioner and
one member of the Minnesota couple to a “secured area,” where, despite being shown a
copy of the document granting Petitioner SIJS status and deferred action, an ICE agent
stated that Petitioner did not have “status” and would be detained. (Id. at 7-8.) At no
point prior to this detention did any ICE agent state that Petitioner’s OSUP was being
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revoked or provide any reason for his detention other than the fact that he did not have
“status.” (Id. at 8.)
After taking Petitioner into custody, Respondents completed a Notice of
Revocation of Release, digitally signed by DDO Scott V. Stricker at 3:24 p.m. on
February 12, 2026 and served on Petitioner at 3:55 p.m. on the same day. (Id. at 8-9; see
also Dkt. 6-3 (Notice of Revocation of Release).) The Notice stated that Petitioner’s
OSUP was revoked because:
• 	“You violated a condition of your release. Specifically, you: Failed to apply
for a travel document to Vietnam; ”
• 	“Circumstances have changed such that there is a significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future;” and
• 	“ICE is seeking a travel document to effect your expeditious removal to Ivory
Coast.”
(Dkt. 6-3 at 1-2.)
Respondents also filed an “Alien Informal Interview” summary authored by an
ICE Officer, stating that he interviewed Petitioner pursuant to 8 C. F. R. § 241.13(i) on
February 12, 2026. (Dkt. 6-3 at 3.) The interview summary states that Petitioner
requested to speak with his lawyer. (Id.) Petitioner was not provided with access to his
attorney. (Dkt. 7 at 9.)
Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this case on February 13,
2026. (Dkt. 1.) Later that day, Chief United States District Judge Patrick J. Schiltz
issued an Order requiring Respondents to answer the Petition by no later than February
16, 2026. (Dkt. 3 at 1.) The Order required Respondents’ answer to include, among
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other things, “[s]uch affidavits and exhibits as are needed to establish the lawfulness and
correct duration of Petitioner’s detention in light of the issues raised in the habeas
petition,” and “[w]hether the absence of a warrant preceding petitioner’s arrest
necessitates petitioner’s immediate release.” (Id. at 1-2.) The Order also enjoined
Respondents from removing Petitioner from the District of Minnesota until further order
of the Court. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner was permitted to file a reply to Respondent’s answer
by no later than February 18, 2026. (Id.)
Respondents filed their answer on February 16, 2026. (Dkt. 5.) On February 18,
2026, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, in light of new
information revealed in Respondent’s answer. (Dkt. 7.) The Court ordered Respondents
to file an answer to the Amended Petition (Dkt. 8), which Respondents did on February
23, 2026 (Dkts. 10, 11). Among other things, their response to the Amended Petition
included a Declaration by one of the lawyers for Respondents stating:
With respect to the reference to a travel document from Viet Nam in the
Notice of Revocation, attached as Exhibit C to my declaration dated February
16, 2026 filed herein, agency officials conveyed to me that was a mistake or
scrivener’s error. The Notice of Revocation should have referenced to
petitioner’s failure to cooperate to obtain a travel document from his native
country of the Ivory Coast, not Viet Nam.
(Dkt. 10 ¶ 6.) Counsel was not able to provide any declaration or other evidence
supporting this assertion when he filed this Declaration. (See id. ¶ 4.)
The response also included a Declaration of Deportation Officer Angela Minner
“based on a review of contents of the Plaintiff’s alien file, official records checks, and
information relayed to me by other officials.” (Dkt. 11 ¶ 1.) The Minner Declaration
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stated, among other things, that “[o]n February 22, 2026, ICE/ERO submitted a formal
travel document request packet to ERO Headquarters for review.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
The case is now ripe for decision.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1 at
5.) Under this provision, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to any person who
demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available
to every individual detained within the United States”) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2)). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus extends to immigration-related detention after a detention order
becomes final. Faysal N. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-04641 (JMB/DLM), 2026 WL 36066, at
*2 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2026).
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition, which does not challenge the
removal order but instead challenges the revocation of Petitioner’s supervised release and
the lawfulness of his re-detention. See Garrison G. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-172
(JMB/DJF), 2026 WL 157677, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026) (“Because Garrison G.
does not challenge the removal order but instead challenges the revocation of his
supervised release and his continued detention, the Court has jurisdiction to decide the
questions raised about the lawfulness of his current re-detention.”); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (“We conclude that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings
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remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-
period detention.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks relief on several grounds, including Respondents’ alleged
violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act and 8 C.F.R. § 241.013(i)(2)-(3) (Dkt. 7
¶¶ 86-89), violation of the Fifth Amendment on substantive and procedural grounds (id.
¶¶ 66-76), and violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (id. ¶¶ 77-85). Because the
Court finds ICE has violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.013 in re-detaining Petitioner, it does not
reach the alternative grounds. See Faysal N., 2026 WL 36066, at *3 n.3 (“Faysal N. also
asserts that his re-detention violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because the Court finds that ICE has violated its
own regulations in re-detaining Faysal N., such that his current detention is unlawful, the
Court does not reach these alternative arguments.” (citation omitted)).
As to his regulatory challenge, Petitioner argues ICE did not comply with the
requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, which governs the revocation of an order for
supervised release. (See Dkt. 7 ¶¶ 77-89.) This regulation provides, in relevant part, that
ICE “may revoke an alien’s release under this section and return the alien to custody if,
on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant
likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(2). This regulation also sets forth factors to consider in determining whether
removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, including: the
noncitizen’s efforts to comply with the removal order; the history of ICE’s efforts to
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remove individuals to the destination country or to third countries; the ongoing nature of
ICE’s efforts to remove the particular noncitizen and his assistance with those efforts; the
reasonably foreseeable results of those efforts; and the views of the Department of State
regarding the prospects for removal to the countries in question. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f).
The regulation further provides that:
Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of
his or her release. The Service will conduct an initial informal interview
promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an
opportunity 	to 	respond 	to 	the 	reasons 	for 	revocation 	stated 	in 	the
notification. The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or she
believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order of
supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any
contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the
facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
In general, a habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing that their detention
violates the law. See Copenhaver v. Bennett, 355 F.2d 417, 422 (8th Cir. 1966).
However, courts in this jurisdiction have concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) places
the burden on the government to establish that changed circumstances justify a non-
citizen’s re-detention. E.g., Garrison G. v. Bondi., 2026 WL 157677, at *3; Yee S. v.
Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 3d 894, 900 (D. Minn. 2025); Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766,
772 (D. Minn. 2025). As this Court previously found in Ban S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-
4750 (PJS/ECW) (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026), R. & R. adopted, 25-CV-4750 (PJS/ECW)
(D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2026)), the reasoning in those cases is persuasive, and the Court
therefore finds that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) requires ICE to show changed circumstances
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that justify revocation of supervised release. As one court has explained, this
requirement is consistent with the default rule that the burden falls on the party who
“generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should
be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.” See Roble, 803 F. Supp.
3d at 772 (quoting Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (quoting
McCormick on Evidence § 337 (5th ed. 1999))). As it is the government who seeks to
change the state of affairs by re-detaining Petitioner, it is the government who bear the
burden to establish the changed circumstances that justify re-detention. See id.
Several courts in this District have concluded that the government does not meet
its burden when it makes conclusory assertions of likelihood of removal. E.g., Ban S.,
No. 25-CV-4750, Dkt. 8 at *7 (concluding that the government had not met its burden
where “the only evidence of changed circumstances offered by Respondents is
Robinson’s statement that ‘ICE Headquarters and Removal Operations is actively
working with the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security on
removal logistics for Petitioner[’]”) (citation modified); Roble, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 773
(concluding that the government did not meet its burden when it “provided ‘scant
information’ about what ‘assistance’ it has requested from ICE headquarters for a third
country removal, and it has provided no information about the anticipated outcome of
requesting that assistance.”).
Here, Respondents have not established that Petitioner has violated any condition
of release. The statement in the Notice of Revocation of Release that Petitioner violated
a condition of his release because he “[f]ailed to apply for a travel document to return to
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Vietnam” is clearly false because Petitioner has no connection to Vietnam. (See Dkt. 6-3
at 1.) Neither can the Court accept Respondents’ assertion that the Notice “should have
referenced to petitioner’s failure to cooperate to obtain a travel document from his native
country of the Ivory Coast” as evidence that Petitioner in fact failed to do so. This
allegation was “conveyed” to counsel for Respondents by unnamed agency officials, but
no declaration from an individual with personal knowledge of those facts has been
submitted to the Court (see Dkt. 10 ¶ 6), nor have Respondents described how Petitioner
allegedly failed to cooperate. The Court notes that the Minner Declaration does not
mention any lack of cooperation by Petition with respect to obtaining a travel document.
Accordingly, the Court gives no weight to the unnamed agency officials who say the
Notice “should have referenced to [sic] petitioner’s failure to cooperate to obtain a travel
document from his native country of the Ivory Coast, not Viet Nam.” (Dkt. 10 ¶ 6.) The
Court finds that Respondents have not provided such “affidavits and exhibits as are
needed to establish the lawfulness and correct duration of petitioner’s detention in light of
the issues raised in the petition” (see Dkt. 3 at 1) insofar as they assert Petitioner violated
the OSUP.
As to changed circumstances, Respondents now claim that they revoked
Petitioner’s OSUP and took him into custody on February 12, 2026 “based on current
information from ERO Headquarters that there is a significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future for citizens of Ivory Coast with final orders of
removal.” (Dkt. 11 ¶ 6.) It is true that “the history of the Service’s efforts to remove
aliens to the country in question” and “the views of the Department of State regarding the
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prospects for removal of aliens to the country or countries in question” are relevant
factors as to whether there is a significant likelihood of removing a detained alien in the
reasonably foreseeable future, see 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f), but for the reasons explained
below, this conclusory and general assertion about “current information” as to “citizens
of Ivory Coast with final orders or removal” is insufficient to show changed
circumstances as to Petitioner himself. Moreover, given the “mistake or scrivener’s
error” in the Notice asserting that Petitioner failed to apply for a travel document to
return to Vietnam, it is unclear that DDO Strickner actually issued the Notice based on
any facts relevant to Petitioner, including the “current likelihood of removal to Ivory
Coast, when he signed the Notice (much less when Petitioner was detained). Indeed, the
Notice contains another false statement, as it asserts that “ICE is seeking a travel
document to effect [Petitioner’s] expeditious removal to Ivory Coast” when in fact ICE
did not seek a travel document until 10 days after DDO Strickner signed the Notice.
(Compare Dkt. 6-3 at 2, with Dkt. 11 ¶¶ 6-7 (first request for travel document submitted
on February 22, 2026).) Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Respondents
have not shown that when they detained Petitioner, they did so because they had
determined that there was a significant likelihood of removing Petitioner in the
reasonably foreseeable future.
The Court has also considered the evidence of changed circumstances that
Respondents requested and obtained after they detained Petitioner and concludes that
this evidence does not satisfy Respondent’s burden to justify Petitioner’s re-detention.
Respondents also state that they submitted a formal travel document request packet to
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ERO Headquarters for review on February 22, 2026, ten days after Petitioner’s detention.
(See Dkt. 11 ¶ 7.) On February 23, 2026, the request was forwarded to the Embassy of
Ivory Coast. (Id. ¶ 8.) According to the Minner Declaration, based on similar cases, ICE
anticipates that the travel document will be issued within 30 days. (Id. ¶ 9.) But as
several courts in this District have held, the fact that a travel document was requested
after a Petitioner was detained does not establish changed circumstances that justify
detention. E.g. Dusan C. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-00620 (JRT/ECW), 2026 WL 458128 at
*4 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2026), R. & R. adopted, 2026 WL 465534 (D. Minn. Feb. 18,
2026); Yee S., 2025 WL 2879479, at *4. The Court also notes that in some cases, the
issuance of a travel document after a petitioner’s re-detention is insufficient to meet
Respondents’ burden to establish changed circumstances. E.g., Vang v. Bondi, No. 26-
CV-1381 (JMG/DLM), at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026) (ordering release where
Respondents obtained a travel document after detaining Petitioner); Yeng X. v. Noem, No.
26-CV-1399 (JMG/ECW), at *2-3 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026) (same). All of these reasons
are sufficient to recommend granting the Petition.
While the Court does not address every possible basis for relief, the Court also
notes that Respondents have also failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3), which
requires that:
Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of
his or her release. The Service will conduct an initial informal interview
promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an
opportunity 	to 	respond 	to 	the 	reasons 	for 	revocation 	stated 	in 	the
notification. The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or she
believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order of
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supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any
contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the
facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). The Notice and interview provided to Petitioner in this case
were deficient because they did not identify the changed circumstances that supported the
revocation of his release. See Faysal, 2026 WL 36066, at *4 (finding notice deficient
where “[t]he Notice of Revocation of Release does not identify any ‘changed
circumstances’ or provide any explanation to support the conclusion that [the petitioner]
is significantly likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. In this notice,
ICE claims summarily that the agency had made a ‘determination that there are changed
circumstances in your case,’ but it includes no factual statements or explanation.”).
Indeed, the record is clear that Respondents had not even requested a travel document
when they served Petitioner with the Notice and interviewed him on February 12, 2026.
(See Dkt. 11 ¶ 7.) And the Notice fails to identify what circumstances have changed to
make removal significantly likely—including because the Notice did not even state the
“current information” relating to “citizens of Ivory Coast” described in the Minner
Declaration. (See id. ¶ 9.)
Courts in this District have ordered release when ICE violated its own regulations
regarding notice and an opportunity to respond even where it was possible that a
petitioner could be re-detained after the government complied with 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3). See Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 781-85 (D. Minn. 2025)
(overruling objections to recommendation for release because ICE did not comply with 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3); also ordering release because Respondents also failed to show
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removal was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future); see also Roble,
803 F. Supp. 3d at 771-72 (“Because ICE violated its own regulations when it detained
Roble without notifying him of the reasons why he was being detained, Roble is entitled
to habeas relief.”) (ordering release due to ICE’s failure to comply with 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3); also ordering release because Respondents also failed to show removal
was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future). Under § 241.13, “it is the
government’s burden to show a change in circumstance before revoking an order of
supervision and detaining a person indefinitely.” Vang, No. 26-CV-1381 (JMG/DLM), at
*5. As one District Judge put it, “The government detained the petitioner first, and asked
questions later. That’s not how this works.” Id. at 4. The Court likewise concludes that
Respondents’ failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) in this case is a basis for
habeas relief, namely, release.
In view of the Court’s finding that Respondents have unlawfully detained
Petitioner since February 12, 2026, the Court sets an expedited deadline for objections to
this Report and Recommendation. See D. Minn. LR 72.2(a)(1) (“A party may file and
serve objections to the order within 14 days after being served with a copy, unless the
court sets a different deadline.”) (emphasis added)). Any objections to this Report and
Recommendation are due February 27, 2026. Responses to objections are due March 2,
2026.
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IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Petitioner
Moussa S. (Dkt. 7) be GRANTED such that:
a. 	If Petitioner is being detained outside of Minnesota, Respondents
be ordered to transport Petitioner to Minnesota and release
Petitioner from custody immediately, where Petitioner’s release
in Minnesota must occur no later than 48 hours after the filing of
an Order adopting this Report and Recommendation.
b. 	If Petitioner is being detained in Minnesota, Respondents be
ordered to release Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable,
and no later than 48 hours from the filing of an Order adopting
this Report and Recommendation.
c. 	Given the weather conditions in Minnesota, Respondents be
ordered to coordinate with Petitioner’s counsel to ensure that
upon Petitioner’s release, they are not left outside in dangerous
cold. It is preferable to release Petitioner to counsel to ensure
humane treatment.
d. 	Respondents be ordered to release Petitioner with all personal
effects, including his driver’s license, passports, or immigration
documents, where such documents are not clipped, defaced, or
otherwise altered.
e. 	Respondents be enjoined from imposing any conditions on
Petitioner’s release other than the conditions in his preexisting
Order of Supervision.
f. 	Respondents be enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner unless and
until they comply with all requirements of 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3). If, after releasing Petitioner, Respondents believe
that they are prepared to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3),
they be required contact Petitioner’s counsel to schedule the
required interview and Petitioner be required to attend the
scheduled interview.
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g. 	If Respondents re-detain Petitioner after completing the required
process, Respondents be required to file an update with the Court
within 24 hours of re-detention. While this update need not
include the exact date and time of Petitioner’s removal flight, it
must identify the approximate time of Petitioner’s removal.
2. 	Petitioner Moussa S. be permitted to move separately within 30 days of
final judgment in this action to recover attorney’s fees and costs under
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
Dated: February 24, 2026 s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright
Elizabeth Cowan Wright
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. The Court modifies this deadline
such that objections are due on or before February 27, 2026. See D. Minn. LR
72.2(a)(1) (“A party may file and serve objections to the order within 14 days after being
served with a copy, unless the court sets a different deadline.”). Responses to objections
are due on or before March 2, 2026. All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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