Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jorge A.-G. and Orlando A.-R.,
Petitioners,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul Field
Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-1392 (ECT/DLM)
OPINION AND ORDER
Claire Glenn, Climate Defense Project, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioners Jorge A.-G. and
Orlando A.-R.
Denisha Devette Daughtry, DOJ-Civ, Washington, DC, and David W. Fuller, United States
Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd
M. Lyons, and David Easterwood.
Petitioners Jorge A.-G. and Orlando A.-R., father and son, are Mexican citizens who
“entered the United States more than twenty years ago, in 2004.” 	Pet. [ECF No. 1] at 4
¶¶ 1–3, 5. 	Orlando has a pending Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)
application, and Jorge has a pending U-visa application. Id. at 4 ¶ 4. Orlando and Jorge
“have never been subject to removal proceedings.” Id. On February 10, 2026, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested Jorge and Orlando in or near Austin,
Minnesota, as part of “Operation Metro Surge.” Id. at 4–5 ¶¶ 5, 8–9, 11. According to the
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Petition, “Respondents did not allege to have or produce any warrant justifying [Jorge and
Orlando’s] detention.” Id. at 5 ¶ 10. 1 It can be inferred from the Petition that Jorge and
Orlando are detained in Minnesota. See id. at 3–4 ¶¶ 7–8, 12 (stating that since their arrest
on February 10, Jorge and Orlando have been “indefinitely detained by Respondents,” who
include 	the 	Acting 	Director 	of 	ICE’s 	Field 	Office 	in 	Fort 	Snelling, 	Minnesota).
Respondents do not argue that Jorge and Orlando had been transferred outside of
Minnesota at the time of the Petition’s filing, nor do they argue that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over the Petition. See ECF No. 6.
Jorge and Orlando challenge their detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. at 4 ¶ 2.
They claim they have been wrongly classified as 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) detainees (whose
detention is mandatory) rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detainees (whose detention is
discretionary and who are entitled to a bond hearing). 	Pet. at 10–11 ¶¶ 26–28; see Jose
J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961–62 (D. Minn. 2025) (explaining legal
framework). According to Jorge and Orlando, that misclassification and denial of a bond
hearing violate their rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration
and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. 	See Pet. at 11–14 ¶¶ 29–45.
Jorge and Orlando seek immediate release in Minnesota without release conditions, and
with advance notice to counsel and return of their personal effects; issuance of an order
enjoining their transfer outside of the District of Minnesota during the pendency of their
1 	The existence of a warrant is the only disputed fact in Jorge and Orlando’s Petition,
as Respondents attached a copy of a warrant to their answer. See ECF No. 6 at 1; ECF No.
6-1. That warrant is discussed infra.
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Petition; that the Court retain jurisdiction over the matter to decide a future motion for an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs; and “any other and further relief that this Court may
deem just and proper.” See id. at 18–19.
Respondents assert that Jorge and Orlando are subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). ECF No. 6 at 1. Recognizing that Jorge and Orlando’s Petition “raises
legal and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court has decided,”
Respondents rely on their arguments in the appeal of Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-3248
(8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025). 	See ECF No. 6 at 1–2. 	This raises an issue of statutory
interpretation2 that courts in this District have repeatedly considered and rejected, and it
will be rejected here as well.
Jorge and Orlando have shown they have been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2)
rather than § 1226(a). 	As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants
“seeking admission,” and the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) and (c)); see Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn.
2025); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL
2802947, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---,
2 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Jorge and Orlando’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find
that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to
“the narrow question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1226 or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No.
25-cv-4455 (ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
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No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v.
Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741 (JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025),
appeal filed, No. 25-3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946
(NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem,
25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos
M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4264 (PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25,
2025). 	As of this writing, two federal courts of appeals have ruled on the question, one
reaching and one rejecting this conclusion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding that respondent was not likely to
prevail 	on 	the 	merits 	that 	petitioner 	was 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2)); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---, Nos. 25-20496, 25-40701, 2026
WL 323330, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (finding petitioner was subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2)). Jorge and Orlando have lived in the United States for more
than twenty years, Pet. at 4 ¶ 3, and I find their detention falls under § 1226(a) and not
§ 1225(b)(2).3
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v. 	Scott,
3 	Respondents do not argue that Jorge and Orlando are subject to mandatory detention
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), or that any other statutory scheme other than that raised in
the Petition would apply to Jorge and Orlando’s detention. See ECF No. 6.
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804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025), appeal filed (Nov. 6, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that
absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” Id.
(emphasis in original); accord Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025
WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me. Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025
WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F.
Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest
warrant is issued” and that “[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the
subsequent provisions giving the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the
arrested alien’ are likewise not triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir.
July 11, 2023).
Respondents have attached a purported arrest warrant to their answer, but the
attached warrant raises several concerns. 	(1) Respondents did not file a declaration
authenticating or describing the attached warrant—it was merely attached to Respondents’
answer, 	without 	including 	a 	citation 	to 	the 	attachment. 	See 	ECF 	Nos. 	6, 	6-1.
(2) Respondents’ answer states that “[o]n February 10, 2026, Petitioners were issued
Warrants for Arrest, Form I-200,” ECF No. 6 at 1 (emphasis added), but the only attached
warrant is for Jorge; it does not mention Orlando. 	See ECF No. 6-1. 	(3) The attached
warrant is dated February 10, 2026, the same day as Jorge’s arrest, but absent a time-stamp
or any explanatory declaration testimony, there is no indication whether the warrant was
issued prior to, or after, Jorge’s arrest. See id. (4) Respondents were ordered to include in
their answer “[s]uch affidavits and exhibits as are needed to establish the lawfulness and
correct duration of [Jorge and Orlando’s] detention in light of the issues raised in the
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Petition,” as well as “[w]hether the absence of a warrant preceding [Jorge and Orlando’s]
arrest necessitates [their] immediate release.” 	ECF No. 3 at 1–2. 	Respondents do not
dispute the Petition’s factual allegations about the arrest—namely, that “Respondents did
not allege to have or produce any warrant justifying [Jorge and Orlando’s] detention,” that
Respondents did not “appear to have any basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity,” and that “[Jorge and Orlando’s] detention appeared to be the result of
racial profiling.” Pet. ¶ 10. Respondents’ statement that “Petitioners were issued Warrants
for Arrest” does not reveal whether the attached warrant preceded Jorge’s arrest. See ECF
No. 6. Respondents make no legal argument about the attached warrant’s legal effects on
Jorge, much less how it could affect Orlando. See id. 	And Respondents do not argue that
any other legal or statutory basis existed for a warrantless arrest. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a) (addressing bases for warrantless arrests by immigration officers). 	On these
facts, the unauthenticated, unexplained warrant is insufficient to satisfy what I understand
to be the requirements of § 1226(a).
“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Vedat C. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 9 (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a
valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through
further proceedings.” 	Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 264 (“Since the
Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a), [petitioners’]
immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (same); Chiliquinga
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Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see also Munaf, 553 U.S.
at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. The typical
remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation modified)).4
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioners Jorge A.-G. and Orlando A.-R.’s Verified
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioners 	are 	not 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), and are instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to the discretionary
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioners from custody as follows:
a. 	If Petitioners remain detained in Minnesota, Respondents shall release
Petitioners from custody as soon as practicable, but not later than 48 hours after entry of
this Order.
b. 	If Petitioners have been moved outside of Minnesota, as soon as
practicable, but not later than 72 hours after entry of this Order, Respondents shall return
Petitioners to Minnesota and then release Petitioners from custody.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 17, 2026, at 12:00 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
4 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Jorge and Orlando’s favor
makes it unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
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